IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (5)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06765438
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00293
• Publication Date: November 25, 1998

(U) IRAQI COMMANDERAp-p-rc7fed -6054)
Identifiers:
Document Number: WA2511083398
Dates:
Date Published: 25-Nov-1998 07:27:00
Date Received: 25-Nov-1998 02:30:12
Coverage:
CIA Country Code: IRQ
Region: MIDDLEEAST
Publisher:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
UNCLASSIFIED 1
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(U) SERIAL: WA2511083398
(U) COUNTRY: IRAQ SUBJ: TAKE 2 OF 7--IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (5)
(U) REF: JN2511081498 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 3 NOV 98 P 11 /// CLOSE TO
IRAQ.
(U) SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 3 NOV 98 P 11 TEXT:
(U) I FELT THE WEIGHT OF RESPONSIBILITY AND STAYED UP TILL LATE IN THE NIGHT
PLANNING PRACTICAL MEASURES TO PUT THOSE ORDERS IN PLACE, NOW AND THEN
LIGHTING A CIGARETTE AND SURVEYING THE MAP HUNG ON THE WALL BESIDE ME.
PALESTINE, ONE OF THE MOST SCENIC SITES IN THE WORLD, WAS ONE OF ITS
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FEATURES. EARLY THE NEXT MCA�pplO'veTIfOri4Wa�s'e:.Y6187:16/66.6506576eTHE DOOR OF MY
OFFICE JOLTED ME OUT OF MY SLEEP. HE FOUND ME HUNCHED OVER MY PAPERS
WITH A KETTLE OF TEA PERCHED ON THE HEATER AND EMITTING A WHISTLE AS IF
ANNOUNCING THE OUTBREAK OF WAR. 9 JANUARY 1991 (SUBTITLE) THAT WHOLE DAY
AND PART OF THE NIGHT WAS OCCUPIED WITH CHARTING A THOROUGH PLAN TO
DISTRIBUTE THE ROCKETS AND CONVENTIONAL WARHEADS AND FUEL. THE PLAN
COVERED AREAS IN THE SOUTH AND WESTERN REGIONS OF THE NATION--IN AL-
RAMADI OF AL-ANBAR GOVERNORATE; AL-'AMARAH IN MISAN GOVERNORATE; AND IN
AL-NASIRIYAH OF DHI QAR GOVERNORATE. FOLLOWING IS A BREAKDOWN OF THE
PLAN: 1--TEN ROCKETS FOR BRIGADE 224 AND AS MANY FOR AL-RAMADI AS A SECOND
LINE. 2--EIGHT ROCKETS FOR BRIGADE 223, PLUS FOUR VEHICLES. 3--TEN ROCKETS
EACH FOR THE CITES OF AL-'AMARAH, AL-NU'MANIYAH, AL-SUWAYRAH, AT A MEDIUM
LEVEL ALERT FOOTING. 4--FOUR ROCKETS FOR THE CITY OF AL-NASIRIYAH, EIGHT FOR
AL-BATHA' REGION AT A MEDIUM LEVEL ALERT FOOTING. 5--ROCKETS IN OTHER AREAS
WERE PLACED AT A LOW LEVEL ALERT FOOTING. 6--THE SPECIAL WARHEADS WERE
DISPERSED IN OTHER PLACES AROUND THE COUNTRY. I SPENT THAT NIGHT PLANNING
UNTIL DAWN. I ISSUED ORDERS THAT THE TRAINING MUST CONTINUE AND SPECIFYING
THE DUTIES ASSIGNED TO BATTALION 227, "ABABIL," AND I EXAMINED THE FORMATION
OF A JOINT TECHNICAL BATTALION SO AS TO ECONOMIZE ON OUR EFFORTS. I ALSO
CONSIDERED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN AUXILIARY CONTROL CENTER AND A
DIVISION OF LABOR AMONG THE BRIGADES AND WHETHER EACH SHOULD BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR A SPECIFIC REGION OR WHETHER THEY SHOULD ALL BE
CONTROLLED CENTRALLY. I ISSUED ORDERS SPECIFYING WHETHER THE ROCKETS
SHOULD REMAIN DEPLOYED ON VEHICLES OR WHETHER THEY SHOULD REMAIN ON
THE GROUND READY FOR ACTION, AS WELL AS CONCERNING OTHER SMALL DETAILS. I
INSTRUCTED THAT 14 ROCKETS BE AT THE READY IN BAGHDAD. I NOTICED THAT THE
COMMANDERS WERE ABSOLUTELY COMFORTABLE WITH THOSE MEASURES, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT THEY ADDRESSED SPECIFICS. I HAD STEPPED INTO AN AREA THAT
THEY CONSIDERED TO BE INTEGRAL TO THEIR SPECIALIZATION, INCLUDING THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE IRON LEVERS THAT EVERY BRIGADE NEEDED FOR LOADING. I
ALSO INTERVENED IN SUCH AREAS AS THE TECHNICAL BATTERIES AND THE FIRST
MAINTENANCE UNIT. THE REASON WAS THAT I FELT THAT WAS NECESSARY IF WE
WERE TO GUARD AGAINST ANY CONFUSION OR LACK OF COORDINATION WHEN
MILITARY ACTION BEGAN. (MORE) 3 NON 10 JANUARY 1991 (SUBTITLE) I
REQUESTED A DETAILED CHART OF ENEMY TARGETS IN "AL-KHAFJI" AND "RA'S AL-
MISH'AB" FROM THE OPERATIONAL ROCKETS CONTROL CENTER AND THEY OBLIGED.
