IRAQ: ELECTIONS DISRUPT, DO NOT DERAIL, INSURGENTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06763187
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: March 8, 2023
• Document Release Date: July 12, 2019
• Case Number: F-2017-02379
• Publication Date: February 11, 2005

Approved for Release: 2019/07/02 C06763187
11 February 2005
Iraq: Elections Disrupt, Do
Not Derail, Insurgents
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Iraq: Elections Disrupt, Do Not Derail, Insurgents
Sunni insurgents failed to disrupt Iraq's national
elections because they could not counter heavy
Coalition and Iraqi security measures throughout
much of the country. Low turnout in some Sunni
areas and the post-election resumption of insurgent
attacks�many against Iraqi security forces�indicate
that the insurgency achieved at least some of its
election-day goals and remains a potent force.
Throughout much of the Sunni areas of Iraq in the
weeks leading up to the election insurgents and
jihadists increased violence and intimidation in an
attempt to undermine the national elections:
� Plior to the election, insurgents throughout central
Iraq attacked Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq (IECI) workers and election centers and
threatened prospective voters with flyers, posters,
and word-of-mouth threats,/
� In a 26 January statement posted on a jihadist
website, the Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi group Tanzim
Qa'dat al-Jihad Fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (QJBR)
warned Iraqis to stay away from polling centers as
"the wedding (procession) of martyrs is near."
Ansar al-Sunnah (AS) issued a similar warning on
27 January.
� Total election-related attacks�on IEC1 officials,
election workers, candidates, and election facilities
and polling places�increased from 54 in December
to 490 in January
Planned guerilla and terrorist attacks on Iraqi voting
centers and security forces were part of an insurgent
II February 2005
strategy to taint the elections by frightening away
large numbers of potential voters:
a string of car-bomb attacks
was set to begin in the Baghdad area four to five
days before the elections to frighten potential
voters. Zarqawi had
given senior QJBR bombmaker Abu Umar al-Kurdi
a list of 30-40 targets�mostly polling sites in Shia
areas of Baghdad�and instructed him to make as
many car-bombs as possible to hit these targets.
�
plans were in place as of mid-
January 2005 to harass election workers and attack
the Iraqi police to undermine any sense of
government control.
�
Attacks against Coalition and Iraqi security forces
spiked on election day, but compared to some of the
bloodiest terrorist and guerilla-style attacks since
April of 2003, they did not inflict massive casualties
and failed to intimidate voters in much of the country:
�
the majority of attacks on election day took
place in the morning to set a tone of fear and
intimidation, but ebbed as the day progressed.
the volume of small-arms
and mortar and rocket attacks was high, but overall
effectiveness was low.
This report was prepared in the Office of Iraq Analysis and the Office of Terrorism Analysis. Comments
and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
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� Vague QJBR election day statements seemingly
claimed responsibility for the seven suicide bomber
attacks against polling places in Baghdad and for
various small-arms, mortar, and rocket attacks in
Baghdad, Mosul, Tall Afar, Ar Ramadi, and Diyala
Province. Low casualties reduced the overall
impact of the attacks while a reported wave of car-
bomb attacks never materialized.
Effective Security Measures (U)
Extremely tight security on election day, the high
operational tempo of Coalition and Iraqi security
forces in the weeks before, and a clampdown on
vehicular traffic hampered insurgents:
� A wave of Coalition detentions of QJBR
members�especially Abu Umar al-Kurdi�
probably derailed some of Zarqawi's plans.
� A well-rehearsed election security plan, the
gradually growing professionalism of some Iraqi
security forces, and the ban on vehicular traffic
thwarted insurgent attacks in urban centers such as
Baghdad and Mosul
These measures were not enough to prevent low
participation in Al Anbar, Diyala, Salah ad Din, and
other Sunni Arab areas. In contrast to other areas in
Iraq, in Al Anbar pre-election attacks on election
centers, clashes with Coalition forces, and election
day news broadcasts of early morning explosions
throughout Iraq resulted in extremely low voter
turnout
2
Insurgents Look to Rebound
Their failure to disrupt elections suggests limits to
insurgents' ability to the mount widespread,
coordinated attacks. Increased insurgent attacks
following the lifting of the election security lockdown
indicates that in a less stringent security environment
they remain capable of using intimidation and
coercion coupled with hit-and-run guerilla and high-
profile terrorist attacks:
� Attacks have decreased since the election day spike,
� QJBR has claimed responsibility for the 7 February
suicide car-bomb attack against a police station in
Baqubah that killed 15 and the suicide bomber
attacks on 7-8 February against Iraqi security forces
in Mosul and Baghdad that killed over 40.
� AS claimed responsibility for the 5 February
execution of seven Iraqi National Guard members
and the 7 February execution of an Iraqi translator
working for the US military.
� Several Iraqi governing officials and politicians
have been killed since the election, including a
Housing Ministry director and three members of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Baghdad on
9 February.
In the aftermath of successful elections, insurgents
will continue to conduct attacks designed to discredit
the Coalition and the Iraqi government�especially
the government's efforts to build a credible security
force�and discourage Sunni Arab participation in
the transitional process. Possible targets include:
� Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces, including Iraqi
police.
� Sunni elites, professionals and everyday citizens�
political and religious leaders, contractors, security
officials and civic workers�who are willing to
work with the Coalition and Iraqi Government.
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� Election participants and members of the
transitional government, especially Shia, who are
encouraging a multi-ethnic government.
� Iraqis who are more secular or Western leaning in
ideology or appearance.
� Government centers and party headquarters.
� Members of the Shia religious establishment,
including Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, and Shia
places of congregation, such as mosques and
community centers.
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