IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (4)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06765435
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00293
• Publication Date: November 23, 1998

Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765435
U IN UL/AJ J iritu
(U) IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (4)
Identifiers:
Document Number: WA2311083298
Dates:
Date Published: 23-Nov-1998 07:32:00
Date Received: 23-Nov-1998 02:35:31
Coverage:
CIA Country Code: IRQ
Region: MIDDLEEAST
Publisher:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
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(U) SERIAL: WA2311083298
(U) COUNTRY: IRAQ SUBJ: TAKE 2 OF 4--IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (4)
(U) REF: JN2311082098 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 1 NOV 98 P 11 /// THE
ENEMY'S PLANS:
(U) SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 1 NOV 98 P 11 TEXT:
(U) 1. NIGHT ACTION.
(U) 2. SHORTENING THE TIME USED TO MAKE TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL
PREPARATIONS FOR MISSILE FIRING.
(U) 3. APPLYING CERTAIN RULES IN SHELTERS AND POSITIONS.
(U) 4. ADHERING TO CONCEALMENT AND DECEPTION RULES.
(U) 5. PROVIDING AIR PROTECTION IN COORDINATION WITH THE AIR DEFENSE
SECTORS.
(U) 6. SECURING COVERS OF THE COLOR OF SAND FOR ALL EQUIPMENT.
(U) 7. FORMING THE FIRST AND THE SECOND SPECIAL DUTY GROUPS FOR THE
WESTERN REGION AND KUWAIT RESPECTIVELY TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY
CAMOUFLAGE.
(U) 8. MANUFACTURING CAMOUFLAGED LAUNCHERS.
(U) 9. CARRYING OUT OTHER PLANS TO CONFUSE THE ENEMY AND FOIL ITS PLANS.
(U) ON THIS DAY, 15 SEPTEMBER 1990, WE DISTRIBUTED MISSILE UNITS TO ARMY
CORPS, AND WE ASKED BATTALIONS TO GIVE SUPPORT TO THE ARMY CORPS AS
FOLLOWS:
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(U) THE THIRD BATTALION OF BRIGADE 225 WITHOUT THE AL-RA'D (LUNA) BATTERY AND
THE FIRST BATTALION OF BRIGADE 226 WITHOUT AL-TARIQ (ASTRAS) RADAR WILL
EXTEND SUPPORT TO THE 3D ARMY CORPS. THE FIRST BATTALION OF BRIGADE 225
WITH THE (LUNA} BATTERY AND THE SECOND BATTALION OF BRIGADE 226 WILL
SUPPORT THE 4TH ARMY CORPS. THE SECOND BATTALION OF BRIGADE 225 (LUNA) AND
THE THIRD BATTALION OF BRIGADE 226 (ASTRAS) WILL SUPPORT THE 6TH ARMY
CORPS.
(U) WE ALSO DEFINED THESE UNITS' PRIORITIES AS FOLLOWS:
(U) 1. HAFAR AL-BATIN-AL-SALIMI.
(U) 2. RA'S AL-SABIYAH.
(U) 3. AL-MANAQISH.
(U) 4. AL-WAFRAH-AL-NUWAYSIB.
(U) THESE MEASURES WERE TAKEN AFTER WE DISCUSSED THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF. ON 16 SEPTEMBER 1990, I FINISHED MY ANALYSIS OF THE
INFORMATION, WHICH WAS PROVIDED TO US BY THE GENERAL MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE. THE INFORMATION QUOTED THE US FORCES AS SAYING
THAT THE IRAQI MISSILES TOOK 15 MINUTES TO BE LAUNCHED AND THAT THE US AIR
FORCE COULD DESTROY THEM WITHIN THAT TIME LIMIT. THIS WHAT SCHWARZKOPF
MENTIONED IN HIS MEMOIRS FOR 19 JANUARY 1991, WHEN HE SAID THAT THE
LAUNCHING OPERATION NEEDED FROM 30 TO 60 MINUTES. OF COURSE, HE WAS
INACCURATE. I READ HIS MEMOIRS, WHICH WERE TRANSLATED INTO ARABIC. HE SAID
THAT PRINCE KHALID BIN-SULTAN HAD LEARNED FROM THE EGYPTIANS THAT THE
IRAQI LAUNCHER DID NOT TAKE MORE THAN 60 MINUTES WHILE SCHWARZKOPF SAID,
ACCORDING TO HIS INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, THAT IT TOOK ONLY 30 MINUTES. HOW
SILLY THIS INFORMATION IS! IN 1993, I DISCOVERED FROM THE QUESTIONS POSED BY
THE INSPECTION TEAMS AND FROM SCHWARZKOPF'S MEMOIRS THAT THE ENEMY
ERRED IN LOCATING OUR POSITIONS BY SCORES OF KILOMETERS. (MORE) 1 NOV
I TOLD THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT THAT FROM 35 TO 40 MINUTES (b)(3)
WERE NEEDED TO PREPARE FOR A STRIKE BY AL-HUSAYN MISSILE. BUT IF A
TECHNICAL FAILURE TOOK PLACE DURING PREPARATION, THE PROCESS WOULD TAKE
ABOUT 60 MINUTES. IN THIS CASE, THE ELECTRIC SYSTEM SHOULD BE SWITCHED OFF
AND IT COULD NOT BE SWITCHED ON AGAIN BEFORE THE ELAPSE OF AT LEAST TWO
HOURS. AS A RESULT, THE SYSTEM SHOULD BE MOVED INTO THE SHELTER BUT NOT
BEFORE HALF AN HOUR TO GIVE THE GYROSCOPIC DEVICES ENOUGH TIME TO COOL
OFF. WE MAY EXPOSE DEVICES TO DANGER WHILE TRYING TO SECURE THE SAFETY OF
THE LAUNCHER IN EMERGENCY CASES. I ALSO EXPLAINED SIMILAR ISSUES RELATED
TO AL-RA'D AND AL-TARIQ MISSILES AND THE FIXED BASES OF THE STRATEGIC
MISSILES. A SPECIALIZED COMMITTEE STUDIED THE ZIONIST ENEMY'S CAPABILITY OF
CARRYING OUT AN AIR OR MISSILE STRIKE AGAINST OUR BASES IMMEDIATELY AFTER
AN IRAQI MILITARY STRIKE. THE STUDY WAS CONDUCTED IN RESPONSE TO OUR
DEMAND AFTER WE DISCUSSED THE SITES OF THE NEW SHELTERS. THE COMMITTEE
SAID THAT THE ENEMY MISSILE RETALIATION WOULD TAKE FROM 30 TO 40 MINUTES
AND ITS AIR RETALIATION WOULD TAKE FROM 40 TO 50 MINUTES. (MORE) END OF
MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
- JN2311082098 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 1 NOV 98 P 11 /// THE ENEMY'S
PLANS:
Collection: FB
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Creator:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
Description: (U) None
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Language: eng
Precedence: ROUTINE
Source:
Attributions: SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 1 NOV 98 P 11
Subject: --
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