DAILY SUMMARY - 1950/01-1950/03

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Daily Summary Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06749479
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2019

24 L 57
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
GENERAL
1. UK views on Hong Kong aircraft--US Embassy London
has been informed by the UK Minister of State for For-
eigh Affairs that he is not sanguine about the chances
for a favorable British response to the strong US pro-
test against British acquiescence to the removal by
Chinese Communists of aircraft parts (and ultimately
the aircraft) now under litigation in Hong Kong. The�
Minister expressed the opinion that under present law
the British Government could not interfere with further
withdrawals of the aircraft equipment by the Communists;
he added that his government could effect only a tempo-
rary delay before permitting the Chinese Communists to
remove the aircraft.
(CIA Comment: The firm determination of the
UK, despite US protests, to avoid antagonizing the Chinese
Communists over the issue of the aircraft and aircraft
equipment in Hong Kong reflects primarily British fears
that the Chinese Communist regime will take retaliatory
measures against the British in Hong Kong or the im-
portant British interests in China.)
Document No. 14
NO CHANGE in Class.
0 DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANCED TO: TS 5
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth:rDA-,-E r1:9.77/Bly7C:
Dato:i 6 milR 78
0
ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
!v 1950
1253
EO 13526 3.5(c)
24856
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T
71' 0 P R E T
GENERAL
u MAR 1950
1252
I. French statement on Indochina urged--The Department
of State has asked US Embassy Paris to make "strong
oral representations" to the French pointing to the urgent
�need for a public statement regarding the evolutionary
nature of French agreements with the three new states in
Indochina and emphasizing that the purpose of the agree-
ments is to establish ultimately the complete sovereignty
and independence-of the three new states within the French
Union, The Department points out that US attempts to gain
recognition by non-Communist Asian regimes for these
states, which is considered a matter of prime importance,
have met with limited success because most Asian countries
continue to view the new regimes as "French puppets." In
the Department's opinion, much greater Asian support would
become possible after such a French announcement. The
Department believes that, without such .a statement, French
accomplishments and intentions in Indochina may be "tragically
misunderstood," both in Asia and throughout the Western world.
2. German._ membership in European Council predicted--US
High Commissioner McCloy in Bonn reports that all the
evidence available there indicates:that:the- Bundetag
will approve German associate membership in the Council
of Europe whether or not the recentconditions proposed
by Chancellor Adenauer to the Allied High Commission are
met. McCloy transmits the view of spokesmen of the op-
position Socialist Party .(SPD) that: ('a) their party's position
will not affect the outcome of the Bundestag vote; and (b) the .
SPD will send representatives to the Council of Europe if
Germany becomes a member. McCloy expresses the opinion
that the lack Of press comment on Adenauer's proposal to the
Document No.
1 NO CHANGE in Class. 0
0 DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANCED TO: TS
DX. Mo, 4 Apr 77
�Auth: DDA 77/1705
Date: 1 6 MAR 1978 By:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
3-5
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP RET
High Commission reflects an awareness among the news-
paper editors of the widespread desire in the Federal
Republic to "have Germany enjoy the distinction" of
membership in the European Council.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that Western Germany
will probably join the Council of Europe unless the west
Germans are offended by the handling of the proceducal
problems of admission.)
EUROPE
3. GERMANY: Suggestions on all-German electoral law--
US High Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt proposes that
the High Commissioners of the three occupation powers be
. authorized to issue a communique giving "full support" to
the recent public proposals of the Federal Republic in regard
to all-German elections. McCloy suggests that the proposed
communique include a statement of Western willingness to
deal with the Soviet Control Commission for the sole purpose
of framing a law to govern elections to an all-German con-
stituent assembly. McCloy expresses the view that, although
the principle of a constituent assembly (to draft an all-German
constitution) was not put forward by the Western Powers at
the last meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, such
an assembly would "in no way 'endanger" the west German
basic law. McCloy believes that it is of paramount importance
to the USSR to legitimize the east German regime and expresses
the view that the proper timing of the proposed Western offer
of an all-German electoral law could interfer with the Kremlin's
timetable in legitimizing the east German regime.
2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T 0 P R E T
4, CZECHOSLOVAKIA: US attitude toward future relations--
The Department of State, in response to estimates that
the Czech Government is considering making a major attack
against principal Foreign Ministries, has authorized Am-
bassador Briggs in Prague to attempt as soon as possible
a comprehensive and forthraglit survey of US-Czech re-
lations with the new Czech Foreign Minister. Briggs is to
indicate to the Czech Foreign Minister that the US would be
obliged to act in its own protection if the Czechs ignore
accepted diplomatic standards and disregard� American
rights. The Department informs Briggs that, if his re-
presentations have no effect in deterring the Czechs from
taking some drastic step against the US, retaliatory measures
against Czechoslovakia will probably become necessary. The
Department also authorizes the Ambassador to discuss the
possibility of a tripartite approach along these lines with the
British and French Ambassadors and to inform them that the
US will act unilaterally if a. tripartite cour�e is not possible.
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
A
24855 Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TO'ET
GENERAL
1. Views of US Ambassadors on German problem--The US
Ambassadors to European nations, meeting in Rome, have
agreed that the US should continue its general policy in
Western Germany, with perhaps increased emphasis
upon action designed to counter increasingly vigorous
"Soviet infiltration and propaganda." .The Ambassadors
recommend that: (a) the Western protest over the forma-
tion of an East German military force be expedited; (b) the
western occupation powers repeat their offer of free elec-
tions in Germany; and (c) "vigorous and immediate efforts"
be made with respect to Berlin, especially to relieve the
"pressing" economic situation, The US Ambassadors con-
sider Berlin's retention to be "vital" to the West. The
US Ambassadors also recommend � that the policy of non-
recognition of the German Democratic Republic be rigidly
maintained and that a Western tripartite or larger con-
ference be held to discuss the German refugee and ex-
pellee problem. The Ambassadors agreed that their
next meeting should be held in Berlin, probably in July 1950,
2. US views on Hong Kong aircraft--The Department of State
has instructed US Ambassador Douglas in London to make
strong representations to the UK Government at the highest
level as soon as possible urging British executive action
to deny to the Chinese Communists the former Chinese
Nationalist aircraft and aircraft equipment now the subject
of litigation in Hong Kong. (A Hong Kong court recently
refused to grant an injunction freezing the former Chinese
Nationalist aircraft and aircraft equipment pending the
outcome of current litigation.) The Department points out
that British acquiescence to withdrawal of further equip-
ment or planes by the Chinese Communists would contribute
directly to the military potential of the Soviet sphere and
.inay.seriously prejudice US-UK relations and current
prospects for US military and economic aid to the UK.
Document No.
1 NO CHANGE in Class. E]
0 DECLASSIFIED
Class. C-3AJCED TO: TS
D22. MOMO, 4 An:7 77
Auth:
E T
Dato: 1 6 MAR 1978
,7: __0141L-
50 - _
1251
erais
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
� Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP RET
The Department instructs Douglas to stress to British
Foreign Secretary Bevin that the overriding considera-
tion of the US in withholding the aircraft and equipment
from the Chinese Communists is one of security for
the Western Powers,
EUROPE
3. GREECE: Prime Minister may resign--US Ambassador
Grady reports that in a recent conversation Greek Prime
�Minister Venizelos appeared extremely worried over
the stability of his government and over possible difficulties
within his own Liberal Party. �Grady expresses the opinion
that Venizelos may resign before Parliament convene
31 March 1950 and may offer to support the candidacy of
General Plastiras in the belief that these voluntary actions
now would help save his own prestige and that of the Liberal
Party.
(CIA Comment: CIA agrees that Venizelos may be
compelled by mounting popular and political pressure to
resign before parliament convenes, although his resigna-
tion might be delayed because of continued maneuvering
by the King. CIA further believes that the termination of
the present government, by making possible the forma-
tion of a broadly based coalition government under Plastiras,
would tend to increase Greek political stability.)
2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24854
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
2 8 MAR
TO'RET 1250
GENERAL
1. US Ambassadors survey world situation--The US Ambas-
sadors to European nations meeting in Rome, in reviewing
the world situation as it affects the US, have agreed that
the Western Powers should intensify their efforts to check-
mate Soviet aggressive action throughout the world. The
US Ambassadors urge, in line with these intensified anti-
Communist efforts by the West, that: (a) the US launch a
vigorous propaganda campaign to recapture for the West
the leadership in the world movement for peace; and (b) the
North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) Council be convened early in
May to consider the establishment within the NAT system
of a "strong, high-level means of direction." The Ambas-
sadors strongly suggest that serious thought be given to
utilizing German material and supplies in building the de-
fense of Western Europe and that the relationship of the US
and UK throughout the world be clarified, including the UK's
role in European affairs. The Ambassadors are convinced
that the preservation of Southeast Asia from Communism
should be a cardinal point of US policy, and believe it is of
the utmost urgency to take steps to hold that area.
Docum Ient No. #7
NO CHA:7GE in Class. n
1_1
IJ
DT:CLASFIFTED
Cla. OND TO: TS S
LEL. 1,!emo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DOA F.EG ,19777 117: oie
763 m
Date: 1 6 M 8 B
ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TO'RET
ANNEX
28 March 1950
INCREASED TENSION BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Tension between India and Pakistan has increased
seriously during the past few days. In India, where press,
public, and government feeling regarding the safety of the
Hindu minority in East Bengal continues to run high, Prime
Minister Nehru has reportedly Intimated that although he
personally continues to oppose war with Pakistan he would
be forced to send troops across the East Pakistan border if
new anti-Hindu violence should break out there. The recent
buildup of Indian Army troops and supplies _near Pakistan's
West Punjab border has led the Pakistan Government to
urgently request the US", the UK, Canada, and Australia to
counsel India to move its troops back from the frontier; and
Pakistan Army leaders feel that they should have already
countered India's military buildup by strengthening their
own border forces.
Although the situation will undoubtedly remain ex-
plosive, there is some possibility that friction at the highest
level between India and Pakistan might be lessened through
a meeting of the two prime ministers; the US has strongly
suggested to both governments that such a meeting is of
"prime importance." Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of
Pakistan recently sent a long personal letter to Nehru
inviting the latter to visit Karachi for a personal discussion
of the situation, an action which parallels previous efforts
on the part of Nehru. Although the two prime ministers
are likely to have some difficulty in reaching agreement on
the time and place, such a meeting may take place and could
lead to a top level understanding on methods for reducing the
present critical tensions between the peoples in the two
countries.
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24b53
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOPS
GENERAL
'4 7 MAR 19511
I. Australian attitude toward Pacific defense pact--US Embassy
Canberra has been informed by Australian Minister of External
Affairs Spender that his government desires to do everything
possible to promote a Pacific pact which would include mili-
tary commitments. In Spender's view, however, no Pacific
nation or group of nations can be expected to embark on a
course which without US backing might prove "futile and even
disastrous." Spender believes that discussions at the forth-
coming Baguio Conference (called by the Philippine Govern-
ment) will be futile, because of the lack of support by Asian
countries themselves and the absence of support from the US.
EUROPE
2. GERMANY: Reform of German interzonal trade set-up urged--
The Berlin branch of the US High Commission in Germany be-
lieves that "the time has come for the Bonn Government to
clean house" and remedy the unsatisfactory situation regard-
ing German interzonal trade. - The Berlin branch recommends
that the Federal Republic's interzonal trade negotiator be re-
placed and that more adequate customs supervision be estab-
lished on the Soviet Zone border; the branch-also suggests that
preparations for sanctions which could be applied to the German
Democratic Republic whenever it departs from the interzonal
trade agreement should be completed. The branch proposes
to ban at once iron and steel shipments and 40 percent of other
shipments to East Germany until the present trade unbalance
ends.
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
3. MAN: US views on recent developments�The Department of
State, in connection with the Shah s recent appointment of
Ali Mansur as prime minister and his reported statement that
Do C111:011t No. 90
- 1 -
irn
1249
� -
VO CHANGE in Class.
DECLASSIFII:D
Class. CHAlinD TO: TS S
T MA Memo , 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA G. 77/1763
"Date: 16 MAR 1978 By: 07,
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 006749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T 0 P R E T
�
the "fight against corruptionJ, must be postponed, has author-
ized US Ambassador Wiley to impress upon the Shah the need
to bring forward "less questionable" political leadership
without too much delay. The Department adds that unless key
officials who symbolize policies of progress and reform are
named in the near future, the effect will be to disappoint the
US Government and people and to discourage Iranians sincerely
working for the benefit of their people. Wiley is also author-
ized to ask the Shah about the truth of reports that secret
Irano-Soviet negotiations are being carried on, supposedly
because Iran failed to receive what it considered adequate US
assistance.
FAR EAST
4. MALAYA: US aid for Malaya recommended--US representa-
tive Griffin, in continuing the analysis of prospects for US
assistance to various Southeast Asian countries, concludes
that Malaya's strategic, political, and economic importance
justifies a small but urgent US aid program. Griffin believes
that Malaya's long-run political orientation is at stake and
suggests the extension of immediate US assistance to provide:
(a) communication equipment for civil police; (b) earth-moving
equipment for the clearing of jungle roads, resettlement
areas, and airstrips; and (c) educational personnel to assist
in reorienting the present pro-China and pro-Communist
teaching in Malaya's Chinese elementary schools.
-2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
0 /14 S
"z 4 b .92)
r-
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP
EUROPE
1, GREECE: New Cabinet formed--According to US Charge
Minor in Athens, the Venizelos Cabinet appointed on 23 March
creates the impression of -an imposed solution to frustrate
the freely expressed will of the Greek people and exposes
the Palace to charges of political favoritism and intrigue.
Minor expresses the view that the Venizelos Cabinet will not
receive the support of the other centrist leaders (Plastiras
and Papandreou), will be tolerated by the rightist parties
only so long as they see fit, and does not even have the full
backing of Venizelos' own Liberal Party. Minor adds that
the new Cabinet will seek a vote of confidence and then sus-
pend Parliament for at least three months, but that the first
meeting of Parliament may be postponed from 30 March
until 17 April.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the Venizelos
Cabinet may, with considerable difficulty, be able to stay
in power temporarily, but lacks the basis for effective par-
liamentary government. The centrist majority in the pre-
sent parliament, upon which any viable government would
have to depend, has been seriously split by Venizelos' action,
and an impasse may develop necessitating a new national
election soon. In such an election, the Greek people would
show increased displeasure with the established major poli-
tical parties, and as a result of the Palace's political in-
triguing might again become sharply divided into traditional
monarchist and republican camps, to the great detriment of
the nation's stability.)
Document No.
25 MAR 1950
1248
E.() CUA1:2 in Class. Li
t] DZCLASSIFILD
lass. C.:AjC17) TO: TS S
.7)71i ilemo, 4 Apr 77
1 - auth: D 77/1.1
16 MAR-19/8
Date: By: 11)1�7
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
����
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOPS
FAR EAST
2, AUSTRALIA: Anti-Communist action --US Ambassador
'Jarman in Canberra reports that the newly-elected Liberal-
Country Government has invoked strong emergency powers
for use against the current series of Communist-led strikes.
In Jarman's opinion, this "bold and vigorous" action indi-
cates the new government's determination to force a show-
down with Communist union leaders. The Ambassador
points out that the action appears to have strong popular
support and predicts that the government "stands a good
chance of victory."
(CIA Comment: CIA believes this anti-Communist
action is an attempt at testing public reaction in preparation
for early action by the government to fulfill its campaign
pledge to outlaw the Australian Comniunist Party.)
2 -
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
C /A - C.
24851
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
54
TO'RET
GENERAL
1. US to protest East German militarization�The Depart-
ment of State has informed US Embassies London and
Paris that the US intends to make a formal protest to
the USSR regarding the formation in Eastern Germany
of a militarized police force. The Department comments
that the purpose of such a protest will be primarily for
the propaganda effect, because the USSR is unlikely to disband
the military police organization at US request. The Depart-
ment expresses thefl belief that the protest would be more
forceful if the UK and French Governments participate in
some-manner and requests the Embassies to discuss the
subject with the British and the French.
EUROPE
2, BELGIUM: Elder statesmen favor Leopold's abdication--
US Embassy Brussels has been informed by former Belgian
Premier Spaak that there is "not the slightest doubt" that
a majority of the Belgian Ministers of State (an advisory
group of "elder statesmen" who have been called into
special session) will favor a formula providing for the
� dignified and honorable abdication of King Leopold. Spaak
described Carton de Wiart, who has been called on by the
Regent to form a government,-as� a "moderate" on the
subject of the King's return. Spaak expressed the opinion
that his Socialist Party (which has heretofore adamantly
opposed Leopold's return)"would display excellent manners"
if Leopold would agree to return and then abdicate.
24 MAR 1950
1247
ciA -5
C/,9 �
Document No. 1471
VO ClikNGE in Class. 0
E] DECLASSMED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS S
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA PEG. 77 1763
tate: RJ9j By:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP CRET
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
3. IRAN: Shah !Limes Ali Mansur as Prime Minister�US
AmbasSadror Wiley in Tehran reports that the Shah has
accepted the resignation of Prime Minister Saed's Cabi-
net-and has appointed All Mansur to form a new govern-
ment in its place. According to -Wiley, the immediate
popular reaction to the -Shah's action was one of bitter
disappointment and increased frustration. Wiley adds
that Prince Abdor Reza (the Shah's personal representative
in the Seven-Year Plan Organization) now plans to withdraw
from active participation in economic affairs and that Minis-
ter of National Economy Taq'i Nasr has indicated that he
will not continue in office with what he calls "the most
corrupt and self-seeking elements in the country."
