IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (4)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06765436
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00293
• Publication Date: November 23, 1998

(U) IRAQI COMMANDERAp-p-rc7fed -60546,)
Identifiers:
Document Number: WA2311083398
Dates:
Date Published: 23-Nov-1998 07:33:00
Date Received: 23-Nov-1998 02:35:53
Coverage:
CIA Country Code: IRQ
Region: MIDDLEEAST
Publisher:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
UNCLASSIFIED 1
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765436
I
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765436
(b)(3)
(U) SERIAL: WA2311083398
(U) COUNTRY: IRAQ SUBJ: TAKE 3 OF 4--IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (4)
(U) REF: JN2311082098 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 1 NOV 98 P 11 /// TO 50
MINUTES.
(U) SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 1 NOV 98 P 11 TEXT:
(U) SO, WE TRIED TO SHORTEN THE TIME BY HOLDING MORE TRAINING, AND WE ASKED
THE UNITS TO GIVE ONLY 35 MINUTES TO AL-HUSAYN MISSILE AND 15 MINUTES TO THE
OPERATIONAL MISSILES AND TO SHORTEN THE TIME USED TO ENTER THE POSITIONS
WITH THE MINIMUM QUANTITY OF EQUIPMENT AND CHANGE THE SHELTERS AND
POSITIONS. WE ALSO BANNED THE USE OF WIRELESS EQUIPMENT DURING THESE
ACTIVITIES, STRESSING THE NEED TO WITHDRAW IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE MOMENT
OF FIRING, USING NO VEHICLES. WE SAID THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF THESE
ACTIVITIES WAS THE LAUNCHERS AND THE MISSILES. THEREFORE, WE BANNED THE
ENTRY OF ANY OTHER EQUIPMENT. WE ALSO RELIED ON NIGHT ACTION AND OTHER
MEASURES TO SECURE PROTECTION, CAMOUFLAGE, AND CONCEALMENT, INCLUDING
THE PAINTING OF EQUIPMENT WITH A SPECIAL PAINT. IN ORDER TO INSTALL THE
CAMOUFLAGE BASES IN THE WESTERN REGION AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE, I REQUESTED
THE ELECTRIC MECHANIZED ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE TO CARRY OUT THIS DUTY
QUICKLY. THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF WELCOMED OUR MEASURES AND ASKED FOR
THEIR IMPLEMENTATION. I INFORMED THIS TO THE CORPS AND MISSILE UNITS ON THE
SAME NIGHT. 17 SEPTEMBER 1990 (SUBHEAD) I TRIED TO FIND A MORE EFFECTIVE WAY
TO FILL MISSILES WITH FUEL, ASKING A TECHNICAL COMMITTEE TO DO THE WORK. AN
APPROPRIATE WAY WAS ACTUALLY WORKED OUT. AS A RESULT, THIS PROCESS TOOK
ONLY 30 MINUTES. I THANKED THE COMMITTEE FOR ITS EFFORTS. 20 SEPTEMBER 1990
(SUBHEAD) I SHOULD CONGRATULATE STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HUSAYN RASHID,
ASSISTANT TO THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, ON ASSUMING HIS NEW POST AS ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF. HIS FORMER POST WAS OCCUPIED BY STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
SULTAN HASHIM AHMAD, WHO BECAME ASSISTANT TO THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR
UNCLASSIFIED 2
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765436
OPERATIONS. TODAY, WE SENTpc;\;edfOr-lie-re.a.s-e727871.6/69cb�4�NORTH OF
BAGHDAD TO THE SOUTH TO REINFORCE OUR MISSILES IN KUWAIT. (MORE) 1 NOV
NO MEASURE WAS TAKEN REGARDING THE SAUDI TERRITORY MAPS THAT (b)(3)
WE ORDERED ON 29 AUGUST. THERE WAS A PROBLEM. THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
HAD NOT DRAWN UP MILITARY MAPS FOR THE ARAB COUNTRIES AT A TIME WHEN IT
HAD MAPS AND INFORMATION OF THE WHOLE WORLD. THIS SHARPLY CONTRASTED
WITH THOSE STANDING IN THE SAME TRENCH WITH IRAQ'S ENEMIES, AND I WAS FILLED
