CIA IN KOREA 1946 - 1965 VOLUME I

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06761479
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: July 13, 2023
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2022
• Case Number: F-2017-00580
• Publication Date: July 1, 1973

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Sfelet
CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by
DD 0
CIA IN KOREA
1946 - 1965
VOLUME I
Se,Wet
DDO HP. 283
. Controlled by: EA
July 1973
PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
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This emphasis on the collection of tactical informa-
tion with its exposure of agents meant that OSO oper-
ations and activities in Korea did not fulfill long-
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range requirements.
was a major OSO project originated
at the direction of the military theatre commander,
which supported the Army by gathering tactical in-
formation. Koreans were recruited and dispatched via
sea landings on the east coast of Korea north of the
38th Parallel. A number of thel agents
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were later captured by North �Korean security forces.--
A special
mission was organized �in
March 1951 to determine the type and virulence of a
reported epidemic in North Korea, which the latter
was attributing to germ warfare. Brigadier General
Crawford Sams of the FEC Public Health unit was in-
filtrated behind enemy lines. General Sams was put
ashore by whaleboat and raft south of Wonsan. This
mission was more dangerous than usual because the Won-
san area was on the alert, having detected lights at
sea. The mission was successful and the disease was
identified as hemorrhagic smallpox. Both Sams and
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the Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) were im-
pressed with the speed and efficiency of the CIA
operation and commended
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in the mission.
personnel engaged
OSO (FRU/FEC) personnel in Pusan also concen-
trated on forming and reactivating agent networks
during the evacuation of Seoul.
after training
radio personnel,
were dispatched to Pusan
to serve as communication links with existing
nets in Seoul and Pyongyang. Efforts to
contact stay-behinds in the North Korean areas con-
tinued. Line-crossers were also used
the gathering of tactical information
in the battle areas.
and
extensively in
on enemy forces
agent
personnel were used in the collection of this ma-
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terial.--
The UN offensive in Korea to the 38th Parallel
lessened the urgency for stay-behind networks for
activities north of the Parallel. A
interrogation team was organized in Pusan to inter-
rogate prisoners and refugees.
In late 1951 the field concentrated on trying
to eliminate peripheral activity and on developing
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SET
position on the basis of his. loyalty to Rhee and his
assistance in establishing the Liberal Party.*
An ipdiction of the volume of reporting from
Korea during 1951 was reflected in statistics which
showed that from 1 November 1950 to 31 October 1951,
reports were disseminated
number,
were considered of interest
tary command. Of these, 50 percent
. Of that
to the mili-
dealt with
military or tactical information, 30 percent
with North Korean political information, 15 percent
with economic intelligence, and 5 percent
with biographic data. The reports not disseminated
to the command dealt with ROK politics, CE informa-
tion, or subjects in which the military command was
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not interested.
H. OPC Objectives and Activities
Arrangements for OPC operations in FEC were not
made until the late spring of 1950 and consequently
OPC was\not operational in Korea at the outbreak of
the conflict. The mission of OPC, which was estab-
lished by the NSC in NSC 10/2 (later 5412/2), was to
* �For further details on
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'(6�)(3�)
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see Attachment A-4. M(1)(b)(3)
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plan and execute special covert operations such as
political, economic, psychological, and guerrilla
warfare. Unlike OSO, OPC was not an intelligence-
gathering group. In theory OPC also did not formu-
late policy but implemented the policies determined
by the NSC as interpreted by the Department of State
and the Department of Defense and was under the guid-
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ance and instructions of these two departments.
The OPC base of operation
(b)(1)
_ (b)(3)
was a field head-
quarters for Korean and other Far Eastern operations.
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
The outbreak of the war in Korea imposed on CIA
broad responsibilities in the covert field. Great
pressure was exerted by the militiary services to
provide covert support to the tactical situation
through the provision of agent assets for guerrilla
warfare and evasion and escape. There was also pres-
sure on CIA to establish long-range assets in North
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OPC plans to use Han's assets in the Wonsan area for
staybehind guerrilla warfare. Later these assets were
used in which became the mission's
first large resistance guerrilla operation.
After the Inchon landing and other UN military
successes in late September 1950, all military and
diplomatic headquarters moved from Pusan to Seoul.