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the Shah's appoint-
ment of Mansur may well have been motivated by fears that
his weak political position called for appeasement of the
powerful landowners and other vested interests .with whom
Mansur has long been associated. CIA considers that, re-
gardless of the Shah's motive, Mansur 's appointment will
probably reduce progress toward the economic and political
stabilization which Iran needs, particularly because the
Shah's appointment of a man with Mansur's reputation will
alienate the progressive elements in the population and dis-
courage the general popular hope that the Shah could put
through a reform program. Moreover, the new government
will be handicapped by the withdrawal of the two most promin-
ent men in Iran's economic and social development program.)
2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
/14 �
24R50
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Jot
TOP ET
EUROPE
1. FRANCE: Speed in initial MDAP shipment urged--US
Embassy Paris reports that French Defense Minister
Pleven is greatly concerned over the arrival dates of
.MDAP shipments, because the French Army will be at
half strength from 15 to 25 April 1950, when one class
of conscripts will have been released and the new class
will not have reported. Pleven expressed the hope that
the initial MDAP shipment will arrive well before.
15 April and that the next shipment will not arrive until
after 25 April. The Embassy urgently recommends:
(a) that every effort be made to speed the initial MDAP
shipment; and (b) that Pleven be informed as soon as
possible of the approximate arrival time of the shipment.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the French
Government's capabilities for coping with serious dis-
orders between 15 and 25 April will be seriously weakened,
because immediately after the present conscript class is
released on 15 April, the troop units in France will con-
sist almost entirely of conscripts having, about four
months' training.)
23 MAR 1950
Document No.
NO C14.--C.3In C_a3s. fl
Cla63. C 7) TO: TS
D:/1 Mono, 4 Anr 77
Auth: DIDP, 77/1763
Date :1 6 MAR 1978 By:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
S�rs�
244�
'-)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
4f
T0 RET 1245
22 MAR 1950
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
1. INDIA: India reportedly reinforcing Punjab border forces �
According to US Consulate Lahore, US Military Attache
Meyers has been informed by Pakistan Army headquarters
that a steady buildup of Indian Army troops and supplies
along the East Punjab border opposite Lahore has been
taking place since 5 March 1950. Meyers reports that the
Pakistan Army Chief of Staff interprets these military
moves as part of a plan to provoke Pakistan into taking
the military initiative and feels that, failing in this, the"next
step" for India would be to declare the present Kashmir
cease-fire line final and dismiss the UN observers there.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes the reported troop
movements probably have taken place and the fears of the
Pakistan Army Chief of Staff may well be justified. CIA
considers that although the Indian Government dbes not
want war, it has clearly indicated a determination to re-
tain all of the territory it occupies in Kashmir. India may,
therefore, adopt provocative tactics, in the hope of either
maneuvering Pakistan into becoming the aggressor or
establishing so clearly Pakistan's reluctance to open
hostilities as to indicate probable acceptance of steps
aimed at consolidating India's present position in Kashmir.)
Document No. (45
(9
NO ClIA:7GE in Class. 0
0 DZCLASS12I=D
Class. C :A= TO: TS
D2.4_ 4 Apr 77
Auth: 1FA T. 77 /1763
Date: �6W1978 By:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
s wi
24848
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP ET
GENERAL
21 MAR 195c�
1. British ask US support in defense negotiations with Egypt--
US Ambassador Douglas in London Atrongly recommends that
the US provide "diplomatic assistance' to the British during
the impending negotiations between the UK and Egypt regard-
ing mutual defense arrangements. According to Douglas,
a British Foreign Office spokesman expressed the hope that
the US could make it clear to the Egyptian Government that
it would be useless for Egypt to attempt to "play off the
US against the UK," and suggested that US Army Chief of
Staff Collins (who is. expected to be in Cairo about 4 April)
might take the opportunity to talk to King Farouk frankly
concerning the present world situation. The Foreign Office
spokesman expressed the view that King Farouk has been
educated to the "realities" of the world situation, but added
that time will be needed before the Wafd Government, which
has been out of power for some time, will Inodify its present
"extreme and somewhat unrealistic views. Douglas com-
ments that the British may have to push ahead with the
"major task" which the defense negotiations represent,
even though they do not appear particularly anxious to do so.
.EUROPE
2. GERMANY: All-Berlin election proposal suggested--US
High Commissioner McCloy in Berlin believes that the
West "has a great deal to gain and nothing to lose" by a
proposal to the USSR for city-wide elections in Berlin.
McCloy strongly recommends that, if the UK and France
concur, the Western Commandants in Berlin confidentially
propose that the City Assembly, not later than 20 April 1950,
formally request the Allied Kommandatura to seek Soviet
agreement to the holding of city-wide elections. According
Document No.
1244
S-TS
NO CHANC-7,E in Class.
Ll DECTIA=FIED
Class. c=1D TO:
rcA
Auth:
Date:
ET
1 6 MAR 1978
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
13
Ar..7.- 77
1:3y:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP RET
to McCloy, Mayor Reuter is enthusiastic about the idea, and
believes there would be no difficulty in getting immediate
Assembly approval of such a resolution addressed to the
Allied Commandants. McCloy comments that a Soviet re-
jection of the election proposal, which he expects, would
clearly demonstrate to the Germans and the rest of the
world the cynicism behind the Berlin Youth Rally scheduled
for 28 May, which is ostensibly for "peace, unity, national
independence, and a better life." McCloy also points out
that if the USSR accepts the election proposal, the West
should insist on complete freedom of speech during the
campaign throughout Berlin, and should readmit the USSR
to the Kommandatura only after the elimination of the veto.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the USSR is un-
likely to agree to the holding of city-wide elections in
Berlin on terms acceptable to the West.)
-2 --
E T
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24847
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
4
T 0 E T
GENERAL
20 MAR 1950
1243
I. Egypt reportedly asking UK to withdraw from Suez and Sudan--
US Ambassador Caffery in Cairo has learned from British
officials there that an Egyptian note, calling for an early Brit-
ish withdrawal from Suez and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, is
en route to London for delivery to Foreign Secretary Bevin.
According to the British, the note was moderately worded,
largely because King Farouk insisted that the original draft
be "toned down."
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the Egyptian Gov-
ernment, which had been expected to reopen negotiations re-
garding its alliance with the UK, is probably asking for more
than it expects to get, both for bargaining purposes and for
home consumption. CIA further believes that: (a) the UK
may agree to concessions in the Suez Canal area; (b) it is un-
likely that the UK will agree to withdraw from the Sudan; and
(c) Anglo-Egyptian discussions will probably be both prolonged
and involved.)
FAR EAST
2. INDOCHINA: Views on US aid for Indochina--US representa-
tive Griffin, in his summary report from Saigon on the possi-
bilities of utilizing US funds for resisting Communism in
Indochina, expresses the opinion that the wave of Communism
in Indochina is predominantly nationalistic rather than eco-
nomic, social, or ideological. Griffin believes that although
the situation is not serious enough to warrant defeatism, it
does justify effective application of US economic aid to
strengthen the Bao Dai Government and to win non-Commu-
nist elements from among the followers of Ho Chi Minh.
Griffin points out that the general French attitude caused his
Document No.
(04
1 NO CHANGE in Class. 0
0 DECLAT-23.:FIZD
Class. (.7-:j-LD TD: T3
132:1
Awn:D ;1 - �
Date: "fr (F-197-8
Pr reit E ET
Oat
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
S � T5
C/A-. 5
S
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP CRET
mission concern regarding the possibility of "exercising
even minimum US supervision" over an assistance program
and suggests that Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should be
direct recipients of any economic aid from the US. Griffin
adds that a formula for distributing US aid to Indochina
"must be found for taking advantage of French experience
without appearing to consolidate French hegemony," and
comments that, to be effective, US aid must be bold, quick,
and generous.
2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
t Itmtk 1.7.ow
, 24846 Approved for ReleAase: 2019/01/02 C06749479
1242
TO ET
GENERAL
1. Western warning to Czechoslovakia not favored�The
UK Foreign Office has expressed an initially unfavorable
opinion of a recommendation made by the British Am-
bassador in Prague that the US, UK, and France issue
a joint warning to the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister
against further "spy trials" involving Western nationals.
The Foreign Office explained this attitude by stating its
view that (1) there is no indication that any such trial
is in the offing; (2) Western demands would be unlikely
to stop the trial if it were being planned, and (3) a
Western demarche might even impel the Czechoslovaks
to organize one.
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
2. IRAN- Negotiations with Soviets reportedly under way--
US Ambassador Wiley transmits the belief of Iranian
Propaganda Chief Shahrokh that high-level secret
talks between the USSR and representatives of the
Shah have been going on for at least three weeks.
Wiley's informant states he reached this conclusion
following a clandestine conference with Soviet First
Secretary Komissarov, who reportedly made special
mention of "satisfactory" conversations on economic
matters, According to Wiley's informant, the Soviets
have apparently made a vague offer of the economic
aid "which America will not give" and may also have
held out the promise of a favorable trade agreement
and the return of Soviet-held Iranian gold.
(CIA Comment: Wiley's source is an unreliable
informant whose present report is as yet completely
� unconfirmed and may be merely a Soviet or Iranian
Document No. Co)
S- s
5 - S
NO C:-IA.7^7, in Class.
Li DaLA:
CiaLs. C T): T3
4 Am^ 77
Auth: � 7 Date: re-47AR /978 BY: ti/t
ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP RET
propaganda move. CIA believes, however, that trade
negotiations (in which Iran has shown some interest in
the past) may in fact be taking place. Iranian leaders,
who have already manifested considerable despair and
indecision about their inability to maintain economic
and political stability without substantial outside aid,
may even now feel that Soviet offers of economic assistance
are worth exploring. It is unlikely, however, that the Iranian
Government would knowingly commit itself to any arrange-
ment which would prejudice its relations with the West.)
2
ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24845
J
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP ET
1241
GENERAL
1. Bevin urges settling Chinese UN representation�Accord- etc*
ing to the US delegation to the UN, the British UN delegation
has been advised of Bevin's deep personal concern that the
question of Chinese representation in the UN be settled
soon. The British delegation has accordingly been instructed
to discuss this =titer with the representatives of Egypt,
Ecuador, and Cuba.
2. US favors centrist Greek goverment�The Department
of State has expressed its concurrence in the views ex-
pressed by US Ambassador Grady in his recent interview
with King Paul of Greece concerning the establishment of
a centrist government headed by Plastiras. The Depart-
ment informed Grady that the elimination of Plastiras at
this time, and the setting up of an alternative coalition,
would be interpreted in the US as a contrived effort to
frustrate the will of the Greek people as evidenced in the
recent elections and would be likely to create more con-
cern than would any possible subsequent disillusionment
concerning the Plastiras government.
I; ,
Document No.
NO CHANGE 4.11 Class,
DECLASSIFIED
Class, CHANGED TO: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77 1763
D
late , YI 8
By:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
cm'.
2444
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP ET
EUROPE
1 6 MAR 1950
1240
I. GREECE: Formation of Plastiras government urged--US
Ambassador Grady reports that while discussing the Greek
political situation with Kingftul, he warned the King against
his expressed desire to form a government other than one
based on the centrist bloc headed by Plastiras. Indicating
his belief that such a centrist solution would reflect the will
of the Greek people as revealed in the recent election, Grady
told the King that any other solution would bring criticism
upon the Palace for interference and Greece would be thrown
into a period of political confusion as the result of an un-
stable government. In answer to King Paul's expressed
fear that the US would become disgusted with Plastiras and
withdraw aid, Grady assured him the US would be more dis-
turbed by political confusion than by the designation of
Plastiras as prime minister. Grady pointed out that by-
passing Plastiras would force him to join forces with the
leftists, thus creating a strong leftist group which might
ultimately take political control of Greece. Grady concluded
by pointing out to the King the dangers of further delay in
forming a new government.
erilfr
TOP
Document No. _ ,
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
El DEcLAssivIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
kith: jpe REG. 77/1781
bate:
ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
02,40
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
R E T
GENERAL
1. Western warning to Czechoslovakia urged--US Ambas-
sador Briggs in Prague reports that the British Ambas-
sador there has urged upon the UK Government the
desirability of taking some "prophylactic action" before
the Czechoslovaks make further attacks on Western
missions in Prague. The British Ambassador suggests
a joint US, British, and French warning to the Czecho-
slovak Foreign Minister that further "spy trials" will
have "unforeseen consequences" for relations between
Czechoslovakia and the Western countries. The British
Ambassador argues that even though this approach might
not stop Czechoslovakia entirely, some effect might be
produced and taking such action is preferable to waiting
for impending attacks like "sitting ducks." Ambassador
Briggs recommends that the US take some such action,
either jointly or alone, basing his recommendation on the
view that Czechoslovakia appears anxious to avoid a com-
plete break with the US. Briggs also recommends that
US vulnerability to such attacks be lessened through a
reductivn of the Embassy's service attaches.
Document No.
Co 0
I 5 MAR 1950
1239
cm � s
NO CAME in Class. m
LI
111
CiaLs, C._:A._TC:7) TO: TS S.
D211 Mono, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA G. 77/1763
1. 6 MAR 1978
Date: By: Pt)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
- 24842
4
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T 0 CRET
GENERAL
le Situation in Iran termed "especially dangerous"--US
Embassy Moscow views the current situation in Iran as
"especially dangerous" and believes the USSR will be
quick to exploit the situation. The Embassy adds that
the fall of Iran to the USSR would have an extremely
depressing effect on the entire Middle East. As possible
remedial action, the Embassy suggests that surplus US
foodstuffs, clothing, and medicines be distributed in Iran
and that a "high calibre" American be sent to Iran to
prepare a list of urgent projects for submission either
to the Export-Import Bank or to the US Congress. The
Embassy comments that such a visit, properly publicized,
would have a heartening effect in Iran and would notify
the USSR that the US does not propose to let Iran fall into
Soviet hands by default.
2. Views on German unity issue--US Embassy Moscow
expresses the opinion that the Western Powers must
seriously reckon with the possibility of a Soviet move
to conclude a "phony" separate peace treaty with the
German Democratic Republic (GDR) and must pursue an
active role in promoting German unity. The Embassy
points out that the recent foreign policy speech by GDR
Foreign Minister Dertinger suggests that the USSR would
�
conclude a separate peace treaty after further "legitimi-
zation" of the claim that the GDR and National Front
speak in the name of all Germany.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes the USSR is unlikely
to conclude an early separate peace treaty with the GDR
unless the Western Powers conclude a separate treaty
with the,Bonn Government in the near future.)
-1 Document No.
cef
1 4 MAR 1950
1238
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
D DECLASSIFIED
Class. C TO: TS
4 A.:sir 77
Date:
E T
16 MAR 1978
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP.S R E T
EUROPE
3. BELGIUM: Cabinet split over Leopold question--VS
Embassy Brussels has been informed that the Belgian
Cabinet is badly split over the question of the return of
King Leopold, following the results of the "popular con-
sultation on 12 March 1950. The Embassy has also
learned that Premier Eyskens, who has flown to Geneva
to discuss the problem with the King, will threaten to
resign if Leopold does not abdicate. The Embassy's
source believesthe chances of civil disturbances over
the issue of Leopold's retUrn are not great.
(CIA Comment: CIA a.nticipates that the present
political uncertainty in Belgium resulting from the
�
Leopold question will not be resolved for some time.)
2 -
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24841
0.. A
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
E T
1 3 MAR 1950
1237
GENERAL
Agjny -e
AR.r4/-c.
1. Atomic cloud located in Caribbean area--The Commanding
General of the US Caribbean Sea Frontier has reported
to the Department of the Army that a weak radioactive
cloud was located over Panama on 10 March.
LCIA Comment: In the absence of sufficient in-
formation to draw any significant conclusions concerning
this report, CIA estimates that this radioactivity is prob-
ably the result of abnormal cosmic ray activity in the
atmosphere.)
2. US position concerning UN seating of Chinese Communists--
The US delegation at the UN reports from New York that
several countries have expressed confusion concerning the
US position on the seating of Chinese Communists in the
UN. The delegation says that despite several reaffirmations
of the US position that each government should make its own
decision in the light of its own circumstances, certain countries
are puzzled by what they regard as an ambiguous position as
contrasted with a previous US attitude favoring a vote against
the seating of the Chinese Communists. The Egyptian delegate
has expressed the view that the US cannot escape its responsi-
bility for leadership and should not leave the smaller countries
to make this decision. The US delegation urgently requests
instructions concerning the problem.
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. rl
LJ
ED DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHANGED TO: TS
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: u 1763
Date:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
By;
a - .5
24840
C LI
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T 0 P R E T
GENERAL
1. Dutch concern over lack of western unity�According to
US Ambassador Chapin at The Hague, Dutch Foreign
Minister Sticker feels that the world situation is "gradu-
ally deteriorating" and that insufficient progress is being
made to counteract this deterioration through "fostering
a sense of unity in the West." Stikker believes, in Parti-
cular, that little progress can be made so long as Western
defense budgets are approved or disapproved on primarily
a national basis instead of being adjusted to the role of the
country in an over-all defense plan. Stikker urges that
an early meeting be held by the North Atlantic Council in
order to make a final decision concerning the allotment
of defense roles in the collective western community.
