USSR - LATIN AMERICA: SOVIET SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTION

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06749624
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2018
• Case Number: F-2018-00722
• Publication Date: November 18, 1981

Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624
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National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
18 November 1981
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18 November 1981 2
Copy
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Warning Notice
This Document Nut To Be Reproduced
Intelligence Sources and Method5 Involved
WN)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624
Approved for Release: 2018/06/08 C06749624
Contents
Po2and: Talks Begin 1
USSR: Brezhnev's Plenum Speech 3
Guatemala: Status of the Insurgency 4
5
Chad: Libyan Withdrawal Continues 6
Greece-NATO: Position on Spanish Membership 6
Cyprus:
Intercommunal Talks Resume
Special Analyses
USSR - Latin America: Soviet Support for Revolution . . . 7
Top Secret
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SPECIAL ANALYSES
ANALYSES'
USSR - LATIN AMERICA: Soviet Support for Revolution
CIA
oscow's involvement with Latin American leftists continues
to expand. In Central America, the Seviets see the weakening of US
influence and the rise in revolutionary currents as an opportunity
to install anti-US and potentially pro-Soviet regimes--especially
in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. In South America, Noscow's
focus is mainly on establishing good bilateral relations with major
governments. It has identified the Pinochet regime in nile, how-
ever, as a target for armed insurrection.
The USSR has continued to support Communist partici-
pation in the United Revolutionary Directorate, the
umbrella organization conducting the insurgency in
El Salvador. Last year the Soviets promised the insur-
gents that they would supply arms through third parties;
they subsequently facilitated the flow of arms and mili-
tary equipment from Cuba and other Soviet allies.
Moscow, however, appears to be less sanguine about
the insurgents' short-term prospects since their offensive
in January failed. The Soviets also were surprised by
the intense US reaction to the situation in El Salvador.
intensified US back-
ing for El Salvador's President Duarte has led Moscow to
consider more circumspect channels for providing addi-
tional support for the insurgents. There is no evidence
of any new Soviet involvement in recent months; the
Soviets may believe that the insurgents have adequate
arms for the moment and could seize power following pro-
longed armed struggle.
The Soviets, in close cooperation with the Cubans
and other allies, are urging the Communist parties in
Guatemala and Honduras to join in broad revolutionary
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fronts and participate in armed struggle. The East Ger-
mans reportedly are providing the Guatemalan Communists
with financial assistance to suppinment similar Soviet
aid.
In 1979 the Soviets began giving paramilitary train-
ing in the USSR to Honduran Communists for the first time
since the mid-1960s.
The USSR's major priority in the region is to con-
Folidate the hold of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.
The Soviets hope that the Sandinistas will serve as a
conduit for support of revolution elsewhere. (S NF)
The Caribbean
In the Dominican Republic, the Soviets and Cubans
have obtained a grudging agreement from the Communist
party there to prepare for eventual armed struggle.
Their main current emphasis, however, has been to get
the party to join a united front with the leftist
Dominican Liberation Party for the national elections
next year--a coalition which the Communists appear de-
termined to avoid.
IPP
Moscow also is using the Dominican Communists to
channel funds to the United Party of Haitian Communists,
which reportedly is trying to organize a movement of
Haitian exiles for the eventual ouster of President
Duvalier. In addition, the USSR evidently is sponsoring
propaganda activities to enlist support for Caribbean
as well as Central American revolutionaries through the
Soviet front organization--the World Feeration of Demo-
cratic Youth.
Major Regional States
The USSR's policy toward Argentina, Brazil, Peru,
and Mexico is keyed to building on good relations with
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Jecrct
existing governments and promoting its economic interest.
Nevertheless, the Soviets continue to pay attention to
animating some Communist parties in order to play uoon
dnmPctic vulnerabilities over the longer term.
The Soviets apparently calculate
that such low-key involvement in strengthening Communist
parties in the existing political system poses little
immediate risk to their state-to-state relationships.
In Chile, however, the Soviets have adopted an openly
militant line aimed at promoting a united armed struggle
against the Pinochet regime. Moscow provided the chief
of the Chilean Communist Party with a forum at the 26th
Communist Party Congress last February to call for armed
revolution and subsequently has broadcast similar messages
to Chile by other Chilean and even Salvadoran Communists.
Outlook
Moscow seems likely to continue its discreet backing
for Latin American revolutionaries, primarily through its
allies. The Soviets seem to calculate that such involve-
ment is unlikely in itself to lead to direct retaliation
from Washington or to US military intervention in the
hemisphere. While the Soviets do not seem to overesti-
mate their own contribution to the region's revolutionary
ferment, they are intent on maintaining revolutionary
momentum in the hope that over the long run it will
undermine the us presence in the region.
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