IRAQ: POTENTIAL OF A COUP DURING COALITION ATTACKS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06746044
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-01399
• Publication Date: October 7, 2002

Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746044
7
-'srettrgi
JIIeJIIiJie,ce(Ci1iwi,flui' larieff
r,
(b)(3)
Iraq: Potential of a Coup
During Coalition Attacks
Kints
(b)(3)ey Po
If a US4ed Coalition attacked Iraq, the chances for a coup to topple Saddam
Hussein would increase as Coalition ground forces closed in on Baghdad and as Sad-
dam's system of command arid control broke down. An air campaign alone probably
would be insufficient to provoke a coup.
The largely Sunni military officer corps most likely would provide the coup lead-
ers, Sunni officers control forces sufficient to change the regime and establish a
successor government.
(b)(3)
: e
The prospect -that the Coalition would in-siren a representative government
-dominated by the Shin Intarity prcibably would dissuade some Sunni �offreets from
attempting a yogi), Others might launch 2 coup to try to retain leverage in a post-
(b)(3)Saddam nvironment.
1 Iraqi opposition grioups, both external and internal, are fragmented and lack
� he military force required for a successful coup. The eternal opposition also has little.
credibility insiiie Irer91 The 'opposition elements probably have contacts within the
(b)(3)
-litary., :however., and footad svport .ti senior officer alreTripting to amsein :Saddam.
ok stunii Ithili taT.21 tti21111,14 =Tire "3.01.0 ika ;a MILT eI;.74.411 rCoup re mild :brills 'some Sta-
bility to post-war hag but prdbiiWrivotad resist surrendering power absent an offer of
� a prominent role im a seetes,sor government .
�Intense regime oversight of the military hampers the ability of senior commanders
to move units intact against the regime, and entrapment and collective punishment
inhibit coup-plotting in the military.
(b)(3)
1.41,41m Oftivrfor the h*.ar Eon anti South Asia lir mvas
This aleinimaidam -was prepared tinder the onspices of the Natioind
wig:41**h CA, Mk iliSit, Ststre9NR,
)
3 a d'uld'AlrifIfil,
Wita.st
44103
(b)(6)
--"SteRE4
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
/7011 201A.1-1>ci
wAtvv.,71.:6P.
0 3 S 4
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746044
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746044
(b)(3)
-.SEelt-E4
(b)(3)
Military Coup Attempt: Balancing
Risks and Opportunities
A military coup would be more
likely to oust Saddam during a Coalition war
against Iraq than would a civilian revolt. We.
suspect that latent opposition to Sa.ddam Hus-
sein exist within the military forces; these
elements have the means to pursue a coup.
� mo-
rale is low in the armed forces. The level
of rexattnent is significant hat active op-
position is muted.
� Sad.dam's preferential treatment of his
Special Republican Guards (SRG) and
security apparatus as well as poor pay and
benefits for other troops contributes to
chronic triorale problems.
Since 1.1 September 2001., Saddam
increasingly has become concerned about
coup-plotting and has strengthened the secu-
rity apparatus in all military units.
� These overt intelligence officers can
countermand the orders of commanders,
effectively undercutting their authority
and further undermining morale.
We judge that officers would move
againUSaddam only if he were. losing mutant'
of his security apparatus and the media and
his defeat by Coalition forces was near. even
then they might simply lay siege to Baghdad
and await the arrival of�Coalitiott forces.
Saddam wonid be relatively secure
from a coup during the initial phases of a war.
As the war progressed, however, military de-
feats and widening fissures throughout the
Iraqi armed forces could create increasing
opportunity for militaryofficers to attempt a
coup.
� A Coalition: air campaign probably would.
not degrade Sadriam's security apparatus
sufficiently to embolden officers. During
the month-long Desert Storm bombard-
ment of Iraq, the military continued to fol-
low orders although desertions increased,
� A Coalition: ground. campaign probably
would lead to widespread breakdown in �
discipline, undermining the ability of the
regime to enforce loyalty by reprisals.
This climate would be more conducive to
a military coup, although con-inlanders
would have to act while their units main-
tairted some cohesion. �
� Regular Army officers are poorly posi-
tioned to move against the regime and
would be tempted. to launch a coup only
after significant attrition of the Republi-
can Guards MG)) and security forces.
