THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 9

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06766050
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766050
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
2 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in South Vietnam No. 9
(As of 11:30 A.M. EST)
1. The Communists are continuing to apply heavy
pressure against a number of major population centers
and their surrounding environs throughout the four
corps areas of South Vietnam. The allied military position
appears to be most critical in Hue, Kontum, Ban Me
Thuot, Da Lat, and Ben Tree There are indications
that the Communists aro planning renewed attacks in
the Saigon area, although the situation at present
remains relatively stable.
I Corps
2. Fighting continues in Hue as US and South
Vietnamese troops press against Communist forces who
continue to offer stiff resistance Within the citadel
and in scattered parts of the city.- Quang Ngai re-
mains quiet, however, a late report states that the
massing of Communist troops that withdrew from their
attack on 30 January poses a serious potential threat
to the provincial capital.
II Corps
3. In the western highlands, the allied situa-
tion remains most critical at Ban Me Thuot and Kontum
City, where regimental-sized North Vietnamese forces
continue their occupation of major portions of both
cities and surrounding environs. Civilian casualties
continue to mount in both areas, largely because of
allied air strikes against enemy units holed up in
heavily populated sections. Enemy forces have also
resumed battalion-sized or larger attacks against
Pleiku City.
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4. In the coastal provinces of II Corps, North
Vietnamose forces apparently continue to maintain a
major presence in Da Lat and Phan Thiet, the capitals
of Tuyen Due and Binh Thuan provinces, respectively.
No major fighting has been reported in Khanh Hoa
Province, the scene of recent heavy enemy activity.
Saigon and III Corps
5. Viet Cong troops are attempting to move into
positions within Saigon and on the outskirts of the
city in preparation for renewed attacks, according to
a number of late reports
An estimated 2,000 Communists were reported
near the Saigon port area; another 200 were said to be
preparing to attack a police precinct station and
.possibly the US radio transmitting station in Cholon.
6. To the north of Saigon in the III Corps area
there were no new attacks on 2 February, however, there
are indications that the capitals of Tay Ninh, Binh
Long, and. Phuoc Long provinces along the Cambodian
border may be the next targets to come under attack.
Some 4,000 refugees have been generated in the Bien
boa city area, where fighting in recent days has re-
sulted in heavy damage to civilian housing. .
Iv Corps
7. The Communists continue to apply pressure
against several provincial capitals and key areas
according to information as of 1800 Saigon time on
2 February. The most critical area appears to be
Ben Tre where heavy fighting is taking place. The
enemy controls most of the city. Sporadic sniper
Lire and fighting in the outskirts is reported
in Can ,Tho, Moe boa, Soc Trang and illy Tho.. VC ele-
ment remain in the immediate vicinity of Can Tho,
Camauo and Rac Gia and additional attacks are ex-
pected. There is no further information on the
situation at Vinh Long.
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Status of Enemy Forces
8. Available evidence indicates that the Com-
munists retain major combat element; in I and II
Corps which have not been committed in their current
offensive effort. The situation in III and IV Corps
is less clear, but is probably substantially the same.
In I and II Corps the remaining units are capable of
launching Additional strong attacks in certain areas
and can also reinforce the current assaults.
9. Enemy strength along the Demilitarized Zone
and in northern Quang Tri Province remains consider-
able--up to four divisions. There are indications
that two battalions participated in attacks on Quang
Tri City and major elements of the Gth North Vietnam-
ese Regiment were involved in heavy fighting at Hue.
It appears that two North Vietnamese regiments and
several independent and local force battalions are
still available in the northern coastal provinces.
10. In the Quang Nam and Quang Tin Province
regions, elements of the 2nd North Vietnamese Divi-
sion have been joined by local force units in attacks
at Da Nang, Hai An and TOM Ky and scattered actions
in the countryside. At least two regiments and prob-
ably as many battalions main uncommitted in this
area.
11. The picture in Quang Ngai is not clear.
However, it appears the enemy has used at least ele-
ments from many of his seven battalions here at this
juncture.
12. In coastal II Corps, the situation is uneven.
Most of the 3rd North Vietnamese Division and several
local force battalions are still available for action.
Further south, about one-half of the 5th North Vietnam-
ese Division has been identified at Tuy Hoa and Nha
Trang, while' the majority of enemy local force strength
here has been committed.
13. Despite heavy fighting at Kontum and Pleiku,
only a small percentage of the 8-3 Front combat power
has participated. Up to five regiments and a few more
separate battalions remain uncommitted and available
in the western central highlands.
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Political Developments
14. Vietnamese Communist propaganda on the Tet
offensive in employing a strong anti-American theme
in an effort to rally popular support for Communist
objectives. Broadcasts by both Hanoi and the Libera-
tion Front have characterized the current offensive
as primarily directed toward ridding the country of
the US "imperialists" and their Saigon "lackeys."
The program of the Liberation Front is singled out as
the guide to achieving these objectives.
15. A Front broadcast on 1 February pitched the
anti-American appeal directly to South Vietnamese
armed forces and police personnel. After painting a
black picture of American involvement in South Vietnam,
it told. these people that their "golden chance" to
contribute to the salvation of their country had come
and urgently called on them to "resist the Americans."
The broadcast reminded them that the program of the
Front contains provisions for rewarding those who
join the Communist cause as well as those who cooperate
in the anti-American stvuggle, even if they do not join
the Communists now. The broadcast stressed the need
for immediate action, saying that the "situation is
urgent and time does not wait."
16. The theme that the offensive represents a
groundswell of popular sentiment favoring an anti-
American struggle was also underscored in a 2 Feb-
ruary article in the Hanoi party daily Nhan Dan.
The article claimed that the offensive showed the
strength of the revolution and of the "national
union" resisting the US "aggressors", all of which
it said is in line with the Front's program. Front
statements discussing the formation of new popular
front "alliances" in Hue and Saigon have stressed
that their first objective is to oppose the US,
bring about the withdrawal of US troops, and to
negotiate with the Liberation Front.
17. The attempt to characterize the Communist
military offensive as a broad, patriotic uprising
against the US and Saigon regime was carried further
in special Viet Cong and Liberation Front statements
on 1 February.
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18, The Viet Cong issued a "special conununique"
describing the "insurrectional atmosphere of the
masses," and claiming that the nationwide attacks were
an "irrepressible uprising of tens of millions of
people" bent on a common course of "national libera-
tion." It said that; although the recent fighting oc-
curred for only a short time, it provided a basis
for continued military successes throughout the coun-
try.
19. Nguyen Huu Tho, head. of the National Libera-
tion Front, wrapped himself in the same patriotic, anti-
American robes in a special appeal carried by Hanoi
radio on. 2 February. Tho's appeal was addressed to
South Vietnamese military and civilian personnel and
called on them to Join in a common struggle against
the US and the Saigon regime. The�Front's "only and
highest goal", he said is the "save the country."
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