CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY - THE BAATH PARTY IN THE ARAB WORLD

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06730891
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2021
• Case Number: F-2017-00022
• Publication Date: March 1, 1963

Approved for Release: 2019/06/25 C06730891
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COPY NO. 83
OCI NO. 0269/63
1 March 1963
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
-�eRr.z
(b)(3)
GROUP I
Excluded horn automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CRE
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 March 1963
THE BAATH PARTY IN THE ARAB WORLD
Page 10
The success of the Baath Party in engineering the
coup in Iraq has encouraged Baathists elsewhere to try to
carry out their plans to topple other "reactionary"
governments, especially in Syria and Jordan. The Baath
is pan-Arab, anti-Communist, and socialistic, with members
in every Arab state except Egypt. Baathism and Nasirism,
which share many of the same socialist ideas, are competing
revolutionary movements. Their sharpest point of difference
has been the Baath's insistence on legal restraint of the
executive power and on the guarantee of individual liberties,
as contrasted with Vasirism's accenta7ce of a single
dictatorial leader.
BRIEFS
R Record
(b)(3)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE BAATH PARTY IN THE ARAB WORLD
The 8 February Iraqi coup
against Qasim has brought the
Baath Party again into prominence
and has greatly encouraged its
adherents to try to carry out
'their plans to topple other
"reactionary" Arab governments,
especially those in Syria and
Jordan.
The Baath, formally Hizb
al-Baath al-Arabi al-Ishtiraki
or Arab Socialist Resurrection
Party, is a pan-Arab, anti-
Communist, left-wing party
with branches in every Arab
country except Egypt. One of
its founders, Michel Aflaq,
has said that it "has fused
Arab nationalism and socialism
into a dialecticism for Arab
nationalism."
The present Baath Party was
formed in 1953 by the merger
of two groups of Syrian origin
founded in the 1940s--the Arab
Resurrection (Baath) Party and
the Arab Socialist (Ishtiraki)
Party. The Resurrection, some-
times called the Renaissance
Party, had been founded by Aflaq,
a Syrian university professor,
a Christian, and until 1943 a
leader of the Syrian Communist
Party, and by Salah al-Din Bitar,
a Muslim. The Arab Socialist
Party .had been organized by
Akram al-Hawrani, a radical
anti-Western politician, for the
purpose of countering the right-
ist Syrian Populist and Nation-
alist parties. Aflaq has been
the party's thoretician, while
for many years Hawrani played
the role of the practical
politician and organizer.
Ideology
The Baath advocates "Arab
socialism"--a mixture of pan-
Arabism and socialist objectives.
The party's main objective is
to revive the "glories" of the
Arab past, to achieve unity of
the "Arab homeland," and to
free it from the influence and
control of the "imperialists."
The party seeks to preserve the
Arab social system, which it
emphasizes belongs neither to
the capitalist West nor to the
Communist Soviet bloc.
In common with other Arab
nationalist groups, the Baath
distrusts the Western powers,
which it considers the enemies
of Arab unity. It opposes all
forms of Western influence in
the Arab world. Despite its
differences with Nasir, the
party is generally in agreement
with his policy of nonalignment
with either the West or the
Communist bloc. It also strongly
opposes any Arab acceptance
of Israel, which it considers
a creature and instrument of
Western imperialism.
In the economic realm the
Baath advocates redistribution
of wealth; state ownership and
management of communications,
public utilities, and the chief
means of production and transport;
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
revocation of all foreign con-
cessions; land reform; and state
supervision of small industrial
enterprises, with the workers
participating in their direction
and sharing in the profits.
Inheritance and ownership of
property are asserted to be
"natural rights," but also sub-
ject to state regulation.
Differences With Nasirism
The Baath never took root
in Egypt, apparently because
by the time it had gotten under
way in Syria, Nasir had come to
power in Egypt and banned all
political parties. Nasir has,
in effect, pre-empted many of
the Baath's ideas. Nasirism
has resulted from the successful
exploitation of circumstances
by one man, while Baathism has
followed a fairly coherent
policy, not dependent on a
single charismatic leader.
