CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY 5 MAY 1978[SANITIZED] - 1978/05/05

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06749092
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: May 5, 1978

3.5(c)
National
Foreign
Assessment
Center
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Current Intelligence
Weekly Summary
S May 1978
Approved for Release: 2018/09/17 C06749092
CG CIWS 78-018
5 May 1978
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�spercci
The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the
Current Reporting Group. reports and analyzes
developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It fre-
quently includes moterial coordinated with or peepored by the
Office of Regional and Political Analysis, the Office of Eci:
nomic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, the Ofi�ce c.f
Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Weapons Intelligence,
and the Office of Geographic and Cartographic Rese...,�6-:
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Mpthods Inv.: ,veci
(WN INTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMAT!ON
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanci.
CONTENTS
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5 May 197N
6 Western Hemisphere
Argentina;
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ARGENTINA
A decision this week by Argentina's
ruling junta to extend President Videla's
term and remove the office of the
presidency from the junta has temporarily
papered over a longstanding dispute over
the organization of the government. The
move leaves the role and powers of the
presidential office unclarified and prob-
ably presages a period of intense maneu-
vering within the military.
The junta announced on 2 May that
Videla, the Army commander, will retire
from active duty by 1 August but remain
as chief executive until March 1981.
Technically, Videla will serve as a civilian
president, although his constituency will
clearly be the military. Navy and Air
Force members of the junta are also slated
to retire by this fall.
The announcement left unclear the
crucial question of whether the presidency
will be subordinate to or independent of
the junta. Videla wants to strengthen the
office but has been consistently opposed by
junta member Admiral Massera, com-
mander of the Navy. Massera's intransi-
gence is perhaps the main reason the
decision was so long in coming; the issue
had been hotly debated for well over a
year.
The politically ambitious Massera has
been severely critical of Videla's style of
leadership. Massera has consistently used
his junta position and popularity within
the Navy to block Videla's initiative and
generate opposition to him, in and out of
the Navy.
Since the action required a unanimous
junta vote, it may have involved some
conciliatory gesture toward Massera. He
may, for example, have been promised
some change in the government's
economic policy, of which he has been a
zty(ET
vocal critic. Or, he may simply have
concluded that having apparently failed in
his effort to win the support of the Air
Force junta. member, he had no alterative
but to go along.
The issue may not be dead. Massera and
other dissidents probably do not have the
power to undo the changes, but they could
hamper the effectiveness of the revamped
presidency
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