F-2015-01895 INITIAL REQUEST

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
06718920
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
U
Document Page Count: 
4
Document Creation Date: 
July 13, 2023
Document Release Date: 
November 10, 2022
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2017-01736
Publication Date: 
September 17, 2007
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon F-2015-01895 INITIAL REQU[16146347].pdf135.46 KB
Body: 
OZ69 [L900 SZ/01.R2OZ :aseala JOJ panaiddV ; xft"..7 Wlr7ofl :Is vac/ /(Pci/ ...gg,Zhi sswe,f/ 211,?/ AarOCkle/ ,0,1-2002 4041,7 ^ 110 PV7eY21' F /p.41, LeVipis4/31(.(/ P 9/ ,lryit, "sift lq pipo 07.21 ita JI2Fre y 5 1(W 70/?y_47 7k&V cy keri2 ce.,/ 4IL191e 7' /24`)Y `cslY-0,10 � 4149?7,41 3-40A7 Prkfrr //4 1e-nr c/s/ eiN/el-teD7 74,0A../ "zo �� / 21� 3 11fr cgd-71"29 yji2 77 Lee? b(ge,e2_ fr/2-2,2" ,g-oe ; y_ -7gs LteliwS " 77 S -our w�-1-111""Y 47L� e.phs,,/nr (zo4h4x-ity f,y 74.2 )7A)./ 712- _A4/ ceee"-towyy 0 _soso ( k-e27/ 7,5-2,41 y/z- 6ot-4,/fra,2 -#9 9 -4 Qie-1(42eZi 13)0510- 9�2--I L`2 !_CC,Q0- So-J (9)(q) (E)(q) Z OD Z OZ69 [L900 SZ/01./2OZ :OSOIOI JOj panaiddV Approved for Release: 2022/10/25 C06718920 e-464. e/ A.Siocc:117.4_,a..2y/ Approved for Release: 2022/10/25 C06718920 Approved for Release: 2022/10/25 C06718920 . � ad.A."to)ilit7:11ati that helped it attack aeda after Gill aticfthasg.itfrOm.itt 'Afglansatictuary" � net and at least Six other top ..agency.- : � .� � � officials should face review boards to fur- ther -evaluate 'their action's, the report said. in juiie 2005, then-CIA directorPor; ter Goss rejected that proposal, a � sion the agency's current director, Gen. .Michael Hayden, said he supported: . Hayden told CIA employees in state'- nnent Tuesday that he opposed declassi- ing and releasing the :report because counterterrorism plan until alter the Sep- that Would "distract officers serving ... tember 2001 attacks, the CIA inspector Tenet Says agency's' ' on the front lines of a global conflict:" general charged in an internal report par- report is "flat wrong." The inspector generals sun-nary was tially declassified on 'Iliesday required to be released under a law said the pre-9/11 CIA failed to develop failures some recommendations of the 9/11 ,month that implemented The report, completed in June 2005, 'The fact that passed this "assets" needed to disrupt al-Qaeda. be- were fore it launched its devastating attacks. Echoing the public 9/11 Commission Re- port in 2004, the CIA watchdog also criti- cized the agency for not sharing intelli- gence that could have led authorities to two 9/11 hijackers who traveled to the USA in 2000 and 2001. Neither the CIA nor its officers dis- charged "their responsibilities in a satis- factory manner," inspector General John Helgerson concluded in the report's 19- page summary. However, the summary also found "no silver bullet" or "single point of failure" that "would have enabled the intelligence Community to predict or prevent the 9/11 attacks." Tenet, who resigned in 2004, said in a statement Tuesday that the report is "flat wrong" in its assertion that the CIA lacked a clear plan. Instead, he said, the agency failure to follow up on al-Qaeda threat By Richard Willing � USA TODAY WASHINGTON -- CIA Director George Tenet declared "war' on al-Qaeda in 1998' but failed to follow up with a thoroUgh systemic should not absolve responsible Officials from accountability.' � John Helgerson, CIA inspector general, in report's 19-page summary 'There was in fact a robust plan (to fight terrorism) dating back to long before 9t11.' George.Tenet, in a statement Commission. Although Hayden said the report is mostly old new, it included several points that were either new or offered in- ternal CIA views that had not been made public. For example: * The CIA targeted 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed for capture and rendition but did not "recognize the.: significance" of his role in al-Qaeda, * No comprehensive study of Opacna bin Laden was written after 1993. "Sctra- tegic analysis" of al-Qaeda was lacking. * The CIA and National Security Agen- cy were sometimes unclear abo'ur their pre-9/11 roles in pursuit of al-Qae4a. * As many as 60 CIA officials read at � least one cable in 2000 or 2001 dealing with the American travel plaris of two '9/11 hijackers, but the information wasn't quickly shared with domestic law enforcement. Approved for Release: 2022/10/25 C06718920 Approved for Release: 2022/10/25 C06718920 / ������� ...����� 0 0 (b)(6) (b)(6) Approved for Release: 2022/10/25 C06718920