2. Belgian Minister favors rearming of Western Germany--
US Ambassador Murphy in Brussels reports that Belgian
Prime Minister Eyskens has, in informal conversation,
expressed unequivocally the personal view that Western
Germany should be rearmed and that no further time should
be wasted in the "urgent situation." Concerning "French
emotionalism" in respect to Germany, Eyskens commented
that to think of present-day Germany as a source of aggres-
sive action against the Western Powers is absurd. Pointing
out that the question is not a sentimental but realistic one,
he asserted that Western Germany must be used as bulwark
against the "only visible danger," the USSR. Eyskens be-
lieves that Western Europe must have a minimum of 80
equipped divisions and that the defense of the area is im-
possible without German participation. Murphy stresses
that these views are personal to Eyskens, not the views of
the Belgian Government, but indicates such views are the
private opinion of "other leading Belgians."
Document No.
57
pniAN 1950
1236
-
NO CHANGE in Class.
DECLASSIFIED
Class. CHA.NGED TO: TS S
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA ET.G. 7711763
ate :t8 MAR 1978 By:
RET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
.24833
Approved for Release: 201_97/.01/02 C06749479
T C RET
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
L INDIA: Tibet to be given additional arms aid--US Embassy
New Delhi has been reliably TnforthedTh�iidia, with
British encouragement, has granted a request from Tibet
for small arms and ammunition in materially larger quan-
tities than the limited amounts supplied in the past. The
Embassy reports, however, that British representatives
doubt Tibet has any real military plan for resisting an
organized Communist incursion and regard India's move
largely as a measure for raising -Tibetan morale and com-
batting the immediate danger of infiltration. Pointing out
that India has failed to respond to British offers of mater-
ial help in this program, the Embassy comments that
India would probably be cool toward similar US offers on
the grounds that: (a) India is already providing all that
Tibet can use; (b) collaboration with the US in an anti-
Communist program would be politically undesirable; and
(c) the US has been unable to meet India's own requests for
military aid.
FAR EAST
�1 0 MAR 1950
1235
2. INDOCHINA: Vietnam expecting US aid�US representative c..71215
Griffin, in making a preliminary report from Saigon con-
cerning his fact-finding mission to Southeast Asia, indicates
that present Vietnamese expectations .regarding US aid are
great as a consequence of Ambassador ressup's recent
visit, the extension of U recognition, and the impending
US naval visit. The French military commander in Indo-
china has pointed out that essential encouragement could
best be given to Vietnam by prompt US token deliveries of
equipment, preferably military. . Griffin emphasizes, however,
that although the early arrival of even token US aid may con-
tribute to rallying Bao Dai, any aid extended in present cir-
cumstances must have both a political and a military impact.
Document No. .c(�
IRV
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
DECLASSIFI:D �
Class. CHAMED TO: TS S
DDA Ee:o, 4 1 77
1
Auth: DDA R:G. 77/1763
Date: 3
1 MAR 978 y QV
1::
RET
Anoroved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
g
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24838 TOP ET
9 MAR 1950
1234
GENERAL
1. US sees no settlement of Trieste at present--The Depart- 0.145
ment of State has advised US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade
that because of the negative attitude of the Yugoslav Gov-
ernment toward any concessions to Italy, the US is inclined
to take no further action at present in a settlement of the
Trieste issue. The Department believes that agreement ,
may eventually be possible but foresees no action open to
the US or Britain which would be effective at this time.
EUROPE
2, GERMANY: Western terms for all-German peace treaty-- culls
US High Commissioner McCloy has been advised by his plans
and policy committee in Frankfort that the three Western
Powers should clearly state the conditions under which they
would be prepared to consider a peace settlement with the
whole of Germany. The committee urges that the US, British,
and French foreign ministers adopt at a future meeting a
three-power approach to the problem of an all-German peace
settlement. The committee expresses the view that any new
unilateral proposals by the US would do more harm than good.
NEAR EAST-AFRICA �
3. INDIA: India reportedly plans to accept UN mediator--US
Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi has learned from a
usually reliable source that India has instructed its UN repre-
sentatives to accept the Security Council resolution providing
for a single mediator in the Kashmir dispute. Henderson's
informant added that he was by no means certain that un-
qualified Indian acceptance would be "readily and quickly
Document No.'
,ce
- 1 - NO in Class.
DECLASSIFII.D
Class. C.IINGID TO:
Memo, 4 Ar 77
Auth: DDA ITZG. 7711.7t",
Dateq_e_Aaa_44._ BY;
RET
0
74
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP RET
evident" at Lake Success. Source indicated that the
decision was preceded by a bitter debate in which tell-
ing use was made of the argument that some progress
on Kashmir was imperative in view of the delicate rela-
tions with Pakistan resulting from the Bengal disturbances.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that India, despite
its continuing vocal objections to the principles embodied
in the UN resolution, will finally accept it "under protest,"
as a means both of easing tensions with Pakistan and
obtaining a new procedural basis for arguing the impractica-
bility of a plebiscite. CIA further believes that Pakistan is
likely to accept the resolution only if it becomes convinced
that the objective of an impartial over-all plebiscite will
not be abandoned as a result of negotiations carried out by
the mediator.)
ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24837
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
_
T 0 P CRET
GENERAL
1. New Palestine approach urged--The US member of the
Palestine Conciliation Commission (PCC) reports that
the Arab delegations, dissatisfied with the� PCC's in-
activity,: may refuse further participation. The US
representative therefore believes the time has come
for a new approach to the task of the PCC. In view of
the deteriorating situation at the PCC talks and in
Palestine, where Israeli-Jordan negotiations have suffered
a set-back, the US member proposes serious considera-
tion be given to the possibility of suggesting that Jordan
make a request for direct talks with Israel under PCC
auspices, such talks to be coupled, if need be, with
mediation,
Q mmn IU
1232
4/0
Document No.
NO CH= ill Cass. 0
E
Class. CAC..) TO: TS
L-A 4 Apr 77
Auth: L2A ''. 77/1761
Dated 6 MAR 1978 BY:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24836
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
ghor
TOP RET
EUROPE
1, NORWAY: Norwegian attitude toward Atlantic Pact--US
Charge Villard in Oslo expresses the opinion that although
there are chronic isolationists in Nonni, the Norwegian
Government and general public have an 'inner conviction"
that Norway is correct in aligning with the Atlantic com-
munity and believe that the survival of Norway as a nation
is intimately linked with the future of Western civilization.
Villard says that the Norwegian will to fight, which he feels
is strong, is based on the expectation of US aid and on con-
fidence in, the active implementation of the Atlantic Pact.
He believes that the arrival of MDAP material will have
profound psychological effects on the people. According
to Villard, the Norwegians are under no illusions that they
could withstand an invasion by the USSR and foresee
national extinction as the result of such an attack.
Doet.,ent No. 5
NO CHAIM in Class.
DF_CLASSIFIID
Class. C-It:,,,`(.2D TO: TS S
Date:
Auth: 7-1". 77/1781
MAR. IJ/8
DA .1.11etro , 4 Aor 77
By:
CI I
7 MAR 1950
1232
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24835
Ir A
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP RET
NEAR EASY-AFRICA
1. JORDAN: Abdullah forced to recall "anti ..treaty" Cabinet
USMinister Drew in Amman has been informed that King
Abdullah has been forced to prevail upon Tawfiq Pasha to
withdraw his resignation as Prime Minister -(recently sub-
mitted in protest against Abdullah's proposed settlement
with Israel). Drew comments that although an eventual
resumption of the Israeli negotiations is not precluded, this
development represents a major setback for the King and
will probably make further attempts on his part to obtain
a settlement much more difficult. Drew's informant ex-
pressed the view that the Cabinet's opposition to the King's
proposed settlement resulted from unwillingness to offend
the other Arab League states, whose press and radio had
already begun violent attacks on Jordan. Drew's informant
attributed Abdullah's current difficulties to the King's
insistence on speed in the negotiations, and suggested that
the Cabinet might have found an acceptable formula if given
more time to study the matter.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that this setback to
King. Abdallih, who appeared powerful enough to ignore
public opinion,demonstrates the continuing importance and
strength of anti-Zionist feeling among Arabs.)
Document No.
NO CHIICE in
D2CLASSIii7L7D
Class. C:IANC2D TO:
DDA Memo, 4
DA REG, 77
AR ig
Date ;
55
Class.
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
0
TS
Apr 77
17e
sit
6 MAR 1950
24834
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
R E T
EUROPE
I. FINLAND: Communists may be included in new Cabinet--
US Minister Cabot in Helsinki has learned from various
quarters that� responsible businessmen, government officials,
and politicians are considering the inclusion of Communists
in unimportant positions in the new Cabinet. Cabot adds that
the apparent Finnish intention would be to place the Commu-
nists in positions where they wil,1 be "well hedged in." The
Minister expresses the opinion that there may be some vali-
dity to the argument that the inclusisin of the Communists
in the Cabinet will "draw their domestic political sting"
by making it difficult for the Communists to avoid responsi-
bility for damage to the Finnish economy resulting from
their irresponsible agitation. In reviewing the "obviously
formidable" objections to including Communists in the Fin-
nish Cabinet, Cabot points out that the Communists would
try, regardless of government precautions, to gain control
of the government. The Minister also expresses concern
�
regarding the unfavorable effect the reversal of Finland's
attitude toward the Communists would have in other Euro-
pean countries, particularly those where Communists had
once been Cabinet members.
Document No.
140 CTE.7; C2af3s.
D2C-?7Y7I:=D
CiLL3 c== TD: TS
D-2:1 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA 1G. 77/1763
Date: LAIALL44 By:
� .
0
4 MAR 1911
1230
a/fi S
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
V
24833
r
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP R E T
GENERAL
1. Developments on Southeast Asian conference�US Embassy
Canberra has learned that Australia has declined a Philip-
pine invitation to attend a proposed conference of Asian
nations largely because of fears that India "will be unable
to send adequate representation" and without India, such
a conference would get nowhere. According to source, the
Australians are considering taking the initiative in planning
regional cooperation by permitting non-commonwealth
Asian states to attend an April commonwealth conference
in Australia.
.Meanwhile, US Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi
expresses the opinion that India would probably be unwilling
at present to participate in a conference under Philippine
auspices because of the belief that such a conference would
be considered anti-Communist in character.
3 MAR 1950
1t29
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the present dis-
agreement between India, Australia, and the Philippines is likely
to preclude the holding of any effective Asian conference in
the near future.)
EUROPE
2, UNITED KINGDOM: Churchill's views of political situation--
US Embassy London reports that Conservative leader Winston
Churchill stated during a recent conversation that his party
has always supported the government in matters of real
national interest, particularly on foreign policy, and will con-
tinue to do so. With respect to domestic affairs, Churchill
indicated thatthe Conservatives would fulfill the function of
an active opposition, but would not use their position in. a
"frivolous manner." Churchill felt that although the new
Parliament must be given a chance, another general election
in the "near future" was inevitable. DOCUTent No. 51
1
2,10 Class.
- fl 0
TS
...o. 77
th: DL-.01 T.
n
Date:' 6 MAft1�-7EH
R E T By.
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
5 - 5
C"F
CIA- S
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T 0 P R E T
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
� 3, JORDAN: Cabinet resigns over proposed Israeli pact--
US Legation Amman reports that Jordanian Prime Minis-
ter Tawfig Pasha's Cabinet has resigned after an all-day
session in which its members vainly attempted to dissuade
King Abdullah from pressing his plans for seeking an
immediate Israeli-Jordanian settlement. The Legation
adds that the King has reportedly asked Samir Pasharifai
to form a new government.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that Tawfig's resigna-
tion does not materially affect the chances for acceptance
of the proposed Israeli-Jordanian pact. King Abdullah, who
represents the only real political power in Jordan, has
already anticipated just such an eventuality by asserting
that if Tawfig's Cabinet failed to accept his Palestine
policy he would get a Cabinet that would.)
FAR EAST �
4. CHINA: Views concerning Chiang's return--US Charge
Strong in Taipei expresses the opinion that the internal
situation on Taiwan has not been altered materially by
.Chiang Kai-shek's resumption of the presidency of the
National Government of China. Strong comments that
military powers on the island will remain in the same
hands and that Chiang will continue his "divide and rule"
tactics. Strong concludes that Chiang's return is no
reason either for optimism or increased pessimism.
2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24832
CA MAR 19btF
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
1228
EUROPE
1. UNITED KINGDOM: Elul election considered unlikely--
US Embassy London expresses the belief, based on 'irW3rma-
don from high sources in both parties, that a new British
general election is unlikely before late summer or autumn
of 1950. The Embassy also believes there will be substan-
tial agreement between the major parties on foreign policy
issues and possibly on defense expenditures and that the
government will be disposed to move cautiously and to post-
pone decisions.
Document No.
VO CHO"CE in Class.
Class. C:-IANGT,D TO: TS
DDA ni7o, 4 Apr 77
Auth: JA 7.P.-7'0 77/1763
Date: 976 By: 0
El
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
d - .S
24831
CA
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TO'ET
GENERAL
1. Possible Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations--The US
member of the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission
(PCC) in Geneva has learned from the Israelis of a secret
meeting between Israeli and Egyptian PCC representatives
regarding the possibility of direct Israeli-Egyptian settle-
ment negotiations. According to the Israelis, the Egyptian
representative indicated that some commitment by Israel
would be a necessary preliminary to direct negotiations
and emphasized Egypt's interest in a territorial settle-
ment in the Southern Negeb which would provide contiguity
with the other Arab states; the Israelis questioned Egypt's
need for such contiguity and suggested that a non-aggression
pact might be more palatable to Egypt than a formal peace
settlement. The Israelis expressed a belief that the door
had been left open for further discussions.
EUROPE
1 MAR 1950
1227
2. NORWAY: Reaction to news of H-bomb--US Charge Villard C /A - s
in Oslo transmits the opinion of Norwegian Foreign Minis-
ter Lange that there is a definite undercurrent of defeatism
and sense of futility in Norway resulting from news of the
H-bomb and that there is real danger the idea of neu-
trality for Western Europe may receive some support in
both Norway and Denmark. According to Villard, Lange
considers the present US position regarding possible US-
USSR atomic discussions "eminently correct and logical"
but believes the US must not be put in a position of negativ-
ism regarding the atom control problem and that something
must be done to demonstrate active and intensive effort
toward a solution. Lange also expressed the opinion that
Document No
NO in Class . 0
0 1' 11.D
(.. -
r_ ' T0 TS TS
r _ ,no, 4 Apr 77
Auth LEC?::5
Date: U_NR�Vailtr By: _Da.
cevi
T cf /li
E T
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP CRET
the Atlantic Pact provides a framework for choosing
a spokesman on behalf of all Western nations and that
if the US could be chosen as such a spokesman, a meeting
between the two giants" might be the most suitable
arrangement.
3. GERMANY: East zone militarization reported--US High
Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt has been informed
that a large-scale remilitarizafion effort is being made
in the Soviet zone of Germany, resulting in the formation
of a military organization of 40,000 to 50,000 men. The
High Commissioner comments that the military capabili-
ties of this organization, which is under complete Soviet
control, will remain negligible for at least another eight
months. McCloy suggests that a Western protest against
Soviet remilitarization activities would: (a) serve as
a basis for further Western propaganda against the pro-
gram; (b) register Western moral indignation; (c) under-
mine to some extent the current Soviet "peace" propa-
ganda line; and (d) let the East Germans know that the
West is "not completely unaware of developments" in the
Soviet zone.
2 -
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
a./A - S
- 24830
N4 28 FEB 1950
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T 0 P E T 1226
GENERAL
1. Western European attitude toward neutrality:--US Ambas-
sador Bruce in Paris believes that although the question
of neutrality in the East-West struggle has been debated in
the French press, there is no indication of a swing in public
opinion against the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) and the
Military Defense Assistance Program. Bruce is convinced
that the French Government retains its original motives
and objectives in participating in the collective plan to
strengthen the defense potential of Western Europe,
US Ambassador Murphy in Brussels expresses the
opinion that although the Belgians would probably not fight
If attacked during the spring of 1950, the Belgian Govern-
ment and people are firmly committed to the concept of
NAT. Murphy adds that the Belgians would fight at a later
date if they thought their side would be successful, but that
they have no desire to be "liberated again."
US Charge Villard in Oslo expresses some concern
over what seems to be growing apprehension among Nor-
wegian newspaper writers and individual businessmen that
the hydrogen bomb negates all efforts to prevent war. Villard
reports, however, that he ha 8 detected no sign of doubts or
waning enthusiasm in government circles or among Norwegian
people generally regarding the principles of mutual defense.
- US Embassy The Hague believes the Dutch are "not
greatly attracted by the neutrality idea." The Embassy adds,
however, that there are indications of a revival of neutrality
sentiment among Western Europeans and that there is some
suspicion that the US has abandoned the policy of containing
the USSR without making an alternative known.
1
4 Document No. Y
s -75
5 -TS
e/ S �
�7�s
NO Ci1L"N2-7, in Class.
Class. C:1A:IC::3 TO.: TS S
11,:lno, 4 knr 77
Auth: DDA 77/17C3
By: oleY
197d
Date; I 6 mAR
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP MTRET
EUROPE
2, RUMANIA: Reaction to US withdrawal from Bulgaria--
US Minister Schoenfeld in Bucharest, in describing the
effect of the suspension of US-Bulgarian relations on the
people of Rumania, reports that the initial gratification
of the non-Communist majority at the vigorous US action
has been followed by a sense of discouragement. Accord-
ing to Schoenfeld, this "deepened dismay" results from
a growing belief that the US action in Bulgaria was in
substance a retreat and may presage retirements from
other Eastern European countries.