� A more likely scenario is that command-
ers would stand down and signal Coali-
tion forces that they are. returning to garri-
son., thereby saving themselves and their
troops for a potential role in a successor
(b)(3)egime-
Widespread unrest in the cities could
improve the atmosphere for a coup.. Iraq's
security forces have extensive training and
experience in handling unrest, and Satichurt
can be expected to use the S.RG, the RG, and
Saddam Fedayeen units to ruthlessly suppress
any internal uprisings. Dissident unitirary
Leaders, however., could exploit a breakdown
in discipline to rally Weeps to their side..
although many probably would desert rather
� than turn on the. regime. Refusal by security
tbrces to fire no civilians during a dlisturbance
would be evidence of such a breakdown..
e, Draconian measures by the security Forces
against troops or units could spark an up-.
rising..
� Retribution and mutiny are possible in the
military. Most of the troops are Shia, and
2 (b)(3)
-7E6MT
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746044
pproved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746044
(b)(3)
-reRt1
they could mutiny against The senior
Sunni officers if they perceived a crum-
bling of regime defenses. �
lilrflital ACCASS !to &Minn. Sad-
dames preoccupation with. security has led
him to surround himself only with those he
cm trust, making a direct physical attack on
him difficult. Any military coup-plotters also
would have to overcome the intensive over-
sight of the military and the security forces
that Saddam has implanted in each command
to guard against a coup,
� Regular Army combat units are stationed
away from Baghdad and deployed on the
fringes of the tout-m.3%* Even Republican
Guard forces are kept largely outside
agladad
� A mires of internal security fortes with
overlapping responsibilities monitors dis-
sent among the populace and within the
government and party�including the
armed forces and security services.
� Security elements closest to Saddam are
carefully vetted and tend to be drawn
1.1 &Adam's and other co-opted tribes.
The Special Security Organization (S SO).
and the SRG probably would be loyal to
Saddam to the end. Dominated by the
Tikriti and Duni tribes, both go-aps are
closely identified with the regime. They
would become targets for retribution and
marginalized in any new government.
Camquently, they would have little rea-
son to participate in a coup.
Insider Coop? Although inilikaly
we WOW ruTh out that sorraeone in Saddaan's
inner circle might attempt to overthrow him
The fornily, party, and security inner tittles
have the access to Saddam that the military
does not We do not know the degree to
which these elites see their fate inextricably
linked to that of,Saddam and the regime.
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Saddam's Security Apparatus
Saddarn's security and intelligence ser-
vices have a 20-year record of -deterring and
destroying organized opposition to his regime.
Saddam and his younger son Qusay dominate
the elaborate system used to maintain his hold
on the nation.
The Special Security Organization (SSO) is
Iraq's premier security organization. The SSO
is primarily 'responsible for &Adam's personal
security and actively monitors the rest of Iraq's
Intelligence and security services.
The Special Republican Guard (SPCr) is an
elite security force 'primarily responsible for
protecting presidential residences: it also works
to suppress civil unrest and to -conceal weapons
of mass destruction.
The Iraqi Intelligence Service (US), Iraq's
primary collector of foreign intelligence, also
plays an important role in internal security.
The Directorate General of Security suntils
and penetrates suspect elements of Iraq's popu-
lation and operates paramilitary "emergency
battalions" that are Saddarn's first line of de-
fense in the streets.
The General Directorate of Military Intelli-
gence monitors the loyalty of military units,
provides security at defense facilities, and gath-
ers 'foreign intelligence.
The Saddam Pedayeen..nominally under the
-control of Saddam's eldest On. Uday, is a Mili-
tia tasked with Combating Internal unrest,
Beth Party Militia. Every member of the
'Ba'th Party is a member of the militia and tan
be mobilized during a crisis.
