SOUTH AFRICA: EVADING THE ARMS EMBARGO

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• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-01251
• Publication Date: January 1, 1990

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Directorate of .
Intelligence
South Africa: Evadin
the Arms Embargo
A Research Paper
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Directorate of
Intelligence
South Africa: Evading
the Arms Embargo
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared by Office
of Global Issues, with contributions by
Office of African and Latin American Affairs,
Office of
Information Resources, and , OGI.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief,
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Scope Note
South Africa: Evadin
the Arms Embargo
This Research Paper describes South Africa's evasion of the international
arms embargo and assesses its capability to design and produce weapons.
Because the arms embargo forbids the sale of arms-related technologies to
Pretoria as well as weapons, this report focuses heavily on Pretoria's
methods for obtaining and applying forbidden technologies. The discussion
is limited to conventional weapons, ballistic missiles, and associated
technologies. Chemical and biological weapons are not treated at length in
this report.
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This paper complements DI Research Paper ALA 89-10008
March 1989, South Africa's Defense Industry: One Step Behind,
which highlighted some potential gaps in South Africa's weapons research
and development programs. That paper argued that the excessive cost of
producing or procuring jet engines and other critical foreign parts and
technology would hamper South African efforts to build a largely indige-
nous advanced defense industry. Additional information about the extent
of foreign assistance to Pretoria and recent developments since the
publication of that paper have provided insights into South African plans to
overcome these obstacles.
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Summary
Information available
as of 22 January 1990
was used in this report.
South Africa: Evading
the Arms Embargo
South Africa mounts a large, well-organized, and well-funded effort to
evade the international arms embargo. Since the mid-1960s, when it
realized that an arms embargo was likely, Pretoria has made a major
investment in developing an arms manufacturing capability. As a result,
the South African Government will have a military-industrial complex well
positioned to build advanced weapons to replace much of its current arms
inventories when they reach obsolesence in the mid-1990s
South Africa emphasizes the acquisition of arms-related technology and
production methods rather than buying components or finished weapons.
Reporting
� Through Armscor, Pretoria's state-owned arms manufacturer, and vari-
ous government and university research facilities, South Africa has
developed the capability to design and manufacture technically advanced
weapons and subsystems.
� South Africa uses its contacts with the international scientific communi-
ty to keep pace with developments in weapons-related technology and,
therefore, to avoid having to duplicate research done elsewhere.
� Armscor and the South African Government have carefully developed
the capability to use advanced computers to design and manufacture
weapons, thus greatly increasing their production efficiency.
� Advanced production machinery and materials technologies have been
imported and are widely used in the defense industry.
In addition, South Africa has trained engineers and arms workers, hired
foreigners with needed skills, invested in foreign high-technology firms,
and, when necessary, used espionage to obtain needed technologies.
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In cases where the complexity of a project is beyond South African
resources�particularly with ballistic missile and aircraft design�Pretoria
has established links to foreign defense industries, mostly in Israel and
France.'
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We believe that South Africa will be in a position to produce a new
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generation of weapons in the 1990s./
\ / available
information indicates that several advanced systems are already well along:
� A new fighter aircraft is being designed. The fighter appears to be a
twin-engine design, is likely to be equipped with sophisticated avionics,
and will incorporate advanced composite materials.
� Ballistic missiles with ranges of over 500 kilometers are likely to be
produced by 1995.
� New tactical antitank, antiaircraft, and antiship missiles are being
produced or developed.
� A new tank may be currently in the testing stage.
We do not know when these weapon systems are scheduled to become
operational, and technical problems or funding cuts could force delays.
As these programs come to fruition, South Africa will gain substantial
intelligence and force multiplier advantages over its neighbors./
i
Airborne command and control systems, working with advanced ground
weapons and combat aircraft, will further South Africa's substantial edge
in combat against other forces in the region.
Because South Africa has developed or acquired advanced technologies
outside of international controls, it has little incentive to cooperate in
international control efforts, such as the Missile Technology Control
Regime, or in embargoes of other politically isolated states. Instead, South
Africa may become a leading supplier of arms and technology to states
such as Iran, Chile, and Taiwan as well as a partner in transnational
programs to develop sensitive weapons, especially ballistic missiles.