Several OPC personnel including also moved
to Seoul in September and in October it was decided
to close Pusan and establish OPC headquarters, under
as acting chief, in Seoul.
New staff members, including.
communications specialists, arrived to bolster the OPC
operation.
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(b)(3)
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(b)(3)
In late October an OPC base of
operations was
also established
in Pyongyang under
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who concentrated on a ground
approach to
liberate US
prisoners of war (POW's).
and (b)(3)
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city only one �d y before it was abandoned.
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on staybehind programs with emphasis on support of
organized resistance from which pilot programs of
EE, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare could be developed.
Stress was placed, therefore, on developing an EE
program based on general resistance groups which it
_ was believe/d w/ould have greater ability to receive
local support and to stay behind the lines, indefinitely.
Approximately was requested in September M(3)
1951 for arms and equipment to supply CIA-sponsored
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Korean guerrillas.
According to an agreement with EUSAK G-3 (McGee),
North Korea was divided in 1951 by a north-south line
through the center with guerrilla responsibility in the
western half falling to EUSAK G-3, while the eastern
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half was assigned to CIA (OPC).-- From January 1951
to April 1952 CIA representatives briefed EUSAK G73
controlled guerrilla forces operating off North Korea's
west Coast in EE requirements and techniques. One
OPC representative during the summer of 1951 was as-
signed to the island of Paengyong-do as an advisor on
EE techniques. In addition to the guerrilla units
also collected agents and trained them in the estab-
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lishment of EE nets.
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Among the claimed accomplishments of this guerrilla
program were the destruction of four bridges, five
factories, a railroad station, a warehouse, and a
transformer station. At least 600 casualties were
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inflicted on the enemy.
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The 8086 AU of the G-3 Miscellaneous Group was
set up to encourage, direct, and control guerrilla
activity in the coastal regions of western North Korea.
five intelligence services,
G-2, G-3, Air Force, ROK/ONI and CIA, engaged in con-
ducting covert activities without any coordination.
four other services and principally the
80.86 AU under McGee had created such a "hodge-podge"
of insecure, inefficient resistance-guerrilla programs
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that existing assets could not be used for secure post-
ceasefire activities. Some agents were even being used
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simultaneously by two or more agencies.
A maritime support operation was developed in
early 1951.
The vessels cap-
tured a number of enemy boats, together with.crews, pas-
sengers, cargo, and documentation, established .safehouses
in .the Sinuiju-Antung area, and operated as supply ves-
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sels for advance EE bases.--
In the summer of 1951 CIA urgently needed.safe
in-
filtration routes into North Korea to supplement aerial .
resupply. A
raider team was recruited and trained
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by a Navy Underwater Demolition Team (UDT) specialist dur-
ing July and August 1951. �Between August 1951 and Octo-
ber 1952 this team carried out
amphibious reconnais-
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sance and raider operations along
the east coast of North
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Korea.
successful landings were
(b)(3)
made.* --
J. OSO-OPC Relations
Unlike a number of other CIA stations, there is
* For additional information on maritime operations see
CSHP 71, History of Maritime Activities .Korea (1950-1956).
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October 1951 attended by representatives of CIA, G-2,
FEC, and G-2, Eighth Army, Ridgway, CINCFE, on 28 No-
vember 1951 ordered the establishment of Covert, Clan-
destine and Related Activities in Korea, better known
as CCRAK (later CCRAFE) Headquarters at Seoul. The
purpose Of CCRAK was to achieve better coordination
among the various US intelligence services .that were
active in Korea.
The letter order published by CINCFE dated
28 November 1951, establishing CCRAK, stated that
the Korea CIA mission (JACK) would come under the
command of the commanding officer, CCRAK, for those
operations in the field of NSC 10/2 activities and
intelligence that were in "direct support of combat
and intelligence of US Forces in Korea." The words
"direct support of combat operations" were signifi-
cant since CIA interpreted this to mean that long-
range unilateral Fl operations under NSCID/5 were
the sole responsibility of CIA and excluded from
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CCRAK control.
