A SECOND IRAQ-TURKEY BORDER CROSSING: POTENTIAL DESTABILIZER IN NORTHERN IRAQ

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
06704889
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RIPPUB
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U
Document Page Count: 
8
Document Creation Date: 
December 28, 2022
Document Release Date: 
June 1, 2018
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Case Number: 
F-2017-02434
Publication Date: 
July 11, 2001
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FROM cmli SITE 3A Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 - � 37606552E = , 2 � � %, : � Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 , FROM 1.01 I TE 3A Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 (WED) 7. 1 ''01 :.19/ST. 18_: :8/NO. 376.0655287 P. 3 (b)(3) A Second�Iraq,Turkey Border Crossing: Potential-Destabilizer tn NOrthern-Traq SuinmaryP�] Iraq and Turkey are likely to proceed with their plans to open. a seCond border crossing through Iraqi Kurdish,-held territory that will .improve Baghdad's strategic and corrunercial,pbsition, �erode.KurdiSh control of northern Iraq, and increase threat's to US forces and interests. Turkish officials claim aneW, crossing Would-take a year or two to put into operation. -- Iraq and Turkey view'a second crossing point as a way to gain 'leverage over the Kurdistan. Democratic Party (KDP) and rein in-its efforts to enhance Ku.rdishindependenee from Baghdad by controlling or eliminating the.K.DP's accesS to thelucrative border trade. The KDP currently earns-an patimatedS15 million a month from illieit oil trading and levies via the Babdr Gate-7a revenue stream that. has helped the KDP dominate its rival, the Patriotic Union of-Kurdistan, for nearly a decade. � The new crossing would giye,addam a new -foothold in the vital Iraq- � Syria-Ttirkey tri-border area and increase his leverage. over Kurdish affairs, � � Turkish disenchantment with the KDP (b)(3) has (b)(1) spurred Ankara to work more closely with:Baghdad to undercut the Kurds' positiOn in northern Iraq. (b)(3) Thebordef initiatiye could;spark aKurdish-lraqi conflict that would prompt Kurdish pleas for.US intervention. � � Baghdad, emboldened by its improving regional position, the erosion of UN sanctions; .and the suceess Of cither:hiliteral.and illieit trading relationships, is determined to rein iirthe Kurds.and wrest Turkish border trade revenues. (b)(1) (b)(3) Iraqi forces deployed to contrcil,the southerly approaches to anew border crossing would-make-Vilining of subsequent Iraqi offensive actions more (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 PROM CM-14 SITE 3A Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 iwrni i 1 1 ()I m � y/ol. 18: I 8/NO. 376 0655 28 7 P 4 challenging and alter the operating environment for Operation Northern Watch (ONW). � Extending the line of contact with the Kurds, thereby creating a longer front, would put a greater number of potential objectives within easy reach of Iraqi ground forces, � An extension of Iraqi-controlled territory could provide new hiding places for surface-to-air weapons that could threaten ONW aircraft and lead to additional Iraqi propaganda over real or alleged collateral damage. Hi (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 , FROM CMN SITE 3A � Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 (wrni :11' ni � 118 : 1.9/ST. 18:18/N0. 3760655287 P 5 (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) A Secoad Iraq-Turkey Border .Crossing: Potential Destabillier in Northern Iraq Iraq and Turkey arc intent on -moving forward on their agreement � announced in April to open a Recorid border crossing through territory currently held by-the'Kurdistan Democratic Party (ICDP): it will be located 10.km southwest of the UN- approved Habit! Gate crossing, Close to the'SYrian border. � he opening of the second border crossing hid been postponed due to economic conditions, but Ankara would build a .15-kilometer road and a 300-meter long bridge, and Baghdad would construct a 35-km road and a 800-meter long bridge. the crossing Will be used exclusively for petroleum andspetroleum products and that�thc.Habur.gate Would be used only for n assenger traffic and Pori-petroleum-trade, the new border crossing would cost Ankara milhon. � Turkish foreign Minister CerpfatibliCly said..the crossing w.ouldbe Open in one-to:two:years, although Turkey has not sought UN,..involvement and neither side has.begun preParations-for . construction on its side of the.botder. Mechanics of the Border Crossing We estimate a crossing comparable to Habur Gate would take at-least a year to build, but a "Panel" bridge, Capable Of-Canying'35,ton tiucks, could'be constructed across the Habur-RiverbetWeen Iraq and Turkey ma matter of