3. HUNGARY: Legation position reviewed--US Minister
Davis in Budapest expresses the opinion that an abrupt
reduction of the Le_gation staff would cause the US to
lose so much prestige that continuation of US representa-
tion would become meaningless. Davis points out that
such a reduction, following Hungarian charges that the
US Legation is a spy ring, would constitute a tacit ad-
mission of the truth of the charges.
4. YUGOSLAVIA: Tito concerned over possible attack--
US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade has learned that Marshal
Tito has expressed serious concern over the possibility of
a Cominform attack on Yugoslavia in the spring of 1950. �
According to Allen's informant, Tito believes such an
attack would be designed to eliminate Titoism before it
spreads to China and to divert attention within the Satel-
lites from current internal hardships. Tito reportedly be-
lieves the greatest safeguard against a Soviet attack on
Yugoslavia Would be for the US to let the USSR know that
2 -
,� ,
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
� Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TO P CRET
such an attack would start World War Em Allen's in-
formant commented that Tito appeared anxious to dispel
the impression given in a recent speech that he was
anti-American and that he seemed genuinely worried
over the present situation.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that although Yugo-.
slav leaders are probably genuinely concerned over the
possibility of some major Cominform move during the
spring of 1950, Tito's current expressions of alarm are
calculated primarily to counteract the unfavorable impres-
sion resulting from both Yugoslav recognition of Ho Chi
Minh in Indochina and recent anti-Western speeches
apparently designed for Cominform and internal consump-
tion.)
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
5. INDIA-PAKISTAN: Bengal situation termed threat to peace--
US Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi reports that Prime
Minister Nehru and other top Indian leaders have been ex-
pressing serious concern over the current communal tension
in Bengal and have even asserted that recent developments
there present the "most grave" threat to the peace of South
Asia since partition. According to Henderson, Nehru has
stated that atrocities committed against minorities in East
Bengal (Pakistan) have produced an atmosphere which might
result in a general exodus of a substantial proportion of
East Bengal's 12 million Hindus if India were to permit
them to enter; Nehru also expressed fear that a violent com-
munal reaction beyond the ability of the government to con-
trol might take place throughout India. Henderson suggests
that although British observers question the "authentic
quality" of the present Bengal crisis, believing it possibly
inspired by a desire to prejudice the UN Security Council
debate on Kashmir, the situation remains dangerous if only
because of Indian emotion over the matter.
- 3 -
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
�
, �
Approved for Release: 2019/01/0-2 C06749479
TOP R E T
6. IRAN: Internal situation reportedly deteriorating�US
Ambassador Wiley in Tehran expresses the belief that
the current situation in Iran is "bad, deteriorating, and
dangerous," and that it requires considerably more
than "token" economic assistance from the US. Wiley
recommends that the US re-evaluate its strategic think-
ing in connection with Iran and make a definite decision
either to let Iran "go down the drain by default" or to
attempt something effective.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that although the
general economic decline in Iran has produced seriously
depressed conditions in certain sensitive areas, there
is no evidence available to date indicating that distress
and unrest are so widespread as to threaten the stability
of the country.)
ET �
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
a/13- S
24829
r A
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
GENERAL
I. Yugoslavia believed willing to compromise on Trieste�US
Ambassador Allen in Belgrade, in discussing recent reports
that Yugoslavia would refuse to enter into negotiations in-
volving a sacrifice of Trieste territory, expresses the
opinion to the contrary that in conversations with Yugoslav
officials, changes in the boundaries of the Yugoslav Zone of
the Territory of Trieste have always been envisaged.
2. Norway does not expect Soviet aggression�US Charge
Villard in Oslo has been informed by Norwegian Foreign
Minister Lange that information available to him does not
indicate that the USSR is preparing any move which is likely
to result in hostilities in the near future. Lange added,
however, that the cold war "might be stepped up" in certain
sectors.
3. Views on Pacific association�The Department of State has
informed Embassy Canberra that the US will watch with
greatest sympathy the development of an association of
Asiatic and Pacific countries designed to increase cultural,
economic, and general cooperation in the area. The Depart-
ment points out that to have any durable value such an
association must have firm roots and indigenous motivation
and comments that participation of such states as Australia
and New Zealand would have the advantage of ensuring pro-
Western orientation of any such association.
EUROPE
4, UNITED KINGDOM: Election results reviewed--According�
to US Embassy London, the British election impasse is the
most undesirable outcome that could have occurred for the 1
Docuzient No.
NO r'::!i7-JOE. in Class. 0
0 D:::!1IIPT:D .
Cla::�3, c A -:-.) T3 : Ts S
0
Alfil
� , :. )a, Et. Aut:-.i:
E T"te: 61 MAR 1978
:_� Ll - -, . 771y.:43
- 1 -
u 7 plagi 131.11
1225
5
-75
5
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP S RET
US, UK, and other Western Powers. The Embassy believes
that: (a) the situation in the immediate future will certainly
be politically unstable; (b) the present government is unlikely
to stay in power long; and (c) there is every prospect of
another election within a few months.
(CIA Comment: CIA agrees with the above estimate.
CIA also believes that although Britain will be weakened
because a strong domestic policy will be impossible, the
direct effect of the election impasse upon foreign policy and
upon military and security commitments will be minimized
because of the substantial agreement among all parties on
these problems.)
5. GERMANY: McCloy suggest8-Western steps to counter USSR --
US High Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt reports that
there is increasing evidence that a persistent and formidable
effort will be made by the USSR during 1950 to gain heavy
advantages in Berlin, "if not to take over the city." To
counteract Soviet pressure, McCloy suggests: (a) an im-
mediate announcement by the ECA nations that they are pre-
pared to increase their purchases in Berlin; (b) the institu-
tion of an increased US public works program in Berlin to
reduce unemployment and bolster morale; and (c) designation
by the Bonn Government of Berlin as a "distressed area" and
the speed-up of relief measures by the West German Republic.
McCloy reports that the Allied Council has agreed to reinforce
Western troops in Berlin against a possible emergency in
connection with the Free German Youth rally scheduled for
May 1950 and to undertake a further recruitment of local
police. In, discussing the over-all German problem, McCloy
also expresses the view that the West runs "very serious
risks" in allowing the USSR to pose as the champion of Ger-
man unification. McCloy adds that in an effort to launch a
2 -
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
05-5
S-Ts
$ - T S
Approved for Release: 2019/01%02 C06749479
counteroffensive to Soviet propaganda, he is making a
statement that a major US objective is the unification of
Germany on the basis of political freedom.
(CIA Comment: CIA concurs with McCloy's esti-
mate of the urgent need for taking counteractions to offset
Soviet pressure on West Berlin.)
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
6. PALESTINE: IsraellJoiclan non-aggression pact--US
Ambassador McDonald in Tel Aviv has been informed by
an Israeli Foreign Office spokesman that Israeli and
Jordanian representatives have initialed an "agreed set
of principles" as a basis for a five-year "friendship and
non-aggression" pact. According to the Israeli spokesman,
the "agreed principles" include a joint Israel-Jordan
guarantee of access to and freedom of the Holy Places,
continuance of present armistice lines, and initiation of
normal commercial intercourse between the two countries.
McDonald adds that another meeting is to be held 28 Feb-
ruary, with the two parties meanwhile going ahead with
preparation of a final draft to be agreed on and signed a
few days later.
3
ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24828
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP S RET
GENERAL
1. British release aircraft to Chinese Communists--US
Consul General Rankin in Hong Kong reports that the
British court in Hong Kong has lifted the injunction
involving the assets of two Chinese airlines and that
only registration formalities remain to be accomplished
-before the Communists fly the aircraft away. Rankin
believes that the actions of Hong Kong executive and
judicial authorities can be explained only if they have
been in possession of highly secret instructions from
London to see that the Communists obtain the aircraft
under any-circumstances. Rankin points out that this
action demonstrates a fundamental divergence between
the US and British attitudes toward Communist China.
25 FEB 1950
1224
Cifi S
Document No.
NO ciu.NGE . in Class.LI Ei
D7.C':,11:.:3EIFIED
CinEs. C 7) TO: TS S
7 -1 4 Apr 77
7 -
MAR 1978 Ot,
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24927
iI
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T 0 P E T
GENERAL
I. French views on Indochina--US Ambassador Bruce in
Paris has been informed by French Foreign Minister
Schuman that he regards Indochina as primarily a
French responsibility and that he would like to get im-
mediate US aid in considerable quantities. According.
to Bruce, Schuman believes that French evacuation of
Indochina would: (a) lead to a massacre of French
troops, French civilians, and natives; (b) cause grave
political disturbances in France.; (c) have a serious
effect on the French Union, especially in Africa; and
(d) create an impression of Western defeatism. Schuman
asserted that France's ability to continue in Indochina
would have to be considered in connection with the over-
all policy to be adopted by the US, UK, and France in
regard to the Far East. Meanwhile, the Secretary General
of the French Foreign Ministry has told Bruce that France
intends to follow an "evolutionary process') with the Indo-
chinese regimes, but doubts the wisdom of publicizing this
intention.
2. Southeast Asia situation reviewed--US Ambassador Kirk
in Moscow expresses the belief that "everything possible
short of involvement of US fighting forces' should be done
to stop the Communists before they control Indochina
Thailand, and Burma. The Ambassador, in support of
his position, expresses the view that: (a) "drawing the
line at the Chinese border will have a vital psychological
effect throughout Asia; and (b) preventing the Chinese Com-
munists from extending their influence in Southeast Asia
and from obtaining foodstuffs there will expose Sino-Soviet
relations to a strain which both partners may be hoping to
avoid. Kirk points out that Japan's economic development
14149
Document No. 4(
24 FEB 1950
1223
6/A- S
CI A- S
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
r]
C1L:;s. C '2.= TO: TS S
4 A717. 77
Auth: 77/17c7
iat.9:1 6 MAR 1978 By: DO
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
is dependent upon markets in non-Communist Asia and
comments that the acquisition of Southeast Asia by the
Communists would increase the attraction to the Japanese
of eventual alignment with the Communists.
EUROPE
3. HUNGARY: Attack on US Legation�US Legation Budapest
suggests that the recent Hungarian accusation that the US
maintains an oversized Legation staff for espionage pur-
poses is designed to force the US to take the initiative in
reducing its Legation staff. The Legation points out that
refusing to dismiss its Hungarian employees would pro-
bably lead to their arrest, whereas dismissing them would
leave them jobless and "branded" as enemies of the state.
2 -
T
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
1'44826
Approved for Re-lease: 2019/01/02 C06749479
RET
GENERAL
1. Prospects for East-West accord reviewed--US Ambas-
sador Kirk in Moscow, in commenting on recent public
proposals for high-level talks between the US, the UK,
and the USSR, expresses the opinion that there are no
new developments in Moscow indicating improved pros-
pects for a basic settlement between the West and the
USSR. Kirk adds that he does not expect a worthwhile
agreement until the free world's collective security attains
sufficient stability and promise of permanency to raise
doubts in the minds of the Soviet leaders regarding their
chances for gaining control of the world for Communism.
The Ambassador also believes that an East-West compro-
mise at this time can only be to the advantage of the USSR
2a FEB 1950
2. Yugoslays reportedly refuse tO compromise on Trieste�.
US Ambassador Dunn in Rome has learned from the Italian
Foreign Office that Yugoslav Foreign Minister Ka.rdelj
recently stated in most emphatic terms that "under no cir-
cumstances" would Yugoslavia consider abandoning to Italy
any portion of the Free Territory of Trieste now occupied
by Yugoslavia. Dunn observes that this position is contrary
to the whole spirit of the informal Italo-Yugoslav talks, which
up to this time had been going quite favorably. The Ambas-
sador adds that the Italian Government is most disappointed,
over this development, which would seem to put an end to the
present attempt to settle the Trieste issue, unless the Yugo-
slays were making a bargaining gesture.
3. Views on Yugoslav recognition of Ho Chi Minh�US Ambas-
sador Allen in Belgrade suggests that it would have been
virtually impossible for Yugoslavia, as an avowed Marxist
state, to refuse the request of Ho Chi Minh (Moscow-trained
- 1 - Do clannt No. (14
1222
!/A-$
C/A -5
C/ A -
NO CHA.,...T:;17, in Class.
DEcLA33F.F.1=1)
Class. C :771). 7Li 7�7
0.: Pr1
,
Auth: _14
By:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP RET
leader opposing Bao Dai) for recognition of his regime
as the government of Indochina. Allen points out that
the Yugoslays have been most anxious to establish con-
tact with the Chinese Communists in order to hasten a split
between Mao and the Kremlin and' that Tito sees a possi-
bility of accomplishing this through Ho. The Ambassador
comments that Yugoslavia's primary value to the US at
the moment arises from its position as a Marxist state
independent of both the Cominform and the West and that
Tito's recognition of Ho is consistent with his "independ-
ent" position.
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
se a. ILI) ;',Jt.1
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24825 1221.
T a p s E r r
GENERAL
I. Reported Soviet military preparations in Austria --US
Ambassador Johnson in Rio de Janeiro reports that the
Brazilian Minister in Vienna has been informed by
Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber that he is "absolutely
sure" the Soviet command in Vienna began about twenty
days ago military preparations which indicate the USSR
is planning large-scale military action. In support of
his conviction, Gruber stated that: (a) new strategic
points in Austria have been occupied by considerable
Soviet forces; (b) large quantifies of modeern materiel
�
and equipment are continuously arriving at Soviet garri-
sons; and (c) Soviet lines of communication are being
carefully protected by new contingents of selected troops.
Gruber also assured the Brazilian Minister that he is ex-
pecting momentarily a Soviet "surprise" in Europe, not
excluding the possibility of the opening of hostilities in
some sector.
(CIA Comment: CIA has no reliable information
justifying the belief that the USSR is planning large-scale
military action in Europe in the immediate future. CIA
believes, however, that the preponderance of Soviet mili-
tary strength in Europe and stringent security measures
in the Soviet sphere provide the USSR with the capabilities
for initiating military operations with little or no advance
information becoming available to the Western Powers.)
2, Increased Communist pressure in Southeast Asia predicted--
US Ambassador Kirk in Moscow suggests that the recently
concluded Sino-Soviet Treaty prepares the way for these two
principal partners in World Communism to assume in the
near future "militant initiative in Southeast Asia to a maxi-
mum degree short of open war." The Ambassador believes
Docament No.
NO Clift= in Class.
0 D:CTASEYFI:D
DA R 3
2G. 77/176
. 16 ;_lrA;i:o19. 748 AB: 77
Auth: 0 ,0
TO: TS S
Date:
E T
5 - 1-5
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TO'ECRET
that Stalin and Mao probably estimate that Communist
expansion in Southeast Asia in the near future is both
militarily and politically feasible. Kirk considers Burma
and Indochina to be the prime targets in Southeast Asia
because their inclusion in the Communist sphere would
advance Communist forces toward the goal of world domina-
tion and because these countries., plus Thailand, would pro-
vide China with a solution to its food problem.
(CIA Comment: CIA concurs in the above estimate
of Soviet intent in Southeast Asia.)
3. Dutch attitude on New Guinea--US Embassy Jakarta trans-
mits the opinion of Netherlands High Commissioner Hirsch-
feld that failure to accede to Indonesian requests for sover-
eignty over Dutch New Guinea at the forthcoming Dutch-
Indonesian conference will mean only "continued trouble"
for the Netherlands Government. The High Commissioner
believes that the New Guinea question should be negotiated
directly between the Netherlands and Indonesian governments
and that the Dutch could participate "profitably and happily"
in the development of a New Guinea which had been "peace-
fully" transferred to Indonesia. Meanwhile, US Embassy
Canberra reports that the Australian Government probably
will not follow through with its plan to approach the Indo-
nesian Government regarding Australian interests in New
Guinea.
4. Views on Asian union--US Ambassador Stanton in Bangkok
transmits the conclusion of the Bangkok Conference of US
Chiefs of Missions that there is "an unfortunate lack" of
interest in a regional association among Asian and South
2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
5 - T
5 � T S
5-7-5
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
� TOP CRET
Pacific states. Burma, Ceylon, India, Japan, and Pakistan
reportedly regard such a regional association coolly; Indo-
nesia prefers to work alone for the time being; Australia
Is unenthusiastic; New Zealand wants only a Pacific pact
with the US, Australia, and the UK. Korea strongly favors
an association and Thailand is interested. All the states
(except Korea) are opposed to an open anti-Communist bloc
or a military alliance.
-3
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24824
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP ET
GENERAL
1. Western European attitude toward defense planning--The
US coordinating committee for European military aid (ECC)
expresses concern over the first signs of diminishing
European public conviction of the "essential rightness"
of proceeding resolutely with combined North. Atlantic
Treaty defense planning. ECC believes that development
of this tendency, together with such unsettling events as
the H-bomb and Soviet successes in the Far East, "could
lead to a resurgence of the neutrality complex" in Western
Europe and a weakening of the will to build Western soli-
darity and strength.
2. Southeast Asian views on the Bao Dai Government--The
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, in
reporting the impressions gained from the recently con-
cluded US diplomatic conference in Bangkok, expresses
the opinion that Bao Dai's Asian neighbors consider him
to be a "French puppet" and are not prepared to support
his government unless its status is modified drastically.
The AssistantSecretary recommends that US assistance
to Indochina be contingent upon a public agreement by the
French to take steps which would lead to Indochina's
achieving a status similar to that of Indonesia.
