THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06772392
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
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Information as of 1200
7 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
The Lang ye Special Forces camp, a scant five
miles from Khe Sanh, has fallen to North Vietnamese
Army units spearheaded by tanks. Communist forces
remain entrenched in the Cholon section of Saigon,
and the enemy position in the city of Da Lat is
strong. Scattered clashes have been reported through-
out the country.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Lang Vei Special Forces camp has fallen (Paras. 1-3).
The situation elsewhere in .I Corps is described
(Paras. 4-7). Except for heavy, pressure at Kontum
and Da Lat, the situation in II Corps is relatively
quiet (Paras. 8-10). The situation in III Corps
is good although security in Saigon itself remains
unstable (Paras. 11-13). Can Tho city was the scene
of the only significant enemy action in IV Corps
(Para. 14). The status of Route 4 is reported
(Para. 15).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
A number of influential personalities seem to be
coming around to the view that the Viet Cong offen-
sive will increase the people's support for the gov-
ernment, provided the government properly exploits
present anti-Communist sentiment (Paras.1-8). Many
senators are criticizing the military leadership,
and their attitude prevented passage of a resolution
worded to express support for thd government (Paras.
9-10). The food situation in Saigon is improving,
and prices are coming down (Para. 11).
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III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
Unprecedented activity on the part of North Viet-
namese bombers and transport aircraft during the
past week suggests that Hanoi will employ its
limited air power in some way to support the cur-
rent Communist offensive in South Vietnam (Paras.
1-9).
IV, Other Communist Military. Developments:
There, is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments:. Inter-
rogation of captured Viet Cong-whopartIcipated.in
the recent attacks on major cities indicates some
of their pre-offensive indoctrination took the
same line the Communists are now peddling in their
propaganda (Paras.-1-7). Vietnamese Communist
diplomats speaking in Pyongyang have linked the
Pueblo incident with the Vietnam conflict (Paras.
Vietnamese Communist spokesmen are under-
scoring their contention that the first moves to
end the war must come from the US (Paras. 10-11).
Communist propaganda is now stressing that their
military offensive'in South Vietnam may not neces-
sarily be short lived (Paras. 12-13).
. VI. Other Major Aspects: Some of the. Commu-
nists.who-attacked-Saigon.were apparently trained
in Cambodia, according to prisoner interrogations
(Paras. 1-3), Truck deliveries.to North Vietnam
during the past three months are reported (Paras..
4-5).
Note: Because of a disruption in field reporting
from MACV the Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle
Statistics will not be published on schedule. They
will appear when available.
7 February 1968
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Lang Vei Special Forces camp, five miles
from Khe Sanh, has fallen to North Vietnamese Army
units spearheaded by tanks. The enemy position in
Da Lat appears stronger than previously reported,
and Communist units hold several key strongpoints.
In Saigon, little activity has been reported, as
South Vietnamese forces have not pushed against the
Communist forces entrenched in Cholon. Sporadic
firing, primarily from isolated Communist detach-
ments, continues in a number of other, urban areas.
Allied forces have reported a series of other
armed clashes throughout the country.
I Corps
2. On the morning of 7 February, enemy forces,
supported by at least nine PT-76 tanks, overran the
Lang Vei Special Forces camp. Latest reports in-
dicate that about one enemy company controls the
camp. An allied reaction force on 7 February re-
ported rescuing 14 of the 20 US Special Forces
advisers and approximately 70-100 of the 450
indigenous forces originally in the camp. The
attack against Lang Vei was coordinated with a
mortar and artillery barrage against the main
Khe Sanh combat base and a ground probe against
Hill 861. On 7 February intermittent fire was
reported to be continuing against US positions
in the Khe Sanh area.
3. MACV has reported that an estimated
6,000 refugees from the Lang Vei area have moved
to a position about one quarter of a mile from
Khe Sanh.- This presents a serious tactical
problem for Khe Sanh and efforts are being made
to deter the refugees from moving any closer.