days. � Any:crossing west ofthe main road through Habur would'require.a new bridge across the river, which runs the.length. o f. the. Turkey-liaq:bOrder. The liabur crossing.has twoconcrete bridges, each Carrying one-waptraffic. � The.KDP- controls The secondary roads west of Habur, which .would.require minor refurbishment to su orthi h vOlumes.of.tnick traffic Iraq also would need to secure eckpoints before work could roads and bui begin. the infrastructure probably would-consist of an inspection Shed on either side of the'crossing, administrative-and su arc buildings), and several parking lots. In an effort to establish a new secure trade corridor, Iraq also might .construct abridge across the Tigris River just south of ICDP-beld-territory; 'bourid-traffic to more quickly.leave.Kurdish areas. , . This assessment was Prepared by the Office of Near Eastern, SoutbAsian, and African Analysis with contributions from the Office of Transnational Issues and the Office- Of Russian and Etiranean AnaWsis. Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 , FROM ,CMN SITE 3A Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 1iv711) .7 I r" :.19.?"8T. : 3760655.287 P 6 (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) , A second border crossing would facilitatelurkish- Iraqi trade by reducing heavy traffic flows through Habur and, if maimed by Iraqi officials, cut the Kurds out of the lucrative cornmerCial�trade. � The average number of oil tankers and cargo trucks last year at the HaburZakho border Crossing was about 1,800 at any. given time. This average increased.to about 2,200 as of May 2001. � The KDP earns an estimated $15 Million a month from illicit oil trading and levies on trade-through Habur Gate. Iraq Looking'to Reisseit'ContrOl The new. crossing woiild enable Saddam-to increase his influence inthe northrby reducing Kp? financial independence and its-ability to dominate the rival PUK arid Iraqi Kurdish affairs in general. *In the past, Iraq has temporarily out off the north frorntrade with Baghdad to demonstrate that Eaddarri,-rather-than the Kurdish leaders, coritro4 theKurds?.econoznic lifeline. � Baghdad already controlithe�amount ofdiesel fuel exported to Turkeythrough K.DP ,territory,. and.in recent years has reduced the flow offueldnring periods of. tension with the United $tatei. Access by non-governmental organizations-(NG0s) to northerri.lraq couldbe closed off if Iraq-assumes control of the area'contiguous�to.the Syrian border, where all NGO workers enternorthem Iraq. Turkey . . , Ti for the last foicyear.s ha S cieriiedNGcs� access:via Habur. Opening a secondborder crossing-float tinonopolizes petroetini wade would berthe'ronSt sighifiCant Iraqi action against - the KnrcLs.since.1996, whenBagh.dad assisted-the KbP in piistingthe�PUK from the - Kurdish- capitatofArbil. The movemould aid � Baghdad's lOnOerm efforts to retake the north. For the-foresCeablefutute, hOwever, die lack of a Kurdish - threattnthetegizne, the-prospect..of a costly occupation and reintegration., the threat 01 U retaliation; and pleocupatiOnl:vith sanctions relief are likely.to deter.Saddanifrorri making a.nia. or move to regain control -of Iraqi-KurdiStan. A�lOgical first step'in iMpleineitting the new border �agreernentwsiuld 'be�the relbcation ofIraqi ' rpeChanized forcesnorthof Mosul toward:the Iraq- TIgkey-Syrialti-border. �Iraqi.forces;ciirrently stationed north of Tall.k.qfan fanderinain� fed infantry diVisiOn anda.lone-thechanizecl-battalion� are insufficient to control the communication betWeen MoSiil and the boyderwith.Turkey. . . � Saddain;s la0s. of C Onsultati on.With the KIR. on the �border-cfoisiitig.agreenient stigge.sts that he plans to coritrof.the-cros4ng-and its sontberlY:aPprOaches. � . . � K.Dp control of border trade has given die group a � To control a-corridor tdfhe.horder, reinforce key strong upper hand overthe'POK for Most of the last river crossings and inountairi paisesi'iestrain . decade. Baghdad '.s control over trade through the scouggling,,and.deter:K.71DP interference Iraq would region Would-increase Saddarifs-levera e in playing . .need to deploy a. mechanized division and an one party againstthe other. infantry divisionbetween Aip-Zalah and the border. . Such. an operation.probablY would require corps- level combat support and river-cc�ossibg assets. 