Do.2ument No.
20 FEB 195C
1220
NO Cal:J:TT! in Class.
Ei
ClasJ. al=71) TO:
TS S
TYCA it:cmo. 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA RTG. 77/1763
Date:1 6 MAR 1978 By:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
s- T
k
.41
5�
24823
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOPJCT
NEAR EAST- AFRICA
18 FEB 1950
1219
I. PAKISTAN: Pakistan said not to plan military attack--
US Military Attache in Karachi reports, after conversations
with important Pakistani officials and military men, that
Pakistan has no offensive plans aimed against India and that
any recurrence of fighting in Kashmir will have to be started
by India. He also reports that Auchinleck has seen no evi-
dence of anything but defensive military activities in Pakistan.
(CIA Comment: Field Marshal Auchinleck's latest
statement contradicts one previously attributed to him to the
effect that recent troop movements seen by him indicated
that war might be imminent and might be started by Pakistan.)
Document No.
NO CHAN:3T:: in Class.
Ei DECLASSIFI=D
ClaLs, C.L.V.c2D TO: TS
DOA Mmo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77/1763
Date:LiNa By:
ARmy-
0
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24822
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TO'CRET
GENERAL
1. soviet jitotives tn_Berliniraffic.4tualtion--US High
Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt suggests that the
Intermittent slowdown of truck traffic to Berlin may be
motivated by Soviet desires to: (a) prevent the unauthor-
ized shipment of materials and goods from the East Zone;
(b) divert shipments from trucks to trains, because the
Reichsbahn needs the revenue and trains are easier to
control; and (c) test the firmness of Western policy in
Berlin. McCloy expresses the opinion that pressure on
the USSR through a selective embargo on industrial and
raw material items badly needed in the Soviet Zone would
be more effective and less open to Soviet reprisal than a
general imposition of traffic restrictions.
(CIA Comment: CIA concurs in this analysis of
the Berlin traffic situation.)
2. ECC views on strikes against military aid shipments
TheUS coordinating committee for European military aid
(ECC), in estimating the purposes of the current Commu-
nist strike campaign against MDAP shipments, expresses
the view that the principal objectives are to: (a) exploit
European popular fear of war by instilling doubts regard-
ing the objectives of the North Atlantic Pact and US policy;
and (b) convince the US Congress and US public that MDAP
Is a waste of money and equipment because European
recipients of military aid are unreliable allies. ECC be
that physical interference with MDAP shipments is
a secondary objective and that the Communists have no
illusions regarding their ability to interfere seriously, with
deliveries.
Document No.
, 7 FEB 1950
1218
- 1 NO CHANGE in Class. EJ
0 DECLASSIFIED
Class. CD.1170 TO: TS S
D-A M?mo, 4 Apr 77
Ruth: 77/173
1 6 MAR 1q78 137:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
4
,)
.-ett Approved for Release: 2019/0-1/02 C06749479
3. France to call on US for aid to Indochina--According to
US Charge Bohlen in Paris, French Ambassador Bonnet
in Washington has been instructed to request large-scale
US assistance to Indochina on a long-term basis. Bonnet's
instructions reportedly convey the view of the French Gov-
ernment that a US-UK-French conference on Indochina is
less urgent at this time than a direct approach to the US
with a view to ascertaining the general attitude of the US.
Bohlen recommends that Bonnet be impressed both with
the importance of development by the French of a "concrete
and realistic" program for Indochina and with the primary
responsibility of France in that area.
4. Proposals to improve Austrian position--US Minister
Erhardt in Vienna expresses the view that in the event
there is no Austrian treaty, the Western Powers should
take steps to strengthen the sovereign control of the
Austrian Government. As preliminary measures, Erhardt
suggests that the Western Powers first propose to the USSR
the immediate termination of the occupation; if this is re-
fused, the West should press the USSR to agree to a sub-
stantial reduction of occupation forces, abolition of zonal
boundaries, renunciation of occupation costs, and elimina-
tion of unnecessary functions of the Allied Council. Erhardt
adds that after Soviet rejection of all these proposals, which
would demonstrate Soviet responsibility for the continued
occupation, the Western Powers could proceed with their own
measures to strengthen Austria by: (a) a renunciation by
the UK and France of claims for occupation costs; (b) termina-
tion of the few unilateral controls in the Western zones;-(c) the
appointment of a civilian High Commissioner, who would
symbolize the end of the military phase of the occupation; and
(d) a reduction in occupation forces.
2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
fl
24821
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP S ET 1217
I FEB 1950
GENERAL
1. Australian views on Dutch New Guinea--US Charge Foster
in Canberra has learned that Australian Foreign Minister
Spender has sent a note to the Netherlands Government
� proposing that an "exchange of views in the near future"
take place regarding the future administration of Dutch
New Guinea, The Australian Foreign Minister points out
that Australia has "vital strategic interests in Dutch New
Guinea" and that the future of that area directly concerns
Australia. Spender expresses the opinion that the inclusion
of Dutch New Guinea in the United Slates of Indonesia
might result in that area's being "undeveloped, undefended
and a major weakness" in strategic planning for Southeast
Asia. Spender adds that Australia proposes, subject to
any contrary advice the Netherlands might offer, to send
a note to the United States of Indonesia "emphasizing
Australia's vital interests in the future administration of
Dutch New Guinea." Meanwhile, the Chief of the Far East
Division of the Netherlands Foreign Office has informed
US Ambassador Chapin at The Hague that the Australian
note is being studied. The. Netherlands Foreign Office
representative characterized the Australian note as "extra-
ordinary" and remarked that his government has no intention
either of answering the Australians until it is "good and
ready" or of antagonizing the Indonesians by "cooking up"
some arrangement over Dutch New Guinea with Australia
without prior consultation with the Government of Indonesia.
Document No.
NO C-..,1;:r2. in 03.6.ss.
1_1
DI-S",z113.11PI:D
C TO: TS S
4 Apr 77
Autt: DDA 7711763
Date:1 6 MAR 1q78 By: 0
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
5-TS
S - TS
24820
C
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP S R E T
. GENERAL
1. Philippine bid for Pacific union--The Department of
State has been informed that Philippine UN representa-
tive. Romulo has issued an invitation to eight Pacific
and Southeast Asian countries to meet during March 1950
"to ascertain whether agreement could be reached" on
a non-Communist regional association limited to political,
cultural, and economic affairs. According to Romulo,
. Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Thailand have already
indicated their willingness to attend the meeting; Australia,
New Zealand, Ceylon, and India were also invited. Mean-
while, the Department has learned that although New Zealand
would be interested in a Pacific security pact which in-
cluded the US and the UK, the New Zealand Government
"does not look with favor" on Romulo's projected organiza-
tion.
Document No.
NO CAIZGE in Class. 0
0 DECLASSTFUD
C1a5s. C7i) TO: TS
C
)
M:mo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA TrG. 77/1763
Date: 16 MAR 1978 By: ble7
32
15 FEB 1950
1.216
Gin- c
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24819
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP S RET
14 FEB 19Y.!
/2-/c
FAR EAST
1. BURMA: US attitude toward Burma--The Department of C/ A - 5 IIIII
State has informed US Embassy Rangoon that the US is
preparing to "take steps to complement" British and
Commonwealth efforts towards stabilizing Burma and
forestalling Communist subversion in that country. The
Department points out that the UK should accept primary,
responsibility for aid to Burma and that the US program is
to be confined mainly to the exchange of personnel and the
extension of technical assistance projects designed to in-
crease Burma's capabilities for dealing with its own problems.
Document No.
31
NC C1-7CE in Class. 0
Ei D:CLA3SITItD
Class. C.= TO: TS
DA �,i), 4 Apr 77
Auth: F61444i.A/1763 or
Date: By: 0
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24818
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T 0 CRET
GENERAL
1. US views on Trieste question--The Department of State has
instructed US Embassy Rome to inform the Italian Govern-
ment that the US would approve of the spontaneous initiation
of direct Italo-Yugoslav discussions on the Trieste problem.
In commenting for the Ambassador's information on a
possible Trieste settlement, the Department warns against
basing the Italo-Yugoslav discussions too solidly on ethnic
principles, because this might call for "unreasonable"
Italian concessions. The Department suggests that if the
Italo-Yugoslav discussions are successful, an interim
de facto regime might be established in Trieste to continue
until the amendment of the peace treaty and the termination
of Security Council responsibility. The Department also ex-
presses the opinion that if the US were to open discussions
now with the Yugoslays on the substance of the Trieste
problem, the full force of the tripartite declaration on Trieste
would immediately be. broken.
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
2. INDIA-PAKISTAN: Former Indian Army chief predicts war--
US Embassy Karachi has been informed that Field Marshal
Auchinleck, following a tour of Pakistan Army units, has
privately expressed the belief that "recent troop movements
clearly indicate" the probability that a war between India and
Pakistan will break out in the early spring of 1950. Accord-
ing to the Embassy, the retired former Commander in Chief
of the Indian Army believes that Pakistan is now determined
to take the initiative in such a war.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that although available
information does not confirm the "recent troop movements"
cited by Auchinleck, his observations, which apparently reflect
Document Nob Go,
1
1214
�3
ei � S
NO CHANCE :in Class. 0
0 DT...CLA3S:71=)
C ") TO: TS S
AT:-..^ 77
Aut'/: I 7; 17 7.'7
Dat:): 1 6 MAR 1978 BY 0
RET.
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T
his general feeling that war in inevitable, warrant serious
attention. Auchinleck enjoys unique opportunities to obtain
information about troop dispositions and attitudes among
military leaders and although he has been pessimistic
about the future of the subcontinent ever since the British
left, there have been numerous other indications that
India's continuing hostility might lead the government
and people of Pakistan to view war as the sole alternative
to slow strangulation.)
US views on Kashmir settlement�The Department
of State, in summarizing for US Embassy New Delhi the
position of the US regarding the Kashmir dispute, has
stressed the importance of an early settlement for the
maintenance of peace and security in the "only relatively
stable Asian area." The Department states that although
an impartial plebiscite will be required in the Vale of
Kashmir in any event, the US is prepared to support any
settlement acceptable to India and Pakistan, including
partition. Pointing out that demilitarization of Kashmir
is essential to any final settlement, the Department ex-
presses the belief that the immediate objective is to seek
modification of India's intransigence on this point. The
Department comments that attempts to assess blame in the
Kashmir case would be unfruitful and adds that the Security
Council should not permit India's raising of legal questions
to divert it from the basic task of bringing about a political
solution.
�
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
S
24817
Approved for Re-lease: 2019/01/02 C06749479
1 1 FEB 1950
TOP ET 12.1.3
GENERAL
1. US views on anti-US restrictions by Satellites --The Depart-
ment of State has expressed to US Embassy Prague, in an
analysis of current US-Satellite relations, the view that
recent anti-US restrictions in Czechoslovakia are part of
a general pattern under "central direction" with the intent
of reducing. Satellite contacts with the West to an absolute
minimum. The Department suggests that if this interpreta-
tion is correct, a stormy period ahead may be anticipated,
with added difficulties and obstruction in Czechoslovakia and
the other Satellite countries and a consequent deterioration
in US-Satellite relations. The Department declares that in
devising tactics to counter this attempt to reduce US opera-
tions or possibly to drive the US out of Czechoslovakia, the
paramount objective must be to maintain contact with the
Czechoslovak people. The Department points out that this
consideration may make the US reluctant on occasion to take
strong action which might seriously impair this contact.
Dof:umzo-kt Yo.
140 el".1-iG7.3 in Class. 0
C1..7.7.J.) TO: TS S
4 Apr 77
Aut!l: DDA 77/170:5
Date:
AR 1978 BY: 0 01
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24816
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP ET
GENERAL
1. Italy may be willing to negotiate Trieste settlement--
US Ambassador Dunn in Rome has been informed that
the Italian Government would be willing to enter into
direct negotiations with Yugoslavia to settle the Trieste
problem only if assured that the Yugoslav Government
is ready to begin serious talks on the basis of the tri-
partite declaration of 20 March 1948, which favored
Italian control over all of the Territory of Trieste.
Dunn adds that the Italian willingness to consider nego-
tiations arises from the beliefs that: (a) the US is now
in a position to make informal inquiries regarding
Yugoslav intentions without jeopardizing Italian ad-
herence to the tripartite declaration; and (b) a spring
political crisis may occur in Yugoslavia and Italy would
have no hope of obtaining agreement from a Soviet-
controlled successor to Tito.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that Italy will not
engage in negotiations with Yugoslavia on Trieste ex-
cept on the basis of the tripartite declaration. CIA
further believes that although preliminary talks may
take place between Italy and Yugoslavia, there is little
likelihood that these talks will lead to formal negotiations
for settlement in the near future.)
2. Yugoslav-Satellite relations-- US Ambassador Allen in
Belgrade has been informed by Yugoslav Foreign Mini-
ster 1Cardelj that although Yugoslavia's diplomatic relations
with 411 the Satellites have long been at the breaking point/
Yugoslavia would hold out "as long as humanly possible.'
Kardelj pointed out, however, that the endurance point has
1
Document No.
.1U FEB 1950
1212
CIA�S
NO CHP.NGE in Class. 0
El 1)-21LASSIFI:D
C, .!1,77.) TO: TS
tY a, 4 tr.77
Auth: /42.4m17n ir.--77:. 77/1763
.4
gate: . , By: DJ!,
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP ET
almost been reached, particularly in Bulgaria and Albania .
The Foreign Minister added that Satellite treatment of
Yugoslav diplomats in Sofia has been "inhuman beyond
description" and that the Yugoslav Ambassador in Rumania
had been recalled but has been unable to obtain an exit visa.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that Yugoslavia will
probably be forced to withdraw more and more representa-
tives from the Satellites as the Kremlin continues its efforts
to isolate Yugoslavia from Eastern Europe.)
3. Yugoslav views on UN seating of Chinese Communists--The
US Delegation to the UN transmits the opinion of Yugoslay.
Security Council representative Bebler that the fundamental
issue involved in seating the Chinese Communists in the UN
is the independence of China. Bebler feels sure that this
question must be connected with Mao's long stay in Moscow
and believes that the longer the Chinese Communists are
kept out of the UN, the more the West will be helping the
Soviet effort to isolate China from the West and to destroy
Chinese independence.
4. Thailand to delay recognition of Bao Dai--US Embassy Bangkok
has been informed by Premier Phibul that the Thai Govern-
ment intends to delay recognition of the Bao Dai regime in
Indochina "for the time being". In support of the Thai deci-
sion, Phibul pointed out that considerations favoring recognition
are outweighed by Thai desires, in common with those of other
Asian peoples, to see nations still considered to be under
"colonial domination" achieve "real freedom and independence".
The Premier added that the Thai people are not convinced that
Bao Dai and his government have yet achieved real freedom,
independence, or a large measure of popular support.
2
ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
- 24815
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
GENERAL
1. French to ask US-UK consultation on Indochina�Accord-
ing to US Ambassador Bruce in Paris, a high official of
the French Foreign Office has informally advised the US
Minister in charge of MDAP affairs that France intends
to approach the US and the UK regarding a tripartite con-
sultation on the entire situation in Indochina. Bruce adds
that the French believe: (a) the USSR would not have
recognized Ho Chi Minh (Moscow-trained opponent to the
French-supported Bao Dai Government in Indochina) unless
It had intended to do what it could to support him, probably
through a considerable increase in military assistance via
the Chinese Communists; (b) in this event the French would
find it very difficult "to continue to hold the fort in Indo-
china alone"; and (c) the time has come to consider the
Indochinese situation in its relation to the entire Asiatic
and world situation in the struggle against Soviet Com-
munism, The French official pointed out that the Govern-
ment was not thinking in terms of some limited military
aid under the MDAP but wished to discuss the larger poli-
tical, economic, .aiid military aspects of the problem. The
Ambassador comments that there is no sign of a change in
French policy since Soviet recognition of Ho, but that the
French margin in Indochina is not great, and an all-out
attack by Chinese Communists or major assistance to Ho
could render the French position in Indochina untenable.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes the French will press
for speedy US and UK aid to bolster their own and Bao Dai's
position in Indochina. CIA further believes that if the mili-
tary situation in Indochina worsens considerably in the next
six months, the French Government would be compelled to
consider reversing its policies in Indochina, including the
possibility of withdrawing its military forces.)
9 FEB 1950
1211
5- S
� �-�
i
� Document No.
NO CI-1.1!.K;E in Class.
D DECLAS;31.YILD
Class. 0-1!17,C:D TO: TS S
no,T.Ilc 4 Apr 77
#3.-1: 7711763
16 MAR 197$ By:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
fl
,J
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP
2. Effects of possible Yugoslav recognition of Ho Chi Minh--
The Department of State has instructed US Ambassador Allen
in Belgrade to inform the Yugoslav Government that the US
is seriously concerned over the possibility that Yugoslavia
may recognize the Communist-led Ho Chi Minh regime in
Indochina. The Department points out that such Yugoslav
action would: (a) strengthen the very forces against which
Yugoslavia is fighting for its independence; (b) raise in-
surmountable difficulties in the US for providing further
support for Yugoslav independence; and (c) lead to an in-
crease in French demands on the US for assistance in
supporting the Bao Dai Government in Indochina. The De-
partment comments that the limited resources of the US
cannot be dissipated in any such fashion.
