CENTRAL ASIA'S AUTOCRATS: MODEL FOR IRAQ'S TRANSITION?

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06772448
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2019
• Case Number: F-2019-00015
• Publication Date: October 29, 2002

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Central Asia's Autocrats: Model for Iraq's Transition?
A post-Saddam regime confronting Imps legacy of authoritarianism, deep
soda! and Mk* division; and a shattered econonw will need to win
legitimacy by rebuilding the economy and imporwing Wag conditions. Central
Asian leaders have already heed many such issues in Me peat-Sesfet or.. Their
experience suggest* a strong Central Asian elyie leader who eon maintain
stability while sustaining Ltd influence Hwy provkle the most realistic model for
bonsitket itOM dkeitaliiiP to a stable and democratic order.
Given the broad interest in post-Sriddan scenarios of governance in Iraq, we offer a
speculative assessment on how Central Asia might provide a model for thinking about an
Iraqi that Is stable and receptive to US influence.
Through A Central Asian Prism
We see similarities between Iraq and the post-Soviet Muslim states Cl Central Asia and
Azerbaijan, which to us suggest that the last decade Cl Central Asian state building may
hold lessens for Iraq after Saddam ,
'suddenness of change. As with breakup of the USSR, polidcal change in Iraq is
likely to come abruptly, with little or no internal preparation for a new order. And
Impending changes In Iraq, like in Central Asia, will be provoked by external factors.
� Weak national colsaidart. Iraq arid the Soviet Muslim states were created by 201Th
century cdonlai occupiers and ladc any deep sense of nationhood or historical
traditions as a state. Borders a'e artiftclal and cut aaoss ethnic and tribal ineS.
Identity is defined more by allegiance to ethnic groups, dens, and tribes than to the
state. Rival groups�in Iraq, the Kurds, Shia, and Sunni�have long histories of
conflict and mistrust.
� Authoritarian legacy. Iraq and the Central Asian successor states have long
traditions Cl eutocratic leadership and fon elemerits of "dvil society" on which to
build denexracy. Only strong leaders have overcome deep divisions wittdn these
regions and prevented dva war. As with the Communist system, stifling Bath Party
ideology leaves no room for alternatives, and opposition is ruthlessly suppressed.
� Military &Bandon. Like the post-Soviet Muslim States, Iraq In defeat will have a
weakened military that will be an insuffident prop for an authoritarian leader. Uke
the Central Asians, a new Iraqi leader will need to rely on other sources of poser.
� Secular Muslims. The populations of both Iraq and Central Asia are not deeply
religious. Neither have shown much receptivity to Islamic extremism. Muslim culture
Is more important than the Islamic religiat
� Piddng winners. Like several of the post-Soviet gates--Katakhstan, Azerbaijan,
and Turkmenistan�Iraq wal be able to draw on energy wealth to reconstruct a
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political and economic order. The new regime in Baghdad similar have to make tough
political choices over distribution of state-owned resources.
� Elite continuity. The old Communist elites brgely stayed on in positions of power
following the collapse of the USSR. Disruptions to the government and bureaucrades
were minimal. Were the current Iraqi ruling group to depose Saddam In a cow, the
US might face an entrenched eke egiectrng, in reward, to be masters of the new
order
We also see two significant differences between apost-Saddarn Iraq and the Central Asian
states. These differences might give the US greater scope to drawn on Central Asia's
experience in promoting a more effective transition to partidpatoty forms of government in
Iraq.
� Favorable geopolitical orientation. Iraq is much more a part of the Paab world
than are the Central Asian states, which looked to the US to offset Russian
domination. No comparable peer will rival the US In Iraq's neighborhood, although
Iraq's need for legkimacy among Arab states will require Baghdad to manage its
affairs with little ostensible US string-pulling once Saddam Is gone.
