THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM NO. 11

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
06766049
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
January 28, 2019
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
File: 
Body: 
-G028335-95� Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 T�SECTirrf CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 3 February 1968 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM The Situation in South Vietnam No. 11 (As of al1717.11171=7"--"---- The Communist offensive continues to maintain considerable momentum in some urban areas and against some allied military installations. Enemy forces are still resisting allied efforts to drive them out of many provincial capitals, and have launched sev- eral new attacks in the XXX and /V Corps areas. Saigon was relatively quiet during the night, but there were some indications that new enemy initia- tives may soon be staged there. I Corps 1. The situation throughout this area was gen- erally quiet on the night of 2-3 February; however, the fighting in Hue is continuing with the enemy still offering stiff resistance in their efforts to hold several strongpoints in the city. 2. Hue: The northern portion of the citadel and parta�OT the city itself are still under enemy control. Several of the compound areas within the citadel exchanged hands late yesterday. Reports of sizeable enemy units in the city's environs continue. One prisoner claimed that 2-3 battalions were massing on the southern side of the river which divides the cities, and that their mission was to attack the MACv compound. Other prisoners have stated the enemy plans to hold Hue for at least seven days. Heavy enemy sniper activity from rooftops and other strategic locations continues to hamper the allied reaction forces which have been making slow progress in clear- ing the city. Six South Vietnamese Army battalions, a ranger battalion, a tank company, plus two Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) EO 13526 3.3(h)(2) EO 13526 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) CO2833595 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 Nof battalions of the US let Air Cavalry Division and two US Marine battalions are now committed to recovering the city. 3. DMZ: The allied strongpoint at Con Thien was hit bY-73 rounds of enemy artillery fire, while and nearby US Marine positions received 65 rounds of artillery and rocket fire late yesterday. There have been no reports of enemy activity at Khe Sanh; however, a press report claims 650 rounds of artillery, rocket, and mortar fire were directed at allied posi- tions all along the southern portion of the DMZ on 3 February. II Corps 4. Fighting continued in two provincial capitals-- Dalat and Phan Thiet--in central South Vietnam on 3 February. Although the enemy presence in or near the western highland cities of Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban Me Thuot remains considerable, these cities were gen- erally quiet overnight and tho Communists may now, in fact, be withdrawing under strong allied pressure. 5. Dalat: Early this.morning, an unknown size force striTiglit the railroad station, two US billets, a South Vietnamese Army outpost, and a sector head- quarters in A brief 15-minute attack. No results have been reported. South Vietnamese forces are presently establishing control of the city. 6. Phan Thiet: Sharp fighting which began yesterday noon was reported continuing in this coastal city this morning. The bulk of the battle is con- centrated in north and northeast sections of the city in the vicinity of the MACY compound, which is still secured by friendly forces. Saigon 7. Saigon was relatively quiet during the night and this morning with only a few scattered clashes. 8. Some reports state that groups of Viet Cong have been sighted withdrawing from the city. Other reports raise the possibility of widespread renewed attacks, Prisoners and captured documents indicate - 2 - 1,2S1R�SECICET Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c 3.5(c) CO2833595 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 Na.0 that the action so far may have been aimed at creat- ing'turmoil in preparation for another attack. Some 25 to 30 Viet Cong battalions are said to be staging in areas north and south of the city. 9. ln addition, elements oi tne North Vietnamese 7th and Viet Cong 9th divi- sions reportedly have taken up reserve positions north of the capital. These reports have not been confirmed. other m Corps Deveiopnents 10. Two provincial capitals, XuRn Loc and Phuoc Le, came under attack during the night. By noon on 3 February, however, most provinces in the III Corps area reported that the military situation had sta- bilized. 11. Xuan Loc: Xuan Loc was assaulted for the second coniBEUTIVI night. An ARVN artillery position was hit by rocket fire; ground:probes were directed at the MACY compound, the National Ponce Station, and other points in the city. There were few de- tails on casualties. 12. Phuoc Le: The capital of Phuoc Thy Prov- ince east of gaigon was attacked on 1 February and at last report late on 2 February (local Vietnam time), *parts of the city were still occupied by a Viet Cong company. Heavy fighting was reported, but the only confirmed casualties have been one US civilian and one Australian killed. 