7 February 1968
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4. On 5 February radio stations serving the
forward headquarters of the Communist Thua-Thien-
Hue Military Region and the headquarters of the 6th
Regiment were located in the immediate vicinity of
Hue city. A prisoner captured during the fighting
in the city has stated that the Hue municipal unit
and the 800th battalion, 6th Regiment, had the mis-
sion of conducting a three-day attack against the
MACV compound. If allied resistance was heavy, the
attack, according to the prisoner, would continue
for seven days, and if the Communist units were re-
inforced, they would maintain the pressure for 15
days. The prisoner claims that the municipal unit
and 800th battalion consist largely of regroupees
or local Viet Cong, lending credence to some assump-
tions that most of the recent attacks in I Corps, and
elsewhere, were primarily conducted by Viet Cong
units, and that by and large few North Vietnamese
Army units have been committed.
5. An after-action report/
concerning the attack on Quang Ngai city
indicates that elements of every combat effective
force in the province were used in the attack. Cap-
tured documents and prisoners have identified eight
sapper/infantry, battalions and 12 local force com-
panies as having participated in the assault.
6. Weapons captured during the attack indicate
that the enemy was well equipped. The RPG-7 rocket
launcher was employed for the first time in Quang
Ngai. In addition, US advisers report that much of
the enemy's ammunition was new. Sapper munitions,
such as satchel charges and bangalore torpedoes were
well made, suggesting that they came from an arms
factory and were probably not homemade.
7. The Vietnamese estimate that the total strength
of the enemy force attacking Quang Ngai city was
around 3,600. Enemy killed, according to Vietnamese
and advisory body counts, exceeded 1,200. Included
in the enemy losses were several high-ranking officers,
7 February 1968
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such as the 48th battalion commander and two of
the battalion's subordinate company commanders.
II Corps
8. Except for continuing heavy pressure by
Communist forces against the provincial capitals of
Kontum city and Da Lat, the military situation in
II Corps was relatively quiet.
9. Heavy contact between US forces and prob-
able elements of the North Vietnamese Army 66th
Regiment apparently continues northeast of Kontum
city. The heavily damaged city is bracing for an
epidemic of plague and cholera. There are also
reports that the Vietnamese 24th Sector commander,
responsible for the defense of Kontum, �has been
relieved for incompetence.
10. In Tuyen Duc Province, an estimated 1,500-
man Viet Cong force reportedly remains entrenched
within the Da Lat city limits.
III Corps
11. While the provincial capitals and district
towns in III Corps are under allied control, security
in Saigon remains unstable. The situation is clearly
at its worse on the southwestern side of the city;
it appears as though the Viet Cong are trying to
isolate the Cholon section from the rest of the city.
On 6 February 16 allied soldiers and 120 Communists
were reported killed in a battle near Tan Son Nhut
Air. Base northeaa-t of Saigon.
12. Military activity elsewhere in the III Corps
area on 6-7 February centered in Hau Nghia Province.
In three engagements there on 6 February, 56 Viet
Cong were killed compared to allied losses of 51
killed and 28 wounded.
February 1968
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13. Interrogation of a prisoner captured on
4 February indicates that the 5th Viet Cong Divi-
sion--active in the Bien Hoa area--has a radio in-
tercept capability and heavy .weapons support organic
to the.division. The prisoner stated that his unit
provided the division with a radio intercept and a
Cryptpanalysis capability-. It has cryptographers
proficient- in the English language. By utilizing
these capabilities, the prisoner claimed that divi-
sion elements recently were able to avoid at least
one B-52 strike and to thwart an allied ground at-
tack. The source also stated that the 5th Division
had a "light" artillery regiment providing it with
140-Mm. rocket support. The prisoner claims to
have heard that the division possesses a weapon
larger than the 140-mm. rocket, but he was unable.
to provide any details.
IV Corps
14. The only significant activity reported on
5-6 February was a series of clashes in and around
Can Tho city. The Communists apparently have been
driven out of the Can Tho university buildings in
which they had barricaded themselves.