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Contents
Page
Scope Note
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Summary
Success to Date
1
Modernizing Weapons
1
Producing New Weapons 1
Emerging Weapons Requirements 1
Priorities
4
Staying Ahead in the Region 6
Meeting the Challenge 7
Weapons Research 7
South Africa's Resources 7
Foreign Sources of Technology 12
Paying the Bills 20
Outlook for Programs 21
Current Programs 21
Aircraft 21
Warships 26
Future Programs 26
Battle Management 26
Space Systems 26
Implications 26
Outlook for the Embargo 26
Continued South African Dominance 27
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South Africa: Evading
the Arms Embargo
Success to Date
Although South Africa openly purchased sophisticat-
ed weapons until the mid-1970s, it began preparing
for an international arms embargo a decade earlier.
dis-
cussions of possible arms sales boycotts led Pretoria to
begin increasing its weapons development and produc-
tion capabilities, primarily through licensing agree-
ments. The last major foreign arms sale to Pretoria, a
$480 million package that included the licensed as-
sembly of French Mirage III and Fl fighters, was
agreed to in 1971 and completed in 1977. Other,
smaller sales, such as a 1975 agreement with Israel
for patrol boats and a series of mid-1970s purchases
of Italian radars, enabled Pretoria to update its arms
inventory. By 1977, when the United Nations imposed
a mandatory arms embargo, the South African De-
fense Forces (SADF) had a 10- to 15-year cushion for
developing new weapons before existing stocks be-
came obsolete.
Modernizing Weapons
Pretoria has used this interim period to modernize
weapon systems while awaiting a new generation of
indigenously developed weapons. In particular, it has
concentrated on the South African Air Force (SAAF).
Armscor's Atlas Aircraft division has rebuilt aging
(b)( 1 ) Mirage III fighters and fitted
canards, new wings, and new electronics into new
fighters called Cheetahs. Atlas also now independent-
ly manufactures the French-designed, 1960s-vintage
Atar 9K50 jet engine, first produced under license in
the Mirage Fl program,/
\Other divisions in Armscor have modern-
ized the South African Army's fleet of 1950s-vintage
Centurion tanks'
And upgraded the
Navy's three French-supplied Daphne-class subma-
rines. Although these programs have not expanded
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Pretoria's inventory, they have provided a "quick fix"
that has kept its equipment operational and competi-
tive with that of other Southern African states.
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Producing New Weapons
Through Armscor, South Africa has also successfully
developed and fielded a small number of new, ad-
vanced weapon systems in the last several years.
These systems have been designed and built entirely
within South Africa, although they use foreign tech-
nologies and components. The weapons are custom-
ized for South Africa's terrain and military doctrines,
which stress mobility and survivability. The G-6 self-
propelled 155-mm howitzer,' for example, has a range
of about 40 km and uses 6X6 all-wheel drive, which
gives it greater mobility over South Africa's terrain
with lower fuel consumption and fewer breakdowns
than tracked vehicles. Similarly, the Rooikat, a light
armored vehicle designed for killing tanks, combines
8X8 all-wheel drive for mobility with a low profile
that makes it a difficult target to hit. As a result of
the modernization and new production programs,
frontline equipment in all of the military services has
been manufactured, substantially modified, or entire-
ly rebuilt within South Africa.
Emerging Weapons Requirements
In our judgment, South Africa is now poised to
manufacture a wider assortment of new, sophisticated
weapons through the mid-1990s. South Africa's de-
fense industries have gained sufficient experience in
adapting and integrating foreign technologies with
' The G-6 uses the G-5 howitzer, which itself is based on a design
developed by the Space Research Corporation of Canada. South
Africa obtained the plans for the howitzer in 197 �
prototype in 1979, and began production in 1982.
