THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM - 31 JANUARY 1968 - 1968/01/31

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06753751
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES,
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31 January 1968
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Information as of 1600
31 January 1968
HIGHLIGHTS
The unprecedented wave of Communist attacks
against principal cities and allied bases through-
out South Vietnam has continued through a second
day.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Communist forces continued their unprecedented wave
of attacks against South Vietnamese cities and key
allied civil and military installations for a
second day. (Paras. 1-13). Weekly Review of South
Vietnam Battle Statistics (Para. 14). (Charts)
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments:
There is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: Com-
munist propaganda is giving heavy play to the
upsurge in military activity in South Vietnam
(Paras. 1-4).
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Communist forces continued their unprecedented
� wave of bold attacks against South Vietnamese cities
� and key allied civil and military installations through-
out South Vietnam for the second day. Sporadic fight-
ing continues in and around Saigon although the im-
mediate threat to the US Embassy has been eliminated.
Enemy action has spread into the delta provinces of
IV Corps, and new attacks have been mounted against
several northern coastal cities. This suggests a
possible enemy attempt to whipsaw allied reaction
forces.
Saigon and the III Corps Area
2. Allied forces have restored a semblance of
order to the central part of the capital following
a night of enemy shelling and probes against such
targets as the US Embassy, the presidential palace,
and the naval headquarters. Except for a terrorist
remnant reportedly being dislodged from a building
near the presidential palace, fighting in the city
has shifted to southwestern Saigon where Communist
Elements are reportedly dug in near a river bank
and possibly around the An Quang pagoda. Civilians
are being evacuated from this area. Allied air
strikes are under way and have caused at least one
fire in a residential section.
3.. The band Of Communists who attacked and
penetrated the US Embassy grounds before dawn on
31 January was overcome by military. police and army
troops by 9:00 e.m..local time and the-embassy is
considered secure and fully operationel. It.now ap-
pears.thet at least six. allied p'ersOnnel were Itilled
and five wounded in this fighting. At least 1p:com-
munist attackers were killed. No US civilja casual-
ties have been reported. The Communists rOpOTtedly
did not succeed in penetrating the chancery itself,
and no structural damage was done to the building
despite several explosions.
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4. Mortar and ground attacks were also launched
on 31 January against Saigon's Tan Son Nhut.Air Base,
which serves, as the headquarters� complex of both
South Vietnamese and US forces, and against Bien Hoa
Airfield and the Long Binh logistical center north-
east of Saigon. At Tan Son Nhut, the Communists
overran the western part of the base, which includes
a control tower, and at last report some fighting
was continuing near the base. Attacks at Bien Hoa
and Long Binh were apparently repulsed, but two jet
aircraft at Bien Hoa were destroyed. and 10 others
damaged.
IN' Corps
5. A series of enemy attacks was launched in
�the delta on 31 January. At least eight of the 16
provincial capitals and a number of district towns
and airfields came under harassing fire or ground
probes. Although details are sketchy, there have
been at least five ground attacks, including two
against the airstrips serving Soc Trang and Vinh
Long. Can Tho, the capital of Phong Dinh Province
and the IV Corps headquarters, was attacked early
but is reported under allied control except for .a
few strongpoints in the city. Chau Phu, the capital
�of Chau Doc Province, reportedly was overrun, and
some street fighting is reported still going on in
Soc Trang, Ba Xuyen Province, and in Ben Tre in Kien
Hoa Province.
I Corps
6. Allied mopping up actions continue in
several major towns struck in the initial Communist
assaults on 30 January, but new attacks have been
reported today against the cities of Quang Tri,
Hue, Tam Ky, Quang Ngai and the US base at Chu Lai.
The situation in Hue is unclear. As yet unconfirmed
late reports indicate that substantial portions of
the city may be under enemy control. An enemy
battalion which entered Quang Tri city on the night
of 30-31 January has been driven into the suburbs
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by South Vietnamese troops, but enemy forces have
reportedly occupied positions north, east, and west
of the city and further attacks are expected.
7. Tam Ky, the capital of Quang Tin Province,
was hit by mortar fire and a ground assault early
on 31 January. The attack, apparently mounted by
elements of the North Vletnamese 21st Regiment,
was repulsed with enemy losses in excess of 400,
but further initiatives by Communist forces on the
city outskirts are possible. An attack against
Quang Ngai city and three nearby district capitals
was also reported early on 31 January. The assault
was repulsed with very heavy Viet Cong casualties and
light allied losses. Pockets of resistance are re-
ported in the city. Elements of South Vietnam's
2nd Division are bolstering the area's defenses.
