THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM - 25 DECEMBER 1967

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06752216
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: December 25, 1967

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
3.5(c)
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
1,44.9
. 25 ecernber 1967 3.5(c)
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Information as of 1600
25 December 1967.
3.5(c)
HIGHLIGHTS
Allied ground and air operations have resumed in
Vietnam following the Christmas military standdown.
Except for small-scale guerrilla activity, Communist
forces generally respected the cease-fire while at
the same time apparently, repositioning and resupply-
ing some regular units. Political leaders in Saigon,
meanwhile, appear to be increasingly disenchanted
with President Thieu's conduct of the affairs of
government.
I. Military Situation in South Vietnam: Allied
forces have resumed military operations in Vietnam
following the Christmas cease-fire (Para. 1). While
at least 92 Communist truce violations were recorded
during the allies 24-hour version of the cease-fire,
no major attacks occurred, suggesting that Communist
main force units were generally content to abide by
the standdown *die continuing to reposition troops
for future offensives (Paras. 2-6).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
President Thieu's government appears to be under
mounting criticism from political leaders in Saigon
(Paras. 1-2). Thieu's inability to exert forceful
leadership has adversely affected the performance of
both the executive and legislative branches (Paras.
3-4). Vice President Ky is steering clear of the
government and its problems (Para. 5). Thieu appears
to be taking a relaxed attitude toward the criticism
(Para. 6). The strikes by Vietnamese workers against
Pan American and Air America airlines are continuing
(Para. 7).
III. Military Develo ments in North Vietnam:
the North Vietnamese may have
utiliied the Christmas holiday bombing standdown to
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resupply and reinforce Communist forces in the south-
ern DRV, the DMZ area, and in South Vietnam's two
northernmost provinces (Para. 1).
V. Communist Political Developments: There is
nothing of significance to report.
VI. Other Major Aspects: The motorable portion
of Laotian Route 110 has been extended eastward into
South Vietnam. (Paras.
1-3).
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I, .MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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1. Allied forces have resumed offensive ground
and air operations against the Vietnamese Communists
following the Christmas holiday truce.
2. While the holiday cease-fire brought major
ground fighting in the South to a virtual standstill,
preliminary reports from American officials in the
field charge the Communists with at least 92 truce
violations during the 24-hour pause (1800 24 Decem-
ber-1800 25 December-Saigon time) declared by the
�
allies. Twenty-nine of these violations are consid-
ered "major," in that they resulted in allied
casualties.
3. Statistically, the great majority of the 92
Communist truce violations reported thus far occurred.
in South Vietnam's I and III Corps areas (36, includ-
ing 9 major ones in I Corps and 29, including 10
major violations, in III Corps). Over-all allied
casualties resulting from enemy-initiated contacts
during the truce period included 2 killed (2 US),
40 wounded (23 US, 16 GVN, 1 ROK), and 3 Missing
(2 US, 1 GVN). Communist losses numbered 28 killed
and four captured.
4. Most of the violations consisted of harass-
ing fire against allied outposts and base camps or
were the product of Communist reactions to intensified
allied ground and air reconnaissance activities. In
One case a US Marine observation plane was downed by
ground fire in the Communist-infested A Shau Valley
area of northwestern Thua Thien Province. No major
enemy attacks occurred, however, suggesting that
North Vietnamese .Army and Viet Cong main force units
were generally content to abide by the standdown.
5. Significant repositioning of major enemy
units in southern I Corps, the DMZ area, and the
western highlands continued to 'be reflected in
SIGINT during the holiday period, suggesting possible
impending Communist initiatives in these regions in
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the near future. The most immediate threat would
appear to be in the Quang Nam - Quang Tin Province
area where SIGINT has evidenced a major buildup of
enemy units. The 2nd NVA Division, main and pro-
vincial Viet Cong units subordinate to Military
Region 5, and a new communications group tenuously
associated with the 320th NVA Division--elements of
which have been detected in southward deployment '
since early November--are involved.
6. The allies will observe a second 24-hour
cease-fire on New Year's Day and a 48-hour standdown
for Tet, the Vietnamese Lunar New Year, in late Jan-
uary and early February. The Viet Cong have an-
nounced a 72-hour pause for New Year's Day and a
seven-day respite for Tet (27 January-3 February).