� Stabilising foreign presence. The likely presence of US forces In Iraq will be seen
as both a anal factor giving a new nsgime stability and in tilting the politics! playing
field. While Russian fames remained in Central Asia�and still do in some cases�they
have not played a significant role In domestic panics.
The Virtues of "Central Asian Auteaacr
To us, the striking similarities between Iraq and Oilltral Asie suggest the post-Soviet
Muslim states as possible models for Iraq. Without a strong leader, Iraq �riven* deep
regional divisions and a history of bitter hatreds�might prove ungovernable and disposed
to duos, with major nsks for US ocapatIon forms and impairment to any plans for
movement toward more temperate democratic (tem
Given such rislcs, a Central Asian style past-Seddam regime might hold key advantages for
the US:
� stability. Only a strong leader Is likely to be able to manage the sharp differences
arming key Iraqi ethnic groups�for example, preventing the Kurds from seceding.
Such disputes could degenerate into civa war and force the US military to put forces
between competing groups.
� Prang:UMW. A Wong leader bodes to be a more rellabte Interlocutor in Baghdad.
one who can make decisions and get them implemented�and do so withal seeming
too obviously a US appendage.
� Western orientation. A Central Asian style regime is likely to be friendly toward the
US. While It would still tend to side with the Arab world on issues IN Israel, It might
share Western�and Central Asian�concerns about the spread of radical Islam and
cooperate willingly with the US to dismantle WMD�as in Kazakhstan�and prevent
Iraq from being used as a safe haven for al-Qa' ida
Absent a strong military, a post-Saddam regime would need to rely on other means to gain
legitimacy and hold onto power. Here too, there are lessons from the Central Asians.
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� 011 for legitimacy. As in the Caspian energy states, post-Soddain Iraq will to rely on
oil revenue to build suppoit. By controlling the distribution of revenue, the regime can
visibly improve living conditions to win legitimacy and use oil wealth as a lever in �
dealing with elites critical for stability and future'Politkal develoPmerit-
- Lifting the pelt. A new regime wIN also gain legitimacy by ending the repressive
methods used by Saddam�an easy piece in aimpariscin� even for an authoritarian
regime�thus giving most of the population a greater sense of personal security.
� patronage neterodra. As In the post-Soviet states, an Iraqi strongman could build
patronage networks dependent on him, using his paver of appointment and removal
to key positions as well as cordrd over ell money. This might strengthen the ability of
a US-backed leader to irnplement sensible polides without having a big visible US stick
waving In his face.
� Media. An autocratic government Milt marshal its media to promote a post-Saddam
domestic agenda but also to counter arei-US media In other parts of the Arab world.
Learning Prom Central Asian Pastel=
The experience of Central Asian success** states also points to areas where a post-Saddam
Iraq and the US might hasten democratic transition by evading mistakes.
. Propeity. Corruption in the distribution of dIsblbudon of Soviet property got out of
control, with new leaders scrambling to enrich themselves. In Iraq, such risks might
be reduced by having a neutral board (supervised by the US) oversee the proms.
. Oil wealth. Instead of welching a small circle. Iraq's oil vrealth might be used to give
a wide rage of stakeholders share in the new regime. A well thought out plan for the
use of dl revenue would help Iraq avoid Centel Asian Problems, where ether
economic sectors suffered as a result of a skewed dependence on oil wealth. A post-
Saddam petroleum board under US oversight might help acteeve this goal.
� Ethnic relations. One of the biggest dialienges for the regime Mil be promoung
good relations among the Sunni; Kurds, and Shia. Kazakhstan. which has effectively
managed the competing Interests of Kazaldis and Russians by giving them both a
stake in the Post-Soviet Polity, could be a positive earn*.
� Building democracy. While Strong leadership has helped build stability In Central
Asia, the suppression of alternative ideas has led to support far ektfebe views, such
as the Islamic Movement of Uzbddstart. Democracy would have a better chanced
emerging if Central Asian excesses�like the suppression ef opposi.the extension
of leaders terms beyond the constitutional emits�are avoided.
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