THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06766064
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
ARCHIVAL RECORD,
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES,
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Information as of 1600
2 February 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
As the Communist offensive continued into its
fourth day, the military situatiOn remained critical
in 9everal provincial capitals and there were indi-
cations that the enemy may be planning renewed at-
tacks in the Saigon area. The Communists, meanwhile,
may be trying to. puttogether some new kind of-politi-
cal facade to back up claims that their current of-
fensive has touched off a popular-uprising.in support
of objectives long sought by them.
I. The Military Situation .in South Vietnam:
As the CoMmunist.offensive'against urban centers rolled.
into its fourth. day,, enemy losses. were counted at well
over 10,000 dead-(Paras. 1-2)-.: In-I Corps, fighting
continues in Hue. _Several district towns have also
come under. attack and.the.city of.Quang Ngai appears.
to be once: again threatened by troops massing on its
outskirts '(Paras. 3-5). The situation remains criti-
cal in the central highlands province capitals of Ban
Me Thuot and.Kontum. In the southern portion of II
Corps.. the.Communists still hold the. market place in
'Da Lat.(Paras. The Communists are reported '
attempting to move into positions in Saigon from out-
lying area's, hut no nevvattacks.have been reported.
In the rest of III Corps there-have.been only scat-
tered attacks (Paras. 9-10). In the IV-Corps area
the situation in Ben Tre remains critical; the city
of Vinh Long is also the scene 'of heavy fighting
(Paras. 11.-12). Allied aircraft' losses have been
heavy (Para. 13). The Communists have the capability
to commit further forces to.sUstain,their offensive
activity (Paras. 14-16).
II. Political Developments.in-South,Vietnaml
Fumbling .by President:. rhieu. and Prime Minister Loc
in the early stages .of the current. crisis May
en-
courage Vice-President Ky to' press for greaterex-
ecutive powers (Paras.' 1-3).. There. is- some - talk that
martial law may be lifted.sOon and' the 24-hour 'curfew
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in Saigon temporarily suspended (Paras. 4-6). Na-
tional Assembly reactions to the current crisis are
mixed (Paras. 7-9). Popular reaction to the crisis
has generally been one of confusion and fear,
causing an increase in refugees (Paras. 10-12).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Commu-
nist propaganda is portraying the current military
offensive as one having broad popular support (Paras.
1-3). The Communists may be trying to put together
some new kind of political facade to back up claims
that their offensive has touched off a popular up-
rising in support of objectives long sought by them
(Paras. 4-11).
VI. Other Major Aspects: Improvements in the
Laotian road net many enable the Communists to ship
greater quantities of supplies into northern South
Vietnam (Paras, 1-4).
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TOPSE-egfi'
I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. The Communist offensive continued for the fourth
day. The military situation remained critical in the
provincial capitals of Hue, Kontum, Ban Me Thuot, Da Lat
and Ben Tre, and pressure is also being exerted against
a number of other key towns or in their immediate en-
virons. There are some indications that the enemy may
be planning renewed attacks in the Saigon area although
the situation presently appears relatively stable.
2. Enemy losses continue to soar. According to US
military authorities, Communist dead now number well over.
10,000 and an additional 3,000 enemy suspects have been
detained. Only some 1,700 individual and crew-served
weapons have been picked up in the fighting, however.
Allied losses at last report totaled about 630 South
Vietnamese and 280 US military personnel killed and 1,590
South Vietnamese and 1,200 Americans wounded.
I Corps
3. Heavy fighting continues in and- around Hue where
Communist forces entrenched in the two-square-mile citadel
area north of the Huonq River continue-stiff resistance.
Two.ARVN armored battalions., have been attempting, to fight
their way into the walled city-, and amARVft airborne-bat.
talion- has been lifted into the citadel inthe vicinity
of the South Vietnamese. 1st Division Headquarters. Two
other. ARVN. battalions have 'been committed to the effort to
secure title,- and. may be joined by a battalion of the US 1St
Cavalry Division. All US and- government installations are
in allied hands-, but severe house-to-house fighting is
-reported throughout" all sections of, the. city. The VOA
transmitter. is:presently inoperative' afterenemy mortar
attack.
4. Elsewhere in I. Corps, fighting continues near sev-
eral provincial towns:, - The-.phw.Loc District headquarters,
which was seized on 1 February, is-now:reported in allied
hands,.but remains' threatened'by-a:aarge enemy force in
the area. Quang Nqai..city,although quiet, may also be'
threatened by enemy forces which are again reported mass-
ing nearby after being routed' from the town two days ago.
The city received mortarfire-on: the. night of 1-2 February.
Tam Ky, the capital of Quang Tin Province, also sustained
a mortar attack, possibly mixed-with-artillery fire, on
the same night. � - 2 February 1968
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5. The district town of Duy Xuyen, in southern Quang
Nam Province, is reported still under enemy control, al-
though a South Korean brigade is preparing a counterat-
tack. In the northeastern part of Quang Tri Province,
a Combined Action Platoon headquarters in the district
town of Cam Lo repelled an enemy force early on 2 Febru-
ary after a six-hour assault.