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TOP RET
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Saigon politicians are continuing to grumble
about the lackluster performance of the Thieu govern-
ment.�
2. Their major complaint is that President Thieu
has failed to provide the kind of dynamic leadership
needed to break the inertia which has gripped the
government since it was installed two months ago. One
high-ranking government official asserts that Thieu
has been delinquent in not establishing a close work-
ing relationship with Prime Minister. Loc, whose politi-
cal inexperience and retiring personality has proved
to be a major liability.
3. The leadership vacuum has affected the per-
formance of ministries in-the.executive branch. Al-
though some progress has been made in. clearing the
decks for implementing new programs and carrying out
added responsibilities, reorganization has been pain-.
fully slow. The foreign, and economliministries have
been cited by observers.as examples of departments
which are almost.certain to face 'critical new problems
in the coming months but which are still caught. in
the grip of bureaucratic indecision.
4. Thieu's inability to exert strong leadership
has also contributed to the problems which the National
Assembly has encountered in getting organized. A num-
ber of deputies have commented that the work of the
legislature, especially in the politically fragmented
lower house, would be assisted considerably if Thieu
or Loc made a real effort to organize a progovernment
bloc to push through the administration's programs.
5. Vice President Ky, meanwhile, is taking pains
to steer clear of the government and its problems.
According to one of his followers, Ky is turning aside
complaints about Thieu's performance with assertions
that Thieu and Loc deserve the opportunity to run the
country's affairs without interference. Ky's with-
drawal.from active participation in the government,
25 December 1967
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however, has given rise to speculation that he is
only biding his time until he can play a more prominent
role.
6. Thieu appears to be taking a relaxed attitude
toward the mounting criticism of his government. He
recently told a civilian adviser that he appreciated
the need for more forceful leadership and that he was
disappointed in the performanceof some of his of
He also stated, however, that popular dissatis-
faction stemmed, at least in part, from the unrealis-
tic expectations of the Vietnamese people, and that
they must be taught not to expect too much from the
government.
Strike Activity
7. The strikes by Vietnamese workers against
Pan American and Air America airlines are continuing.
According to a labor minister conciliator, negotiations
between the companies and the workers have been ex-
acerbated by managements insistence on firing the
strike leaders. An additional problem is Pan America's
use of management and US military personnel to keep
its military-associated operations running. Air
America activities have been brought to a virtual
standstill. The US Embassy believes that the strike
against Pan American is essentially for union recogni-
tion, with wage demands a peripheral issue. The next
negotiating round is scheduled for 29 December, al-
though labor leaders have expressed interest in getting
talks resumed. sooner.
25 December 1967
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SEC-RET
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-.2V� OTHER .COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. Signals from radar,
have been
intercepted six times since 20 November in an area
northwest of Haiphong. The actual number of
radars in North Vietnam is not known.
2. The
an early warning radar
provides
ground control' intercept information. The relocation
of a tactical air control outstation to the Haiphong
Cat Bi area in mid-November
the North Vietnamese are
ground control intercept role.
3.
suggests that
in a
have been added
along tne North Vietnamese
border since mid-November.
along the Vietnamese and
Laotian borders, providing early warning coverage
of almost all of North Vietnam, the Gulf of Tonkin,
southwest China, and parts of Laos.
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
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1. Mere is nothing of significance to report.
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RET
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VI. OTHER MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS
1.
the motoraole portion ot Lotlan Route. 110- has. been
extended eastward across the.northeast extremity of
Cambodia and about one mile into South Vietnam.
2. The new construction is visible to within
four miles of SVN Route 512 which hooks up with SVN
Route 14 in the Dak To region of the central highlands.
The Communists already have access to this area via
foot trails and the motorable route will aid in supply
movements. A second two-mile southerly extension of
Route 110 into Cambodia is also under construction,
but there are no motorable Cambodian roads in the
area and this construction is probably to aid in moving
supplies to the adjacent regions of South Vietnam.
3.
the Cambodian Tonle Kong
and a small section of Route 97 along the Laotian
border are being used to send supplies--mainly rice--
into Laos. At least 15 tons per day are estimated
to have reached Communist forces in Laos and South
Vietnam, largely via these routes, during the 1966-67
dry season.
25 December 1967
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25 DECEMBER
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1 I 106
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NORTH
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25 DECEMBER
30 Kilometers
340 Miles
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