Under the general staff supervision of the As-
sistant Chief of Staff, G-2, FEC, CCRAK Headquarters
assumed direction of all clandestine activities of
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the Army, Navy, Air Force, and CIA in Korea in direct
support of combat operations of US forces. Guerrilla
operations in Korea remained a staff responsibility
of the G-3, Eighth Army. Provision was made in the
letter order for preserving the organizational in-
tegrity of members units "to extent required." In
the case of CIA, the channel of command wa's to con-
tinue to proceed from the Senior Representative
to the chief of the Joint Korea
Mission. The Senior Representative's approval was to
be required for CIA participation in any "joint task
force" operations mounted by CCRAK. The chief of
CCRAK was initially Colonel Washington Ives. The
chief of the CIA mission, Korea, became deputy chief
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of CCRAK, in addition to his CIA duties.
The formation of CCRAK was viewed by Headquarters
as well as the field, as a continuation of the strug-
gle by G-2, FEC, to control CIA activities in the
area in such a manner as to preclude, the performance
of clandestine tasks clearly within the jurisdiction
of CIA. Station officers believed there was no rea-
son for the existence of CCRAK in the first place and
that G-2's authority to coordinate, which it possessed
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was also initiated. This resulted in better coordi-
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nation of station activities.
In March 1952 the Korea Mission (JACK) had moved
its main headquarters to the Traymore Hotel in Seoul.
The magnitude and complexity of the CIA installations
in Korea in October 1952 were reflected in the total
physical plant which included four major installations;
Joint Korea Mission at Seoul (JACK) and the Seoul, In-
training or launching
vessels
chon, and Pusan bases, plus
or reception points, offices
of varying sizes and a staff
sonnel. This staff of indigenous
in number to approximately
October 1952 there were
or safehouses,
of indigenous per-
employees later rose
by July 1953. In
Americans with an admini-
strative and housekeeping staff of Koreans assigned
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to the Joint Korea Mission (JACK).--- In addition to
%the operations sections, JACK had complete support
facilities, including sections for service and supply,
registry, security, personnel, reports and require-
ments, medical, finance, �and mess and billeting.
The Seoul Operating Base, which existed prior
to the move of the Joint Korea Mission to Seoul, played
a more restricted role after, the transfer. This base
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had a staff
It ran (b)(3)
of Americans and
Koreans.
Projects
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
* The cover desig-
nation of the Seoul Base was changed in May 1952 to
Far East Command Department of the Army Research Unit
(FE/DARU) from the Department of the Army Liaison
Detachment (BALD).
Inchon Base, developed primarily to provide as-
sistance and support to the EE program for the west
coast of Korea, was located nine miles southeast of
Inchon
This base, which had a
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
staff of
Americans,
was concerned particularly with
(b)(3)
(b)(1)
the
and
projects.** The goal of
to contact and recruit agents
(b)(3)b)(3)
these
projects was
in North
nets for
Korea for the purpose of establishing EE
downed UN airmen.
The Pusan Base, formerly headquarters for the
* These projects are described in detail in CSHP 339,
Infiltration and Resupply of Agents in North Korea
(1952-1953).
** These EE projects are described in detail in
CSHP 339, Infiltration and:Resupply of Agents in
North Korea (1952-1953).
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into North Korea were low level and possessed only a
minimum of resistance training superimposed on a
background of guerrilla warfare for which they were
more suited and inclined.
During 1952 and 1953 approximately 20 percent
of the teams launched into North Korea failed to make
radio-
any report whatsoever. At.the'end. of 1952,
contact teams were operating. in North Korea,
of
which were holdovers from 1951. After the July 1953
Armistice only
agent radios were contacted. As
of 1 January 1954 this number had diminished to
14
and all were
in September
believed to be enemy controlled.
Chief, Intelligence Branch, stated
1952 that the mission's EE teams had
almost no chance of success, the cover was almost
uniformly bad, the mission was vague and indefinite,
the problem of communication had not been properly
solved, the agents were going in with articles of
clothing and
they did not
He predicted
equipment which would blow them, and
understand the nature of resistance work.
that they would be captured in a very
short time and that the majority of them would be
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doubled.
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All of the 'resistance programs also suffered,
according to
because of the inability of the
Korea Mission to get documents reproduced by the TSS
unit
The severe North Korean winter also
.limited many of the unconventional, warfare operations,
particularly those of OPC to those few months.with.a
favorable moon phase,.. and in the case. of air or sea
infiltrations to favorable climate conditions. .The
necessity to communicate through interpreters also
affected almost every aspect of recruitment,, training,
planning and control for unconventional warfare
projects.
