IF SADDAM SHOULD ACCEPT EXILE...

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06746043
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2018
• Case Number: F-2016-01399
• Publication Date: March 18, 2003

Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746043
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Director of Central Intelligence
DCI Red Cell
A Red Cell Special Memorandum
�SECRET.
18 March 2003
In response to the events of
11 September. the Director
of Central Intelligence
commissioned CIA's Deputy
Director for Intelligence to
create a "red cell" that
would think unconventionally
about the full range of
relevant analytic issues. The
Da Red Cell is thus charged
with taking a pronounced
"out-of-the-box" approach
and will periodically produce
memoranda and reports
intended to provoke thought
rather than to provide
authoritative assessment.
Please direct questions or
comments to the DCI Red
Cell at
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If Saddam Should Accept Exile...
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Saddam might gamble that an eleventh-hour acceptance of exile will buy
time�either for UNSC foes of war to delay military action until the dust settled
in Baghdad or for his own efforts to mount a surprise WMD attack as coalition
forces are lulled into a false sense of security.. Saddam might even send one of
his doubles into exile while he remains in Iraq. Saddam's actual departure
would probably prompt widespread international reluctance to press a
successor regime too soon on WMD. Longer-term problems would include
assuaging Iraqi concerns that Saddam's crimes will go unpunished anr!
guarantees that the new regime will truly differ from the old order. (b) (3)
With exile the only option left for Saddam othpr than war, the Red Cell speculates on how
he might try to manipulate a "final" offer. (b)(3)
Is He for Real? (b)(3)
If Saddam confounds expectations and actually accepts exile, the most immediate
challenge would be ascertaining whether the move is for real or only a ploy. Saddam
might calculate that gaining even a few hours of maneuver would give the French or
Russians a chance to introduce a UNSC resolution calling for a suspension of military
action until the situation in Iraq "clarified itself."
� A best case for Saddam miaht be such a "wait-for-war" resolution, followed by a US
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A number of other pitfalls lie in wait should Saddam seem to accept a last-minute exile:
� Stall. Saddam might try to use an exile bid to start a new round of negotiations as
he remains in control. States trying to prevent a war would play along. To head this
off, any exile offer would need to be non-negotiable and offered on a take it or leave
it basis�with the clock ticking and a plane waiting to fly the dictator off.
� Is it him? Another challenge would be determining if it is truly Saddam who has
gone into exile or one of his doubles. Knowing such a ruse would eventually be found
out, Saddam might use the period of uncertainly to launch a preemptive WMD
attack, hoping to find the coalition forces off guard.
� "My way." Saddam might depart on his own terms, going to a friendly country, like
Syria or Belarus, while leaving a trusted surrogate behind to run the countr, ('sr he
might claim to be leaving�or send a double�while remaining in Iraq. (b)(3)
Potential Pitfalls of Verified Exile
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A decision for exile would pose to the coalition a different set of challenges
-seeREI
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-SEcitu
Disarmament. For many governments, the case for disarming Iraq is based on getting
WMD out of the hands of a dangerous megalomaniac. With Saddam gone, some states will
probably be willing to give a new regime a pass on WMD.
� We would expect international�and particularly Arab states�pressure to limit the
number of US and UK forces entering post-Saddam r(b)(3)verify disarmament, in
favor of relying on UNMOVIC inspectors.
Power Vacuum. Saddam's exit�whether real or faked�before Iraq is occupied by US and
UK forces might result in a dangerous power vacuum or a splintering of the country into
Kurdish, Sunni, and Shi'a regions. This might lead to loss of control over secret WMD
stocks, and the possibility that faction leaders, rebels, or even terrorists might get them.
� Outside powers�Iran and Turkey�would be tempted to intervene. An exile deal
would need to be accompanied by rapid occupation of key points by an int((bx�a)ial
� force that included US and UK troops already in the Gulf.
Splits Over Sunni Rule. If the succession issue emerged before Iraq's occupation by
coalition forces, the international community would probably split again over the successor
regime, with the Russia, France, and the Arab states arguing for a Sunni regime as
acceptable, and the US, Britain, and others demanding more far-reaching changes.
� Kurdish and Shi'a Iraqis might see Saddam's departure as an opportunity to topple a
confused and weakened successor regime. If Kurdish and Shi'a rebels were to seize
control of their local areas and then demand US support, Washington could be faced
with a situation similar to the aftermath of the war in 1991.
� Even Iraqi Sunnis might be discomfited. With Saddam and his senior henchman gone,
lines of authority and loyalty would be unclear, especially in the security forces,
clearing the way for ambitious cliques of lower-ranking officers to bid for power.
Saddam's departure might open the door to a series of destabilizing coup5(b)(3)ious
factions within Iraq struggled for control of the new regime.
Justice Denied? The greatest long-term danger would be a successor who said all the
right things but who, once attention focused elsewhere, would become a new Saddam and
resurrect Iraq's WMD program. Even if all WMD were destroyed, the expertise to build new
ones, including nuclear weapons, will remain. Without a basic change in the nature of the
Iraqi state, few ways exist of guaranteeing that a successor regime would eschew WMD.
� The Iraqi people and the exile community would feel betrayed and abandoned if
Saddam went into a comfortable exile and was able to leave a Sunni military leader in
charge. Exempting Saddam and his henchmen�arguably the prime perpetrators of
massive crimes against humanity during the past two decades�from accountability
would set a dangerous precedent and deny a sense of justice and closure. (b)(3)
�Smits;
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Approved for Release: 2018/05/17 C06746043