IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (1)
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
06765421
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 28, 2022
Document Release Date:
November 20, 2018
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2018-00293
Publication Date:
November 20, 1998
File:
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Body:
(U) IRAQI COMMANDERAp-p-rc7fed i as f&i6?o C06765421)
Identifiers:
Document Number: WA2011153898
Dates:
Date Published: 20-Nov-1998 14:37:00
Date Received: 20-Nov-1998 09:42:20
Coverage:
CIA Country Code: IRQ
Region: MIDDLEEAST
Publisher:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
UNCLASSIFIED 1
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(b)(3)
(U) SERIAL: WA2011153898
(U) COUNTRY: IRAQ SUBJ: TAKE 3 OF 5--IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (1)
(U) REF: JN2011144298 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT 98 P 11111 STRIKES
BE REPEATED?
(U) SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT 98 P 11 TEXT:
(U) THE PARTICIPANTS AGREED THAT WE MUST CONCENTRATE ON THE TARGETS
WHICH SHOULD BE HIT BY THE MISSILE CORPS AND THOSE BY THE AIR FORCE. WE
FOUND EIGHT SUITABLE TARGETS FOR THE MISSILE CORPS AND EIGHT FOR THE AIR
FORCE. THUS, WE HAD 16 SUITABLE TARGETS FOR ATTACK BY AIRCRAFT AND
MISSILES IN RETALIATION FOR ANY MILITARY ACTION THAT MIGHT BE CARRIED OUT BY
THE ZIONIST ENTITY AGAINST IRAQI TARGETS. WE TOOK INTO CONSIDERATION THE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S DIRECTIVES THAT THE TARGETS SHOULD BE FAR FROM
CITIES AND RESIDENTIAL AREAS AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE VITAL TO ENEMY
MILITARY EFFORT, WHICH WOULD THUS DETER THEM FROM COMMITTING FURTHER
CRIMES AGAINST THE IRAQIS AND THE STRUGGLER PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. 28 AUGUST
1989 MORE UPDATED MAPS OF PALESTINE WERE PRINTED AFTER THE MILITARY
INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE HAD CARRIED OUT A GENERAL REVISION OF THE
COORDINATES. EFFORTS WERE ALSO CONCERTED AT THE MISSILE DIRECTORATE TO
MAKE THE CHANGES IN LIGHT OF THE NEW MAPS AND DATA. A FEW MINUTES BEFORE
CLOSE OF BUSINESS, I RECEIVED THE REPORT ABOUT THE OFFICIAL SOVIET APOLOGY
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NOT TO SUPPLY US WITH AR17 r 0 r-14;ij 6-i oionbE6-8,T2-i'ENSE MINISTRY
AND MIO THAT THEY NO LONGER PRODUCED THE MISSILES AND DID NOT HAVE ANY
RESERVE. 7 OCTOBER 1989 I REMEMBER THIS DAY IN 1973 VERY WELL. I WAS
ENTHUSIASTIC AS ANY OTHER FIGHTER IN THE IRAQI ARMY. WAR BROKE OUT ON 6
OCTOBER 1973 ON THE EGYPTIAN AND SYRIAN FRONTS, AND IRAQ DECIDED TO TAKE
PART AFTER HEARING THE NEWS FROM THE RADIOS. I WAS STAFF OFFICER AT THE
TIME IN CHARGE OF MOVEMENTS AND ARMAMENTS IN THE ARTILLERY DIRECTORATE.
WE WERE FOLLOWING THE MOVEMENT OF OUR FORCES AS THEY RUSHED TO THE
RESCUE OF DAMASCUS. THEY INCLUDED TANKS AND ARMORED CARS. I SPOKE
ENTHUSIASTICALLY: IF ALL THE STRATEGIC MISSILES AND GUNS WITH THE ARAB
STATES ARE USED IN ONE EFFECTIVE STRIKE, WHAT CAN THE ZIONIST ENTITY AND THE
UNITED STATES DO IN FACE OF SUCH A MASSIVE FORCE? CAN THEY TAKE REVENGE
FROM ALL THE ARAB STATES?! MY VISION STEMMED FROM MY BELIEF AND FAITH
ABOUT THE NEED FOR A UNIFIED ARAB POLICY AGAINST THE ZIONIST ENTITY. WE HAD
THE STRONGEST WEAPON, OIL. AND LIFE, IN MY OPINION, WAS FAITH AND JIHAD. SO,
WHAT WERE WE WAITING FOR? I RECALLED HOW I FOUGHT IN THE 1967 WAR AND HOW
A RELATIVE OF MINE FELL IN THE BATTLE WITH PRIDE. HE WAS A CO-PILOT OF THE
IRAQI PLANE SHOT DOWN OVER TEL AVIV IN 1967. IT WAS ONE OF TWO IRAQI PLANES
THAT FLEW DEEP INTO ENEMY TERRITORY. WELL, I SAID, THE DAY WILL COME WHEN