8. There have been renewed mortar and rocket
attacks in the Da Nang area. Seventeen helicopters
have been damaged at the Marble Mountain air fa-
cility, but it is fully operative and there have
been no new terrorist acts in the city itself. US
autflorities expect no further major assaults at Da
Nang although sporadic mortar or rocket harassment
and small-scale terrorism remain ossible
allied control.
The town is now declared under
II Corps
9. The moat serious fighting in II Corps con�
-
tinues in or around Kontum city in the highlands.
Two enemy battalions are reported still in the capital
city. Communist losses are believed to be nearly
300 killed. Pleiku city is now reported quiet, al-
though sporadic fighting continues outside the city.
Ban Me Thuot, capital of Darlac Province in the
highlands, was under renewed attack on 31 January
around the airfield and the MACV compound, but both
attacks have been successfully repulsed.
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10. Along the coast, an estimated two enemy bat-
talions penetrated the outer defenses-of phan Thiet
in Binh Thuan Province under cover of heavy mortar
fire. Heavy fighting apparently continues around the
MACV compound, and allied reaction forces are at-
tempting to bloc enemy withdrawal, routes-. Elsewhere,
South Korean forces have secured the radio station-
and railroad station in Qui Nhon where enemy forces
had remained dug in after an assault on 30 January.
Nha Trang and Tuy Hoa, where heavy fighting was re-
ported yesterday, have been returned to full allied
control. Scattered fighting continues on the out-
skirts of both towns, however.
The Character of the Enemy. Offensive
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11. :Enemy assaults during- the past two days- a
haVe been characterized- by a willingness to- take ex-
tremely. high-casualties, tenuously estimated at more
than 1,400.. In general, allied personnel losses
have been relatively light, although losses- in equip-
ment, especially aircraft, have been heavy The- ob--
viously well-planned and-well-coordinated- enemy. at-
tacks- have-involved North Vietnamese main. force units
in. several northern areas, who operated in close co-
ordination-with-local Viet Cong troops and sapper
units In several, areas such-as Saigon and Qui Nhon, a
the enemy attempted- to seize -local radio stationS,
possibly- in an- effort .to gain maximum propaganda
benefit and to-confuse.the loCal, populace as to-the
extent of their achievements.-
The- Threat to Khe Sanh'
12. In addition to disruption of allied reac-
tion efforts, the extensive harassment of allied air-
fields throughout the country may be intended to set
the stage for Communist action in the area of Khe
Sanh and the Demilitarized Zone. This area remains
relatively quiet. US Marine patrols are reporting only
minor clashes with small enemy units. Evidence of
the large enemy buildup in the area continues, how-
ever.
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Weekly Review of South Vietnam Battle Statistics
14. The week of 21-27 January compared with
the week of 14-20 January:
I. Casualties
US
VC/NVA
14-20 Jan, . 21-27 Jan
14-20 Jan
21-27 Jan
Killed
1,842
2,365
218
203
Wounded
1,796
1,678
Missing/
Captured
TOTALS
1,842
2,365
2,014
1,881
GVN�
FREE WORLD
14-20 Jan
21-27 Jan
14,-20 Zan..
21-27 Jan
Killed
198
236
19
33
Wounded
657
688
36
49
Missing/
captured
,..- 65
57.
0
0
TOTALS
920
981
55
82
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II. Viet Cong Incidents
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Attacks
Battalion or Larger.
Small Unit
14-20
Jan 21-27 Jan
48
93
2 � � . . 4
46- � � � � 89
Harassment
354
318
Terrorism
49
29
Sabotage
44
47
Propaganda
5
7
Antiaircraft
189
212
TOTALS
689
706
III. Weapons Captured
VC/NVA
GVN
14-20 Jan
21-27 Jan
14-20 Jan
21-27 Jan
Individual
361
Not
126
135
Crew-Served
99
Reported
26
16
TOTALS .
