INSURGENT'S CLAIM OF LACK OF SUCCESS OF EARLY DECEMBER MILITARY SWEEP OPERATION IN MORAZAN DEPARTMENT; REESTABLISHMENT OF PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) BASE AREAS IN MORAZAN FOLLOWING MILITARY SWEEP OPERATION.

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06721507
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2018
• Case Number: F-2017-00467
• Publication Date: December 30, 1981

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DIRECTORATE OF
OPERATIONS
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Intelligence Information Cable IN 7726408
PAGE 001 OF 005
FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT. -
STATE/INR JCS/mC(DIA) CIA/NmCC
SWS NSA TREAS SOU
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(HARD COPIES TO:"NSC/S NFAC wHSITRm OCR).
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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT, FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE
REPORT CLASSSECRETwNINTEL NOFORN
CITE
01ST 30 OEC 81
COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR
SUBJECT: INSURGENT'S CLAN OF LACK OF SUCCESS OF EARLY
DECEMBER MILITARY SWEEP OPERATION IN MORAZAN
DEPARTMENT; REESTABLISHMENT OF PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY
ARMY.(ERP) BASE AREAS IN MORAZAN FOLLOWING MILITARY
SWEEP OPERATION.
(DOI:
SOURCE : SEE 8E1.06.
1.
2./
THE EARLY DECEMBER SALVADORAN MILITARY SWEEP OPERATION IN
moRAZAA DEPARTMENT HAD LITTLE EFFECT ON THE DISPOSITION AND
OPERATIONS OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP), mHICH IS
THE GUERRILLA GROUPS THAT IS DOMINANT IN mORAZAN DEPARTMENT.
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IN 7726408
ViARN/NG NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
PAGE 002 OF 005
FURTHER DISSEM/NATION AND USE. OF THIS /NFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND ENO OF REPORT
THE ERR HAD SEVERAL wEEKSI
ADVANCE wARNING THAT THE SALVADORAN ARMED FOPCES PLANNED A
SWEEP OPERATION IN mORAZAN DEPARTMENT TO ATTEMPT TO DESTROY
THE CLANDESTINE RADIO STATION, "RADIO VENCEREMOS." THUS, WHEN
THE ENCIRCLEMENT OPERATION BEGAN, THE EPP HAD ALREADY DEVELOPED
ROUTES OF ESCAPE, HAD CACHED THE "RADIO VENCEREMOS" EQUIPmENT,
AND WERE
3.
APLE TO EASILY ESCAPE THE
ENCIRCLEMENT. �
THERE WERE FOUR
TRANSMITTING
SITES FOR
"RADIO VENCEREMOS" WHICH
WERE DISMANTLED
AND THE
RADIO EQUIPMENT HIDDEN PRIOR TO THE MILITARY SWEEP
OPERATION.
THE RADIO DISCOVERED BY THE SALVADORAN MILITARY NHICH WAS
SAID TO BE "RADIO VENCEREMOS" WAS ONLY A SHORT4AVE TRANSCEIVER
USED FOR COMMUNICATIONS WITH OTHER GUERRILLA UN/TS AND NOT
PUBLIC BROADCASTS. FOLLOWING THE MILITARY V!ITHDRAWAL FPOm
THE'ERP AREAS OF CONTROL, THE "RADIO VENCEREmOS" EQUIPMENT
AS RETRIEVED, AND THE CLANDESTINE RADIO WAS RETURNED TO
'FULL OPERATION.
COMMENT: "RADIO VENCEREmOS" WAS BACK
ON THE AIR AT LEAST BRIEFLY BY LATE DECEMBER.)
THE EFT AS WELL
AS .THE OTHER GUERRILLA GROUPS CURRENTLY HAD LO 4 nEAPoNS
INVENTORIES AND THAT ONE REASON THAT THE ERP AVOIDED
-CONFRONTING MILITARY UNITS WAS THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT FIREARMS.
NONETHELESS,
ERP UNITS DID MOUNT
SUCCESSFUL AMBUSH OPERATIONS AGAINST THE MILITARY UNITS AND
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WARNING NOTICE PAGE 003 OF
.INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS. INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT 9EGPIN/NO AND ENO OF REPORT
.ERE.A8LE TO CAPTURE ONE RECOILLESS :E AND .A "ROMm CANNON."
THE ERP UNITS ALSO NOTED THAT THE MiLITARY TROOPS APPEARED TO
HAVE A LO4 MORALE AND WERE AFRAID TO PRESS FOR4ARD RAPIDLY
IN THEIR ADVANCE TOWARD ERP STRONGHOLDS.