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Table 1
Strength and Inventories of South African Forces,
1965-89
1965
1975
1985
1989
Army
Personnel
19,000
38,000
76,000
75,000
Tanks
Mixed Sherman,
Centurion
141 Centurion
250 Centurion/
Olifant a
250 Olifant a
Light armor
Panhard
1,000 Eland a
250 Saracen
1,600 Eland a
1,500 Ratel a
1,600 Eland a
1,500 Ratel a
Artillery
Mixed light
Miscellaneous 25 pounder, 40 G-5 a
towed 155 mm 20 Valkiri a
75 G-5 a
10 G-6 a
80 Valkiri a
SAM
0
18 Cactus a
36 Tigercat
20 Cactus a
24 Tigercat
20 Cactus a
24 Tigercat
Navy
Personnel
3,500
4,000
9,000
7,500
Destroyers
2
2
o
o
Frigates
4
4
1
o
Mine warfare
12
10
6
9
Submarines
0
3
3
3
Fast attack
0
0
9a
9a
Mr Force
Personnel
4,000
8,500
13,000
13,000
Fighters
38 Sabre
16 Mirage III
56 Mirage III
51 Mirage III
32 Mirage Fl a
45 Mirage III/Cheetah a
32 Mirage Fl a
Bombers
Canberra,
Buccaneer
6 Canberra
6 Buccaneer
6 Canberra
6 Buccaneer
6 Canberra
5 Buccaneer
Light attack
0
160 Impala a
122 Impala a
124 Impala a
Helicopters
60 mixed
40 Alouette III
20 Puma
15 Super Frelon
80 Alouette III
50 Puma
12 Super Frelon
80 Alouette III
50 Puma
14 Super Frelon
EW/tanker
0
0
0
3 Modified 707
Transports
Mixed C-47, C-130,
Viscount
7 C-130
9 Transall
7 C-I30
9 Transall
7 C-130
9 Transall
23 C-47 12 C-47 5 C-47
a Built or substantially modified in South Africa.
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Table 2
Major Weapons Produced in South Africa Since 1975 .
Weapon (Producer)
Comments
Aircraft
Impala (Atlas)
Trainer. Licensed copy of Italian MB 326.
Produced 1964-86.
Cheetah (Atlas)
Rebuilt/modified Mirage III. Production began 1986.
Mirage Fl (Atlas)
Licensed assembly 1974-77.
Seeker remotely piloted vehicle (probably Atlas)
Copy of Israeli Scout RPV.
Attack helicopter (Atlas)
Development began 1981. XTP-1 test bed displayed 1987.
Rolls-Royce Viper jet engine (Atlas)
Production licensed by Italy for Impala.
Atar 9K50 jet engine (Atlas)
Licensed assembly under Mirage Fl program. Production of improved
version (lower weight, increased reliability) continues.
Missiles
Cactus (Kentron)
Developed as part of French Crotale program, South African production
began in 1971.
Skorpioen (Kentron)
Kulcri (Kentron)
Antitank guided missile
Licensed copy of Israeli Gabriel.
Probably derived from US and French air-to-air missiles. Development
effort began 1971, production in 1982.
Entered production in mid-1989, probably based on Israeli Mapats
ATGM.
Ballistic missiles
Ground weapons
Under development since early 1980s with Israeli cooperation.
Olifant tank
Ratel infantry fighting vehicle (Sandock-Austral)
British Centurions modified 1976-77.
Produced 1976-87. Also available in antiaircraft, command, mortar, repair
versions.
Ingwe armored fighting vehicle (Sandock-Austral)
Casspir armored personnel carrier (TFM, Ltd.)
Rooikat tank destroyer (Armscor, Lyttleton Engineering)
Private venture, several versions available.
Production began 1979, logistic versions available.
First shown publicly in October 1988.
Mfezi armored ambulance (Magnis Truck Corp.)
Series production began in mid-1989.
Artillery
G-6 155-mm self-propelled (Armscor, Lyttleton)
First prototype in 1981, advanced prototypes in 1984-86. Series production
since 1988.
G-5 155-mm towed howitzer (Armscor, Lyttleton)
Valkiri 127-mm multiple rocket launcher (Armscor)
Warships
Development began in 1976, production in 1982. Operational in 1983.
Development began in 1977, production in 1981.