EUROPE
3. YUGOSLAVIA: Increased aid from West requested--
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj has presented an urgent
oral request through US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade for
increased US economic assistance. In support of his re-
quest, Kardelj pointed out that Yugoslav economic conditions
are becoming increasingly difficult and that the USSR would
consequently redouble its efforts to unseat Tito in 1950.
The Foreign Minister added that if Yugoslavia had to balance
1950 exports against import needs, the Yugoslav standard of
living would be depressed and the resulting internal difficulties
would provide much ammunition for hostile Cominform propa-
ganda. Allen comments that in view of both political and eco-
nomic considerations, it would be highly important to ease
the present Yugoslav foreign trade difficulties.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that Yugoslavia's pres-
ent economic situation, including present and contemplated
Western aid, does not justify the alarm expressed by the Yugo-
slav Foreign Minister.)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
d/A - e6 F
24814
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP-ET
�-�-"a r:F9 iorr;
121r
GENERAL
1. Gruber reviews Austrian treaty situation--US Minister
Erhardt in Vienna has been informed by Austrian Foreign
Minister Gruber that a bluntly worded note will be delivered
to the Soviet Foreign Office, insisting on the resumption of
the Austro-Soviet financial talks (which have been delaying
the treaty negotiations in London). Gruber reiterated the
hope that the Western deputies in London would reach agree-
ment with the Soviet deputy on all issues other than financial
settlement for the USSR in Austria so that blame for failure
to conclude a treaty would be placed squarely on the USSR.
The Austrian Foreign Minister added that strong words from
the Austrians and the Western Powers might have a "restrain-
ing influence" upon the USSR in its plans for Austria and ex-
pressed the fear that prolonged Soviet occupation might lead
to communization of eastern Austria and to eventual parti-
tion of the country. Erhardt comments that Gruber would
like to arouse similar apprehensions among the Western
Powers as a means of ensuring a determined effort to obtain
an agreement on a treaty.
Aro. 31.
NOflJ CS4NC4" in C7a."-s-73.
DraLdEflif/17.:D
TO:
/2� 1 4 .A..;pr 77
Au 2
Da t a :;-iy:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24813
(")
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
E T
GENERAL
1. French views on status of Indochina�US representative
Gullion in Paris has been informed by Parodi, Secretary-
General of the French Foreign Office, that the French
Government is unable at this time to issue a statement
outlining a plan for "evolutionary" development in Indo-
china. Parodi points out that the Government cannot tell
the French Parliament the agreements just ratified are of
"merely passing value" and comments that the French
cannot afford to "kindle unrealistic nationalist appetites"
in Indochina that would have to be disappointed later.
Parodi adds, however, that "important extensions" of
the 8 March 1949 Franco-Vietnam agreement will be made,
and he cites as an example the recent permission given
the Vietnamese to establish missions in London and
Washington. Parodi concludes that the French, "after
thoughtful consideration," intend to seek US and UK views
on the very serious problems in Indochina.
FAR EAST.
2. CHINA: Shanghai air raid damage reported to be severe--
US Consul General Shanghai reports that the. Chinese
Nationalist air raid of 6 February resulted in severe.
damage to the city's power facilities. The Consul General
estimates that the necessity to maintain essential public
services will result in a heavy cut in the amount of power
normally supplied to industrial users and transmits the
opinion of top officials in the Shanghai Power Company that
a continuation of such damaging air raids during the next
few days would render Shanghai "virtually untenable:"
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that although the
6 February raid caused considerable temporary disruption
in Shanghai, its broader significance in terms of Nationalist
military capabilities or the effect on Communist China cannot
be established unless frequent raids of similar weight and
accuracy are staged.) Document No.
NO CHUME in Class. 0
FEB 1950
1209
�,A- 5
/ A -.5
DECLAS=IED
Class, C=:D TO: TS S C
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
17Auth:
Date: /18 wa By:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24812
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP ET
GENERAL
1. US to recognize Bao Dai�The Department of State has
informed US Consul General Saigon that after consultation
with the French High Commissioner and immediately
following British recognition of Vietnam and neighboring
Laos and Cambodia, he is to present messages from the
President of the United States to Bao Dai, the Emperor of
Vietnam, and to the Kings of Laos and Cambodia, extending
recognition to their states as independent members of the
French Union. The US notes will invite an early exchange
of diplomatic representatives; Consul General Saigon is
advised that the US plans to establish a Legation at Saigon
as soon as possible with a single Minister accredited to
the three states.
Document No. 3
NO CHANGE in Class. ri
D'X' AS7,IFILD
C_ aEsC TO: TS
1 4 Apr 77
Auth: 77 '17C3
bate: "4177-94
Y
ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
6 FEB 1950
1208
L4.0.1.1
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP ET
GENERAL
1. UK recognition of Bao Dai imminent--Embassy London
has been informed by the UK Foreign Office that it will
announce 'recognition of Bao Dal's regime in Vietnam,
_together With-the governmehts at Laos arid Cambodia,
as "associated states" of the French Union on or shortly
after 7 February 1950. The Foreign Office points out
that although a number of special problems arise from
the fact that the three Indochinese states are not "fully
independent,'; overriding political considerations assure
UK recognition. Meanwhile, Embassy Belgrade expresses
the belief that the Government of Yugoslavia will extend
recognition in the near future to the rival pro-Communist
Vietnamese regime under Ho Chi Minh.
�
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
DECLASSIFIED
Cia.r3s. C..:7:::: TO: 2S S 0
r]
D7..':A .!!c7,,m3, 4 Apr 77
_7.17,21Y!3
:D
Dat: _4
111L40,8 By:
2-1
4 1-tts 101J
1207
cxnjs
tip is
eta' c insc
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24810
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP ECRET
0 FEB 1950
1206
GENERAL
I. French views on Indochina--According to US Ambassador IR. is
Bruce in Paris, Parodi, Secretary of the French Foreign
Office, is very "gloomy" about the implications for Indo-
china of recent Soviet actions. Parodi is inclined to be
that the Chinese Communists will grant strong
support in equipment and technicians to the Vietnamese
guerrilla leader Ho Chi Minh and that they may even
launch a direct military assault against Indochina. Parodi
stated that the French, in either case, could not withstand
indefinitely and that his Government was planning to make
Inquiries concerning US intentions if such developments
should materialize.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the Chinese Com-
munists can make substantial military supplies available
to Ho Chi Minh but that they are unlikely to send a major
military force into Indochina.)
:
Documazlt No.
-01
NO C;irn in ClLI
El DC:i1.7i1D
Cl.:;;, C.!T=D TO: TS S
0
4 Apr 77
Antli: r:!1. :-.T. 77/1733
Date :1 6 -WATC1-0By 8 :.---
____
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24809
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP S ET 12V.
2 FEB 1950
FAR EAST
1 INDONESIA: Westerling threat reported lessening--US
Ambassador Cochran in Jakarta has been assured by the
Netherlands High Commissioner in Indonesia that he now
has the cooperation of local Netherlands military leaders
and that the threat posed by the activities of the ex-army
insurrectionist Westerling is declining. Cochran also�
transmits evidence from Indonesian Government sources
indicating that Westerling and his associates had been
financed by Dutch officials. Cochran, however, recom-
mends that no US representations on the subject be made
to the Netherlands Government on the grounds that the
best results can be achieved if negotiations concerning
Westerling are left directly to Indonesian and Netherlands
officials in Jakarta.
Document No.
27
5 5
C/A- 5
5-75
NO CHANGE in Class.
0 DECLASSIFIED
Class. C:IANC:D TO: TS S
DLA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REQ. 77/1763
Date:1 6 mAn
078 By: 029
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
%4508
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479 1 FEB 1950
TOP SECRET
GENERAL
I. Views on admission of Chinese Communists to UN--The
US Delegation to the UN has expressed its belief that in
view of the basic US policy to preserve the peace through
collective action in the UN, it is to the interest of the US
that the USSR resume participation in the UN as early as
possible. The US Delegation also believes that: (a) the
trend of developments may inevitably transform what is
probably intended as a temporary Soviet withdrawal into
a permanent one; and (b) the issue of Chinese Communist
representation in the UN is not necessarily "a favorable
one') on which to risk Soviet withdrawal. The Delegation
concludes that in the absence of countervailing considerations,
the US should cease discouraging other UN members either
from recognizing the Chinese Communists or from voting
against seating the Chinese Communist representatives in
the UN.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that early seating of
the Chinese Communist delegation by the UN would bring
about the termination of the Soviet walkout.)
2. french reaction to Soviet recognition of Ho Chi Minh--
US Ambassador Bruce in Paris expresses the view that
Soviet recognition of Ho Chi Minh, with its implicit attack
on "the integrity of the French Union," will: (a) induce
a violent reaction in France; (b) sharpen French non-Com-
munist opposition to the Communists; (c) strengthen the
will of the people and Government to resist and contain
Communist pressure; and (d) by quickening national pride
in France, increase popular support for a more cohesive
and determined policy toward the USSR. Pointing out that
the US may soon be faced in Indochina with a situation
Document, No.24
1204
C IA
Cill-S
� 1.� NO CHANGE i.71 Class.
El DECLASSIFIED
Class. C-7.n.:::D TO: TS
D-11. ErD, 4 Anr 77
Jath: : 77 /17C2';
Date :1 6 limb
1978 By:
/qv/ 9117/k R E
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
h.
TOP ET
similar to that formerly prevailing in Greece, Bruce re-
commends that the US: (a) stigmatize the Soviet action as
a breach of the principles of international relations and a
threat to world peace; (b) recognize Bao Dai immediately
after French ratification of the Bao Dai accords; and
(c) announce and extend at once any military or economic
aid to Bao Dai which the US may contemplate. .
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the French Gov-
ernment's policy in Indochina will now gain considerable
political and popular adherence in France among all non-
Communist elements, including the Socialist Party.)
2 -
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP
ANNEX
1 February 1950
IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET RECOGNITION OF THE
HO REGIME IN INDOCHINA
Soviet recognition of Ho Chi Minh's "Democratic
Republic of Vietnam" early this week, following similar
action by the Chinese Communists, has jeopardized the al-
ready uneasy position of the French--and the French-
sponsored Bao Dai regime--in Indochina. The implicit
threat in the Communist diplomatic maneuvers is strength-
ened by the presence of Chinese Communist forces on the
Indochina frontier and their ability to make substantial mili-
tary supplies available to the pro-Communist Ho regime.
This combination of political and military pressure may, by
itself, force the French to withdraw from Indochina within
a year. In the unlikely event that the Chinese Communist
Government should send a major military force into Indochina
for action against the French, French withdrawal could be ex-
pected within six months.
If France is driven from Indochina, the resulting
emergence of an indigenous Communist-dominated regime
in Vietnam, together with pressures exerted by Peiping and
Moscow, would probably bring about the orientation of adjacent
Thailand and Burma toward the Communist orbit. Under these
circumstances, other Asian states�Malaya and Indonesia, par-
ticularly�would become highly vulnerable to the extension
of Communist influence.
Meanwhile, by recognizing the Ho regime, the USSR
has revealed its determination to force 'France completely
out of Indochina and to install a Communist government.
Alone, France is incapable of preventing such a development.
Although Western nations are committed to support of the
E T
T 0 P
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
R E T
French on the diplomatic level--the US and the UK, for ex-
ample, plan shortly to extend recognition to the French-
sponsored Bao Dai regime--such actions are unlikely to
halt the present trend in Indochina. Prospects for obtaining
additional diplomatic support for the French or Bao Dai are
poor in view of the unwillingness, of most Asian nations to
assist that. they regard a-s a_ "colonialist" -puppet regime. ,
In fact, many of these nations can interpret Soviet and Chinese
recognition of Ho as concrete action in support of Asian na-
tionalism.
In resisting the Communist advance, France can
now turn for assistance only to the US, which, in the face of
recent actions by the USSR and China in seizing the initiative
in Southeast Asia, is now confronted with the general alter-
natives of either increasing its support-of Bao Dai or with-
drawing such support as has already been afforded. Adoption
of the-first alternative sets up Bao Dai as the principal anti-
Communist instrument in Indochina, despite the inherent
weakness of his position. Asian nations, moreover, would
tend to interpret such US action as support of continued
� Western colonialism. The second alternative, which would
result in the inevitable downfall of Bao Dai, would open the
way for intensified Communist action in Southeast Asia and
would render increasingly difficult the containment of Soviet
influence throughout the Far East.
eattz
TOP
ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24807
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP RET
GENERAL
1. French prh3ose Western conference on Austria--The
French Government has proposed to the US and the UK
that a conference be held soon on a governmental level
to consider Western policy in Austria in the event that
a treaty is not concluded. The French favor strengthen-
ing the internal authopity of the Austrian Government
and propose a considerable reduction in the administra-
tive duties of the occupation authorities. In conclusion,
the French point out that they do not contemplate the
reduction of occupation troop strength and stress that
they do not wish to prejudice the treaty negotiations,
weaken the quadripartite system, contribute to the parti-
tion of Austria, or give the impression that the Western
Powers are seeking a separate treaty.
Document No. ; (
31 JAN 1950
1203
5 - 5
NO CHANCE in Class. ri
fj D2C:.AST.;771.11:D
ClaLis.T.s TO: TS S
4 Apr 77
Auth: 77/1763
Date: TC map 1,379 By: 0 2,
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24806
J C.
Approved for Release: 201- 9� /01/02 C06749479
101' l; It E '1"
GENERAL
1. Views on the Soviet UN walkout--US Embassy Belgrade
transmits the opinion of the Yugoslav Government that
the Soviet walkout from the UN is part of a scheme to
isolate Communist China from contacts with the outside
world. According to the Embassy, the Yugoslav Govern-
ment believes that the USSR does not "really want":
(a) the Chinese Communists to be seated in the UN; or
(b) the US to recognize the Chinese Communist Govern-
ment. Meanwhile, the US delegation at the UN reports the
fears of Secretary General Lie that unless the contro9rsy
over the seating of the Chinese Communist delegation is
resolved within four to six weeks, the USSR may "stay
out of the UN for good, keep the Chinese Communists out
and proceed to set up a rival organization comprehending
perhaps 7 to 8 hundred million people."
(CIA Comment: CIA concurs with the Yugoslav
opinion that the USSR is seeking to discourage US recogni-
tion of Communist China. CIA further believes that:
(a) the Kremlin may wish to delay the seating of the
Chinese Communists in the UN until satisfactory poli-
tical and economic arrangements with Mao have been
concluded; and (b) the USSR is unlikely to withdraw from
the UN permanently.)
D 0 c ullint N.
NO CHANGE Class.
El DECLASSTFaD
TO: TS
D7A :71?o, 4 Apr 77
Au th 77/1763
Date:72�102:::
30 JAN 1950
1202
0
C
C 1R 3
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
�,19s,
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479 JAN 50
R E T 12151
GENERAL
1. Views on Soviet strategy--US Embassy Moscow, comment- 3IS
ing on British and French views that the USSR is easing
tension in Western Europe and shifting its attention to the
Far East, expresses the opinion that during 1950 Commu-
nist moves in the Far East will be more dramatic than those
in Europe, but considers it erroneous to assume that Soviet
"attention" to the Far East implies "material Soviet
neglect of Western Europe."
(CIA Comment: CIA agrees that the USSR has
neither abandoned its objectives in Europe nor will relax
its efforts to achieve them.)
2. Austrian views on Treaty prospects--Austrian Foreign
Minister Gruber has informed US representative Reber in
London of his conviction that the USSR has no intention of
concluding an Austrian treaty at present. Gruber fears that
the USSR has some definite drive in mind for 1950, possibly
involving increased sabotage tactics by local Communists,
and is thus anxious to counteract any Soviet allegations con-
cerning Western responsibility for the deadlock. Gruber
therefore recommends that when treaty negotiations are
resumed on 15 February the Western Powers make every
effort to dispose of the unagreed articles, thereby depriving
the USSR of any pretext other than the Vienna financial nego-
tiations for stalling on the treaty.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the USSR will not
conclude a treaty on terms satisfactory to the West. CIA
further believes that instead of agreeing to a treaty the
USSR will: (a) attempt to force the Austrian Government to
negotiate a bilateral agreement; and (b) begin to utilize its
occupation power to undermine the authority of the Austrian
Government in the Soviet Zone.)
Document No.
NO MANGE in Class.
- 1 - 0 DECLASSIFIED
Closo. C-TICTO TO: TS S
IDD.1 Ecmo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: IX)A E:(4, 77/1783
Date :177WAR /978 By: 0
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOPS ET
EUROPE
3. YUGOSLAVIA: Tito's views on Cominform rift--In
a friendly and frank interview with US Ambassador Allen,
Tito expressed the view that the USSR would do every-
thing short of war to cause Yugoslavia to "crumble poli-
tically and economically." Tito appeared to regard with
some seriousness the possibility that unrest might develop
in Yugoslavia as a result of: (a) economic hardships
caused by Soviet economic pressure; and (b) the infiltra-
tion of Soviet agitators. Tito made no specific -requests
for US assistance, but considered it essential that close
economic relations be developed with the US.
-2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24804
1.
Approved forReleaseg019/01/02 C06749479
TOP RET
GENERAL
Views on possible Trieste settlement--Acting US Political
Advisor Judd in Trieste transmits the view of General Airey,
Commander of the British-US Zone, that the Allied Military
Government (AMG) in Trieste should be terminated before
the expected end of the European recovery program in 1952.
