THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 11
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 February 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Situation in South Vietnam No. 11
(As of al1717.11171=7"--"----
The Communist offensive continues to maintain
considerable momentum in some urban areas and against
some allied military installations. Enemy forces
are still resisting allied efforts to drive them out
of many provincial capitals, and have launched sev-
eral new attacks in the XXX and /V Corps areas.
Saigon was relatively quiet during the night, but
there were some indications that new enemy initia-
tives may soon be staged there.
I Corps
1. The situation throughout this area was gen-
erally quiet on the night of 2-3 February; however,
the fighting in Hue is continuing with the enemy still
offering stiff resistance in their efforts to hold
several strongpoints in the city.
2. Hue: The northern portion of the citadel
and parta�OT the city itself are still under enemy
control. Several of the compound areas within the
citadel exchanged hands late yesterday. Reports of
sizeable enemy units in the city's environs continue.
One prisoner claimed that 2-3 battalions were massing
on the southern side of the river which divides the
cities, and that their mission was to attack the MACv
compound. Other prisoners have stated the enemy
plans to hold Hue for at least seven days. Heavy
enemy sniper activity from rooftops and other strategic
locations continues to hamper the allied reaction
forces which have been making slow progress in clear-
ing the city. Six South Vietnamese Army battalions,
a ranger battalion, a tank company, plus two
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battalions of the US let Air Cavalry Division and two US
Marine battalions are now committed to recovering the city.
3. DMZ: The allied strongpoint at Con Thien
was hit bY-73 rounds of enemy artillery fire, while
and nearby US Marine positions received 65 rounds
of artillery and rocket fire late yesterday. There
have been no reports of enemy activity at Khe Sanh;
however, a press report claims 650 rounds of artillery,
rocket, and mortar fire were directed at allied posi-
tions all along the southern portion of the DMZ on
3 February.
II Corps
4. Fighting continued in two provincial capitals--
Dalat and Phan Thiet--in central South Vietnam on 3
February. Although the enemy presence in or near the
western highland cities of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me
Thuot remains considerable, these cities were gen-
erally quiet overnight and tho Communists may now,
in fact, be withdrawing under strong allied pressure.
5. Dalat: Early this.morning, an unknown size
force striTiglit the railroad station, two US billets,
a South Vietnamese Army outpost, and a sector head-
quarters in A brief 15-minute attack. No results
have been reported. South Vietnamese forces are
presently establishing control of the city.
6. Phan Thiet: Sharp fighting which began
yesterday noon was reported continuing in this coastal
city this morning. The bulk of the battle is con-
centrated in north and northeast sections of the city
in the vicinity of the MACY compound, which is still
secured by friendly forces.
Saigon
7. Saigon was relatively quiet during the night
and this morning with only a few scattered clashes.
8. Some reports state that groups of Viet Cong
have been sighted withdrawing from the city. Other
reports raise the possibility of widespread renewed
attacks, Prisoners and captured documents indicate
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that the action so far may have been aimed at creat-
ing'turmoil in preparation for another attack. Some
25 to 30 Viet Cong battalions are said to be staging
in areas north and south of the city.
9.
ln addition, elements
oi tne North Vietnamese 7th and Viet Cong 9th divi-
sions reportedly have taken up reserve positions north
of the capital. These reports have not been confirmed.
other m Corps Deveiopnents
10. Two provincial capitals, XuRn Loc and Phuoc
Le, came under attack during the night. By noon on
3 February, however, most provinces in the III Corps
area reported that the military situation had sta-
bilized.
11. Xuan Loc: Xuan Loc was assaulted for the
second coniBEUTIVI night. An ARVN artillery position
was hit by rocket fire; ground:probes were directed
at the MACY compound, the National Ponce Station,
and other points in the city. There were few de-
tails on casualties.
12. Phuoc Le: The capital of Phuoc Thy Prov-
ince east of gaigon was attacked on 1 February and
at last report late on 2 February (local Vietnam time),
*parts of the city were still occupied by a Viet Cong
company. Heavy fighting was reported, but the only
confirmed casualties have been one US civilian and
one Australian killed.
