EL SALVADOR: PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06749630
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00722
• Publication Date: December 4, 1981

Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749630
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I ni,Ilivyth,
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
4 December 1981
Co NW 81-281JX
4 December 19bl
Copy
253
Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749630
Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749630
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This Document Not To Be Reproduced
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National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749630
Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749630
Contents
El Salvador: Prospects for Negotiations 4
4 December 1981
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NR Record
NR Record
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EL SALVADOR: Prospects for Negotiations
he guerrilas' asscrtions that thej are LLij to negotiat.e
LK:thout 2:reconaions are aimed at underminina the junta's election
stratea an at sti-en:ithening Eeftist unit?.
Moderates in the leftist alliance oppose the pro-
tracted war strategy of guerrilla hardliners and believe
that attempts to boycott the elections or to disrupt them
through violence could backfire. They want to break the
military impasse by negotiating a power-sharing arrange-
ment with the government but are hamstrung by the more
radical elements.
Leaders of the largest guerrilla group will not
accept any compromise with the government. To maintain
insurgent unity, however, they are publicl iving lip-
service to the call for negotiations.
Both moderates and hardliners expect the junta to
reject negotiations. By pushing talks they hope to sow
discord within the junta and plan to increase accusations
of government intransigence in their continuing efforts
to damage the credibility of the election process.
Senior military officers believe that the armed
forces are at least holding their own against the insur-
gents and refuse to allow the left to achieve through
talks what it cannot win on the battlefield. Some civil-
ian leaders, on the other hand, believe that negotiations
would split the insurgents but are unwilling to challenge
the military by pressing. their views.
--TDP�Se�T-41--
4
4 December 1981
Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749630