According to Judd, General Airey believes that AMWs pro-
blems are sure to increase and that Allied withdrawal now
is likely to be less awkward than at a later date. Airey also
expressed the opiniOn that although British and US pressure
may be necessary, present circumstances are favorable for
direct Italo-Yugoslav negotiations on the Trieste problem.
Airey believes that the Allies should retreat as little as
possible from their present stand that the entire Trieste
territory be returned to Italy and that negotiations should
be prolonged at least until Atlantic Pact arrangements near
completion. Judd comments that he personally favors, as
a means of obtaining some indication of Tito's intentions, a
preliminary and informal approach to the Yugoslays with
the clear statement that "the US would be unable to support
Yugoslav territorial and other claims."
Document No.
7Z.
JAN 195O
12)13
CIF1JS
NO CHANCE in Class. 0
0 DECLASSIFIED
--73 TO: TS S
4 Apr 77
Ann: 77/1763
e:1. 6 MAR 1978 By:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24803'
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
E T
GENERAL
1. Early_Trieste settlement urged-- US Embassy Belgrade
reiterates its firm belief that an early settlement of the
Trieste problem by direct negotiations between Italy and
Yugoslavia would be very much to US advantage. The
Embassy strongly endorses the idea of a joint US-UK
demarche to Italyand Yugoslavia and points out that the
UK Foreign Office also believes an early settlement is
desirable. In addition, the Embassy expresses the
opinion that the Yugoslays are sincerely desirous of an
early settlement of the Trieste issue because Soviet
acceptance of the US-UK-French declaration in 1948
favoring the return of all of the Trieste Territory to. Italy
would place the Yugoslav Government in an "obviously
critical" position. The Embassy comments that there is
no prospect of an Italian compromise unless US influence
is exerted to alter the "negative attitude" of the Italians.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the reluctance
of the Italian Government to engage in direct negotiations
with Yugoslavia regarding Trieste probably reflects con-
cern over the internal political repercussions which
�
would result from any major reduction in Italian claims.
CIA further believes that the gradual improvement of
over-all relations between Italy and Yugoslavia, now in
progress, will eventually facilitate an Italian-Yugoslav
settlement of the Trieste issue.)
2. Views on UN seating of Chinese Communists--The US
Delegation to the UN expresses the opinion that it would
be in the interest of the US to accept the UN seating of
Communist China's representatives in due course "as
gracefully as possible and without unnecessary delay."
The Delegation suggests that this policy be followed
irrespective of the timing of US recognition of the Chinese
Communist Government,
z b JAN IU
1199
e
d A - S
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
DECLASSIFIlzD
TO: TS S
4 Apr 77
E T Au":,11: D:11 7:-.1'1,_i/1763
TiltAR
Date: Dy:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24802
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
'1 ' E T
GENERAL
1. Schuman's views on Saar agreements--US Ambassador
Bruce in Paris has been informed by French Foreign
Minister Schuman that he has no intention of entering
into any agreement with the Saar that does not specifi-
cally provide that the agreement is "in every respect"
subject to an eventual peace treaty. Schuman-added that
he felt such a provision would largely still the present
excitement over the issue. Although Schuman would not
promise that French leases on Saar coal mines would not
extend beyond the date of a peace treaty, he pointed out
that the proposed 50-year period for the leases was
simply a suggestion of technical experts. The French
Foreign Minister was not willing to postpone the opening
of the Franco-Saar conference (scheduled for 7 February),
but he indicated that the negotiations will require a long
time and could be deliberately lengthened. (German
Chancellor Adenauer has indicated his strong opposition
to any hasty decisions regarding the Saar.) Schuman
emphatically asserted that the Saar difficulties would not
alter the determination of the French Government to have
West Germany become an associate member of the Coun-
cil of Europe.
2. Interpretation of "new" Soviet attitude--US Ambassador
Kirk in Moscow interprets Vishinsky's reply to Secretary
Acheson's recent statement concerning Soviet imperialism
in China as one more example of the "rashness" being
displayed by Soviet officials as they become convinced that
the Soviet position is improving and the Western position
deteriorating. As further evidence of Soviet "rashness,"
Kirk points to recent aggressive statements of top Soviet
officials and to the Communist treatment of Western
Document No.
2, 5 JAN 1950
1198
C/A -S
C/A- .5
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
0 DE:MASSIF=
C :AT'7D TO: TS S
DDA 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA L-G. 77/1763
R E TDato : MAR 197R 33" 0147
0
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
fl
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T 0 P R E T
nationals and property in China and Eastern Europe. Kirk
expresses the opinion that the increasing Soviet aggressive-
ness is a reflection of Stalin's belief that with China won
and an economic crisis developing in the West, he need no
longer placate the US or try to "mask his intentions" for
furthering a world revolution,
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the recently
increased Soviet pressure represents a continuation of
the Communist strategy of challenging any Western posi-
tions which appear weak.)
2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24801
C 2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T 0 P E T
GENERAL
24 JAN19.50
1. Western Commandants' view of Berlin situation--According
to US Commanding General Taylor in Berlin, the three West-
ern Commandants in Berlin agree that the recent Soviet
interference in Western traffic to Berlin reflects a deliberate
Soviet plan to sabotage the economic: rehabilitation of Berlin,
undermine the confidence of Berliners and WestGermans,
and embarrass the Western Powers. Taylor adds that the
Western Commandants have agreed to maintain close collabo-
ration on this matter and to consider at their 26 January 1950
meeting the merits of making a joint protest to Soviet authori-
ties.
2. 15 February proposed for resuming Austrian treaty talks--
US representative Reber in London reports that the Western
Deputies to the Austrian treaty talks have agreed upon
15 February as the date of the next Deputies meeting in
order to keep the London talks alive, while giving the USSR
an opportunity to conclude its financial negotiations with the
Austrians in Vienna. (Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister
Gromyko has insisted that the Vienna talks must be com-
pleted before the Deputies in London can discuss as a group
the outstanding issues of the Austrian treaty.) The Depart-
ment of State has informed Reber that the completion of the
� Austrian treaty with the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet
occupation forces remains the major US objective in Austria
and that if a treaty cannot be concluded at this time, the
Department will consider alternative courses of action to
achieve Western aims in Austria.
� Meanwhile; US Minister Erhardt in Vienna has
learned from the Austrian Foreign Office that during a
� recent conversation With the Austrian Foreign Minister in
Moscow, Gromyko, for the first time, failed to give assur-
ances that the Austrian offer in the financial negotiations was
being studied. The Austrian Foreign Office added that Gromyko
appeared "embarrassed and unusually reticent" at the meeting. le
Document No. /
- 1 - NO CHANGE in Class. 0
0 DECLASSIFIED
CU;'CED TO: TS S
R E T DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DnA F.G. 77/1763
Date :1 6 MAR 1978'
e/14- S
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
4 Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C0-6749479
FAR EAST
3. CHINA: Possible split in Communist Party--According to
US Consul General Shanghai, a Chinese source has told
a US official in Shanghai that Communist General Chen Yi,
mayor of Shanghai and commander of the Third Field Army,
Is led up" with Soviet influence over the Peiping regime
and foresees a possible split in Chinese Communist ranks
following Mao Tse-tung's return from Moscow. Chen is
allegedly interested in learning whether the US would assist
the 'China first" group in the event of an open split. The
US Consul General has "strong reason to believe" that this
approach is "genuine," but recommends that in view of the
vulnerability of US personnel in Communist China, the US
obtain "infallible proof" that the Chinese source is an
authorized spokesman for Chen and that further conversa-
tions be carried on in Hong Kong.
(CIA Comment: The political views attributed to
Chen are plausible and find some substantiation in other
reports. CIA has no evidence, however, that Chen is pre-
pared to take military action against the "pro-Soviet".
leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. CIA further
believes that this approach may be an attempt to involve
US personnel in Shanghai in an 'espionage" trap.)
2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
LI LI
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T 0 P
GENERAL
I. Possible shift in Soviet tactics in Austria--In discussing
the new Soviet attitude in Austria, US Legation Vienna
expresses the opinion that increasingly "vigorous" Soviet
tactics in the Allied Commission and the harsher Soviet
attitude toward the Austrian population may be explained
as attempts to intimidate the Austrian Government and
people in order to minimize Austrian objections to Soviet
stalling on the Austrian treaty negotiations. The Legation,
however, does not exclude the possibility of a basic change
in Soviet strategy, perhaps including a decision to split
Austria along the German pattern. The Legation points
out that the Kremlin may now ,consider that: (a) an early
treaty and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet troops
would no longer enable the USSR to gain dominance over
all of Austria; (b) the liquidation of Tito requires the
presence of Soviet troops in Austria; and (c) the USSR
must now concentrate on the further integration of the
present Soviet sphere, including eastern Austria. The
Legation recommends that regardless of the reasons behind
Soviet 'stalling. on the Austrian treaty, the US put Soviet
intentions squarely to the test and use all available means
to obtain Soviet withdrawal from Austria.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the present
aggressive attitude of Soviet officials in Austria reflects
the continuing Soviet 'desire to delay conclusion of an
Austrian treaty rather than a Soviet decision to attempt
to split Austria in the near future.)
23 JAN 1950
1196
C/14- 5
Document No. /7
NO CHANGE in Class.
DECLASSIFIED
Class. C-I.A-T7D TO: TS s
Pi 4 Apr 77
7711763
Date: An 1978 By:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP S E T
EUROPE
2, FRANCE: Speed urged in decisions on MDAP requests--
US Ambassador Bruce in Paris expresses the opinion that
anything that can be done to speed decisions on French re-
quests under the Military Defense Aid Program (MDAP)
would be "most helpful' to US security interests. Bruce
points out that French Defense Minister Pleven, in planning
for recruitment and disposition of French land forces, is
faced with decisions affected by the delivery dates on MDAP
aid. According to Bruce, Pleven considers that it would be
unwise to give the Communists an opportunity to build up
their propaganda on Western disunity by any protracted
delay in MDAP deliveries.
(CIA Comment: CIA agrees that any delay in MDAP
shipments to France is likely to be effectively exploited by
the French Communist Party as evidence of Western dis-
unity.)
2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24799
JL
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
E T
GENERAL
1. US stand on Saar issue�The Department of State has ad-
vised US Embassy Paris that Secretary Acheson's recent
statement on the Saar means unequivocally that the US
supports French claims for political detachment of the
Saar from Germagy and financial-economic integration of
the area with France. In instructing the 'Embassy to dis-
cuss the Saar with the French Foreign Office, the Depart-
ment observes, however, that arrangements made prior to
the peace treaty are provisional and that any proposal look-
ing toward long-term regulation of economic and political
life of the Saar, such as the current French proposal to
lease mines from the Saar Government on a 50-year basis,
is subject to US-UK consultation. The Department notes
the "pressing urgency" of drawing Germany closer into
the Western European community and expresses the view
that the French would be wise not to introduce new propo-
sals which at the present time "can only be expected to
excite nationalistic feelings in Germany and thus retard
improvement of Franco-German relations."
2. US views on SC action during Soviet boycott�The US
delegation at the UN, in reporting that it has received
numerous queries from other delegations concerning
possible UN action on the membership applications of
Indonesia and other states during the absence of the USSR
from the UN, expresses the view that the US should not
support any membership applications at this time. The
delegation believes that the Security Council has the right
to adopt substantive resolutions in the absence of a per-
manent member but points (a) to the likelihood that the
USSR would never recognize the new members as UN
members and (b) to the "conceivable" possibility that
1
Document No.
NO CHATAGE in Class.
0 DECLASSIFIED
Class. CUNGED TO:. TS S
DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77/1.763.,,i
1 6 mar,
Date: ---"v OM By: 0111,9
21 JAN 1950
llq
d/A- 5
4./14 - 5
El
(?)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP ET.
the USSR might leave the UN. Concerning the specific
plication of of Indonesia, which the delegation presumes will
be filed shortly, the US representatives estimate that if the
US at present neither fosters nor opposes Indonesian mem-
bership aspirations, the matter will then die.
2
Aff
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24798
c2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP ET
GENERAL
20 JAN
1. Adenauer disturbed by French Saar policy--US High
Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt has been informed by
German Chancellor Adenauer .that "there is no possibility"
he will be able to bring the Federal Republic into the Coun-
cil of Europe if the French persist in their present course
in the Saar. Adenauer expressed the view that the timing
of the French action is the most important element in the
situation, and asked that the US and the UK bring pressure
to bear on the French to gain more time for a settlement,
possibly through direct French-German-Saar conversations.
McCloy agrees with Aden.auer's opinion that French timing
on the Saar projects is "most unfortunate" and expresses
the "firm conviction" that the announced French intentions
will probably prevent German entry into the Council of
Europe.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that early French
action to conclude long-term leases on the Saar mines is
likely to jeopardize the chances for German entrance into
the Council of Europe. CIA further believes that Adenauer's
attitude on the Saar issue is governed primarily by his
anxiety to avoid prejudicing the final settlement of German
boundaries and partly by his desire to counter German
critics of his "pro-French" policy.)
EUROPE
2. BULGARIA: US replies to Bulgarian note--In response to
the Bulgarian note declaring US Minister Heath in Sofia
persona non grata, the Department of State is informing the
Bulgarian Government that, unless the note regarding Heath
is withdrawn and Bulgaria demonstrates its willingness to
1 Document No. /t;
5 - S
5 -5
NO CHANGE in Class. rl
1-1
0 DECLA:SIFIED
Cia3s. C TIMED TO: TS S
(])
DDA Mcmo, 4 Apr 77
Luh: DDA F2G. 77/1763
IgaLe :1 6 MAR )978 By:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP RET
observe established international standards of conduct,
the US Government will be obliged to withdraw the US
diplomatic mission from Bulgaria and to request the re-
call of the Bulgarian diplomatic mission from the US.
The Department points out, in support of the US position,
that: (a) over a period of years the Bulgarian Government
has subjected the US Legation in Sofia to increasing
indignities and restrictions; and (b) more than a month
ago the Department informed the Bulgarian Government
of the very serious view the US was taking of the reckless
charges then being made against the US Minister in
Bulgaria.
2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24797
,-)
ic
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP
GENERAL
1. Gromyko unable to give assurances on Austrian treaty
US Ambassador Kirk in Moscow reports that the joint US-
UK-French request to Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko
for assurances of increased Soviet cooperation on the
Austrian treaty negotiations received a "negative" re-
sponse. In reply to the Western Ambassadors' statement
that all outstanding issues should be discussed at the
current four-power talks in ,London, Gromyko insisted
that treaty Article 48 (dealing with Austrian payments to
the Allies for services and supplies) could not be dealt
with further by the Deputies until conclusion of the Soviet
Austrian talks now taking place in Vienna. When asked
what progress had been made in the Soviet-Austrian talks,
Gromyko said he was unable to comment on either the
progress of the talks or Soviet intentions in regard to
them. Gromyko added that, meanwhile, the Deputies in
London could discuss other unagreed articles of the treaty.
Kirk points out that Gromyko was willing to study the West-
ern memorandum on the treaty negotiations and observes
that throughout the interview, Gromyko was �"negative,
illogical and inconsistent," but "not disagreeable."
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class.
El DECLASSIFIED
C T.A.C7D TO: TS
� 4 Apr 77
:11 jiga.4917.61_ 1;7:
Tql), 4rT
Alt
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
1.9 JAN 1950.,
5)3
1133
24796
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T 0 E T
EUROPE
1. FRANCE: Schuman reaffirms French plans for Saar--
According to US High Commissioner McCloy in Frankfurt,
French Foreign Minister Schuman is determined to acquire
50-year leases for France on Saar coal mines, even though
German Chancellor Adenauer has expressed the fear that
such French action might endanger Franco-German rapproche-
ment. McCloy adds that Schuman, while emphasizing that any
arrangements made now will be subject to review in the peace
treaty, apparently also intends to effect some "administrative
changes" in the Saar, including converting the Office of the
French Commissioner to a Legation. McCloy believes that
the 50-year leases would prejudice final disposition of the
Saar and agrees with Chancellor Adenauer that the French
policy will make Franco-German rapprochement more diffi-
cult
(CIA Comment: CIA agrees that the French policy
on the Saar will make the achievement of a Franco-German
rapprochement more difficult, and believes that the French
Government will probably maintain its present firm stand
regarding the Saar.)
Document No.
(SI
NO CHANGE in Class. 1-1
LJ
171 DECLASSIFIED
Cls, C-.P.,' ZED TO: TS
S
r1. 4 fi.....:r 77
2
'GI
Au'll: D'-�A -R -!,-=-5
Date: -19 ;
7
___
8------ -
i3':
3Arli 1950
1192
CRET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
5
24795
,-)
Approved forkelease: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP
FAR EAST
�
1. CHINA: Nationalist Governor of Taiwan discouraged--US
Charge Strong in Taipei transmits the opinion of recently
appointed Governor K.C. Wu that the drastic changes
necessary to salvage the economy and to assure the proper
defense of Taiwan could not be effected without the help
of US advisors. Governor Wu added that Chiang Kai-shek's
self-confidence is badly shaken and that advisors would
now be able to dictate "any and all changes." Strong re-
ports that although Wu is making progress in small ways,
major issues are sure to wreck his efforts; the obviously
tired and discouraged Nationalist Governor expects de-
cisively unfavorable developments in the near future, with
"complete failure" probably becoming apparent before the
end of February 1950. The Charge expresses the conviction
that Wu's appeal was not only on instructions from above
but also represented Wu's own last hope to achieve some-
thing "real and basic."
