NORTH KOREAN POLITICAL STRATEGY

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06759859
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: October 4, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00295
• Publication Date: August 8, 1969

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
North Korean Political Strategy
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8 August 1969
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
8 August 1969
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
North Korean Political Strategy
Introduction
Aggressive actions of the North Korean regime
toward South Korea and the United States--exem-
plified by the capture of the Pueblo, in January
1968 and the destruction of the EC-121 reconnais-
sance aircraft in April 1969--have been the subject
of a number of National Intelligence Estimates and
intelligence memoranda over the past two years.
This latest study examines possible underlying
considerations behind the present North Korean
policy as they emerged from the changing strategic
balance on the Korean peninsula and in Southeast
Asia during the 1960s. The possibility of future
belligerent actions by the North Koreans is dis-
cussed in the Outlook section of the study, para-
graphs 15-21.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence
and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research,
the Office of Strategic Research, and the Office of
National Estimates.
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1.. The seizure of the Pueblo in January 1968
and the attack on the US EC-121 reconnaissance air-
craft in April 1969 were acts of political warfare.
They form a key element of Premier Kim Il-song's
strategy for advancing three major objectives: in
the North to solidify further his political position
and to stir the population to greater economic ef-
forts; in the South to undermine confidence in the
government and to exacerbate its relations with the
US; in relationship to the US, to capitalize on the
US public's disenchantment with the burdens and
risks of military commitments in Asia and ultimately
to force a retrenchment in American commitments,
particularly the withdrawal of US forces from Korea.
2. Kim Il-song has been quoted as saying,
"The Vietnam war is crucial. The defeat of the
United States in Vietnam will mark the end of
American power in Asia." Kim's view closely par-
allels Maoist China's evident conviction that the
Vietnamese Communists must impose a defeat on US
policy that would force the US to retract its power
and commitments in East Asia. This, they believe,
would remove the principal barrier to the achieve-
ment of Chinese aspirations in Southeast Asia and
to North Korean objectives in the South.
North Korean Pressure Tactics
3. The eagerness with which Kim Il-song has
attempted to exploit the US involvement in Vietnam
stems partly from North Korea's increasingly bleak
prospects in competing with South Korea. Prior to
the military coup in South Korea in May 1961,
Pyongyang relied on propaganda and political sub-
version against the South and a high economic growth
rate in the North to set the stage for eventual
unification of the peninsula under a Communist re-
gime. Time appeared to be on the side of the North
as South Korea muddled through one political and
economic crisis after another. But throughout the
1960s, the South under President Pak's leadership
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has outpaced the North in terms of both international
standing and economic growth. The South's rate of
economic growth has been double that of the North
for most of the past�decade; it is now increasing
almost three times as fast. There is little pros-
pect that the North can unaided revive its lagging
economy and avoid falling even further behind.
4. South Korea's normalization treaty with
Japan in 1965 also represented a major setback for
the North. Pyongyang's efforts to forestall and
discredit this agreement underscored its fear that
the treaty, which provided for $800 million in
Japanese economic assistance over a ten-year period,
would lead to the re-establishment of strong Japa-
nese influence in the South and would erect another
formidable barrier to North Korea's long-term aim
of extending its control over the entire peninsula.
5. Another reflection of Kim's decision that
bold aCtion was necessary to check South Korea's
growing momentum and power was his abandonment of
earlier proposals for the "peaceful reunification"
of the country based on "democratic" elections. .
He has publicly set the goal of achieving unifica-
tion "within our generation." In his October 1966
speech, Kim outlined a program for achieving this.
goal by stimulating a revolution of "patriotic forces"
in the South which would unite with the North to expel
US forces, overthrow the Seoul government, and estab-
lish a "peoples' government." He called for the de-
velopment of a militant Communist party in the South
to lead the revolution and to spearhead a broad anti-
US "national salvation front."
6. Kim has acknowledged that North Korea has no
prospect of achieving unification as long as US forces
remain in the South. The "supreme national task" fac-
ing the Korean people, he has declared, is to "drive
the US imperialist aggressors from our soil" and to
overthrow their "stooges" in Seoul. Until this task
is accomplished, unification is "unthinkable."
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North-Korean Reaction to US Intervention in Vietnam
7. Kim responded quickly to the opening he per-
ceived in the initiation of US air strikes against
North Vietnam in February 1965 and the landing of the
first US combat forces the following month. In late
March 1965, after South Korean noncombatants arrived
in South Vietnam, the North Korean Government offered
to send "volunteers" whenever the Vietnamese Commu-
nists requested them and followed this with offers
of arms and equipment.
The Pueblo Incident
10. As the US became even more heavily engaged
in Vietnam, Kim evidently decided that he could stage
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more risky provocations with relative impunity.
The Blue -House raid and the seizure of the Pueblo
followed. The :North Koreans clearly calculated
that their possession of the Pueblo and its crew
would exert an additional powerful deterrent against
retaliatory.action. Pyongyang took pains to draw
attention to its leverage by threatening to try and
punish the Pueblo crew.
13. The overriding aims of humiliating the
US, generating public opposition in the US to
American military activities in the Korean area,
and obtaining visible evidence for the Korean
people of "victory" over the US guided Pyongyang
to press for a formal US apology throughout the
eleven-month period of negotiations. After the
release of the Pueblo crew, the North Koreans
portrayed the document signed by the US represent-
ative as a "confession" of guilt, claimed that
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North Korea had proved that a determined small na-
tion could defeat a "mighty imperialist," and com-
pared the US "humiliation" in the Pueblo affair
to the "abject surrender" of the UN Command in
the 1953 Korean armistice.
