NORTH KOREAN CIB ARTICLE 24 APRIL 1969

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06759869
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00295
• Publication Date: April 24, 1969

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Central Intelligence ulletin
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24 April 1969
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The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
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current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
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24 April 1969
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Korea: Pyongyang has adopted a defensive yet defiant
stance in its first formal statement on the shootdown.
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Korea: Pyongyang has adopted a defensive
yet defiant stance in its first formal pronounce-
ment on the EC-121 incident.
The North Koreans clearly have been playing
for time in which to assess US intentions. The
defensive tone of the government statement on 23
April suggests that the North Korean leaders are
well aware of their weak international position
and are fully conscious of the hazards in any fur-
ther military provocations against heavily defended
US fleet units and installations.
The North Koreans made a feeble attempt to
link the EC-121 with the Pueblo affair, but the
weakness of their case is evident in their failure
to cite a precise location for the alleged intru-
sion of the US plane. The omission of details
contrasts sharply with the elaborate attempt to
"document" the Pueblo's violation of North Korean
waters.
The statement attempts to offset the weakness
of the North Korean claim by adopting a defiant
stance with regard to any future US intrusions.
In an obvious attempt to play upon foreign uneasi-
ness regarding US intentions, the statement claims
there is no "guarantee" that US flights "will not
intrude again." It further seeks to cast doubt on
US intentions by warning that the US will exploit
any North Korean defensive reaction as a pretext
to "commit full-scale attack" which may lead to an-
other "total war" in Korea.
An incident along the central sector of the
Demilitarized Zone on 23 April apparently was not
directly related to Pyongyang's response to the re-
sumption of US reconnaissance flights. The North
24 Apr 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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Koreans fired on a UN Command guard post, probably
in order to cover the retreat of reconnaissance
personnel who had stumbled into a nearby minefield
two hours earlier.
The North Koreans presumably were attempting
to collect information on South Korean and US force
deployments since the shootdown on 15 April. Sim-
ilar probes and encounters along the Demilitarized
Zone occurred in the period immediately following
the Pueblo seizure. The fire fight was cited by a
Pyongyang domestic service broadcast as a serious
"new provocation" by the US.
South Korea appears to be continuing to make
a deliberate effort to keep in step with the US
position.
24 Apr 69 Central Intelligence Bulletin
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