Baath also advocates legal re-
straint on the executive power
and the guarantee of individual
liberties--the point of greatest
difference between Aflaq and
Nasir. Nevertheless Aflaq will
associate his policies with
those of Nasir as long as Nasir's
successes last and personal
policy conflicts can be avoided.
Based in Lebanon since 1958,
the Baath is organized into
cells on the Communist pattern.
Outside of Syria and Iraq the
party is a clandestine, closely
knit and centrally directed or-
ganization bent on undermining
the foundations of the estab-
lished order in every country
opposing its aims.
Syria
Of all the Arab countries,
Syria has experienced the most
prolonged and deepest Baathist
influence. Between 1955 and
1958 dissension among conserva-
tive political parties brought
the Baath into 2 position of
decisive importance. These were
its "golden years." The Baath's
alliance with left-wing army
elements ended in the crushing
of the conservative opposition
by 1956. However, Syria's
present prime minister, Khalid
al-Azm and the Communists were
able to increase their influence
by exploiting the anti-Western
pro-Soviet policies the Syrian
Government adopted largely at
Baathist insistence.
By late 1957 the Baath,
fearing that it was losing con-
trol of the situation, appealed
to Nasir for union with Egypt.
This came into being on 22
February 19580nder onerous con-
ditions for the Syrians. Two
Baathist leaders, Bitar and
Hawrani, became minister of
state and vice president in the
UAR cabinet, but in the end they
were relegated to sinecures and
the Baath, alona with other
parties, was liquidated. By
October 1959 both Bitar and
Hawrani had gone into opposition
to Nasir.
The Syrian Baath, which
may have as many as 50,000 adher-
ents, now is divided into two
main wings led by Aflaq and
Hawrani. The dominant Aflaq
wing expouses a conciliatory
policy toward Nasir, regrets the
break with Egypt in September
1961, and has a strong affinity
with the Iraqi �Baath. This
group is reported to be planning
to take over the Syrian Govern-
ment in the near future And to
have discussed these plans with
the Iraqi Baathist leadership.
Akram al-Hawrani's wing
is bitterly anti-Nasir, an
attitude strongly influenced
by Nasir's suppression of the
Baath following the union in
1958. Hawrani, an astute,
ruthless and forceful politician,
recognized early in his political
career the growing importance
of the army in Syrian political
affairs and soon capitalized
on it. He figured in at least
four of Syria's five military
coups, and was instrumental in
the Baath's gaining suppdrt
among the junior and noncom-
missioned officers in the army
as well as in intellectual and
student circles. His army
supporters are believed to out-
number Af1aq's, which may prove
decisive in any test of strength
between the two wings.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Iraq
The Iraqi Baath PlArty which
directed the coup against Qasim
was founded in 1953 or 1954.
From the outset it was a sub-
versive group and its members
were mostly students. By 1955
it had a clandestine press and
was disseminating antiregime
pamphlets. Throughout 1957-58
the Iraqi Baath cooperated with
the Communists and several other
groups against the royal regime.
The party's aims were similar
to those of its Syrian counter-
part and the UAR Embassy probably
was the channel of communication
with central headquarters, then
located in Damascus.
After the 1958 revolution,
one of its leaders, Fuad al-
Rikabi, now a pro-Nasir exile
in Cairo, becamc% the first minis-
ter of development in the Qasim
government. The Baath soon fell
out with the new regime, however.
In 1959 its members participated
in the abortive Mosul revolt and
Baathists critically wounded
Qasim in an assassination attempt.
Current Baath strength in
Iraq is estimated at 5,000 to
7,000 members, plus about 20,000
militant supporters and 50,000
to 100,000 sympathizers. Ten
members of the 21-man Iraqi
cabinet are known Baathists
several being members of the
Baath's international leadership.
These include the prime minister
and deputy prime minister and the
ministers of defense, foreign
affairs, interior, social af-
fairs, and education.
An Iraqi cabinet delegation
led by Deputy Prime Minister
Saadi visited Cairo on 22 Febru-
ary, apparently to reach an under-
standing with Nasir on Iraqi's
relationship with the UAR.
Saadi made a high-sounding
statement of cooperation and
"brotherhood."
