SPORT REPORT ON THE CURRENT VIET CONG STRATEGY

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06772389
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

.4"
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772389
SEGRI
OCI No. 1195/68
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Spot Report on the Current Viet Cong Strategy
1. More detailed and comprehensive reporting
based on prisoner interrogations is beginning to come
in concerning the strategy and objectives of the
Communists in their mass attacks on urban areas.
EO
13526
3.5(c))(2)
EO
913526
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
2. One report is based on statements by sev-
eral medium level political and military cadre from
the city area in Province. The 3.3(h)(2)
burden of their testimony is that the enemy had
plans--in this area at least--for following up either
a success or failure in the assaults. If complete
success had been achieved and if the cities were
held against government reaction, the VC would have
attempted to organize a new front apparatus whose
main objective would have been to enlist popular
support in favor of the overthrow of the Thieu re-
gime and the withdrawal of the Americans from South
Vietnam.
3. If the attackers failed to hold the cities--
and it does not appear that very many of them con-
fidently expected to do so--they were to withdraw to
previously assigned rendezvous points in the country-
side to await new orders.
4. It does not appear that the attackers at
least in the area were promised that a
major second wave assault would be launched if the
first one failed. Most prisoners stated they had
no orders beyond withdrawal to base points if the
attacks failed.
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772389
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
.ev 75e9/
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772389
5. the enemy high com-
mand apparently saw the possibility that their assault
would be repulsed in short order. They appear to
have chosen the weakest elements of the NVA divi-
sion in the local areatosupport the assault, holding
the others in reserve.
6. Thus far no concrete evidence has been de-
veloped to indicate that a second major attack is
now planned. The enemy clearly retains the capa-
bility to do so in this area, however, according to
local observers. A new attack would be hampered by
loss of the element of surprise and probably by loss
of part of the covert VC apparatus which existed in
prior to 30 January.
7. As in other areas of South Vietnam, the
chances for a new, major assault will probably depend
primarily on the Communist assessment of the need for
it and its chances for success. Most of the prisoners
expected in any case, that thecity would be subjected
to continuing harassment and small scale ground
probes.
2 -
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06772389
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)