Status of Highway 4
15. On 5 February Highway 4, the strategic
route linking Saigon with the delta provinces, was
reported impassable due to numerous interdictions
in Dinh Tuong, Vinh Long, Phong Dinh, and Ba Xuyen
provinces. The nine miles of this highway which
traverse An Xuyen were reported clear, but the status
of the road in Bac Lieu is unknown.
7 February 1968
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. An increasing number of influential personali-
ties seem to be coming around to the view that the Com-
munist offensive has not only hurt the Viet Cong image
in the eyes of the people but will also serve to in-
crease support for the government. They say, however,
that the degree of popular backing which the govern-
ment can expect will depend on the government's ability
to provide for the people and mobilize them for the
anti-Communist fight.
2. Tran Quoc Buu, president of the Vietnamese
Confederation of Labor, who took a pessimistic view
early in the crisis, told an embassy officer on 6 Feb-
ruary that he believes many people previously "neutral"
have now swung to support of the government. This opin-
ion was concurred in by Vo Van Tai, secretary general
of the confederation's Saigon Council. Tai, who is
still scheduled to be tried for his part in the recent
labor disputes, had previously issued a statement on
behalf of his council voicing full support for the
government in the crisis.
3. Buu told the embassy officer that the regime
now has a perfect opportunity to capitalize on anti-Com-
munist sentiment, but should not use its own resources
exclusively to mobilize the population. The government
would do better, he feels, to encourage the direct par-
ticipation of leading nongovernment personalities.
Buu's own effort to or-
ganize his confederation affiliates to assist the govern-
ment are being encouraged by several cabinet members.
4. Oppositionist Lower House deputy Ly Quy Chung
expressed similar views in a recent conversation with
an embassy officer. Chung voiced optimism at the lack
of popular response to the Viet Cong and, like Buu,
views the present situation as a good opportunity for
the government to broaden its base of popular support
by calling on the assistance of various prestigious
figures. Chung said that the Lower House will con-
tinue to support the government's efforts in the
current crisis, as long as no unconstitutional steps
are taken.
7 February 1968
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5. Phan Khac Suu, an oppositionist and de-
feated presidential candidate, was taken into pro-
tective police custody on 6 February because of a
Viet Cong prisoner's allegation that Suu would be
kidnapped. Suu has expressed his eagerness to
help the government
he planned to confer with other political leaders
and then offer his �services to the government and
his willingness to work with anyofficial or or-
ganization.
6. Although Suu's remarks were made before
the police took him into custody, there is little
reason to believe that his attitude has changed.
His ability to carry through with his plans will,
of course, be hampered if he remains in custody.
7. These indications of a willingness to
join forces with the government from persons
who, like Suu and Chung, are known oppositionists
or, like Tai, 'have a grudge against the govern-
ment, are encouraging signs. All of these indi-
viduals can probably command a considerable follow-
ing, �and their influence should be useful �in com-
mitting more of the public to the anti-Communist
effort.
8. As for the people themselves, a number of
reports indicate that morale in' many.areas'is on
the upswing. Some confusion still exists, un-
founded:xtMors still find currency, and there con
tinues.to.be criticism of the, government, but
for the most part, observers in Saigon report,
.anti-Communist sentiment is-growing.. This is. true,
despite the fact that people in some localities
view the Viet Cong offensive as having resulted
in a psychological victory .for the Communists.
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Upper House Dissent
9. Despite these encouraging signs, there con-
tinue to be serious expressions of dissent from the
Upper House. During a heated session on 6 February,
several senators severely criticized the government,
and particularly the military leadership. They
charged that, although the security services had had
prior warning of impending Viet Cong attacks, no
steps were taken to prevent them. One senator called
the military commanders incompetent and irresponsible,
saying that "a sense of decency should compel them
to resign."