SAS Drakensberg (Sandock-Austral)
12,500-ton fleet replenishment ship. Laid down 1984, launched 1986,
operational 1987.
Minister-class patrol boats (Sandock-Austral)
Six built under Israeli license 1978-86.
a In addition to these systems, South African firms produce a wide
range of small arms, munitions, vehicles, and spare parts sufficient
to satisfy the needs of all three services.
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their domestic weapon designs in order to tackle more
ambitious projects with realistic cost and risk assess-
ments. The political leadership in Pretoria, mean-
while, is likely to encourage these programs, both to
replace the military's aging preembargo inventory and
to retain a substantial qualitative edge over black
African Frontline States and potential outside inter-
vention forces, such as Cuba's
Priorities
We believe that South Africa's most pressing need
will be for new combat aircraft. Many of the SAAF's
strike aircraft are 1950s and 1960s vintage Mirages
and British Canberras and Buccaneers that, even with
refurbishment, will increasingly experience operation-
al losses due to age.
Top &act
Procurement of a short-range ballistic missile
(SRBM) is another high priority for South Africa. In
1986 the head of Armscor stated publicly that missile
development would be a major goal for Pretoria.
SRBMs would enable Pretoria to make attacks on
airfields and other military facilities without risking
aircraft and pilots. Missiles would also give the SADF
a delivery system for possible chemical or nuclear
weapons.
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The Structure of Armscor
The Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Ltd.,
Armscor, began as a small state-owned corporation
established in 1968 to oversee the development and
production of arms in South Africa. The company is
one af the largest in South Africa, with over 20,000
employees and $700 million in assets. Armscor has
also developed an impressive array of subsidiary
companies and facilities:
Atlas Development, manufacturing, ser-
Aircraft vicing of aircraft
Telcast Manufacture of high-technology
castings
Kentron Design and production of missiles
(Irene) and guided weapons
Somchem Production of propellants and
explosives
Naschem Production of large-caliber
ammunition, bombs
Eloptro Manufacture of optical and elec-
tro-optical equipment
Lyttleton Manufacture of small arms,
Engineering mortars, cannons
Pretoria Manufacture of small arms and
Metal ammunition
Pressings
Swartklip Manufacture of pyrotechnics and
Products munitions
Infoplan Computer services
Arniston, Test ranges
St. Lucia,
Alkantpan,
Eugene
Marais
Armscor is controlled by a board of directors of seven
to 12 members. The board is appointed by the
President of South Africa and includes the head of
the SADF. (b)(3)
Private South African companies also work closely
with Armscor. These include Dorbyl (warships), San-
dock Austral (armored vehicles), REUTECH (com-
munication systems), and OMC Engineering (ar-
mored vehicles). Armscor claims that about 75
percent of its work is done by over 1,000 major
outside contractors, although most finished assembly
of major systems appears to be carried out by
Armscor itself.
Slightly further down the line, Pretoria will need to
replace much of its Navy. South Africa's three Daph-
ne submarines were commissioned in 1970 and 1971
and, even with refits, their hulls are not likely to
remain serviceable beyond the 1990s. The Navy's two
frigates�its largest warships�are already in reserve
status. The remainder of the combat fleet consists of
5
Israeli-designed patrol boats not intended for long
periods at sea; extended operations in the rough
waters of the Indian Ocean or South Atlantic could
shorten their operational lives considerably.
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Staying Ahead in the Region
South Africa's weapons acquisition will be designed,
in our judgment, to maintain regional hegemony
rather than to counter any immediate military chal-
lenge from hostile neighbors. Although the scheduled
departure of Cuban forces from Angola by July 1991
will remove South Africa's most significant military
adversary in the region, South African military plan-
ners will look to deter the return of outside, well-
armed forces. Pretoria probably also calculates that
the overall defensive capabilities of its neighbors will
improve, South Africa expects the personnel strength
of the combined armed forces of the Frontline States
will peak in 1997
with notable improvements
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in heavy weapons, tanks, aircraft, and air defense
systems. Pretoria has several other motives for build-
ing offensive arms:
� Pretoria's military doctrine promotes the use of
raids and strikes into neighboring countries to dis-
courage antiapartheid insurgents. As long as Pre-
toria faces an active insurgency, in our judgment, it
will attempt to maintain offensive weapons that are
one step ahead of its neighbors' defensive systems.
