IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (5)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06765442
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00293
• Publication Date: November 25, 1998

(U) IRAQI COMMANDERAp-p-rc7fed -6054-42)
Identifiers:
Document Number: WA2511083798
Dates:
Date Published: 25-Nov-1998 07:27:00
Date Received: 25-Nov-1998 02:31:01
Coverage:
CIA Country Code: IRQ
Region: MIDDLEEAST
Publisher:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
UNCLASSIFIED 1
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(b)(3)
(U) SERIAL: WA2511083798
(U) COUNTRY: IRAQ SUBJ: TAKE 6 OF 7--IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (5)
U REF: JN2511081498 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 3 NOV 98 P 11 /// 3 NOV
(U) SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 3 NOV 98 P 11 TEXT:
(U) 2--THE PREPARATION OF THE WESTERN OPERATIONS THEATER BY DEPLOYING
FIXED ROCKET LAUNCH PADS SO AS TO ENSURE THAT THE SET TARGETS IN THE
ZIONIST ENTITY ARE ATTACKED ACCORDING TO PLAN. 3--CLOSE COORDINATION WITH
THE DIRECTORATES OF THE GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY SURVEY
UNCLASSIFIED 2
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DEPARTMENT TO GET RELIABLEAi3Tod iOr7-14eiesW .161-85 4--WE HAD TO
STUDY THE NATIONAL DAYS OBSERVED IN THE ZIONIST ENTITY AND ALSO TO TAKE
INTO FULL ACCOUNT OUR OWN NATIONAL DAYS SO THAT OUR UNITS ARE NEVER
TAKEN UNAWARES. 5--WE HAD TO UNDERTAKE DRILLS IN WHICH OUR UNITS AND
FORMATIONS ENGAGE IN TRIAL COMMUNICATIONS IN PREPARATION FOR THE BATTLE.
6--WE HAD TO REORGANIZE THE ROCKET HEADQUARTERS SO AS TO SECURE GOOD
RUNNING OF THE ROCKET UNITS. 7--WE HAD TO UNDERTAKE EARLY RECONNAISSANCE
OF POTENTIAL TARGETS AND MAKE US AWARE OF ANY PIECE OF INFORMATION THAT
WE MAY OBTAIN ABOUT THEM AND WE HAD TO ENSURE THAT OUR MILITARY UNITS
SHARE SUCH INFORMATION. 8--WE HAD TO MAKE SURE THAT OUR STOCKPILES OF
ROCKETS WERE KEPT IN GOOD WORKING ORDER AND TO DEVISE A PLAN WHEREBY
THEY WOULD BE DEPLOYED. 9--WE HAD TO MAKE SURE THAT WE COLLECT
INTELLIGENCE ABOUT OUR INTENDED TARGETS AND ANALYZE THE USEFULNESS OF
ATTACKING THEM USING VARIOUS MILITARY AND CIVILIAN MAPS AND AERIAL PHOTOS.
WE HAD TO MAKE USE OF COORDINATES TAKEN BY OUR PILOTS. 10--ATTENTION MUST
BE GIVEN TO THE ISSUANCE OF ORDERS TO VARIOUS FORMATIONS AND UNITS AND
THE USE OF PASSWORDS AND CLEAR CODE WORDS SO AS TO SAVE THE TIME. 11--WE
HAD TO CONTINUE CONDUCTING ROCKET LAUNCH EXPERIMENTS IN COORDINATION
WITH THE MILITARY INDUSTRIALIZATION ORGANIZATION WITH A VIEW TO IMPROVING
THE PRECISION OF THE ROCKETS. 12--WE HAD TO PLAN THE POSSIBLE PROGRESS OF
THE BATTLE IN DETAIL TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION EACH OF THE STAGES OF THE
WAR. 13--WE HAD TO EXTEND TRANSPORT ACROSS AS WIDE AN AREA AS POSSIBLE
AND MAKE SURE THAT THE TRACKS ARE COVERED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 14--WE HAD
TO MAKE SURE THAT SPECIFICS OF IMPLEMENTATION ARE REVIEWED WITH
SUBORDINATES WITH A VIEW TO CORRECTING MISTAKES AND CALLING ATTENTION TO
IMPORTANT POINTS. 15--WE HAD TO MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR BUILDING
UNDERGROUND SHELTERS AT EVERY LAUNCH SITE MAKING SURE THAT THESE ARE
SET AT SUCH DISTANCES FROM EACH OTHER THAT WOULD NOT LEAD TO THEIR BEING
DISCOVERED. 16--SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE WAR COULD NOT BE OVERSTATED. 17--
WE SHOULD MAKE AS MUCH USE OF LIAISON OFFICERS AS POSSIBLE. THEY PLAY A