10. As a result, the Upper House was unable to
reach agreement on the wording of a resolution to
voice support for the government. The question was
deferred until the 7 February session, when a resolu-
tion was finally drafted without any, explicit mention
of backing for the government. The communique de-
nounces the Viet Cong, expresses gratitude to Viet-
namese soldiers--but not military commanders--and
to allied forces. It also urges creation of an
armed peoples' self-defense force. Antigovernment
sentiment was somewhat, muted in the second session,
but more criticism can probably be expected in the
future.
Food in Saigon
11. The food situation in Saigon is apparently
not as serious as it first appeared early in the
crisis. On 1 and 2 February food stocks available
in the markets were very limited and prices skyrocketed
to three and four times the normal price in many in-
stances. By 3 February, however, prices began to came
down and on the 5th the markets carried an almost com-
plete stock of foodstuffs, including meat, fish, poul-
try, and vegetables. Food vendors reported that some
fresh products were arriving from areas close to Saigon.
Stocks of rice, which are stored in warehouses in the
Saigon-Cholon area, were held up for a time because of
insecure conditions in Cholon, but on 6 February the
government began to move quantities of rice out to the
public in some parts of the city and planned greater
distribution for succeeding days.
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AN-2 Activity
6: The southward deployment. of North Vietnam's
AN-2 forde.may. also have been complicated by weather
conditions-or tactical.considerations.-
about seven AN-2s did depart Hanoi/
Gia Lam in the late afternoon of 7 February (Hanoi
time) and flew, at least 50 miles south of Vinh.
7.
shortly thereafter these planes flew tartner
south and attempted to land--possibly at an "inactive"
airstrip at Tchepone, Laos, which is located about
35 miles west of the Khe Sanh area.
the AN-2s ran
into bad weather, and were forced to abort their
mission in this region.
8. /
/five AN-2s did fly
north from the southern section of the.country in
the. earlyevening hours of 7 February (Hanoi time).
By about 2200 hours three of these aircraft had
landed at ,Gia Lam Airfield and .6-rie'at Vinh. It is
'still not. clear whether-the AN-2s'were involved
in a transport or an attack mission.'
9., Meanwhile, North Vietnamese air defense
nets continued to carry warnings.of B-52 operations
in the-vicinity.of-the Demilitarized Zone on 3 Feb-
ruary; The steady. bombardment of Communist posi-
tions ..by these' oombers makes them an important
target. for North Vietnamese surface-to-air missile
Units; which are known to be in.the area, or for
MIG-21s based near Hanoi:
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Interrogation of captured Viet Cong who took
part in the recent attacks indicates some of their
pre-offensive indoctrination took the same line the
Communists are now peddling in their propaganda. These
prisoners assert that the Communists hoped the Tet
military offensive would attract dramatic popular
support, particularly in urban areas. They say that
the end product was to be a coalition of the Libera-
tion Front with new "front" groups--a coalition which
would take the form of a new national "administration"
or "government."
2. A group of officers captured at Nha Trang
claim to be especially informed on Communist political
intentions and that these intentions were embodied in
North Vietnam's Communist Party Resolution No. 13.
Although there have been many references to this
policy paper dating back to the spring of 1967, de-
tails are sketchy. One of the Nha Trang prisoners
claims that the main purpose of the military offensive
was to establish a significant Communist presence in
important cities in an effort to strengthen the hand
of the Liberation Front in negotiations with the US.
The actual technique used was to establish other
"fronts" composed of groups or individuals with a
record of disagreement or disaffection with the Saigon
government. The Liberation Front, in alliance with
these new "fronts," planned to form a new national
government for South Vietnam which could negotiate
directly with the US for withdrawal of all foreign
troops.
3. Many of the prisoners claim to have no knowledge
of any long-range political objectives in the current
Tet offensive. Others, however, like the Nha Trang
group, claim that their mission, was primarily a prop-
aganda one. One man says he was under instructions to
organize the kind of popular "opposition" groups which
Hanoi and Liberation Radio have claimed were springing
up all over South Vietnam. He reports that part of
the plan at Nha Trang was to capture the local radio
station so that the Communists could use it to generate
a general uprising among the people. The existing
government administrative structure was to be won
over or destroyed.
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