THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 21

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06772390
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772390
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
7 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in South Vietnam No. 21
(As of 12:30 P.M. EST)
There has been no basic change in the situa-
tion since our report of 7:00 A.M. EST. Following
is a roundup of the more significant developments
noted from field reports.
I Corps
1. Late reports clearly indicate that fighting
diminished at the Lang Vei Special Forces Camp dur-
ing 7 February.' However, the status of the installa-
tion and its garrison remain unclear.
2. Thirty wounded personnel, including 16 US,
have been evacuated from the area, but no additional
friendly or enemy casualty figures are available.
A Special Forces reaction force was reportedly en
route to Lang Vei during the late afternoon of the
7th.
3. The armored vehicles which supported the
estimated company-size assault at Lang Vei have been
identified through aerial photography as PT-76
amphibious tanks. This Soviet-built vehicle can
float and move through inland waterways. However,
it is lightly armored and armed only with a 76-mm.
gun and one light machinegun. Of the nine PT-76's
photographed at Lang Vei, five were destroyed or
disabled.
4. The exact origin of the PT-76's is not known,
but they may have come from elements of a North Viet-
namese armored regiment possibly now located in the
Vinh Linh area of southern North Vietnam.
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5. There have been no reports of significant
activity at Khe Sanh or elsewhere along the DMZ
since the 7:00 A.M. Situation Report.
6. Press reports from Hue indicate slow pro-
gress continues in block-by-block fighting.
II Corps
7. Except for continuing heavy pressure by
Communist forces against the provincial capitals of
Kontum City and Dalat, the military situation in the
western highlands and coastal provinces of II Corps
remains relatively quiet.
8. The heavy contact between US forces and ele-
ments of the NVA 1st Division's 66th Regiment just
northeast of Kontum City apparently continues, but
battle results are still sketchy. Meanwhile, the
heavily damaged city of Kontum is bracing for a pos-
sible epidemic of plague and cholera. There are also
reports that the commander of the ARVN 24th Sector
Tactical Zone, which has responsibility for the de-
fense of Kontum, has been relieved for incompetence
and malfeasance.
9. Meanwhile, in Tuyen Duc Province, an esti-
mated 1,500-man Viet Cong force apparently remains
entrenched within the city limits of Dalat. A North
Vietnamese Army prisoner captured in the recent fight-
ing at the one-time mountain resort has stated under
interrogation that the Communist intention is to
capture Dalat city and hold it for two months. He
further claims that Viet Cong battalions presently
en route to Dalat have been ordered to break up into
company-sized units and to use propaganda among the
population to get them to rally to the enemy cause.
10. While presently under tenuous allied con-
trol, the provincial capitals of Ban Me Thuot and
Nha Trang are bracing for a possible new round of
attacks. Elments of B-3 Fronts 33rd and 95 "B" Regi-
ments are said-to be threatening Ban-Me Thuot, while
elements of the 5th NVA Division's 18."B" Regiment
are reportedly massing for an attack in a mountain
range west of Nha,Trang. The relativply unscathed
Phu Bon provincial capital of Cheo Reo also antici-
pates an attack by enemy forces, some of which
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may be withdrawing westward to Cambodia from recent
major attacks on urban coastal centers.
Saigon
11. No clearcut change in the situation in
Saigon has emerged in the reporting from the area
during the past 24 hours. 'Security, however, is
clearly the worst from all reports on the south-
western side of the city. Most indications of VC
movement and activity have come from the race track
area in that sector and from the 5th precinct to
the south.
North Vietnam Air
13. Hanoi's transfer of six IL-28s from their
reserve base at Yunnani strengthens the belief that
North Vietnam will undertake significant air opera-
tions against friendly forces in the near future.
It would be to Hanoi's advantage to employ these
strike aircraft before they can be caught by a US
raid on Phuc Yen. However, adverse weather or some
hold-up in the tactical situation in South Vietnam
may have caused a delay.
14. Targets in northern South Vietnam still
appear to be the most likely objectives of any IL-28
operations, but it is conceivable that they could
be used in diversionary attacks against targets in
Laos or US naval forces in the Gulf of Tonkin.
15. The southward deployment of North Vietnam's
AN-2 force may also have been complicated by weather
conditions or tactical considerations
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seven AN-2s did depart Hanoi/Gia Lam 3.3(h)(2)
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in the late afternoon of 7 February (Hanoi time) and
flew at least 50 miles south of Vinh.
16. Additional unconfirmed reports indicate
that shortly thereafter these planes attempted to
fly further south--possibly to an "inactive" air-
strip at Tchepone, Laos, which is located about 35
miles west of the Khe Sanh area.
the AN-2s ran into
abort an attempted
weather
in this
and were forced to
region.
at least five AN-2s did fly
vicinity of Dong Hoi.in southern North
that by 2200 (Hanoi time) three of the
landed at Hanoi/Gia Lam.
bad �
landing
north from the
Vietnam and
planes had
Political Developments
17. Vietnamese Communist propaganda is stressing
that the present military offensive will not neces-
sarily be of short duration, and that difficult days
for the allies are still ahead.
18. Earlier appeals seem to characterize the
fighting as "urgent" and stressed the immediate ob-
jectives, whereas Front and Hanoi statements in re-
cent days have frequently predicted that the fighting
would become fiercer and fiercer, but that greater
victories are yet to come. The AFP correspondent in
Hanoi, whose material is censored through and sometimes
inspired by the North Vietnamese, reports he was told
that the present fighting is only the beginning of a
"new phase" of the struggle and that there will be a
"second phase" to prevent the allies from recoverig
from the first blow.
19. In the absence of any genuine popular up-
rising, the Communists have probably found it neces-
sary to bolster Viet Cong morale in some quarters by
stressing that the fighting must continue in order
to nail down the partial successes achieved in the
initial Tet thrust. Such propaganda is also designed
to encourage greater uncertainty and fear among the
already shaken populace and to magnify and prolong the
Communist threat.
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