2 � Realigning forces .ndrtliCvard probably would draw rigOlai- army fOrees,frOm�the Arbil or Kirkuk .area (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(3) Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 FROM ,CMN SITE 3A Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 n" ra :9/ST. 18 : 18/NO. 3760655287 P 7 �Ja 4., (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) while leaving:Republican.Guard forces currently garrisoned near Mosul- and Kirkuk- available for offensive operations. � An alternative scenario for extending Iraqi military presence toward the border-----on the north side of Saddam Lake, between ljahuic, and the border:� would require:a much greater commitment because Iraqi forces would need to secure KDI'Lcontrolled urban area and ridgelines along.thiS route Turkey Flexing"Its INJUSeles The Turks have talked aboutopening a second border crossing into northern Iraq for several years Prime Minister ECev.rit and Foreign' Minister Cem in earlyJurie were touting plans to open a second border crossingWith Iraq, outside ICDP control'. The TurkS have held-a-number of meetings with the Iraqis-to tinalize-a.potential location and to :discuss.who would run the berder crossing, � Border trade With Iraq�worth an estimated $600- $800 million ayear for AnkaraiS a vital aC.0140111jC safety valve for .Turkey's impoverished-Kurdish southeast. A-subStantial portion ofthe ideal. o uiation is engaged in supporting the trade. The key goal for the Turksis to-rein in the Iraqi Kurds, pritrianly e KDP, by using a secon :crossing fOgainmore control over a key source of Kurdish revenues � In late May reports; that Ankara had deveioped a policy to react With tnilitatY, force if the Iraqi Ktirds declared independence. ; � the Turks are prepared to take-strong steps .to niake sure the Iraqi Kurd i cannot create an independent entity and Turkey would retaliateif the KDP used force to block progreSs on the new border crossing. � The Turks have-triaproY:ed.tbier ties with the KIDP's rival-PL/K and Could Use this growing relationship to press the KDP--perliips�-gOin. So far as to.foSter �clashest!etween the twO-grOup.s. .}Curds. Unnerved by Talks The:OP and PUK have alleged-thatplans fof a second liatilTithkeybonder'gate staffed by Iraqi officials will embolden Saddam to-rnove north Both parties, have expressed concern that the Ttirk.S would facilitate;access-for ii44i-officiaLs. tO set up border oneratiOaS on the Kurds' 'western flank,: Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 - - - , FROM.CMN SITE 3A Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 - 19/ST. 1818/.NO. 3760655287 P 8 - � (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(3) � Impact on US Interests The border initiative-portends a Kurdish-Iraqi conflict with the potential for dragging Washington- into the fray. Baghdad, eifibOldened by. its. improving regional position, the erosion Of UN sanctions, And the success of other bilateral and illicit trading relationships; is determined to rein in the Kurds and wrest Turkish border trade revenues; � The Kurds appear equallydeterrnined not to lose a vital revenue stiearn or to give Saddain's regime a new foothold in-the area. � Iraq illicitly expo'rts about .�5,600 barrels per day of oil to Turkey-via tanker tr4clts, riaking Ankara the third-highest importer--behirid.Syria and 'Jordan respectively� of Iraqi illicit Oil. 4 � Until a-riew.crossing opens, Turkey will use its-rail line through Syria� which opened in May for the first time in more than 20 years-to tratispert cargo outside the oil-for. food program to Baghdad: Iraqi control of the approaches to anew border crossing would create a longer line of contact with the Kurds and Put a greater.numbet of potential Kurdish objectives within easy reach of-Iraqi ground forces. � Warning of-Iraqi offensive operations would be complicated because it would be.harder to determine-Baghdad's Militnyobjective if it - mobilizes armored or Mechanized forces in-the area. � The longer front would reqUire. Iraqi troops to patrol more road S and man additional theekpoints! _ increasing. opportunities for-clashes . With the ICDP. Iraq could use the :additional- territory to deploy surface-to-air weapons targeted at Operation Northern Watch(ONVI) aircraft, further restricting .ON W's freedom of movement._ � The new swath �Of territory wouid play host to 3 large voNtne of truck traffic, increasing the potential for collateral damagcH=arid Iraqi propaganda�.--should ONW. strike'Iraqi Suiface-to- air units nearby: ' . . � Iraq could deploy surface-to-air units.within imles of the-Turkish border,_ including the border Crossing usedby Turkish forceS deployed to tiorthern,Iraq. Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 'FROM c),IN B LIE � . Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889 (YYL.:-/) I. 1, U1 !CS : 10 : 10/ Av. 0 I ovO7DZO f r Kurdish tiqr100irl trql -58 IrGt!rnelerc- . � � � � . � zone-riorch Of_36ifriallei Proposed new border crossing '011iiik.(000)' conceniation Satah� ad Oln.d mosel � iC,?1,173 -cr . PUK�PaLlap ynien of Kutc9st3rk KDP-Kurijscan Clanocratic Parry IUMK-Iblania Unity Mousgrisni In Iraq Kt:ratan 75662661 (R01926) 2-0 Approved for Release: 2018/05/29 C06704889