WITH PAIN AND BITTERNESS. ONCE AGAIN, I WAS OBLIGED TO WRITE TO THE
OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT, EXPLAINING THAT WHAT HAD BEEN DONE BY THE
MILITARY SURVEY DIRECTORATE COULD NOT BE RELIED ON AND THAT IF IT HAD NO
OTHER CAPABILITIES, IT SHOULD HAVE CLARIFIED IT SO THAT WE COULD RELY ON OUR
OWN EFFORTS. I URGED THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS CHARGED WITH CHECKING
COORDINATES TO PROVIDE ACCURATE INFORMATION AFTER I SECRETLY PREPARED A
LIST OF TARGETS AND OTHER POINTS. THE COORDINATES COULD NOT BE CHECKED
FOR THEY WERE NOT NEAR THE BORDER BUT IN THE DEPTH. I AND THE MILITARY
SURVEY DIRECTORATE CHIEF DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH THE ASSISTANT TO THE
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF AND FOUND OUT WAYS TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM. IN THE
EVENING, I HELD A MEETING TO STUDY THE RESULTS OF THE CHECKING OF THE IRAQI
AL-NIDA' LAUNCHER. IN FACT, THIS LAUNCHER IS NOT AS FLEXIBLE AS THE FOREIGN-
MADE ONE CALLED TIL, WHICH STANDS FORM TRANSPORTATION, INSTALLATION, AND
LAUNCHING. AL-NIDA' LAUNCHER, HOWEVER, HELPED US INTENSIFY THE FIRING BUT
WAS NOT SUITABLE FOR TACTICAL MANEUVERING BECAUSE IT FAILED TO MEET
TRANSPORTATION, INSTALLATION, AND LAUNCHING REQUIREMENTS. WHAT WAS EVEN
MORE DANGEROUS WAS THAT IT WAS LOADED ON THE SITE IN CONFLICT WITH MY
ORDERS TO SHORTEN THE TIME USED FOR THE ENTRY INTO THE POSITION.
MOREOVER, CHECKING THE MISSILES BY ACTUALLY INSTALLING AND PREPARING
THEM TECHNICALLY BEFORE BEING TAKEN TO THEIR LAUNCHING SITE, NEEDED
LAUNCHERS AND OTHER COMPLICATED PROCESSES. WE SUBMITTED THE RESULTS OF
THE CHECKING TO THE Mb, WHICH STARTED TESTS ON THE ISSUE OF FLEXIBILITY
THAT WE HAD PROPOSED FOR THESE LAUNCHERS. WE ALSO ASKED FOR INCREASING
THE NUMBER TO SIX LAUNCHERS. AS A RESULT OF MANY TECHNICAL PROBLEMS, I
DECIDED TO USE THESE LAUNCHERS ONLY IN THE SOUTH, WHICH ENJOYS MANY
NATURAL ELEVATIONS SUITABLE FOR THAT PURPOSE. 22 OCTOBER 1990 (SUBHEAD)
WE STARTED THE EXERCISES TODAY IN THE WESTERN REGION OF THE COUNTRY,
WHICH WOULD BE OUR PRINCIPAL OPERATIONS FIELD. IN THE EVENING, I WAS VERY
BUSY ISSUING ORDERS AND RESPONDING TO OTHERS. THE MISSILE ATTACK ON THE
ZIONIST ENTITY STARTED AFTER THE ENEMY CARRIED OUT A TREACHEROUS STRIKE
AGAINST BELOVED IRAQ. OUR MISSILES RAINED ON IMPORTANT MILITARY TARGETS
AND OTHER TARGETS FEEDING THE ENEMY'S WAR MACHINE. I WAS PLEASED BY THE
SUCCESS OF THE MISSION. THESE WERE THE DETAILS OF A BATTLE BY TELEPHONE,
WHICH WE APPLIED FOR TRAINING PURPOSES BETWEEN OUR HEADQUARTERS ON THE
ONE HAND AND BRIGADES 223 AND 224 AND THE OTHER CONCERNED UNITS ON THE
OTHER. LIEUTENANT COLONEL MAHMUD WAHIB, AN OFFICER OF OUR DIRECTORATE
HEADQUARTERS, ENTERED MY ROOM AND SHOOK HANDS WITH ME, CONGRATULATED
ME ON THE SUCCESS OF THE EXERCISE, AND HANDED ME SOME OBSERVATIONS. I
IMAGINED FOR A WHILE THAT THE ARAB MASSES HAD COME INTO MY ROOM CHANTING
FOR IRAQ AND ITS BRAVE LEADER SADDAM. (MORE) END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
- JN2311082098 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 1 NOV 98 P 11 /// TO 50
MINUTES.
Collection: FB
UNCLASSIFIED 3
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765436
Creator:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765436
Description: (U) None
Language: eng
Precedence: ROUTINE
Source:
Attributions: SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 1 NOV 98 P 11
Subject: --
UNCLASSIFIED 4
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765436