IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (2)

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06765413
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 20, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00293
• Publication Date: November 22, 1998

Approved for Release: 2018/10/09 C06765413
U IN UL/AJ J iritu
(U) IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (2)
Identifiers:
Document Number: JN2211083998
Dates:
Date Published: 22-Nov-1998 07:51:00
Date Received: 22-Nov-1998 02:53:34
Coverage:
CIA Country Code: IRQ
Region: MIDDLEEAST
Publisher:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
UNCLASSIFIED
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(b)(3)
(U) SERIAL: JN2211083998
(U) COUNTRY: IRAQ SUBJ: TAKE 1 OF 4--IRAQI COMMANDER MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (2)
(U) REF: 1. JN2011144298 AND ADDS AL-ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT--
COMMANDER 2. MEMOIRS ON MISSILES (1)
(U) SOURCE
AL-ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 27 OCT 98 P 12 TEXT:
(U) (PART TWO OF BOOK OF MEMOIRS ENTITLED "FORTY-THREE MISSILES ON THE
ZIONIST ENTITY," BY STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL HAZIM 'ABD-AL-RAZZAQ AL-AYYUBI,
COMMANDER OF THE IRAQI SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE CORPS DURING THE GULF
WAR)
(U) (FBIS TRANSLATED TEXT) CHAPTER 2: THE ZIONISTS' THREATS 1 JANUARY 1990
(SUBHEAD) THIS IS A NEW YEAR, AND WE HAVE NEW WISHES OF PROGRESS. I BELIEVE
THAT OUR SCIENTIFIC TESTS TO DEVELOP OUR MISSILES ARE IMPORTANT TO ALL THE
ARABS WHO ARE AWARE OF THE ENEMY'S PLOTS. NOTHING HAS MADE ME MORE
UNHAPPY THAN ARAB INATTENTION TO THE ATTACK THE ZIONIST ENTITY CARRIED OUT
AGAINST THE IRAQI TAMMUZ REACTOR ON 7 JUNE 1981, ALTHOUGH IRAQ IS NOT A
NEIGHBORING STATE. SO, THE ATTACK IS PART OF A ZIONIST PLAN TO APPLY THE
SLOGAN OF "FROM THE EUPHRATES TO THE NILE," WHICH THE ZIONIST ENTITY STILL
UNCLASSIFIED 2
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ADOPTS AND WHICH IS DISPLAYED BY THE ZIONIST FLAG. THIS WAS STATED IN THE
SPEECH PRESIDENT SADDAM HUSAYN ADDRESSED TO THE CONFERENCE OF
SOLIDARITY WITH IRAQ HELD ON 12 JUNE 1981 IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTACK ON
THE IRAQI NUCLEAR REACTOR. HE SAID: "THE ATTACK AGAINST THE NUCLEAR
REACTOR IN IRAQ MEANS THAT THE ZIONIST ENEMY GIVES ITSELF THE RIGHT TO
ATTACK ANY PART OF THE ARAB HOMELAND, ANY FACTORY OR PROJECT, OR ANY
ARAB PROGRAM ANY TIME IT LIKES UNDER THE PRETEXT THAT ITS SECURITY IS
ENDANGERED. IT ALSO GIVES ITSELF THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE COURSE OF
DEVELOPMENT, GROWTH, AND POLICIES. THIS IS THE MOST DANGEROUS, HOSTILE
THEORY IN THIS AGE AND IS EVEN MORE DANGEROUS THAN FASCISM AND NAZISM.
THOSE WHO CLOSE THEIR EYES TO THIS REALITY DENY HUMAN PRINCIPLES AND
ETHICS." HENCE, IN LIGHT OF THESE WORDS SHOWING THE EXTENT OF THE DANGER,
SOME ARAB RULERS SHOULD REALIZE THE NATURE OF THE AGGRESSION AGAINST
THE ARAB NATION AND IRAQ INSTEAD OF BACKING THE ZIONISTS' PLAN TO HARM IRAQ.