* By withdrawing from Namibia, South Africa has
Lost access to Mpacha airfield at the tip of the
Caprivi strip, which had extended the SAAPs
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Figure 4.
by Arrnseor*s
zer, buns
subsidary,
range well into central Africa. We believe the loss of
Namibia will encourage defense planners to bolster
Pretoria's long-range strike capability by stepping
up development of ballistic missiles.
* Pretoria may also perceive a need for advanced
weapons to defend its Walvis Bay enclave on the
coast of Namibia.
In adjusting to the loss of its buffer zones, South
Africa will require a higher degree of technological
sophistication in its weapons. Pretoria will face a
significant challenge in evading the arms embargo
and obtaining technologies currently available in the
West:
� Fighters will require electronics and weapons capa-
ble of engaging multiple targets. Stealth technol-
ogies are also likely to be sought to minimize the
aircraft's radar profile and to increase its ability to
evade ground-based air defenses.
� Tanks will need modern armor, including ceramic
materials and bolt-on reactive armor, to survive
advanced antitank weapons and munitions.
� Antiaircraft missiles, both radar and infrared guid-
ed, will need electronic counter-countermeasures to
defeat jammers and decoys. (b)(3)
South Africa's well-established collaborative efforts
with foreign companies and ability to purchase sub-
systems abroad for its major weapon systems, albeit
discreetly and sometimes clandestinely, give Pretoria
access to the personnel, resources, and technology that
it needs to work on these problems
Weapons Research
South Africa's Resources. W*
Defense, the Plans Staff is res
future arms needs and,
mistry of
or forecasting
\wants closely with Arun-
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cor to define requirements and designs. Armscor's
chief executive has publicly stated that the company
and armed forces were working to identify defense
requirements 15 to 20 years in advance. Armscor
brochures indicate that the company tries to satisfy
requirements by purchasing and adapting existing
arms and components whenever possible, and in 1987
a high Armscor official stated that South Africa could
obtain any military commodity or technology it need-
ed, although it usually had to pay
and make payment in US dollars. (b)(3)
Because off-the-shelf weapons or technology are
sometimes either unavailable or cannot satisfy a
requirement, Armscor maintains and is expanding
research and engineering facilities at several of its
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Figure 5. The Rooikai lank denroyee
p1ants.2 Missile research has long been carried on at
Kentron, Armscor's tactical missile subsidiary, and in
July 1987 Armscor announced that it would build a
new complex for research on missiles and advanced
weapons./
Armscor can turn to other South African research
centers if its own capabilities are inadequate for a
given project:
� The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research
(CSIR). CSIR is a large, state-owned and funded
organization that conducts civilian, industrial, and
military research in a broad number of fields.
several CSIR offices are working on military-relat-
ed programs, including the Aeronautical Systems,
Microelectronics and Communications, and possibly
the Materials Science Divisions.
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0 Universities. Several South African universities
have institutes involved in weapons-related research.
.he
University of Stellenbosch's Bureau of Systems
Engineering does about 75 percent of its work for
Armscor. work at
other university centers includes research, develop-
ment, and small-scale manufacturing of weapon
components and microelectronics for military use.
We believe that the quality of the researchers working
in these institutes is excellent
senior and staff personnel are experi-
enced and well-trained�many with Ph.D.'s (some of
them earned at US universities)�and that they en-
hance their technical knowledge by participating in
international scientific conferences.
Table 4
Known South African Military
Research Facilities
Organization
Specialized Facilities or Programs
Armscor facilities
Milistan
Kentron
Somchem
Houwhoek
Atlas Aircraft
Formed in 1987 as a think tank for strate-
gic analysis, decisionmaldng support for
setting Armscor's technology research
budgeting priorities.
Research on tactical and ballistic missiles.
Solid-propellent development.
Missile research facility.
Research on aircraft.