II Corps
6. The allied military situation remains critical in
the central provincial capitals of Kontum and Ban Me Thuot.
Regimental-size North Vietnamese forces still occupy major
portions of both towns and their environs. Heavy damage has
been reported, particularly in Ban Me Thuot.
7. To the south, the Communists still hold the market
place in the center of Da Lat and scattered strongpoints,
particularly in the western part of the town. Small-arms
fire is reported throughout the town, but there are indica-
tions that allied reinforcements spearheaded by South Viet-
namese troops are beginning to bring the situation under
control.
8. New battalion-size attacks were reported on 2 Feb-
ruary against Pleiku city and nearby village. Heavy fighting
also resumed in the coastal city of Phan Thiet in southern
II Corps. No recent details are available from Pleiku, but
at last report, Phan Thiet was reported under shaky govern-
ment control, with fighting west and east of the city.
Scattered sniping was continuing within several other key
coastal cities.
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III Corps
9. There have been new. reports that the Communists were
attempting to move into positions in Saigon and outlying areas
during the past 24 hours. Np new attacks have materialized,
however, except for sporadic firing around the airport.
There has been evidence that enemy units involved in the re-
cent attacks on Saigon had moved into the capital area from
as far south as the delta and as far north as Tay Ninh Province.
No North Vietnamese have been confirmed in the Saigon fight-
ing although some northerners assigned as fillers to Viet
Cong units may have Participated.
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10. To the north of Saigon, scattered attacks
have been reported in the past few days in �Tay Ninh
city area and around Phu Cuong in Binh Duong Province.
No attacks were reported in this area of III Corps
on 2 February, but there have been indications that
Tay Ninh, An Loc, and Phuoc Vinh, the capitals of
the provinces bordering Cambodia, may be targets
in the near future.
IV Corps
11. Sharp fighting continues in the Mekong
Delta provinces, where the Communists continue to
apply pressure against several provincial capitals
and surrounding areas. The most critical situation
exists at Ben Tre in Kien Hoa Province, where heavy
fighting continues against some 700-800 enemy troops
still in the city. Two US companies of the 9th
Division have arrived to reinforce the ARVN troops
in the area.
12. The city of Vinh Long Was the scene of
heavy fighting on the night of 1-2 February, but
there is no late word on conditions there. Two
other towns, Moc Hoa in Kien Tuong Province and Ca
Mau in An Xuyen, came under attack on 2 February,
�but Viet Cong forces appear to have been subsequently
driven out. Sporadic firing continues around these
towns as well as Can Tho and My Tho, which had been
attacked earlier.
Nationwide Aircraft Losses
13. From 29 January. to 1 February, at least 24
airfields and landing zones were attacked by enemy
forces. Reports presently indicate that only
the airfield at Kontum remains completely nonopera-
tional. In these attacks, about 15 fixed wing air-
craft and 23 helicopters were destroyed, and an
additional 85 fixed wing aircraft and 267 helicopters
were damaged.
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Prospects for the Immediate Future
14. Although the Communists have been pushed
out of most urban areas, they continue to hold
strategic ground positions near several major towns.
They may attempt to renew their attacks, or merely
to maintain pressure on surrounding areas to keep
up the tension and intimidate the populace.
15. Despite extremely high losses in the re-
cent fighting, the Communists appear to be prepared
to sacrifice most of the units involved in order
to carry out their offensive. This probably is
because the enemy has not thrown the full weight
of his forces into the current effort. For example,
in the fighting around Hue, it appears that only
elements of the 6th North Vietnamese regiment,
plus some local forces, have been involved. At
least four other enemy regiments are within 20
miles of the city. There is also evidence that
parts of some regiments, or entire regiments, of
the B-3 Front in the highlands and of the 14R-10
Front in northern III Corps have not yet been
committed in the present offensive. In the Khe
Sanh western Quang Tri area, elements of at least
three divisions of North Vietnamese troops remain
poised for early action, although the situation
continues generally quiet. A rallier captured
earlier around Khe Sanh has alleged that offensive
activity would begin about 3 February.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. A leadership crisis could develop in the
government as a result of continuing Viet Cong
militar �ressure a ainst urban areas.
/Vice President
Ky who took charge or the Joint General Staff and
the government on 31 January and made all the
decisions until President Thieu returned to Saigon
from the delta that evening. Ky then pressed Thieu
to declare martial law and also to use the op-
portunity to press for full mobilization of the
nation. Ky reportedly urged the president to call
the National Assembly into session and ask for "full
powers" to run the nation. Ky also feels that, un-
less decisive action is taken to counter present
and future Viet Cong actions, the people will begin
to doubt the government's ability to protect them
and will start to believe in an eventual Viet Cong
victory.
2. Director Gen-
eral of Information Linh, reportedly Indicated that
Prime Minister Loc was in "a state of bewilderment"
after the crisis erupted on 30 January, and was
generally allowing the military to run the show.