"SteRT4,1
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746044
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746044
(b)(3)
--51tekisl
� AlthoughSaddam's inner ring alone has
access necessary to target. the President,
only a few ;trusted aides know Saddam's
location at all times: Even if they wanted
to,, these insiders would have difficulry
-enlisting the support the military and se-
curity services because most carver .offi-
c ers rtistrust and resent the regime elite,
6 Saddam's son .2)asal comb's the security
and Italmho services arid is one of his fa-
her' two deputies in the Sallt Party's
;rni1Jitht buremi-----giving him the means
and the access to 'topple his father, Way.
the elder son, does :not have a power base
but is unpredictable. Although we assess
both sons will remain loyal, we cannot
dismiss the possibility that one or both, as
ruthless as Saddam. would MONte against
their father,
Potential Coup-Piotters�Personal
Interests :Dominate
In calculating the risks of a coup, the
largely Swmi 'officer corps would be guided
more by individual] self-interest than by any
desire to safeguard 'troops Or to redact the
stiffering of the Iraqi populace,
The prospect of a Coati don-imposed
democracy, meaning greater power for the
numerically ilominant Shia, might discourage
some officers ;from ...pursuing a coup of joining
Coalition forces,
te,
Alternatively, S unni ;Oilfice.rs might sre-e
ref:kip as the only way tosnve(offeklermil
efforts 'to give power to the Shia and to tin leverage leverage in pot-warir-aq.
Military offreets -Might be responsive
to inaaniives ArliterrisM�by Vodlitim fr.arces.
crimes against humanity. An amnesty
could encourage theta to abandon Saddam
and even to try to topple him.
� Similarly, senior military leaders probably
would respond to assurances that the mili-
tary and its leadership were considered an
important institution for the post-Saddarn
era and that Coalition forces had no inten-
tions of disrnanding it Although such
guarantees probably would not provoke
;coup-plotting, they might encourage rnili-
(b)(3Try officers to defect. '
Senior officers considering a coup
also would gauge the support they are likely
to receive from regional governments.
� Some could solicit support from
neighbors in Jordan or Turkey prior to
making the decision to try to oust Sad-
dam.
brew
The Opposition,: Not a Credible
Iraqi opposition elements, both in-
ternal and external, have little capability to
depose Saddam :and are unlikely to form the
core of any coup attempt. Most opposition
patties probably have ties to elements of the
however, and a senior officer con-
temTilating a coup might try to c..x.pluit such
associations.�,especially 41 Channel for
toreips:upport.
(b)(3)
�hrteMiri:Opposithyn. Both the KUT,
distan Democratic Party 'MDT') and the Patri-
otic Onion of 'Kurdistan IPLIK) have small
Forces, scant weaponry, ;and little pow-el-TO
proljett.
�'The XIV aftif PUR eireh vlaim aboar
20,000 fighters. figures that
� Some within Iraq's military 'leadership probably are inflated.
have executed orders requiring them to
repress the populace, and many probably
could be prosectited for war crimes .or
"StteRriA
4 (b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746044
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746044
(b)(3)
�SEERF4,3
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Ethnic
and Religious Makeup
divisions (Arab
Shia) and ethnic conflict
weaken Iraqi social
Deep religinus
Sunni versus Arai)
(Arab versus Kurd)
cohesion-
GMUTP
Pervahstio*.
pwittiouo
Shaft iTio
Shia Arabs
13.5
56
Sunni Arabs
5.3 -
22
Kurds
4.1
17
Turkomans
05
� In contrast, Iraq maintains II. Regular
Army and two Republican Guard divi-
sions comprising about 200,000 troops ar-
rayed against the north, while six Regular
Army divisions and three Republican
Guard with about 100,000 troops are sta-
tioned in south and south-central Iraq,
The Shia; despite their numerical
predominance in Iraq, similarly lack the cert-
tralize.d. organization, military forces, or the
capability to force Saddam out.
We estimate the Supreme Council for the
islantic Revolution in Iraq (SCLRI) has
4,000 to 10,000 fighters,
� Baqr Al-Hakim, the leader of SCIRE, has
indicated publicly he would participate in
a transitional. government that. incorpo-
rates Iraq's majority Shia population.. He
eventually would push, howevex, for a na-
tional referendum.. which he presumably
anticipates woad secure Shia leadership
of the government_
A Kurdish, or Shia coup attempt
might have the negative effect of rallying the
largely Sunni military behind Saddam., Sad-
(b)(3)
5
dam has made a priority of maintaining the
allegiance of elite Sunnis,---particularly those
in the military, intelligence., and security ser-
vices�by providing patronage and. mardpu-
latin8 Sunni feangihat US goals include parti-
tioning the country,
� Despite the Shia allegiance to Iraq during
the Iran-Iraq War, Sunni Arabs distrust
the close ties Shia parties have with Iran.