COmmENT:
THE ERP HAS A
LARGE AMOUNT OF ARMS AND AMMUNITION CACHED IN THE SAN SALVADOR
AREA THAT COULD BE SHIPPED TO FIELD UNITS IF NEEDED:
OPERATIONAL REPORTS FROM UNITS IN MORAZAN HAVE NOT
MENTIONED A NEED FOR ARMS OR AMMUNITION.)
005
6, ON 23 DECEmBER
JTHE DISPOSITION OF THE ERP IN mORAZAN WAS THE SAME NOW
AS PRIOR TO THE MILITARY OFFENSIVE, WITH THE SAME CAMPS
REOCCUPIED AND CONTROL REGAINED OVER THE SAME BASE AREAS.
THE ERR WAS A9LE TO ELUDE THE MILITARY ENCIRLCEmENT BECAUSE
THE GUERRILLAS KNEW OF THE ATTACK PLAN TAO AND A HALF WEEKS
PRIOR TO THE START OF THE MILITARY SWEEP OPERATION. THE ERP
BELIEVES THAT THE MILITARY wILL INITIATE ANOTHER SWEEP
OPERATION IN mORAZAN DEPARTMENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE BECAUSE OF
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wARNING NOTICE PAGE 004 OF 005
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES'AND- METHODS /NVOLVED
FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT
THE LACK OF SUCCESS IN THE EARLY DECEMBER OPERATION. MEANWHILE,
THE EPP IS -ONCENTRATING ON EXPANDING
ITS AREAS OF OPERATION AND CONTROL IN USULUTAN DEPARTMENT.)
7.
B. IN MID-DECEMBER 1981. MID-LEVEL MILITARY OFFICERS wHO
PARTICIPATED AS FIELD COMMANDERS IN THE mORAZAN SwEEP OPERATION
DESCRIBED THE OPERATION AS INCONCLUSIVE. THE OFFICERS SAID
THAT MILITARY UNITS HAD ALMOST NO DIRECT CONFRONTATIONS WITH
GUERRILLA UNITS. HOWEVER, THE GUERRILLAS CONSTANTLY AMBUSHED
MILITARY UNITS, EFFECTIVELY BOGGING DOWN THE ENCIRCLEMENT
AT CERTAIN POINTS AND ALLOWING THE GUERRILLAS TO ESCAPE.
THE AciBUSH TACTIC HAD A GREATLY NEGATIVE IMPACT ON THE TROOP
MORALE. ONE OFFICER SAID THAT HIS PERSONNEL PANICKED
WHENEVER THEY RECEIVED FIRE AND WOULD RETURN FIRE BLINDLY
kr,/TH No FIRE oIsCIPLINE. FIELD OFFICERS BELIEVE THAT THE
GUERRILLAS HAD AOVANCE NOTICE ABOUT THE OPERATION ALTHOUGH
CAmPS DISCOVERED BY MILITARY UNITS APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN
HASTILY ABANDONED LEAVING BEHIND SMALL nUANTITIES OF FOOD,
MEDICINE AND OTHER MATERIALS.
9. (
COMMENT: MID-LEVEL MILITARY OFFICERS BELIEVE
- THAJTHE LACK OF DISCIPLINE AMONG MILITARY RECRUITS IS A MAJOR
116,
)
. )
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0ARNING NOTICE PAGE 005 OF
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED
FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO
CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND ENO OF REPORT
REASON WHY MILITARY SWEEP OPERATIOmS ARE GENERALLY INCONCLUSIVE.
OFFICERS MANY TINES ARE UNABLE TO GET THEIR UNITS TO ADVANCE
AGAINST ENTRENCHED, wELL-DISIPLINED GUERRILLAS. MID-LEVEL
OFFICER BELIEVE THAT THE SITUATION COULD BE REMEDIED BY
INCREASING THE NUMBER OF JUNIOR OFFICERS AND INSTITUTING A
DRAFT TO OBTAIN SOLDIERS FROM OTHER SOCIAL CLASSES.)
10.
COMMENT:
005
12.
.FEPORT CLASSSECRET
DISSEM: EMBASSY AT SAN SALVADOR. SENT TO
USCINCSO ONLY),
=WARNING NOTICE � INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED - NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN
NATIONALS -
RECORDED REPORTING
OFFICER. ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION ANO CONTROLS
OF OVERALL DOCUMENT.
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