ON 15 JANUARY 1991 I DIRECTED THAT THEY AMEND THEIR PLAN SO THAT IT WOULD
PROVIDE FOR A SIMULTANEOUS STRIKE AT THE TWO TARGETS AND THAT ALL UNITS BE
PREPARED TO COLLECTIVELY HIT ANY ONE OF THE TWO. I SPELLED OUT MY
INSTRUCTIONS IN SOME DETAIL TO SATISFY MYSELF THAT I WAS BEING FULLY
UNDERSTOOD. I ALSO SATISFIED MYSELF WITH RESPECT TO THE MEASURES BEING
TAKEN AT THE CENTER IN REGARD TO THE EXERCISE IN THE SECOND BATTALION OF
BRIGADE 225 OF EACH OF THE SECOND CORPS AND THE COMMAND OF THE FORCES
OF JIHAD. ALSO ON THAT DAY CORRESPONDING TO 24 JUMADA AL-AKHIRAH OF THE
HEJIRAH YEAR 1411, I SUBMITTED A REPORT TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT
INCORPORATING THE ADDITIONAL TARGETS ABOUT WHICH WE HAD BEEN ALERTED BY
THE GENERAL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE ON 9 JANUARY 1991. MY PLANNING
WAS BASED ON THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVES THAT HE HAD ISSUED ON 6 JANUARY
1991 AND WHICH I RECEIVED ON 8 JANUARY 1991. HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRESIDENT
HAD ALREADY GIVEN CLEARANCE FOR OUR CHOICE OF TARGETS IN TEL AVIV AND
HAIFA AND THEIR ENVIRONS AS PRIORITY TARGETS IN THE EVENT OF A STRIKE BEING
LAUNCHED AGAINST THE ZIONIST ENTITY. I EXPLAINED IN MY REPORT THE POINT OF
VIEW OF THE ROCKET CORPS INSOFAR WITH RESPECT TO STRIKES AT THE
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CONCENTRATIONS OF THE AME4p�rjm,;cric;Elkele726-71-8/1"6/66�cp6M8Z3'8VERE BASED IN
SAUDI ARABIAN TERRITORY. IT EMERGED THAT STRATEGIC ROCKETS WERE NOT MUCH
USE AGAINST CERTAIN TARGETS, PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT WERE SOMEWHAT
DISTANT OR SMALL IN SIZE OR ABOUT WHICH WE KNEW VERY LITTLE. ACCORDINGLY,
WE SETTLED INSTEAD FOR "DHAHRAN" AS A FIRST PRIORITY SAUDI TARGET
FOLLOWED RESPECTIVELY BY "DAMMAM," "AL-JUBAYL," AND "HAFR AL-BATIN." BEFORE
THAT, AS OF 13 AUGUST 1990, ENEMY TARGETS IN "DHAHRAN" AND "MUJAMMA' BAQIQ"
HAD FOR US A LOWER PRIORITY. I EXPLAINED THAT OUR CAPABILITIES HAD BEEN
STEPPED UP SO THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO LAUNCH ROCKET ATTACKS AT 14 BASES.
I PROPOSED THAT WE HIT TARGETS IN TEL AVIV WITH EIGHT ROCKETS AND IN HAIFA
WITH SIX. AS FOR ENEMY TARGETS IN "RIYADH," "DHAHRAN," AND "MUJAMMA' BAQIQ," I
SUGGESTED THAT WE HAD THREE CHOICES: 1--FOURTEEN ROCKETS TO BE LAUNCHED
AT ENEMY CONCENTRATIONS IN "RIYADH" OR "DHAHRAN" OR "MUJAMMA' BAQIQ". 2--TO
HIT ENEMY TARGETS IN "RIYADH" AND "DAHRAN" ONLY. 3--TO HIT ALL OF THE THREE
TARGETS. THE TIME FRAME THAT I PROPOSED FOR AN ATTACK ON THE ZIONIST ENTITY
WAS 22 HOURS, FOLLOWED 10 HOURS AFTERWARDS BY AN ATTACK ON ENEMY
TARGETS IN SAUDI ARABIA. (MORE) END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
- JN2511081498 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 3 NOV 98 P 11111 CLOSE TO
IRAQ.
Collection: FB
Creator:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
Description: (U) None
UNCLASSIFIED
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Language: eng
Precedence: ROUTINE
Source:
Attributions: SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 3 NOV 98 P 11
Subject: --
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