Additionally, the 'bloody violence that
erupted in southern Iraq after the Gulf
War has led many Sunnis to fear that Shia
from. the poor suburbs would and raid
middle class and wealthy Sunni neighbor-
hoods.
� Similarly, Sunni Arabs question the
commitment of the Kurds to Iraq's territo-
rial integrity and the country as an "Arab
nation."
The Tags, Roughly three-quarters
ot Iraqts identify with a tribe, and their
shayldts can mobilize thousands of armed
men. The trite..s maintain an unteady tela-
ttouship with, the regimee. Kost shaykhs have
cooperated with Saddarn. beir2t1Se he has
given them political and material benefits and
fear his retribution if they do not cooperate.
Most tribesmen probably would remain neu-
tral, only actively opposing Saddam when
they concluded that the United States was de-
termined to overthrow him.
Shia tribes to the south may seek to
remain uninvolved until an outcome is dear.
Many are wary of jeopardizing their uneasy
level of accommodation with the regime.
Like others, if they perceived a widespread
uprising or knew US gyound forces were up-
preaching, they probably would join the anti-
regime forces.
� Since the Gulf war, a number of tribally
organized independent Shia guerrilla
groups have enter lin southern traq,
"SmeREz
(b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746044
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746044
(b)(3)
-Sre1+64
(b)(3).
(b)(3)
(b)(3)
Despite some military experience, they do
not have the capability to topple the re-
gime alone but do have extensive tribal
connections among sympathetic Shia
within the Iraqi Army and the Iraqi Na-
tional Congress (INC).
.External Opposition, The INC and
other external groups presently have a narrow
support base in Iraq from Which to launch a
coup. Sunnis are not well represented. in the
INC, and. Iraqi military officers are unlikely
to line, up with them.
Most Iraqis.�Su.nni and Shia alike�have
little regard. for opposition elements out-
side the country. Many exiled dissidents
and activists have not been in Iraq for.
years, and their influence and public rec-
ognition is diminished by that absence.
Implications. of a Coup .
A coup by a strong military officer
in command of a mechanized or armored bri-
gade or division would have the: most chance
of success, if such an individual could rally
other members. of the Sunni-dominated milltary and security elite, the odds of success
would increase. Even then, he probably
could. only lay siege to Baghdad and: not get
to. Saddam. Such: an indi.viduat probably
would be steeped in the brutality and strong-
arm methods that characterized the Saddam
regime,
Such a person probably would not want to
relinquish power to Coalition forces, al-
though he might provide a retativelly sta-
ble. interim government
ik Somewhat more likely would be a general
on the. periphery declaring himself the
new ruler of Iraq and calling for troops
across the: country to ratty to his cause,.
The The chances of such a leader taking
Baghdad, however, would be slim,
Coup. Attempts Widely Reported(b)(1 )
Few Verified (b)(3)
(b)(3)
the Iraqi opposition press fre-
quently report coup attempts within the Iraqi
military, the security service, or Saddam.' s
family. These reports generally originate
within the opposition and are followed by
amplifying reports that provide corroborating
details, often about how the coup-plotters
have been arrested and summarily punished,
The reports tend to be widely circulated but
appear to be rumors spread to highlight Sad-
elatres vulnerability as well as his penchant for
brutality.
(b)(3)
Reports of coup attempts Of political
c.
purges ose to Saddam's inner circle are dif-
ficult to verify, but certain indicators can help
corroborate specific incidents.
Intelligence reporting of security forces
- reacting to a coup attempt-or suppressing
relakd unrest would.pravide strong evi-
dence.
b)(3)
Sustained and detailed reports front a
wide variety of sources would. help con-
firm an incident�as they did in- 1999 af-
ter opposition press reported that the re-
gime executed U. Genend Kama Sajed
Al-Jartabi and others for trying to organ-
ize a coup. Such reporting, however. of-
ten conies well after such events have
frampired,
Infrequently, Baghdad will publicly
ack.nowledge. an assassination attempt against
a. tegiune: figure, as it did with S:addamts: son.
("day or Vice. President Izzat Ibrallim� when. it
OCCILIES in. public venue- and its disclosure. is
unavoidable,
6 (b)(3)
Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746044