BRIEFING FOR HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE - MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06730889
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: March 9, 2023
• Document Release Date: January 5, 2021
• Case Number: F-2017-00022
• Publication Date: March 21, 1963

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Briefing for
Rouse Armed Services Committee
CONTENTS
21 March 1963
NR Record
3. MIDDLE EAST
New Iraqi Government
New Syrian Government
Iraqi-Syrian Relationships with Nasir, Faysal,
and Rusayn
NR Record
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21 March 1963
IRAQ
I. The coup on 8 February which ousted the psychotic
*Qasim brought in a young and untried regime which
is faced with the task of bringing order out of
the economic and political chaos left by four
and a half years of Qasim.
A. Iraq's new rulers are a combination of Iraqi
nationalists and pan-Arab socialistic Baathists.
The Baathists dominate the government but
depend on the army, which has many anti-Baathist
officers who resent the Baath's leadership.
Dissension in likely to break out soon.
B. One of the toughest problems faced by the
new regime is its relations with Iraq's
800,000 Kurds, about 15-20 per cent of the
population. They successfully rebelled
against Qasim and held off the Iraqi army
over 20 months. The present regime is
attempting to reach an understanding with
them whereby the Kurds will be allowed some
sort of local autonomy.. So far negotiations
have not progressed very well and the war
could break out again.
C. The Baathists are strongly anti-Communists
and have crushed the Iraqi Communists, jailed
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hundreds of party members, and executed
several of the party's central committee.
Relations with Moscow, excellent under Qasim,
are now bad. Relations with the US are
good--five members of the cabinet are pro-
ducts of US universities�and the Iraqis
have asked to buy US helicopters and tanks,
items previously purchased from the USSR.
There are indications that the regime wishes
to loosen Iraq's ties with the Soviet Bloc
and gradually replace Communist technicians
with Western experts. However, the regime
fears to give the impression of having too
close ties with the West and outwardly
professes a neutral foreign policy.
Another unresolved problem is Iraq's
relations with the Iraq Petroleum company
(23.75 per cent owned by Standard of New
Jersey & Socony). Qasim seized over 99 per
cent of the company's concessionary area
and imposed a high loading fee on oil going
out of Basra. As a consequence the company
did not increase its production. Since
the country depends on oil income� (about
$206 million a year), and governmental
-SEVirgr..
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and development costs are rising, settle-
ment of the dispute is important to the
new regime.
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A-teitar
. 21 BArch 1963
SYRIA
I. Syria's Baathist-inspired coup on. 8 March came
exactly one month after the Iraqi one. The new
Syria regime is even more heavily dominated by
the Baath than that in Iraq, but is much more
shaky. Pro-Kasirism is stronger in Syria and
the country is deeply divided into a number of
factions. The army, which is the key to the sit-
uation, has a considerable pro-Nasir element. Its
leadership at the present time, however, is pan-
Arab in its inclinations, but desires to retain
Syria's national identity.
II. Syria traditionally has been a pawn between Egypt
and Iraq. The present Syrian regime will retain
control of be overthrown on the issue of its rela-
tions with Nasir's Egypt. Syria has been very un-
stable since 1949 and has undergone eight military
coups since then. The army has continually inter-
fered in the civilian government.
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IvEeRE.
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� '.21 March 1963
THEIRAQI -SYRIAN RELATIONSHIP WITH NASIR
I. The establishment of Baathist-dominated regimes
in Iraq and Syria has produced a competition for
leadership of the Arab Nationalist Movement.
While standing for much the same things in the
economic and social fields, Baathist leaders and
Nasir are split over the form of Arab unity. The
Baathists do not want Iraq and Syria swallowed up
in a Nasir-run super Arab state. Nasir's popu-
larity among the Arab masses, and much of the in-
telligentsia and army officers, however, has put
the Baathists on the spot. Syria has become the
battleground for this clash of ideas.
II. Realizing its vulnerability to Nasirism, the
Baath leadership in Iraq and Syria has attempted
to ward off a Nasir takeover in Syria by proposing
federation of the three countries. Each would re-
tain control over its internal affairs but would
cooperate with Egypt in matters of defense and
foreign policy.
III. Negotiations are being carried on at the present
time in Cairo over this question. A combined
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Syrian-Iraqi delegation left Cairo last Sunday
after fruitless negotiations. The Syrians re-
turned suddenly on Tuesday and are being joined
by the Iraqis on Thursday. Apparently Nasir is
being tough in his demands for a Cairo-controlled
union. The Baathists are resisting this to the
best of their ability, but are fearful of being
charged with blocking Arab unity. Opposition to
Nasir's demands could spark a pro-Nasir coup in
Syria; agreement to them might bring about the
ouster of the Syrian regime by anti-Nasir army
elements. Meanwhile, Nasir's propaganda embar-
rasses the Baath by hammering on the theme of
Arab unity, while his agents stir up pro-Nasir
demonstrations in Syria.
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21 March 1963
IRAQI-SYRIAN RELATIONSHIPS WITH FAYSAL AND HUSAYN
I. Jordan and Saudi &alibis have become isolated in the
Arab world as the result of the Iraqi and Syrian
coups. Both the Beath and Nasir have Openly declared
their opposition to monarchist regimes and they are
targets for .Baathist-and Nasir�instigated sUbversive
operations.
II.. Saudi Arabia now appears to be the most promising
target. The Saudi involvement in the Yemeni affair
has been unpopular with the majority, of Saudi Arabians
'and for several years there has been 4isaffection'An
the Saudi. armed forces. Nasir paradropped'arms into
Western Arabia in mid-February, apparently to equip
'anti-regime elements. Most of these were recovered
by the Saudi regime.
III. A revolt in the Hijaz--the area along the Red Sea
coast--is possible and Nasir might send troops to sup-
port it in much the same manner that he backed the
Yemeni revolutionaries.
IV.. Jordan's position is somewhat different. While King
HUsayn's regime is unpopular with much of the popula-
tion, his army is believed to be generally reliable.
Also, Baathist and Nasirist elements are reported not
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to feel strong enough at the present time to carry
out a successful coup. Assassination of the King is
always a possibility.
V. A factor which might put a damper on Nasir, or any
other potential revolutionary, is the threat of
Israel's reaction. The Israelis at times have
threatened to seize that part of the country lying
west of the Jordan River should HUsayn be overthrown---
almost certainly if they felt it was a pro-Nasir coup.
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