CRUCIAL ROLE IN COMMUNICATING ORDERS AND URGENT INFORMATION. 18--WE HAD
TO BEWARE OF THE ENEMY GUIDANCE SYSTEMS (BAYKANAT AL-DALALAH), WHICH
POINT I HAD GUARDED AGAINST FOR YEARS. 19--WE HAD TO MAKE SURE OF THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE ELEMENT OF BOOSTING THE MORALE OF THE RANKS ON EVERY
POSSIBLE OCCASION. 20--WE NEEDED TO FORM A FIRST LEGION FOR THE FIRST DUTY
IN THE WESTERN REGION AND THE SECOND LEGION FOR THE SECOND DUTY IN THE
SOUTH FOR PURPOSES OF CAMOUFLAGE. WE ALSO NEEDED TO SET UP CAMOUFLAGE
LAUNCHERS AND EXPLAIN HOW THESE COULD BE USED. 21--WE NEEDED TO ANALYZE
THE CAPABILITIES OF THE ENEMY IN LINE WITH INCOMING DATA FROM THE
DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND WORK OUT PLANS TO FORESTALL THE
ENEMY. 22--WE HAD TO KEEP SHIFTING THE SITES OF SHELTERS AND TO MAKE USE OF
NATURAL AND OTHER CURTAINS AND TO INTENSIVELY USE CAMOUFLAGE EQUIPMENT
AND MAKE SURE THAT RELEVANT PROCEDURES ARE APPLIED. 23--WE NEEDED TO SET
OUT THE SEQUENCE IN WHICH THE ROCKET ATTACKS WILL TAKE PLACE. WE ALSO HAD
TO SET THE PRIORITIES UNDER WHICH THE STRIKES MUST TAKE PLACE SO AS TO
ECONOMIZE ON TIME. FOR EXAMPLE, IN AUGUST 1990 WE WERE ABLE TO CUT THE
TIME THAT WE NEEDED TO RESPOND TO THE FIRST WAVE OF AGGRESSION ON IRAQ
WITH ROCKETS TO JUST FOUR HOURS. 24--OUR FIGHTERS HAD TO BE MADE
ADEQUATELY CONSCIOUS OF THEIR TASKS. I MADE SURE THAT ALL CONCERNED KNEW
ABOUT MY IDEAS AND WHAT THEY SHOULD DO IN AN EMERGENCY. 25--WE HAD TO
MAKE SURE THAT ELECTRONIC CALCULATORS WERE USED IN THE FIELD AND THAT A
SHOOTING TIMETABLE WAS DRAWN UP. 26--WE HAD TO MAKE SURE THAT A
SUMMARIZED MODEL WAS PREPARED TO REGULATE THE SENDING OF REPORTS
UNCLASSIFIED 3
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ABOUT THE STRATEGIC AND OPA-- [70Tie-alo-r.Rele-a-se720-1-8/1-Ci/0-9�C-6-65-47190PS SHOULD BE
TRAINED IN THE SENDING OF EASY AND SIMPLE CODES. 27--WE HAD TO MAKE SURE OF
FLEXIBILITY IN AMASSING TROOPS SO AS TO ENSURE THAT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES
ARE MADE TO SERVE THE FUNCTION SET FOR THEM. (MORE) 3 NOV 28--WE (b)(3)
HAD TO ENSURE SMOOTH COOPERATION BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND THE MILITARY
INDUSTRIALIZATION ORGANIZATION WHENEVER THERE WAS A NEED FOR THAT. 29--WE
HAD TO PLACE THE FIRST ROCKET MAINTENANCE UNIT, ASSIGNED TO AL-HUSAYN
ROCKET UNIT, UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE COMMAND OPERATIONS SO THAT THEY
WOULD BE RUN DIRECTLY BY ME. AS TO THE OPERATIONAL ROCKET UNITS IN THE
SOUTHERN SECTOR, THAT SET ME THINKING ABOUT THE PREPARATIONS THAT WE HAD
PUT IN PLACE: A--WE PREPARED NUMEROUS LAUNCH SITES FOR EVERY ROCKET UNIT
AT THE RATE OF 10-15 IN THE AREAS WHERE THEY WERE DEPLOYED SO AS TO
ENSURE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMBAT DUTIES AND SUFFICIENT PROTECTION
FOR EQUIPMENT. B--WE ENGAGED IN RECONNAISSANCE PRACTICE AND DAYTIME AND
NIGHTTIME MOVEMENTS UNDER ALL KINDS OF CIRCUMSTANCES. (MORE) END OF
MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
- JN2511081498 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 3 NOV 98 P 11 /// 3 NOV
Collection: FB
Creator:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
Description: (U) None
UNCLASSIFIED
4
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Language: eng
Precedence: ROUTINE
Source:
Attributions: SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 3 NOV 98 P 11
Subject: --
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