The EC-121 Incident
14. From the standpoint of advancing North
Korean objectives against the US, the outcome of
the EC-121 incident was a major disappointment for
the Pyongyang regime. In contrast with the Pueblo
affair, the initial uncertainty in international
opinion about the location of the shootdown was
quickly dispelled by the US and Soviet search
operations 90 miles from the Korean coast and by
President Nixon's announcement that both North
Korean and Soviet radar tracking confirmed that
the aircraft had never been closer than 40 miles
to North Korean territory.
15. Pyongyang never overcame this inauspici-
ous beginning. Its propaganda media devoted Un-
usually light .coverage to the incident, and much
of this was geared to supporting domestic goals of
the regime. The government withheld a formal pro-
nouncement until five days after President Nixon
had announced the resumption of reconnaissance
flights under protection. The defensive tone of
Pyongyang's statement indicated that the regime
was well aware of its weak international position.
It made a feeble attempt to link the EC-121 with
the Pueblo and to arouse opposition to US activi-
ties by claiming there was no "guarantee" that con-
tinuing US reconnaissance flights "will not intrude
again." Aside from a North Vietnamese expression
of support and lukewarm, pro forma Soviet support,
North Korea's isolation was complete. It was
forced to resort to private appeals to its allies
and friends abroad for some gestures of support.
16. North Korea's eight-day delay in issuing
a formal statement on the EC-121 incident apparently
was prompted not only by the regime's awareness of
its vulnerable propaganda position but also by a
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desire to play for time in which �to assess US inten-
tions in deploying Task Force 71 to the Sea of Ja-
pan.
Outlook
17. Kim Il-song's taste for risky ventures is
sometimes attributed to wishful thinking and delu-
sions, of grandeur as a revolutionary leader. But
these personal characteristics, however important,
probably are less influential in shaping his deci-
sions than the hard and unpromising facts of North
Korea's objective situation and Kim's perception of
opportunities to alter these conditions to his ad-
vantage. The North Korean Government is not only
losing ground in the contest for power and prestige
to an increasingly prosperous South Korea, but lack-
ing any firm assurance of military protection and
direct support in crisis situations from the USSR
and China--support that would counterbalance the
US role in the South--it confronts a highly uncer-
tain future.
18. . There is little prospect that Kim will
abandon the political strategy that produced 'the
Pueblo.and EC-121 incidents. FromPyongyang's van-
tage point, neither the urgent pressures of compet-
ing with the, South 'nor exploitable opportunities
abroad have diminished. Even if the next year or
so should witness a settlement in Vietnam or sub-
stantial reductions in the level of combat and the
number of pS forces involved, it is unlikely that
such developments in themselves would bring a marked
shift in North Korea's present policy. 'Much would
depend on Kim's interpretation of the outcpme in
Vietnam.,.particularly its bearing on future American
military posture and intentions throughout East Asia.
19. There are. additional factors, both domes-
tic and foreign, that will probably encourage Kim
to persist in his tactics against South Korea and
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the US. In the first place, Kim's deep personal
commitment to a program of maximum military prepar-
edness, described as "fortification of the whole
country," and to the goal of reunification "within
our generation" has generated a powerful momentum
across the entire range of North Korean policies.
A series of purges of high-ranking opponents of
this course over the past two years has reinforced
Kim's commitment. His public demands for unques-
tioning and unconditional acceptance of his deci-
sions and constant agitation to instill militant
discipline in the population will make it diffi-
cult for Kim to reverse course over a short period
of time. In addition, Kim Il-song, like Mao, re-
lies heavily on the domestic tension and hatred
generated by an "aggressive US imperialism" to
motivate his people and to keep a social revolution
alive in a nation where ancient attitudes die hard.
Such tension and hatred must be fed periodically by
fresh "evidence." ,
20. The political crisis in the South over .
amending the constitution to permit President Pak
to run for a third term will be a strong incentive
for the North Koreans to intensify infiltration
and subversive operations. They may be tempted to
exaggerate the opportunities for disruption pre-
sented by recent student demonstrations in Seoul
protesting the third-term amendment. It was the
students, after all, who spearheaded the drive to
overthrow the Syngman Rhee regime in 1960.
21. Pyongyang, however, faces a.dilemma in
trying to exploit South Korean political unrest.
A sharp upsurge. in pressure and subversion would
not only invite harsh repressive action by the
Seoul government but would impair the North's
ability to take advantage of the sentiment for
early reunification among student and intellectual
groups in the South. Such action could, indeed,
backfire and improve Pak's third-term prospects.
The great majority of South Koreans could well
regard a sharp rise in the threat from the North
as a compelling argument for keeping Pak in of-
fice.
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22. The limitations on the North's ability
to intervene effectively in South Korean politics,
combined with its poor chances for developing
guerrilla bases and significant political support
in the countryside, may prompt Pyongyang to con-
centrate its main attention on harassing actions
against the US presence and attempting to shake
South Korean confidence in US protection. In
addition to further attacks on US ships ovair7.
.craft.that may offer targets-of opportunity, the
North Koreans may attempt provocations against US
personnel and installations in the South.
The significant
decrease in incidents along the DMZ so far this
year, however, suggests that Kim has opted for
restraint in the hope, that without fresh evidence
of an outside threat, the South Korean people will
!open the way for subversion as they wrestle with
the third-term issue.
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