13. Bien Hoe: Estimates of civilian refugees
in the Bien Rea area now reach as high as 11,000.
Information from prisoners and ralliers indicate that
the 274th and 275th Main Force Regiments of the 5th
Viet Cong Division participated in the attacks on Bien
Hoa. The prisoners state that they had no withdrawal
plan as they were told that it would be easy to overrun
the city.
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Other Action
14. In other recent action in xrr Corps US
� Army troops reported a sharp clash with an enemy
force of undetermined size about five miles north-
east of Saigon, while Viet Cong gunners attacked
the US Army base at Cu Chi for the third time
within a week on 2 February. Some 100 rounds of
mortar and heavy rocket fire hit the camp. US
Losses were light.
IV Corps
15. Reports indicate that there was a slacken-
ing off of fighting in several previously hard hit
provinces in this area during the night of 2-3 February.
Heavy action is still going on in some sectors, how-
ever, and many major cities are still experiencing
sniper and harassing fire.
16. Ben.Tre: Some of the heaviest Lighting in
the delta firgritinued over the past three days in
this provincial capital, located some 43 miles south
of Saigon.. Viet Cong.forebs, estimated to be 200-
800 strong, have infiltrated virtually all parts of
the city and control most of it, especially at night.
More than half of the buildings in the city have
been destroyed.
17. The ARVN Regiment defending Ben Tre is
reportedly fighting "tenaciously, but rather ineffec-
tively because of a lack of "planning and organiza-
tion," One US Army unit has already arrived in the
city and most of. the 2nd Brigade of the US 9th In-
fantry Division was scheduled to arrive during the
night.
18. Chau Phu: Chau Phu, a provincial capital
near the Cambodian border 115 miles due west of Saigon,
was reported almost completely secure this morning.
An ARVN search and destroy operation is sweeping the
outskirts of the city. Unconfirmed estimates list
77 Viet Cong killed and eight captured. Some 100
civilians have been wounded and it is estimated that
the fighting against at least two Viet Cong battalions
in the city over the past few days destroyed the homes
of up to 4,000 people.
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19. One prisoner, taken during the battle, who.
claims to be the Viet Cong deputy security chief in
the province, indicated that the attack on Chau Phu
. was launched with considerable ideological prepara-
tions but without the thorough tactical rehearsals
which traditionally proceed Viet Cong attacks. He
said that he first learned of the Tet offensive about
two weeks prior to the Chau Phu attack.
20. Viet Cong main force units, Wording to
the prisoner, were given the responsibility of
"liberating" provincial capitals, whereas district
forces and guerrillas were responsible for seizing
their respective district seats. He claims that the
force which attacked Chau Phu city included ten party
members who were to constitute the city front which
was to organize a provisional government. The prisoner
first. heard the term coalition government about six
months ago, but had never heard. it brought into formal
party proceedings until the briefings for the Tet
operation.
21. If. these statements do provide an accurate
reflection of current Viet Cong strategy, the Commu-
nists have indeed decided to expend a great part of
their resources in the Tet offensive.
Other Delta Action
22. Sporadic mortar and small arms fire con-
tinues within or on the outskirts of several prov-
incial capitals--including Can Tho, My Tho, Moc Hoa,
Vinh Long, and Rach Gia--as well as a number of other
smaller towns. At Ca Mau a Viet Cong assault was
repulsed during the night of 1-2 February but further
attacks were expected.
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Political and Psychological Developments
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27. Overall information on popular reactions
to the crisis is still relatively sparse--particularly
for areas outside Saigon. From the evidence available,
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however, it still appears, as earlier reported, that
the general reaction i� ono first: of fear, second:
of surprise at the demonstration of continued Commu-
nist strength and, third: of disgruntlement at the
government's inability to block the attacks.
28. There are numerous reports of belief in a
widespread rumor that the U8 connived with the vc. in
the attacks in order to force formation of a coalition
government. While the enemy is doubtless pushing this
line as part of the psywar side of his current offen-
sive, the widespread willingness to believe the story
is significant, since it seemingly indicates a growing
political malaise among the people over the war.
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