460
152
151
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8000
6000
4000
2000
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Weapons Losses
Viet Cong
GYN
0
1964
DEC
2,404
11111111111
16000
12000
8000
4000
i 11111 11 111 11111111111
1965
11111111111
932
11111111111
1966 1967
Casualties
(Killed only)*
1968
Viet Cong/NVA
GVN/US/other F
ree World
DEC
7,938
2,125
0 11111111111 11111 111 III 11 1 1111 1111 1 1111111111 111 1111111 1
1964
1965
1966
1967
US Casualties to Date: Killed 16,880 Wounded 105,671
1968
2000
1500
1000
21-
27JA
500
151
0
1 1 1
111 1
1 1 1
NOV DEC JAN
1968
4000
21-27JAN
3000
2
365
2000
1000
472
0
1111
1 1 1 1
1 1
NOV DEC JAN
1968
Captured 232 Missing 736
*Due to a change in the reporting of personnel losses, from 12 February 1967 the weekly and monthly
figures represent only personnel killed.
69449 1-68 CIA
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600
400
200
0
4000
3000
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Viet Cong Attacks
,
1-044
DEC
286
1
11111111111
Vlvvv,,v,ifiv
11111111111
.ji\Af
iiiiiiiiiii
2000
1000
0
1964
1965 1966 1967
Viet Cong Incidents
E cludin attacks)
1968
. ._
DEC
3 034
.
Y
A,
e�
V
,
11111111111
11_1_1_111_1_111_1_111111_1111
11111111111
111111
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
150
100
50
0
21-27JAN
A
1111
11111
3
NOV DEC JAN
1968
\/,\I7Propoganda
83 47Sabotage
29Terrorisin
SE
13 TOTAL
12 AA Fire
NOV
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Viet Cong Try for Popular Support
2. There are indications that the Viet Cong
in Da Nang tried unsuccessfully to attratt popular
support for their military actions of the past 48
hours. The Communists called a rally in front of
Da Nang's Tinh Hoi Pagoda on the morning of 30
January and portrayed their attacks the night be-
fore as a significant victory, claiming that they
had taken over the city. They reportedly urged
Vietnamese servicemen to desert and called for an
end to the war in Oentral Vietnam.
3. Rather than winning over their audience,
however, there is evidence that some of their
listeners turned the Viet Cong in to government
authorities. According to reports reaching Viet-
namese security forces, the Da Nang Buddhist Con-
gregation--frequently a center of antigovernment
agitation--sent a representative to the authorities
asking for help and disclaiming any complicity in
the rally. As a result, police broke up the gather-
ing and arrested several suspected Viet Cong agents.
4. A number of recently captured enemy docu-
ments have suggested that the Communists were
hoping to spark some degree of "general uprising"
among the urban populace as a part of their major
offensive. They failed in Da Nang, and there is
little information to indicate that their efforts
in other areas have been .markedly more successful
in causing hew civil uniest or in spurring support
for their cause among urban people.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
-31 January 1968
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Communist propaganda is giving heavy play
to the surge of military activity, stressing that
by this show of strength the Communists have demon-
strated that the US cannot accomplish its objec-
tives. The unstated but clear implication is that
�the US must resort to a political compromise.
Vietnamese Communist propaganda beamed to the
South emphasizes the size and scope of the of-
fensive as if to underscore Communist capabilities
to stand up to US military power.
2. Hanoi has made no attempt to portray the
current offensive as a conclusive or final stage
in the struggle but instead is treating it as
further proof that Communist. forces hold the
initiative and are able to launch large-scale,
coordinated attacks. This, it says, demonstrates
once again that the US is in a "losing situation."
A broadcast on 31 January said the upsurge in Com-
munist military activity is a continuation of
successes achieved during the past month. It
claimed that recent Communist victories had caused
the US to cancel the allied cease-fire, and the
Communists "repaid the enemy in kind" by launching
widespread attacks -on 30 January.'
3. Hanoi's replay of a Viet Cong news agency
report on 31 January took the same line in claiming
that Communist forces had successfully attacked
"all over the battlefield" and reduced the allies
to confusion and clumsy response. The Vietl-Cong
radio singled out the attacks in Saigon as especially
significant in showing Communist abilities to strike
the heart of the enemy camp.
4. There has been no Chinese Communist com-
mentary on the situation as yet. Soviet broadcasts
are carrying both Western and Vietnamese Communist
accounts of the action and stressing the US predica-
ment. A commentary in Pravda on 31 January says
the Comenunists have launelia�a. new tajor offensive
which disproves "US propaganda" that Viet Cong forces
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are "depleted." It charges that US optimism is
designed solely to mislead people before the
presidential elections. It also asserts that the
offensive is a reply to continued US attempts to
seek a military solution to the conflict and that
these events show again that the US is "bogging
down deeper" in a war "without prospects."
31 January 1968,
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