13. Bien Hoe: Estimates of civilian refugees in the Bien Rea area now reach as high as 11,000. Information from prisoners and ralliers indicate that the 274th and 275th Main Force Regiments of the 5th Viet Cong Division participated in the attacks on Bien Hoa. The prisoners state that they had no withdrawal plan as they were told that it would be easy to overrun the city. - 3 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c 3.5(c) .0O2833595 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 SPelfifr \NO Other Action 14. In other recent action in xrr Corps US � Army troops reported a sharp clash with an enemy force of undetermined size about five miles north- east of Saigon, while Viet Cong gunners attacked the US Army base at Cu Chi for the third time within a week on 2 February. Some 100 rounds of mortar and heavy rocket fire hit the camp. US Losses were light. IV Corps 15. Reports indicate that there was a slacken- ing off of fighting in several previously hard hit provinces in this area during the night of 2-3 February. Heavy action is still going on in some sectors, how- ever, and many major cities are still experiencing sniper and harassing fire. 16. Ben.Tre: Some of the heaviest Lighting in the delta firgritinued over the past three days in this provincial capital, located some 43 miles south of Saigon.. Viet Cong.forebs, estimated to be 200- 800 strong, have infiltrated virtually all parts of the city and control most of it, especially at night. More than half of the buildings in the city have been destroyed. 17. The ARVN Regiment defending Ben Tre is reportedly fighting "tenaciously, but rather ineffec- tively because of a lack of "planning and organiza- tion," One US Army unit has already arrived in the city and most of. the 2nd Brigade of the US 9th In- fantry Division was scheduled to arrive during the night. 18. Chau Phu: Chau Phu, a provincial capital near the Cambodian border 115 miles due west of Saigon, was reported almost completely secure this morning. An ARVN search and destroy operation is sweeping the outskirts of the city. Unconfirmed estimates list 77 Viet Cong killed and eight captured. Some 100 civilians have been wounded and it is estimated that the fighting against at least two Viet Cong battalions in the city over the past few days destroyed the homes of up to 4,000 people. - 4 - Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) :02833595 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 \of 19. One prisoner, taken during the battle, who. claims to be the Viet Cong deputy security chief in the province, indicated that the attack on Chau Phu . was launched with considerable ideological prepara- tions but without the thorough tactical rehearsals which traditionally proceed Viet Cong attacks. He said that he first learned of the Tet offensive about two weeks prior to the Chau Phu attack. 20. Viet Cong main force units, Wording to the prisoner, were given the responsibility of "liberating" provincial capitals, whereas district forces and guerrillas were responsible for seizing their respective district seats. He claims that the force which attacked Chau Phu city included ten party members who were to constitute the city front which was to organize a provisional government. The prisoner first. heard the term coalition government about six months ago, but had never heard. it brought into formal party proceedings until the briefings for the Tet operation. 21. If. these statements do provide an accurate reflection of current Viet Cong strategy, the Commu- nists have indeed decided to expend a great part of their resources in the Tet offensive. Other Delta Action 22. Sporadic mortar and small arms fire con- tinues within or on the outskirts of several prov- incial capitals--including Can Tho, My Tho, Moc Hoa, Vinh Long, and Rach Gia--as well as a number of other smaller towns. At Ca Mau a Viet Cong assault was repulsed during the night of 1-2 February but further attacks were expected. -5 - TOP RET Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c 3.5(c) CO2833595 Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 Political and Psychological Developments NNW 27. Overall information on popular reactions to the crisis is still relatively sparse--particularly for areas outside Saigon. From the evidence available, -6 - Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 "nESWIIVT� Nue however, it still appears, as earlier reported, that the general reaction i� ono first: of fear, second: of surprise at the demonstration of continued Commu- nist strength and, third: of disgruntlement at the government's inability to block the attacks. 28. There are numerous reports of belief in a widespread rumor that the U8 connived with the vc. in the attacks in order to force formation of a coalition government. While the enemy is doubtless pushing this line as part of the psywar side of his current offen- sive, the widespread willingness to believe the story is significant, since it seemingly indicates a growing political malaise among the people over the war. El Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766049 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c) 3.5(c)