IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (1)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06765420
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00293
• Publication Date: November 20, 1998

(U) IRAQI COMMANDERAp-p-rc7fed -6054(5)
Identifiers:
Document Number: WA2011153798
Dates:
Date Published: 20-Nov-1998 14:37:00
Date Received: 20-Nov-1998 09:42:18
Coverage:
CIA Country Code: IRQ
Region: MIDDLEEAST
Publisher:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
UNCLASSIFIED 1
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765420
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765420
(b)(3)
(U) SERIAL: WA2011153798
(U) COUNTRY: IRAQ SUBJ: TAKE 2 OF 5--IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (1)
(U) REF: JN2011144298 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT 98 P 11111
PEACEFUL TAMMUZ REACTOR.
(U) SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT 98 P 11 TEXT:
(U) STAFF GENERAL 'ADNAN KHAYRALLAH, DEPUTY COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE
ARMED FORCES AND DEFENSE MINISTER WHO HEADED THIS COMMITTEE, CONVEYED
THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S DIRECTIVES THAT THE TASK OF THE MISSILE CORPS WAS
TO SELECT MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL TARGETS IN THE ZIONIST ENTITY, IF IT
ATTACKED OUR MILITARY AND INDUSTRIAL INSTALLATIONS. WE WOULD ALSO NOT
REPLY WITH OUR STRATEGIC MISSILES UNTIL THE ZIONIST AIRCRAFT HAD RETURNED.
THIS WAS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THEY WOULD BE ABLE TO AVOID OUR GROUND
DEFENSES. OUR AIRCRAFT WOULD THEN REPLY FIRST. THEN THE MISSILES WOULD
PLAY THEIR ROLE, DEPENDING OF COURSE ON THE TIME NEEDED FOR PREPARATION. I
EXPLAINED THE FACTS ABOUT THE TECHNICAL AND LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS THAT (b)(3)
WERE NEEDED FOR AN EFFECTIVE STRIKE. I SAID THAT THE TIME NEEDED BY EACH
BATTERY TO CARRY OUT THE STRIKE IS EIGHT HOURS FROM THE TIME OF RECEIVING
ORDERS. THIS WAS ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ALL THE EQUIPMENT NEEDED WAS
CLOSE TO THE LAUNCHING SITE. BUT, IF A DECISION WAS TAKEN TO PACK THE
MISSILES IN ADVANCE, THE TIME WOULD BE SHORTENED BY TWO HOURS. IT MUST BE
UNCLASSIFIED 2
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765420
POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THATA�p'Fo\WFO.R7e7H1-8-ti 675' coz 76 Ti2-0E R ONE MONTH.
WE HAD TO DECIDE ON THE NUMBER OF MISSILES NEEDED FOR EACH TARGET WHEN
SEVERAL TARGETS WERE TO BE ATTACKED AT THE SAME TIME SO AS TO ASSIGN THE
FIRING CREWS. I EXPLAINED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO INSURE DIRECT
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE GENERAL COMMAND AND THE LAUNCHING SITES FOR
QUICK ACTION. THIS WAS IN ADDITION TO COMMUNICATION WITH THE EARLY WARNING
SYSTEMS. AND, TO PROTECT OUR MEANS OF FIRING, I SAID THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL
TO ESTABLISH FIXED BASES. FINALLY, I SAID THAT IT WAS ALSO ESSENTIAL TO INSURE
ACCURATE AND DETAILED MAPS OF THE TARGETS, CARRY OUT FIRING TESTS FROM
EAST TO WEST TO CHECK ACCURACY, AND TO CONSIDER THE MEANS OF
CAMOUFLAGING, CONCEALING, AND STOCKPILING MISSILES. MY PROPOSAL
CONCERNING FIXED BASES WAS INFLUENCED BY MILITARY INDUSTRIALIZATION
ORGANIZATION (MIO) PLANS. THEREFORE, I EXPLAINED THE NEED TO COORDINATE
WITH MIO FOR MORE FLEXIBILITY. THIS WAS ESSENTIAL DUE TO THE DIFFICULTY OF
MOVING MOBILE IRAQI LAUNCHERS IN A VERY SHORT TIME AND THE NEED TO
INTENSIFY THE FIRING ON ENEMY TARGETS. IT WAS PROVEN LATER DURING THE
IMMORTAL MOTHER OF BATTLES THAT THE PLAN WAS USEFUL IN DELUDING THE
ENEMY AND THWARTING THE DANGER TO OUR MOBILE FORCE. NEVERTHELESS A BIG
PART OF THE FORCE WAS DESTROYED BY ENEMY BOMBING. MIO WAS ABLE TO MAKE
NEW LAUNCHERS. HOWEVER, THEY WERE NOT, FROM THE ASPECT OF FLEXIBILITY
AND MANEUVERABILITY, UP TO THE STANDARD OF THE ORIGINAL LAUNCHERS, WHICH
WERE CLOSED TO THE FIXED BASES. THEREFORE, WE ONLY USED THEM ONCE FROM
THE WESTERN REGION. STILL, THEY DID A SPLENDID JOB. IT WAS A QUIET EVENING.
