EL SALVADOR: INCREASED TENSION IN THE MILITARY
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
06743179
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 28, 2022
Document Release Date:
August 28, 2018
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2017-01411
Publication Date:
March 25, 1983
File:
Attachment | Size |
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Body:
Director of
Central
Intelligence
Approved for Release: 2018/08/14 C06743179
0 co kAbte ifo(
(b)(3)
National Intelligence Daily
(Cable)
25 March 1983
0-1rirSeeret--
CPAS N1DC 83-071C
Sc 00071183
25 March 1983
Copy 4 1 8
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Warning Notice
National Security
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
Unauthorized Disclosure
Dissemination Control
Abbreviations
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111.1111.11.11.111=11111MApproved for Release: 2018/08/14 C06743179
�
(b)(3)
Contents
NR Record
Special Analysis
El Salvador: Increased Tension in the Military 9
SC 00071/83 00071/83 (b)(3)
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Special Analysis
EL SALVADOR: Increased Tension in the Military
Another showdown may be approaching in the Salvadoran officer
corps over Defense Minister. Garcia's status. Garcia would prefer to
remain in office through the presidential elections in December, even
though subordinate commanders are seeking to oust him. Tension
may ease over the short term if Garcia is forced out, but continued
stability in the military will depend heavily on the personality of his
successor.
//Garcia reportedly has reaffirmed his intention to submit his
resignation to President Magma in the next several weeks. Magana
has not indicated if he will accept it, but he is likely to come under
strong pressure from Garcia's critics to do so. He may be tempted to
wait until the end of April, at which time Assembly President
� D'Aubuisson�his principal rival�has stated he would resign from
office to begin his election campaign./
Probable Successors
if Magana accepts the resignation�which is not at all certain�
Garcia's replacement probably would be General Vides Casanova. He
is currently serving as head of the National Guard and is generally
respected In the officer corps for his professionalism.
Vides would be likely to assume a caretaker role and follow a
conciliatory line designed to strengthen the unity of the armed forces.
He has a pro-US outlook, and he probably would continue to support
agrarian reform, democratization, and human rights, but largely as a
means of ensuring continued US aid to the country
Vides might be vulnerable, however, to pressures from civilian
and military Ideological hardliners and from ambitious young officers
seeking new career opportunities and a more aggressive
counterinsurgency strategy. Moreover, his lack of combat experience
and personal following among troops would be likely to hinder any
efforts to increase control over traditionally Independent regional
commanders
continued
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(b)(3)
�Air Force commander Colonel Bustillo, First Brigade leader
Colonel Blandon, and Deputy Defense Minister Colonel Flores Lima
are other possible candidates for Garcia's post. They all appear able
to handle the Job.
The three officers are pragmatic conservatives who would focus
on unifying the military and cooperating with the US. To varying
degrees, however, they would face problems similar to those
� confronting Garcia.
Renewed Coup Plotting
If Garcia refuses to quit voluntarily, some reports suggest coup
plotting would resume among some key field commanders. Although
the officer corps would seek to avoid a coup at this time, senior
offiaers critical of Garcia would be likely to urge Magana to remove
him. Some individual commanders might even refuse to obey orders
from Garica until he agreed to step down
Such unrestin the military would have a debilitating impact on the
power structure. As the principal force for moderation in the
provisional government, the military leadership has been crucial to
ensuring continued compromise amona rival civilian parties and
enforcing the reform process
Insurgent Reaction
The insurgents probably Will try to turn any political problems in
San Salvador to their own advantage. In January, following the
rebellion of dissident field commander Lieutenant Colonel Ochoa, the
guerrillas moved up their operational timetable and launched
offensives in several regions
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The insurgents are now regrouping and resupplying. To keep
government forces off balance during this process, they are engaging
in harassing actions. The Army, anticipating a'renewed large-scale
Insurgent offensive, has sent quick-reaction forces to the northern
departments of Chalatenango and Morazan to reinforce permanent
garrisons and to launch preemptive operations. (b)(3)
10
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