INFORMATION FROM PRISONERS AND DOCUMENTS WHICH INDICATE POSSIBLE VC/NVA INTENTIONS DURING THE TET PERIOD

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06766069
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766069
3 February 1968
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Information From Prisoners and Documents Which Indicate Possible
VC/NVA Intentions During the Tet Period
1. The following information is based on Central Intelligence Agency
reporting from the field as it has been received over the past four days and is, for
the most part, uncollated and unevaluated information. This information should
not be construed to be all the information that will become available to Agency
reporters when the situation settles enough to permit a more favorable reporting
atmosphere. The information received so far, including a few sketchy prisoner of
war interrogations, permits some tentative generalizations concerning what the
enemy hopes to accomplish by his attacks on urban centers.
2. Outside of Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces, which the enemy has
repeatedly promised to liberate, it appears that the enemy's main objective was
to gain a psychological victory. Despite the call for a general uprising, there is
little evidence to suggest that the VC leadership really expected an uprising to
succeed all over South Vietnam. It also appears that the enemy did not expect to
permanently seize control of some provincial capitals. The forces that were
committed were expected to hold out as long as possible against Allied counter-
attacks, in order to gain psychological victories and to cover the impending enemy
offensive in northern I Corps.
EO
13526
3.3(h)(2)
3. Enemy objectives in attacking Quang Tri and Hue cities were undoubtedly
tied in with the impending Communist offensive along the DMZ. Their attacks on
other cities in the south indicate, however, that their over-all "winter-spring
campaign" objectives are much broader and may, in fact, involve a continuing
effort to put military pressure on urban areas during the coming week, pressure
which has the political objective of collapsing the GVN as an effective governing
institution.
4. A compendium of POW statements relating to enemy objectives follows:
I Corps
1) Quang Tri
Agent reports, POW interrogations, Chieu Hoi statements and
documents consistently stated that the enemy planned to take
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766069
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766069
and occupy Quang Tri city.
2) Quang Ngai
Based on POW interrogations and documents captured on 31
January, the VC were planning a five-day attack on Quang Ngai
province to begin on the evening of 30 January. One VC or NVA
battalion was resting and preparing to attack on the night of 31
January/1 February.
3) Thua Thien
An FBIS Report (69) FOUO, indicates that a French press team
captured in Hue were told by a NVA. officer that "we are going
to liberate all of South Vietnam in this offensive. We intend to
keep what we hold in Hue. We have large stocks of food and arms
hidden away over many months. Already we control 90 percent
of the city, we will keep it."
II Corps
1) Nha Trang
According to PIC interrogations of POWS, NVA troops were told
prior to the attack on Nha Trang that they would be able to take
and hold the city because the VC organization within the city had
organized the population to assist them. NVA officers, however,
say they knew before launching the attack that it would fail, but
they had to attack to support the nationwide effort and to make success
possible elsewhere.
2) Pleiku
Prisoners have stated that they had orders to "take Pleiku city
or not return. "
III Corps
Bien Hoa
After the attack by the VC 274th and 275th regiments on Bien Hoa
city, prisoners stated that they were told that it would be easy
to overrun Bien Hoa city. Plans captured from prisoners and ralliers
indicate the VC had no withdrawal plan.
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Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766069
JEGREr
IV Corps
Chau Doc
A VC prisoner captured in Chau Doc city, Chau Doc province
in IV CTZ reports, on interrogation, that he was informed of
the Viet Gong Tet military operations on the night of 30-31
January. He was told by his chief that the future plans of the
attack called for the creation of conditions which would bring the
U.S. Government to negotiate in order to "proceed to peace."
He was told that the attacks would be a departure from previous
operational procedures.
The prisoner, Buu, stated that the VC realized they were
commiting everything and every person they had in this assault.
He said it was obvious to all that it was a "go for broke" matter.
He believes few of the participants expected success. He further
mentioned that the VC expected a popular uprising in support of
the Viet Gong and that the lack of all out popular commitment would
probably have an adverse effect on morale.
He said that District Forces would attack District Headquarters
and that ten cadre Party members were to establish a provisional
government in Chau Doc.
The intention of the VC to occupy and stay in the city was indicated
by evidence of camp beds, rice and personal effects left in occupied
houses.
Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766069