The failure to employ in Korea the extensive
. experience gained in guerrilla warfare during World
War II was reflected particularly
air support/ for the Korea Mission
is estimated that approximately
V
in the inadequate
during the war.. It
agents were de-
ployed into North Korea by air from 1951 through 1952.
At times the CIA agent was only one of several drops
to be made during an Air Force flight, which also made
flare and leaflet drops, thus compromising the security
of the agent. The Air Force provided one flight, called
B-flight, to support various intelligence activities.
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Crew members, however, were never taught the finer
techniques of clandestine air support. Little stress
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was placed/oh accuracy of altitudes, speeds, and drop-
ping. The main aim was to get in and out of North
Korea regardless of the quality of service rendered.
The main technique was to penetrate during the
moon phase in clear, weather and make drops.on a light
pattern. Since the same technique was used during
every moon phase, a defense of hill watches was set
up, and numerous fires in various type patterns would
appear on the ground whenever a plane flew overhead.
Asa
even
over
tons of rice and other items as well as
result, air crews were dropping supplies and
personnel without any certainty that they were
the right drop pattern and not a trap.
Many
personnel were dropped into North Korea from 25 June
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to 27 July 1953.
T. Criticism of Coverage of South and
North. Korea (1952)
The Rhee government increasingly became a one-
show operated along personal dictatorial lines.
Rhee's position had strengthened considerably, partly
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information which would please their American cus-
. tomers. All too often the case officer dealt with
the principal agent and accepted the operational data
without further investigation. There was, for example,
"no shred of information supporting the existence of
so-called strategic penetrations, "which
included purported high-level North Korean officials
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and military,officers, stated further that
intelligence was not only fallacious, but
his trading with the enemy was an immense financial
benefit to them since his American intelligence con-
nections served to facilitate widespread traffic in
narcotics amounting in value probably to many mil-
188/
lions of dollars.
CIC's knowledge of
ties was so extensive according to that the
former CIC commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel.
commercial
Barrows, would not allow any cooperation by his organi-
zation with the Korea Mission.. Only with his.depar-
ture was it possible to develop a cooperative. rela-
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tionship with .CIC.
PM chief in Korea. from July.1952.to
August 1953, has also stated that
the large majority of the intelligence
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gathered in 1952 and 1953 through infiltra-
tion and exfiltration operations was fabri-
cation or controlled by the North Korean and
Chinese Communist Forces security services.
The remaining intelligence not so exposed
was low level by CIA standards of that
period. 190/
had the
support
also stated that although the Agency
responsibility for clandestine operations in
�of EE of downed UN airmen and POW's from
North Korean territory, no airman or POW was known
to have been assisted by CIA-sponsored clandestine
mechanisms.
.(b)(3)
chief of the Korea (b)(3)
�Branch (FE/I.) in Headquarters, expressed similar views
in a January 1954 report:
staff officers .., agree emphatically that EE
operations as conducted by CIA in Korea were
not only ineffective but probably morally
reprehensible in that the number of lives lost
and the amount of time and treasure expended
was enormously disproportionate to attain-
ments therefrom. 191/
In addition, insofar as the Korean experience was il-
lustrative, special mission groups, special action
teams, and caching missions also proved ineffective
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and wasteful both of personnel and funds. One
of the greatest deficiencies in the Korea Mission's
program, according to
was to attempt to convert (b)(3)
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guerrilla warfare assets. into, resistance assets.
"The lesson learned was not to use burned assets what-
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ever the 1:Tevibus investment in them."
---
The Agency had spent, over a.4-year period,
on unconventional warfare activities
in Korea under the. umbrella.of-Project. Al-
though in the early stages of the Korean War, some
operational successes resulted from. activities carried
on. under.this project, in the later stages of the war,
and particularly after the battlefront solidified.and
enemy security increased, there was little appreciable
effectiveness from the substantial sums spent and the.
-numerous Koreans sacrificed in what proved to be a
basically futile attempt to Set up resistance cells
and EE. capabilities in North Korea. .Consequently,
nearly all of the activities covered by
were
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
terminated, with only a few transferred to formalized
individual projects, and on 30 June 1955 Project
(b)(1)
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12P)/
(b)(3)
was terminated.
of
To cite a few of the failures in subprojects
conducted resistance activities,
*For additional information see CSHP 339.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3)