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Foreign Sources of Technology
In cases where South African defense projects are too
advanced and ambitious to pursue independently,
Pretoria seeks to form partnerships with other coun-
tries. Ind uses van- (b)(1)
ous legal and clandestine methods to obtain defense-
related technologies. By using this approach, Pretoria
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Paying the Bills
Pretoria's new weapon programs will require large
expenditures. The cost of weapons is high for any
country�tanks cost close to $3 million each and even
relatively unsophisticated fighters cost at least $20
million, according to our data�and South Africa's
isolation will add to those prices. Pretoria will have to
continue investing in research and test centers, as well
as to expand and modernize its production facilities.
Because of the limited size of South Africa's armed
forces, these costs will not be amortized over long
production runs. Pretoria, for example, would need
only about 250 tanks to replace its current inventory,
resulting in higher-than-normal unit costs. Moreover,
accurate projections for cost overruns�almost inher-
ent in major defense programs�are not likely to have
been included in Pretoria's budgetary calculations and
may force reductions or delays in research, produc-
tion, and procurement.
The South African Government's current effort to
reduce its arms expenditures is already beginning to
effect these programs. The Defense Forces' budget
rose steadily in the late 1980s, with most of the
increases going toward developing and procuring
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weapons In early
1990, however, South African defense officials stated
publicly that decreased regional tensions will soon
result in cuts to the Defense Forces and weapons
_ cin ur_o_ei___Jnent
Some of these reductions are already being
made: at the January 1990 unveiling of Atlas Air-
craft's new attack helicopter, the Rooivalk, the chief
of the SAAF's air staff said that the aircraft would be
tested but not put into productionlf
\, The possibili-
ty is increasing, however, that high cost projects, such
as for fighter aircraft, could be stretched out or scaled
back
South Africa will continue to have only modest
success in using arms exports to lower its costs.
Estimates for the value of Pretoria's arms sales vary,
but in May 1989 an Armscor spokesman placed them
at about $225 million for 1987, and we have no reason
to doubt this figure. Most of the revenue comes from
sales of small arms and munitions/
I ins situation is unlikely
to change. While ammunition is relatively anony-
mous, most customers are unlikely to order weapon
systems, such as aircraft or tanks, which could be
readily identified as South African�made,!
,. .
6 The total defense budget was announced as about $4 billion, but
we believe it is considerably greater than that�possibly by as much
as 50 percent. Pretoria routinely hides defense-related spending in
nondefense accounts, and does not include its subsidies for arms-
related work at CSIR and universities or subsidies for arms firms.
Revenues from arms exports are also turned over to the Defense
Ministry without being counted in the budget
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Outlook for Programs
Pretoria will try to combine all the resources of its
defense industry to produce a number of new, ad-
vanced weapon systems in the first half of the 1990s.
Several projects are already under way, involving
arms for all of South Africa's forces
In addition, we believiTthiFtffe
broad outlines of future programs are beginning to
take shape.
Current Programs
Aircraft. Atlas has probably been working on the
design of an indigenous fighter aircraft only since
1987, when designers and engineers could have been
released from the Cheetah program. The planned
fighter�codenamed Cava, according to press re-
ports�will be a twin-engine, multirole aircraft initial-
ly powered by the improved Atar 9K501
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and will
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probably replace the Air Force's Mirages, Bucca-
neers, and Canberras�suggesting production of at
least 100 aircraft. Atlas's experience with the delta-
winged Mirage III and Cheetah and composite mate-
rials suggest additional details about the fighter's
planform and material composition.
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Figure 9
South Attica: Arms Production Timeline
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detecting and locating ground-based radar and com-
munication systems and to provide information for use
in attacking them.
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Warships. South Africa does not have any warships
under construction but could build major combatants
if it chose. The Sandock-Austral shipyard at Durban
built a 12,500-ton supply ship, the Drakensberg, for
the South African Navy in the mid-1980s; all of the
components for the Drakensberg were made in South
Africa. In our view, Sandock would be able to apply
this capability to build frigates, which run about
2,500 to 3,000 tons, and that would be superior to any
ships in the Angolan or Mozambican Navies. Press
reporting also indicates that Pretoria has obtained the
blueprints for West Germany's Type 209 submarine.