AND MY THOUGHTS WENT BACK TO 1964 WHEN I ENTERED A STRONG COMPETITION
FOR ADMISSION INTO THE MILITARY TECHNICAL COLLEGE IN EGYPT AND SUCCEEDED
WITH HONORS. BUT, I ALSO WAITED FOR THE RESULTS OF MY ADMISSION INTO THE
IRAQI MILITARY COLLEGE, WHICH I WANTED TO JOIN VERY MUCH. MY FATHER DID NOT
INTERFERE WITH MY CHOICE. GOD FULFILLED MY WISH AND I JOINED THE COLLEGE.
MY MOTHER'S PRAYERS MUST HAVE BEEN WITH ME ALSO. I ALMOST FLEW WITH JOY.
MILITARY SERVICE SUITED ME. IT BROUGHT ME CLOSER TO PALESTINE. I WONDERED:
WOULD I EVER FIND THE RECORD WITH THE SONG THAT CREATED OUR AWARENESS
OF THE PALESTINE QUESTION; THE ONE THAT SAYS: JERUSALEM WILL REMAIN ARAB?!
8 NOVEMBER 1988 I AND A GROUP OF OFFICERS STUDIED A REPORT AND A MAP FROM
THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE-12TH BRANCH EXPLAINING ENEMY
MILITARY TARGETS IN OCCUPIED PALESTINE, AS WELL AS OTHERS WHICH WERE NOT
ON THE MAP. THE PURPOSE WAS TO GIVE US AMPLE TIME FOR PLANNING. WE HAD
REQUESTED THIS INFORMATION THREE WEEKS AGO. AND WHEN WE GOT THE
INFORMATION WE FELT THAT ONE REQUIREMENT HAD BEEN FULFILLED. THE REPORT
INCLUDED INFORMATION ON NUCLEAR REACTORS, MILITARY AND CHEMICAL
FACTORIES, AIR BASES AND AIRPORTS, NAVAL BASES, AND TARGETS THAT GIVE
SUPPORT TO ENEMY MILITARY EFFORT. 24 JANUARY 1989 THESE COORDINATES ARE
NOT ACCURATE, I TOLD THE OFFICER FACING ME. WE DISCOVERED THAT THE
COORDINATES WE RECEIVED ON SOME OF THE TARGETS WERE NOT ACCURATE.
ACCURACY WAS OUR MAIN OBSESSION. MAPS KEPT PILING UP IN THE OPERATIONS
ROOM. THE SEARCH, INVESTIGATION, AND VERIFICATION CONTINUED FOR FIVE
CONTINUOUS MONTHS. IN MAY 1989, WITH THE HELP OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
DIRECTORATE AND THE MILITARY SURVEY DIRECTORATE, WE REACHED THE MOST
ACCURATE COORDINATES. MY THOUGHTS, AS I CARRIED ONE PARTICULAR MAP TO
THE MILITARY SURVEY DIRECTORATE, WERE WITH MY WIFE WHO WORKED HARD FOR
DAYS TRYING TO ORGANIZE A ROOM WE ASSIGNED FOR OLD THINGS IN THE TOP
FLOOR. I REMEMBER SPREADING EVERYTHING ON THE FLOOR OF THAT ROOM TO FIND
A MAP OF PALESTINE WHICH I HAD WHEN I WAS TEACHER AT THE MILITARY STAFF
COLLEGE. TAKING THAT MAP WITH ME TO THE MILITARY SURVEY DIRECTORATE TODAY
UNCLASSIFIED 3
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765420
WAS A BIG EVENT. IT HELPED UrAp-pr;TeTi P'eTeseTRii6/16/6-9 'OE0E4YciSsiLES
DIRECTORATE, DEPENDED ON OUR OWN DISCRETION WHEN IT CAME TO DECIDING
WHETHER GEOGRAPHICAL OR QUADRANGULAR COORDINATES WERE ACCURATE. THE
SHAPE OF THE TARGET WAS IMPORTANT WHEN DETERMINING THE ACCURACY OF THE
FIRING. FOR THIS REASON, WE ASKED FOR TOURIST MAPS IN MAY 1989. AND NO
SOONER THAN THE MILITARY SURVEY DIRECTORATE SUPPLIED WITH MAPS OF A 150-
200 SCALE, WHICH WE FOUND ACCEPTABLE, ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUED TO STRIVE
FOR SOMETHING BETTER. 15 JUNE 1989 ANOTHER JOINT EFFORT BEGAN WITH THE AIR
FORCE AND AIR DEFENSE COMMAND. WE HAD TO CLEARLY DEFINE OUR
RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS JOINT EFFORT. WE SPENT MANY HOURS OF TECHNICAL
DISCUSSION ON THE FIRST STRIKE. FOR EXAMPLE, SHOULD IT BY FOR THE MISSILE
CORPS OR THE AIR FORCE? AND HOW OFTEN SHOULD THE STRIKES BE REPEATED?
(MORE) END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
- JN2011144298 AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT 98 P 11111 PEACEFUL
TAMMUZ REACTOR.
Collection: FB
Creator:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
Description: (U) None
UNCLASSIFIED
4
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765420
Language: eng
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765420
Precedence: ROUTINE
Source:
Attributions: SOURCE: AMMAN AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT 98 P 11
Subject: --
UNCLASSIFIED 5
Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765420