Jordan
In Jordan, the Baath reached
its peak of influence at the
time of the 1956 Suez war. A
prominent Baathist, Abd Allah
Rimawi, became foreign minister,
and in alliance with a sympathetic
army chief of staff worked openly
for the absorption of Jordan
into a Baathist Republic of
Greater Syria. Cooperation
with the Communists was close.
When King Husayn blocked
this scheme, however, Rimawi
fled to Syria and became closely
identified with Nasir, after
Syrian-Egyptian union. He has
remained at odds with both Aflaq
and Hawrani. Although the
Rimawi faction of the party has
received support from Nasir and
can hardly be termed Baathist any
more, it still had adherents in
L;yria and Lebanon as well as Jordan.
Baathists in Jordan now
number about 1,500, including
an unknown number of army offi-
cers. In addition there probably
are about three times that many
sympathizers. The compromising
of the Baathist conspiracies
against Husayn cost the party
some of the strength it enjoyed
in the army in the mid-1950s.
Munif al-Razzaz, the present
Baath leader in Jordan, is in
contact with other antiregime
elements regarding a new move
against King Husayn if the
Baathists take over in Syria.
Razzaz also recently visited
Baghdad to meet with Syrian and
Iraqi party members.
Lebanon
Although Beirut is the
headquarters of the international
Baath leadership, the Lebanese
Baath is neither particularly
widespread nor specifically
Lebanese. The country's
divisions along religious lines,
its laissez-faire economic
policy, and the existence of
a rival socialist party led
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
by Minister of Interior Kamal
Jumblatt, has left but a small
field for the Baath to work,
and its members and sympa-
thizers probably number only
about 1,000.
Persian Gulf and Saudi Arabia
In the Persian Gulf area
the Baath is strongest in Kuwait.
Its actual membership in Kuwait
is largely confined to expatriate
Arabs working there, but it
exercises considerable influenc,
among Kuwaiti reformist elemen�..m,
including members of the govern-
ment. The relatively prosper-
ous Kuwaiti Baathists help
finance party activities else-
where. Other Baathist cells
exist in Bahrain and Qatar.
The Saudi Arabian Baath
membership is comparatively
small and is centered in the
eastern.part of the country
where the American oil installa-
tions)are located. TheH3aath
is active in the labor syndicates
and could bring about strikes
and agitation against the royal
regime-
North Africa
The clandestine Baath is
the only organized political
group in Libya, where parties
are outlawed. The Baath num-
bers around 200 hard-core mem-
bers, with the majority in
Tridoli where the central com-
mittee is located and the re-
mainder in Benghazi, the coun-
try's second largest citu.
It has penetrated the 14uor
movement, whose leadership is
non-Baathist, and there are a
number of Baathists among non-
Libyan Arabs. Its strength
lies in the young educated
element, however, which gives
it disproportionate influence
in a country where the number
of the educated elite is ex-
tremely small. The government
cracked down onthe Baath in
1962 and some leaders were
jailed.
In Tunisia the Barth,
through weak, is working assid-
uously. to increase its strength.
Despite its criticism of
Bourguiba for not adopting 'a
sufficiently "Arab" policy, it
supports him against Nasir.
The university students are a
special target.
The Baath has been in touch
with Algerian leaders, some of
whom are said to be Baathists.
Baathist organizations in
Morocco are fairly active and
are collaborating with the
opposition to the royal regime.
Students Abroad
One of the greatest strengths
of the Baathist movement lies
in its inroads among Arab
students abroad. Small Baath
.groupings have been formed of
,students in France and West
Germany.. Of the approximately
5,000 Arabs studying in the
United States, an estimated
30 percent are Baathists, and
recruiting goes on continually.
Several members of the Iraqi
cabinet evidently acquired
their Baathist tendencies
while students abroad. These
include the foreign minister who
studied in Britain, the finance
minister who studied at the
University of California, and
the minister of agrarian reform
who received a doctorate at
Wisconsin. Strength in such
student groups provides the
Baath with a reservoir of
trained youth that will help
ensure the party a continuing
and probably growing influence
in the Arab world.
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