Docum-int No,
CAflZ ir Class. 0
Li DECUSZI-TTD
(,:A.-LD TO: TS
Di\'!zno, 4 Apr 77
Luth: DDA 7-ar. 77/1765
Date :1 6 MAR 66 By:
ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
/ 7 JAN 1950
1191
a
24794
c2
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
R E T
GENERAL
16 JAN 1`-,,51/.
1190
1,West to approach 'Vishinsky on Austrian treaty�The Depart-
ment of State has instructed US Ambassador Kirk in Moscow
to join with the French and British Ambassadors in making
an approach as soon as possible to Soviet Foreign Minister
Vishinsky on the question of the Austrian treaty, The Depart-
ment indicates that the approach should consist of an oral
demarche and an aide-memoire, designed to obtain either
a flat Soviet refusal to continue negotiations or assurances
that the Austrian treaty may be concluded on the basis of
existing agreements withoUt, the creation of further obstacles
by the Soviet representative. The Department recommends
that the Ambassadors: (a) remind Vishinsky of his recent
promise in New York that no further difficulties would be
encountered on the treaty if the Soviet position on the German
assets were accepted; (b) avoid detailed discussion of specific.
articles of the treaty; and (c) avoid giving the impression that
the Western Powers are overly eager for a treaty.
FAR EAST
2. INDOCHINA: Thai views on Bao Dai Government--US Em-
bassy Bangkok bas been informed by the Thai Fdreign Min-
ister that his government, while fully aware of the gravity
of the Indochina Situation, is not prepared to extend re-
cognition to Bao Dai until France actually grants independence
to Vietnam and Bao Dai receives a large measure of popular
support. The Thai Foreign Minister added that in the absence
of these developments the Thai Government will continue
to regard Bao Dai as a French puppet 'y who will eventually
fail." In conclusion, the Thai Foreign Minister expressed the
opinion that: (a) there is no reason why an accord similar to
the Netherlands agreement in Indonesia cannot be reached with
Ho Chi Minh (Communist leader opposing Bao Dal) and other
VietnameLe leaders; and (b) the problem in Indochina is one
which the UN might well endeavor to solve.
Document No,
CiA S
NO CHANGE in Class. E]
Li DECLASSIFIED
CM3s. CriAW,ED TO: TS S
DWI. Memo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: /DemF_T,G. 77/1763
Date:
inAIR 1978 By: 0
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
193
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP ET
GENERAL
1. UK postponing recognition of Bao Dai--US Embassy
Colombo reports that, as a result of the French failure
to ratify the 8 March Agreements transferring limited
authority to the Bao Dai Government of Vietnam, the
UK has been unable to persuade other Commonwealth
countries to recognize Bao Dal, Following discussion
during the Colombo Conference on the problem of recog-
nizing Vietnam, British Foreign Secretary Bevin has
expressed the opinion that the attitude of other Common-
wealth countries anw makes it impossible for the UK to
extend "de facto" recognition to Bao Dai until the French
ratify the 8 March Agreements and indicate plans for
implementing them. Bevin believes that UK recognition
of Bao Dai without such French action would bring about
open opposition from the Commonwealth countries.
THE AMERICAS
2. BOLIVIA: Revolt brealcs out in the mining area
an armed revolt led by the Movi-
miento Nacional Revolucionario party (MNR) and supported
by army personnel broke out in Oruro and Potosi on 13 Jan-
uary; add (2) the Government is attempting, by preventive
arrests, to forestall similar outbreaks in the capital
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that (1) the Bolivian Govern-
ment has been weakened by dissention in the army and general
deterioration in the nation's economy; (2) if the rebels can
gain substantial support from the army, they will probably
be able to gain control of the country. CIA also believes
that A-government led by the MNR would be less democratic
and less cooperative with the US than the present.Government.)
1 4 JAN 14)
1189
CCO
TO
Document No.
/1
�
C/A- S _ .
NO CHANGE in Class. El
D DECLASSIFIED
Cl s. iAlIGED TO: TS
DTA Menlo, 4 Apr 77
8
1-1-e h DDA n:G. 77/1763
Date:1 6 MAR 197 By :
ET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24792
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
.D4
T 0 P
GENERAL
1. US agrees to suggested protest to Moscow �The Depart-
ment of State has informed US Representative Reber in
London of its concurrence in the plan for a tripartite oral
protest in Moscow in the event that "no conclusive result"
is reached during the 13 January meeting on the Austrian
treaty. In order to avoid the appearance that the Western
powers are breaking off negotiations in London, the Depart-
ment recommends that a specific date be fixed during the
13 January meeting for another meeting of the representa-
�-dyes during the following week. The Department adds that
no hint should be given the Soviet deputy that a tripartite
protest is contemplated, and suggests that the protest bed,
- followed by publicity in the three Western capitals. MOW-
while, the French Foreign Office has expressed general
.-:*greement to the proposed joint approach to Moscow.
RETURN TO Ar!'?;�1'1F.F�. Pr..TRI),S CENTER
IMMEDIATELY With bYii
/2_1:10X 6
01'
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. E]
ii] DAIFILD
TO: TS S
r era�, 4 Apr 77
.7G. 77/1763
"re-MAR 1978_ By:
g JAN ig5Q
1189
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE':
"
AGENCY ARC.cii v
3.8(C)
OQ
�6
�
I
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
34791
fl
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
T OS1ET
GENERAL
1. Soviet attitude disturbs Austrian leaders--According to
US Legation Vienna, Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber
has indicated that he has scant hope for early agreement
on the Austrian treaty primarily because of the increas-
ingly unfriendly interviews he and the Austrian Premier
� have had with Soviet Deputy High Commissioner Zheltov.
In support of his fears of renewed Soviet pressure on
the Austrian people, Gruber points to: (a) the revival of
lawlessness in the Soviet Zone; (b) Soviet propaganda
about neo-Nazism and war criminals; and (c) Soviet un-
friendliness to Austrian officials. Gruber expresses the
hope that the London treaty negotiations will not completely
bog down and says that the Austrian Government will avoid
any display of impatience that would aid Soviet moves to
frighten the Austrian people.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the present
Soviet actions in Austria reflect the Kremlids desire to
delay conclusion of an Austrian treaty.)
Document No.
NO ClikNGE in Class.
fl DECLASS/FIED
C.1a2s. C -(1'T.D TO: TS
P"A '2m , 4 A-)r 77
'.!
r 6 -MAR-i* . (nal1763
0
WOU
1187
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24790
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
�.1
GENERAL
1. Proposed Western approach to Moscow on Austrian treaty...
USRepresentative Reber now attending the Austrian treaty
talks in London reports that, because the 9 January meeting
indicated the USSR has no present intention of concluding
the treaty negotiations, the Western representatives have
agreed that a joint western approach should be made to
Moscow. The US, UK and French representatives feel that
the three Western ambassadors in Moscow should make
a joint representation to the Soviet Foreign Office as soon
as possible after the 13 January meeting when a continuation
of the negative Soviet attitude is expected. Reber recom-
mends that the joint representation: (a) recall the Kremlin's
past assurances of a desire to conclude a treaty; (b) point
out that, despite progress, new obstacles are continually
being created; and (c) request that the Soviet Government
state, its attitude toward the Austrian treaty and give proof
of its intention to proceed with negotiations. The Western
representatives
representatives are also in favor of having the joint approach
to Moscow accompanied by adequate publicity to demonstrate
that the USSR is blocking the current negotiations for an
Austrian treaty.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that the USSR will
continue its present stalling tactics on the Austrian treaty
negotiations regardless of a tri-partite approach to Moscow.)
Document No.
NO Ca4NCE in Class.
O DECLASSIFIED
Class. C TO: TS
T.7.1 , 4Apr77
"" ".__/". -7 /1 73
;
Dy:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
3 1 JAN 1950
1186
C/A � S
247R9
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TO'RET 1185
J v J/414 NW
GENERAL
1. Possibilities for discussing Kashmir issue at Colombo--
In connection with the proposal that the Kashmir problem
be discussed at the Colombo conference of British Common-
wealth countries, the UK High Commissioner in New Delhi
expresses the opinion that India would "resent any suggestion
that the Kashmir question should be raised in any formal.
way" at the Commonwealth meeting., The UK High Com-
missioner adds that the most to be hoped for is "some
progress on the Ministerial level with Pandit Nehru in an
entirely informal and friendly" discussion.
Document No.
1
NO CHANGE in Class. rl
LJ
0 DZCLASSIFIED
Class. C-T.A.-KI'D TO: TS S
DDA Y_or..to, 4 Apt 77
Auth: DDA. 77/1763
Date :1 6 e7By: Ole,
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
CIA- 5
24788
,-)
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOPS-ET
GENERAL
L US-UK relations reviewed�US Embassy London, in
discussing causes of strains and stresses on US-UK
relations, expresses the view that despite the growing
number of differences between the US and UK there is
no reason to believe that these differences are result-
ing from any change in the basic British policy, designed
to assure harmonious and cooperative working relations
with the US. The Embassy comments that although there
have been several periods of tension between the US and
UK since World War II, the present period is potentially
the most serious because US-UK differences are now
more numerous, complex and intangible and some are
likely to remain for a considerable time. In reviewing
the factors considered to be contributing to the current
US-UK tension, the Embassy lists: (a) the continuing
economic difficulties in the UK; (b) British annoyance
over the increase in general US pressure and criticism;
(c) the uncertainties caused by the pending general elec-
tion in the UK; (d) a constant state of British bewilder-
ment over the US political system; and (e) the degree of
fatigue in top governmental circles in London and irrita-
tions caused by the numerous US official and private
visitors to the UK.
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. 0
[-I DECLASSIFIED
Class. -A TO: TS
4 Apr 77
Auth: L G. 77/1763
Date: " MAR 1978 By: Ca>
10)
sl
1941
1184
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24787
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
a-
7 JAN 135L1
1183
GENERAL
I. US urges UK and Canadian pressure for Kashmir settlement-- Sis
Secretary 'of State Acheson has informed the Canadian and C Nis
British Foreign Ministers of his concern over a possible stale-
mate in India-Pakistan negotiations on the Kashmir issue, and
has urged them to raise the problem with the two Dominions
11111
during the conference of Commonwealth Foreign Ministers
beginning on 9 January in Ceylon. The Secretary urged the
two Foreign Ministers to use their influence to impress India,
which has been less cooperative than Pakistan, with the
necessity of continuing negotiations "on a real give and take
basis" until a satisfactory solution is reached. The Secretary
also informed the British and Canadians that he planned to
"emphasize this point" on 9 January with the Indian and
Pakistani Ambassadors to the US.
FAR EAST
2. CHINA: Nationalist mines in Yangtze estuary�The US
Naval Attache in Shanghai reports that British naval authori-
ties in Formosa and Hong Kong assume that the Chinese
Nationalist Navy has laid approximately twenty mines of
Chinese manufacture in the Yangtze estuary. The Attache
agrees that mines have been laid but seriously doubts whether
these initial mines will be efficient either in design or place-
ment or will remain in position against the strong currents.
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. ri
0 DECLASSIFIED
Cla: s. C TrD TO: TS S
3, 4 Apr 77
I VAR ig7
Date :
2OV �
RET
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24786
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TO'RET
GENERAL
vi3 JAN 1950
1182
1. Possible Western action on Austrian treaty negotiations--
According to US Representative Reber now in Paris, French
representatives agree that if the USSR continues to stall
on the Austrian treaty negotiations, the three Western
Powers may be forced to do something "spectacular" to
demonstrate that only the Soviet attitude blocks progress
on the treaty. In discussing with Reber the possibility of
a tripartite approach to Moscow, the French are inclined
to agree, that if. the Soviet Deputy continues his delaying
tactics atthe new meetings beginning 9 January, such a
joint Western approach should be made within a few days
after the talks are resumed.
Document No.
NO CHAT.IGE in Class. 0
0 DECLA.SSIFIED
Class. CqA.NGED TO TS
DDA. Menlo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DDA REG. 77 1763
Da',.,E-37.1 6 By:
48NR E T
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24785
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP
FAR EAST
1. INDOCHINA: US plans for recognizing Bao Dai--The
Department of State has informed US Embassy London
that the US is planning to extend some form of re-
cognition to the Bao Dai Government of Vietnam, as
an associated state in the French Union, provided the
French National Assembly adheres to the estimated
timetable for ratifying the agreement transferring
limited powers to Bao Dai. The Department expresses
the hope that recognition can be synchronized with a
"spontaneous" French pi4blic statemeht of liberal in-
tentions and concrete plans for further evolution of
political independence in Vietnam. The Department also
hopes that some South Asian nations may be persuaded
to extend some form of recognition to the Bao Dai
Government before the US acts. Meanwhile, US Em-
bassy Paris estimates that the "most optimistic" date
for the start of French Assembly debate on the agree-
ments for relinquishing certain Freneh powers in Indo-
china is now 17 January 1950. (French Foreign Minister
Schuman orginally estimated that debate would begin
by 12 January.)
Document No. .
3
JAN 1::3D
1181
NO CHANGE in Class. ri
0 DECLASSIFIED
Class. C.:IOCED TO: TS
Moo, 4 Apr 77
Auth: DL 1 77., 77/1763
Date: / 6 ton
" 4970 j
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
ov,
24784
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP CRET
GENERAL
1. Implications of Mao's prolonged stay in Moscow--
Commenting on the recent statement by Chinese
Communist leader Mao Tse-tung that he expected
to remain in the USSR for "several weeks, US,
Embassy Moscow considers it odd that Mao would
absent himself from China for an extended period
at this critical time. The Embassy cites previous
reports of the "nationalistic" flavor of Mao's leader-
ship and suggests that: (a) Mao's return to Peiping
is being delayed by failure to reach agreement in
negotiations with the USSR; and (b) strongly pro-
Kremlin elements in the Chinese Communist Party may
be expected to take advantage of Mao's absence to
strengthen their position at the expense of the "national-
istic" faction in the Party.
(CIA Comment: CIA believes that Mao's return to
China may be delayed by an inability to reach Agrebment
on certain provisions of a revised Sino-Soviet treaty.
CIA has no evidence, however, that Mao is out of favor
with the Kremlin or that an anti-Mao coup is being
planned in China. )
4 JAN 1c150
1180
/ - ediOF
Document No.
NO CHANGE in Class. El
0 DECLASSIFIED
CThs.c:::A1C,ED TO: TS S
.K.7r.To, 4 Apr 77
77/1763
1 6 MAR 1978 BY:
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
24783
1.
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP
GENERAL
Views on Chinese Communist recognition--US Ambassador
Kirk in Moscow expresses the view that US long range
interests would best be served by early recognition. of the
Chinese Communist regime. Kirk points out that the US
cannot exploit the Chinese situation without representatives
actually in the country and that the USSR prefers that the
US delay recognition until a dependable local Communist
regime and an efficient secret police system have been
established. Kirk adds that it would be 1.ackly dangerous
for the western world to s issue of recognition
and considers c d action by the US and UK to be
highl le. In recommending early recognition of
� ommunist regime, however, Kirk emphasizes that
the question of recognition be clearly separated from that
of trade policy and that no steps be taken to lessen the
burden of the USSR in meeting China's desperate need for
outside assistance. Meanwhile, Kirk opposes any US action
to strengthen the Nationalist regime on Taiwan on the
grounds that such action would preclude the establishment
of relations with the Peiping regime and would cause a
strong adverse reaction in Southeast Asia.
2. UK to grant de facto recognition to Vietnam--According
to US Embassy London, the British Foreign Office has in-
formed the French that the UK has decided to accord de
facto recognition to the Bao Dai regime in Indochina after
the Colombo Conference and that Bevin will appeal to the
Commonwealth Foreign Ministers there to follow the UK's
example. The Foreign Office explained that UK recognition
before the Conference might cause those Commonwealth
governments inclined to withhold recognition to "harden
their attitude."
Document No.
3 JAN "5.0
1173111
NO CHANGE in Class. rl
1_1
0 DECLASSIFIED
Class. C-IUCED TO: TS S
ricno, 4 Apr 77
Auth:
Date:
TCliTagmv 44Wir
A - G. 77/1763
6 MAR 194 By: 0 le?
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479
TOP RET
3. British position on Somaliland�The UK Foreign Office
has informed US Embassy London that if the UN and
Italy have not completed a trusteeship agreement for
Somaliland by the end of March, the UK will be prepared
to reconsider the timing of the formal transfer of ad-
ministration to Italy. The Foreign Office reiterated,
however, that the UK intends to start receiving Italian
administrators and troops in the territory immediately,
� with the object of completing the transfer by the end of
March.
4.
EUROPE
SPAIN: Implications of denial of Argentine wheat--The
Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce has informed
US Representative Culbertson in Madrid that Argentina
has cancelled its wheat agreements with Spain and that.
Spain must now turn elsewhere for substantial imports of
wheat. Culbertson expresses the opinion that although the
Minister overestimates Spain's import requirements,
Spain would be forced, unless it received US aid; to draw
further on its meager gold reserves, with serious economic
consequences. Culbertson recommends that the US make
a determined effort to enable Spain to solve its difficulties
without using its gold reserves. In the absence of such an
effort, Culbertson believes that by accusing the US of re-
fusing to aid the Spanish people, the Franco regime would
strengthen its internal position and weaken US influence.
(CIA Comment: CIA agrees that the Spanish Minister
overestimates Spain's wheat needs, but doubts that Franco's
internal position would be strengthened in the event of serious
economic difficulties.)
-2
T SON
Approved for Release: 2019/01/02 C06749479