WE WILL ACHIEVE THE BIG DREAM. (MORE) 25 OCT 1 NOVEMBER 1989 THE
WORK CONTINUED TO ACHIEVE AT LEAST THE MINIMUM LEVEL OF ENGINEERING
PREPARATION FOR THE PROCESS OF HIDING THE LAUNCHING PADS OF MOBILE AND
FIXED BASES WITH THE LIMITED RESOURCES AVAILABLE THEN WITH THE MILITARY
ENGINEERING CORPS. WE RECEIVED THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF'S APPROVAL OF
WHAT WE TERMED "PROJECT 44" FOR FULL ENGINEERING SUPPORT. THE PROJECT
WAS SUMMED AS FOLLOWS: DUE TO THE RANGE OF AL-HUSAYN MISSILE, H2 AREA IN
THE WESTERN DESERT WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR LAUNCHING STRIKES AT TARGETS IN
THE CENTER OF OCCUPIED PALESTINE, SUCH AS TEL AVIV; H3 AREA WOULD BE
SUITABLE FOR LAUNCHING STRIKES AT TARGETS IN THE SOUTH, SUCH AS ELAT; AND
THE AREA WEST OF KILOMETER 160 WOULD BE SUITABLE FOR LAUNCHING STRIKES AT
TARGETS IN THE NORTH, SUCH AS HAIFA. AND DUE TO THE FACT THAT WESTERN IRAQ
IS ALL DESERT AND FREE OF SUITABLE NATURAL FORTIFICATIONS, IT WAS PLANNED
TO BUILD SUCH INSTALLATIONS THAT REQUIRED TIME AND THE ALLOCATION OF LARGE
SUMS OF MONEY. IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE INSTALLATIONS SHOULD INCLUDE
SCORES OF ARMED SHELTERS TO PROTECT AND HIDE THE MEANS OF FIRING,
FORTIFIED DEPOTS TO STORE MISSILE PARTS, AND FORTIFIED COMMAND POSTS AND
SHELTERS FOR PERSONNEL UP TO THE LEVEL OF BRIGADE, BATTALION, AND BATTERY.
THIS WAS IN ADDITION TO BUILDING DOUBLE THE NUMBER OF SUCH INSTALLATIONS
WITH LESS FORTIFICATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF CAMOUFLAGE AND DEPLOYMENT. I
MUST EXPLAIN HERE THAT THESE INSTALLATIONS WERE NOT BUILT AS WE HAD IN
MIND, IN VIEW OF THE DIFFICULTY OF INSURING THE RESOURCES. I HAD ALWAYS
HOPED TO POSSES A MISSILE SYSTEM WITH A RANGE OF 850-1000 KILOMETERS AND A
HIGH ACCURACY TO ENABLE US TO ATTACK ANY TARGET IN THE ZIONIST ENTITY FROM
SAFE AREAS IN IRAQ; IN OTHER WORDS, FROM AREAS CONCEALED AND FORESTED SO
THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO HIDE IN THEM, NOT LIKE THE WESTERN REGION
WHICH IS OPEN DESERT WITH NO FORTIFICATIONS IN SIGHT. 5 DECEMBER 1989 THE
PRESIDENT CONTINUED TO FOLLOW THE STAGES OF OUR WORK, WHICH INCREASED
OUR MORALE AND MADE US WORK CONTINUOUSLY WITHOUT FEELING TIRED OR
NEEDING LEAVE OR REST. I THOUGHT THAT THE EFFORTS PUT UP BY SOME OF OUR
TECHNICIANS WERE BEYOND HUMAN ENDURANCE AND DEFINITELY SHOWED A DESIRE
TO EXCEL AND TO CREATE. HERE ARE THE MIO MEN GIVING THE HOMELAND THEIR
BEST SCIENTIFIC EFFORTS. AND HERE ARE THEIR EFFORTS BEARING FRUITS WITH THE
LAUNCHING OF AL'-ABID MISSILE THIS DAY AFTER SINCERE AND EARNEST WORK AND
UNCLASSIFIED 3
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SEVERAL MONTHS FIELDS OF PrApproved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765421E EXPERIMENT
WAS A SUCCESS, THE GOOD TIDINGS WERE COMMUNICATED, AND WE REAPED THE
FRUIT OF OUR PATIENCE, HARD WORK, AND EFFORTS, WHICH WERE PURELY IRAQI,
WITHOUT THE HELP OF ANY FOREIGN EXPERTISE. 29 DECEMBER 1989 THE YEAR 1989
CAME TO AN END, BUT THERE WERE STILL MANY PROBLEMS THAT REQUIRED
SOLUTIONS IN THE ARMAMENT, LOGISTICAL, AND MANAGEMENT FIELDS. (MORE) END
OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
- JN2011144298 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT 98 P 11 /// STRIKES BE
REPEATED?
Collection: FB
Creator:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
Description: (U) None
Language: eng
Precedence: ROUTINE
Source:
UNCLASSIFIED
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Attributions: SOURCE: AMMAN A'Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 CO6765421/8 P 11
Subject: --
UNCLASSIFIED 5
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