MOREOVER, THIS MUJAHID COUNTRY SHOULD ACCEPT THE CHALLENGE AND KEEP ITS
EFFECTIVE WEAPONS TO DEFEND ITSELF AND THE ARAB NATION. 9 JANUARY 1990
(SUBHEAD) I LIKE HEGIRA DATES. TODAY IS 12 JUMADA AL-AWWAL 1410 HEGIRA. FOR
SOME IMPORTANT REASON, I WAS SUMMONED FROM INSIDE A CONFERENCE, HELD AT
MIO (ABBREVIATION NOT FURTHER EXPLAINED) TO STUDY THE SECOND PHASE OF AL-
'ABID MISSILE. I WAS SUMMONED TO ATTEND ANOTHER MEETING. ON THE WAY, I
THOUGHT THAT NOTHING WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAT THIS CONFERENCE EXCEPT A
MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. THIS WAS WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED. THERE WAS
ANOTHER MEETING UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF,
ATTENDED BY THE DEFENSE MINISTER, THE INDUSTRY AND MINERAL RESOURCES
MINISTER, THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF, THE AIR FORCE COMMANDER, AND THE
DIRECTOR OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OPENED THE
MEETING WITH A QUESTION ON HOW TO PREPARE OURSELVES TO CONFRONT THE
ZIONIST THREATS AND HOW TO DEPLOY OUR MISSILES IN AND PROTECT THE
WESTERN REGION. WE EXCHANGED VIEWS FRANKLY, AND WE DISCUSSED THE ISSUE
WHETHER IT WAS BETTER TO FIRE MISSILES FROM FIXED OR MOBILE BASES. THE
INDUSTRY AND MINERAL RESOURCES MINISTER SAID IT WAS BETTER TO FIRE FROM
FIXED BASES AND TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF MOBILE BASES, WHILE THE DEFENSE
MINISTER AND THE ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF SAID THAT THE MOBILE BASES WERE MORE
SUCCESSFUL. THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS DECISION, ORDERING THAT BOTH FIXED AND
MOBILE BASES BE USED ALONG WITH CAMOUFLAGE AND THAT MORE MISSILES BE
PRODUCED. HE ALSO ORDERED THAT THE AREAS FOR THE FIXED MISSILE BASES BE
CHOSEN. WE SPENT THE DAYS FROM 21 TO 25 JANUARY 1990 TRYING TO CHOOSE
AREAS FOR THE FIXED MISSILE BASES. WE SURVEYED NINE AREAS LOOKING LIKE A
SEMICIRCULAR TABLE AND SUITABLE FOR FIRING AL-HUSAYN MISSILES AT HOSTILE
TARGETS AROUND TEL AVIV AND HAIFA IN OCCUPIED PALESTINE IN ORDER TO AFFECT
THE ZIONIST ENEMY'S MILITARY AND WAR EFFORT. 17 JANUARY 1990 (SUBHEAD) WE
ASKED THE OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT TO OBTAIN THE ARMY STAFF'S AGREEMENT TO
FORM A WORKING TEAM INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF A NUMBER OF
DEPARTMENTS, COMMANDS, ARMY CORPS, AND OTHER APPARATUSES TO MEET WORK
REQUIREMENTS IN THE WESTERN REGION OF THE COUNTRY. AMONG THESE
REQUIREMENTS WERE SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS, ENGINEERING EFFORT TO
IMPROVE ROADS AND SHELTERS, CAMOUFLAGE, THE PROTECTION OF THE LAUNCHING
PADS, CHECKING THEIR SECURITY AND THAT OF ROADS TO THEM, AS WELL AS OTHER
ISSUES NECESSARY FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION. ON 29 JANUARY 1990, OUR
PROPOSALS WERE APPROVED, AND WE HAD TO CONDUCT A LAND AND AIR SURVEY OF
THE AREA IN WHICH WE WOULD WORK. (MORE) 27 OCT 31 JANUARY 1990 (b)(3)
(SUBHEAD) WE WERE BUSY TRYING TO ATTAIN ACCURACY FOR AL-HUSAYN MISSILE,
AND WE HAD TO CONDUCT A NEW FIRING TEST. WE WENT TO THE CITY OF AL-'AMARAH
UNCLASSIFIED 3
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IN MAYSAN GOVERNORATE AND FIRED FOUR MISSILES TOWARD THE WESTERN
REGION. ON THE SAME DAY, WE MADE ANOTHER SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENT BY
CONDUCTING A SUCCESSFUL TEST ON A MISSILE ENGINE IN AL-HABBANIYAH IN AL-
ANBAR GOVERNORATE IN COOPERATION WITH THE Mb. TESTS ON AL-HUSAYN MISSILE
FACED MANY DIFFICULTIES, INCLUDING THE PROBLEMS OF GUIDING THE MISSILE AND
SEARCHING FOR FALLING SHRAPNEL OVER LARGE AREAS. THE R-17 MISSILE, WHICH
THE ENEMIES CALL SCUD IS NOT AL-HUSAYN MISSILE. IT MAY BE USEFUL TO MENTION
THE FOLLOWING SPECIFICATIONS OF THE SCUD MISSILE, COMPARED TO AL-HUSAYN
MISSILE:
(U) 1. THE SCUD MISSILE WEIGHS 5,860 KG, WHILE AL-HUSAYN MISSILE WEIGHS 6,533
KG. (MORE) END OF MESSAGE UNCLASSIFIED
-1. JN2011144298 AND ADDS
COMMANDER
AL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 25 OCT--
Collection: FB
(b)(3)
Creator:
Agency Acronym: RESTON VA
Office Name: FBIS
Description: (U) None
(b)(
UNCLASSIFIED
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Language: eng
Precedence: ROUTINE
Source:
Attributions: SOURCE
okL-'ARAB AL-YAWM IN ARABIC 27 OCT 98 P 12 (b)(3)
Subject: --
UNCLASSIFIED 5
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