On 1 February Loc called a cabinet meeting which
resulted only in a decision to draft a communiqug
to be broadcast on that evening outlining the
situation in broad terms. The rest of the cabinet
meeting was unproductive, according to the source.
The various ministers tried to play up what they
did in their respective ministries to counter the
Communist actions and criticized other ministries
for their shortcomings.
3. The fact that it was not Thieu but Ky who
took the initiative in the early stages of the
crisis will probably cause the senior generals to
criticize more than before Thieu's indecisiveness
in handling the government. Loc's apparent in-
ability to function in a crisis situation also will
probably come under fire. A possible result is that
Ky may be encouraged to seek greater, and extra-
constitutional, executive powers in the government.
There have been earlier clandestine reports that at
some point he might attempt to seek a constitutional
amendment which would _allow him as vice president
to hold concurrently the position of prime minister.
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4. According to unconfirmed press reports,
martial law, which was proclaimed on 31 January,
will remain in effect only until the Viet Cong
have been cleared out of the major cities. A
spokesman for Thieu reportedly said today that
"it shouldn't be long now;" and suggested that
martial law would be in effect no longer than a
week. The government apparently is convinced that
the situation is rapidly coming under control and
that the Communist threat will soon be reduced
to the point where some controls can be relaxed.
5. One indicator of the government's con-
fidence is the scheduled lifting of the 24-hour
curfew for about seven hours on 3 February. Sec-
retary to the Prime Minister Cang indicated to
embassy officers that the curfew will be lifted
to allow people to move about for such essential
purposes as the purchase of food. The curfew sus-
pension will be*officially announced only one
hour before it is scheduled to begin to prevent
the Communists from taking advantage of the move.
Cang also said that the Ministry of Social Wel-
fare is currently trying to provide food and
shelter to victims of the fighting in Saigon.
National Assembly Reaction
6. Reaction among National Assembly members
to the Viet Cong offensive and its effects on the
population and the government thus far has been
Mixed. Senator Truong Tien Dat believes the Com-
munists hoped to achieve a psychological victory
by demonstrating their strength to the urban pop-
ulation. The result, Dat believes was both a mili-
tary and psychological defeat. He is confident
that the people now will more willingly rally to
the government cause. Senator Huynh Van Cao also
views the outcome as a psychological defeat for
the Viet Cong.
7. Senator Nguyen Van Ngai, on the other
hand, believes the Viet Cong have won a psychologi-
cal victory, despite the fact that Saigon residents
are indignant at having the Tet holiday disrupted.
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TOP_OferRST
Ngai does not feel, however, that the people's out-
rage will necessarily be enough to make them more
responsive to the government.
8. The consensus of assembly members on Presi-
dent Thieu's imposition of martial law is apparently
that the assembly will approve the emergency measures,
even though many individual members are outspokenly
critical. Senator Ngai told a US Embassy officer that
the Communist attacks revealed the "weakness and in-
effectiveness" of the government security apparatus.
He regards the situation as serious enough to war-
rant assembly consideration of a no-confidence vote.
Ngai believes, however, that the assembly will sup-
port Thieu's actions--a belief concurred in by
Senators Dat and Cao and the prime minister's sec-
retary, Doan Ba Cang. Cao has urged Upper House
Chairman Nguyen Van Huyen to issue a statement ex-
pressing the house's support for Thieu's actions.
Impact on Population
9. Popular reaction to the crisis has, in
general, been one of confusion and fear. Rumors
are rampant in some areas of a possible coup in
Saigon, of a possible coalition government, and
of more Viet Cong attacks. After the attack on
Saigon, rumors circulated that, since Vice Presi-
dent Ky had signed the martial law decree, Presi-
dent.Thieu had either been killed by the Commu-
nists or kidnaped by forces staging a coup.
Such stories are still prevalent in some areas,
along with rumors that the US permitted the
attacks as a means of pressuring the government
into negotiating.
10. Attitudes toward the Viet Cong and their
actions range from outrage at the Communists'
flagrant violation of the cease-fire to fear and
surprise at-their strength. Many have criticized
the government's failure to provide security for
them, and some local observers fear that the net
result will be a loss of confidence in both the
government and the US. Despite this, however,
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there has been no indication of a significant swing
to the Viet Cong and no apparent public response to
the new Communist front organizations.
11. A number of areas have reported large refugee
flows. The population of Quang Tri city is estimated
to have doubled in the 48 hours between 30 January and
1 February. In Quang Nam Province residents of Duy
Xuyen district town, had been evacuated by 1 February,
and Hoa yang District reported that approximately
1,000 refugees needed food. The Binh Long provincial
capital has seen a steady flow of refugees from out-
lying areas, which are reportedly in Communist hands
and there are some 4,000 refugees in Bien Hoa city.
In Long Khanh Province, where no major enemy attacks
occurred until the night of 1-2 February, people
were reported leaving the provincial capital because
they feared an imminent assault.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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