In our view, South Africa's shipbuilding capability
and experience operating and overhauling submarines
would enable it to build the 1,400-ton ship, although it
would probably need four to five years to do so.
Future Programs
As new weapons go into operation with the SADF, we
believe Pretoria is likely to combine them with new
command, control, communications, and intelligence
collection systems. Because of the technological so-
phistication and costs of producing these integrative
systems, Pretoria is likely to either purchase them
abroad or with fnreigr
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Battle Management. The acquisition of tactical battle
management systems is likely to become a major
priority for the SADF, in our view, especially as
Angola and Zimbabwe improve their air defenses.
Along with the Phalcon AWACS for directing air
battles, the South Africans will probably continue to
seek new airborne SIGINT and ELINT systems for
13 ecru
/Pretoria is almost certain, in our view, to seek
additional air-, ground-, and sea-based electronic
countermeasures equipment to use for degrading ene-
my communications, radar, and other electronic sys-
tems. Whether South Africa is able to develop these
systems itself or buy the hardware abroad, Armscor
and its associated firms are almost certainly capable
of installing and integrating the equipment in aircraft,
ships, and vehicles.
Space Systems.
/ Pretoria is examining the use of
space-based systems. We believe that weight consider-
ations and the requirement for real-time intelligence
dictate an electro-optical system for an imaging satel-
lite instead of a film return system. Development of a
launch system, however, capable of lifting the weight
of an imaging satellite and the costs associated with
such a program may be major impediments. Nonethe-
less, successful development would probably enable
the South Africans to spot military movements, bases,
and facilities in neighboring countries�capabilities
that would provide it with a significant margin of
intelligence superiority.
Implications
Outlook for the Embargo
In our view, Pretoria will continue to have consider-
able success in obtaining technologies and components
for use by its arms industry and the SADF. Despite
political pressures and enforcement actions, we be-
lieve Pretoria will almost certainly continue to find
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individuals, companies, and governments willing to
assist it. Pretoria will suffer occasional setbacks.I
I Fbut undoubt-
edly accepts these risks and costs of circumventing the
embargo.
A longer term possibility is that South Africa will
trade the technologies it has acquired for those it still
needs. Already officially cut off and forced to rely on
clandestine and domestic resources for arms technol-
ogy, Pretoria has no reason to respect international
embargoes on specific countries or international con-
trol regimes, such as the Missile Technology Control
Regime. Rather, South Africa has every incentive to
form partnerships with other embargoed countries.
Embargoes or political restrictions on other states are
unlikely to impress Pretoria, and we see no reason for
the South Africans not to swap or provide technology
or arms to China, Argentina, Iran, Chile, Taiwan, or,
under the right circumstances, the Soviet Union�
should those countries be interested.
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Continued South African Dominance
Pretoria's drive to modernize its forces and capabili-
ties is likely to widen its military lead over the
Frontline States, The poverty and instability of neigh-
boring governments, particularly in Mozambique, is
likely to preclude them from purchasing, absorbing,
and maintaining enough modern weaponry to offset
South Africa's advantages. Decreases in Soviet mili-
tary aid to client states, such as Angola, probably
means that South Africa's neighbors will be unable to
acquire up-to-date arms. They may be forced to look
to second-tier suppliers, such as China and North
Korea, for less expensive, and perhaps less capable,
aircraft, missiles, and tanks
\ Chi-
nese or North Korean weapons, even if provided to the
Frontline States, would probably not constitute a
challenge to South Africa's superiority,
y ac
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The modernization of South African arms will en-
hance Pretoria's ability to "go to the source" and
impose military solutions on its conflicts with regional
states. The African National Congress (ANC) is
currently struggling to regroup after relocating much
of its military wing from Angola to Tanzania, and
Pretoria may calculate that more pressure on the
Frontline States, particularly Botswana and Zimba-
bwe, will help interdict ANC infiltration routes. If
necessary, we have no doubt that Pretoria would use
its new modern weapons to strike deep into its neigh-
bors' territory to force their acquiesence
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