A SECOND IRAQ-TURKEY BORDER CROSSING: POTENTIAL DESTABILIZER IN NORTHERN IRAQ
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
06704889
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
8
Document Creation Date:
December 28, 2022
Document Release Date:
June 1, 2018
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2017-02434
Publication Date:
July 11, 2001
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A Second�Iraq,Turkey Border Crossing:
Potential-Destabilizer tn NOrthern-Traq
SuinmaryP�] Iraq and Turkey are likely to proceed with their plans to open. a seCond
border crossing through Iraqi Kurdish,-held territory that will .improve
Baghdad's strategic and corrunercial,pbsition, �erode.KurdiSh control of
northern Iraq, and increase threat's to US forces and interests. Turkish
officials claim aneW, crossing Would-take a year or two to put into
operation. --
Iraq and Turkey view'a second crossing point as a way to gain 'leverage
over the Kurdistan. Democratic Party (KDP) and rein in-its efforts to
enhance Ku.rdishindependenee from Baghdad by controlling or
eliminating the.K.DP's accesS to thelucrative border trade. The KDP
currently earns-an patimatedS15 million a month from illieit oil trading
and levies via the Babdr Gate-7a revenue stream that. has helped the KDP
dominate its rival, the Patriotic Union of-Kurdistan, for nearly a decade.
� The new crossing would giye,addam a new -foothold in the vital Iraq- �
Syria-Ttirkey tri-border area and increase his leverage. over Kurdish
affairs,
�
� Turkish disenchantment with the KDP
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spurred Ankara to work more closely with:Baghdad to undercut the
Kurds' positiOn in northern Iraq. (b)(3)
Thebordef initiatiye could;spark aKurdish-lraqi conflict that would
prompt Kurdish pleas for.US intervention. �
� Baghdad, emboldened by its improving regional position, the erosion of
UN sanctions; .and the suceess Of cither:hiliteral.and illieit trading
relationships, is determined to rein iirthe Kurds.and wrest Turkish border
trade revenues.
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Iraqi forces deployed to contrcil,the southerly approaches to anew border
crossing would-make-Vilining of subsequent Iraqi offensive actions more
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challenging and alter the operating environment for Operation Northern
Watch (ONW).
� Extending the line of contact with the Kurds, thereby creating a longer
front, would put a greater number of potential objectives within easy
reach of Iraqi ground forces,
� An extension of Iraqi-controlled territory could provide new hiding
places for surface-to-air weapons that could threaten ONW aircraft and
lead to additional Iraqi propaganda over real or alleged collateral damage.
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A Secoad Iraq-Turkey Border
.Crossing: Potential Destabillier
in Northern Iraq
Iraq and Turkey
arc intent on -moving forward on their agreement �
announced in April to open a Recorid border crossing
through territory currently held by-the'Kurdistan
Democratic Party (ICDP):
it will be located 10.km southwest of the UN-
approved Habit! Gate crossing, Close to the'SYrian
border.
�
he opening of
the second border crossing hid been postponed due
to economic conditions, but
Ankara would build a .15-kilometer road and
a 300-meter long bridge, and Baghdad would
construct a 35-km road and a 800-meter long
bridge.
the crossing Will be
used exclusively for petroleum andspetroleum
products and that�thc.Habur.gate Would be used
only for n assenger traffic and Pori-petroleum-trade,
the new border crossing would cost Ankara
milhon.
� Turkish foreign Minister CerpfatibliCly said..the
crossing w.ouldbe Open in one-to:two:years,
although Turkey has not sought UN,..involvement
and neither side has.begun preParations-for
. construction on its side of the.botder.
Mechanics of the Border Crossing
We estimate a crossing comparable to Habur Gate
would take at-least a year to build, but a "Panel"
bridge, Capable Of-Canying'35,ton tiucks, could'be
constructed across the Habur-RiverbetWeen Iraq and
Turkey ma matter of days.
� Any:crossing west ofthe main road through Habur
would'require.a new bridge across the river, which
runs the.length. o f. the. Turkey-liaq:bOrder. The
liabur crossing.has twoconcrete bridges, each
Carrying one-waptraffic.
� The.KDP- controls The secondary roads west of
Habur, which .would.require minor refurbishment to
su orthi h vOlumes.of.tnick traffic
Iraq also would need to secure
eckpoints before work could
roads and bui
begin.
the infrastructure probably would-consist
of an inspection Shed on either side of the'crossing,
administrative-and su arc buildings), and several
parking lots.
In an effort to establish a new secure trade corridor,
Iraq also might .construct abridge across the Tigris
River just south of ICDP-beld-territory;
'bourid-traffic to more quickly.leave.Kurdish areas.
, .
This assessment was Prepared by the Office of Near Eastern, SoutbAsian, and African Analysis with
contributions from the Office of Transnational Issues and the Office- Of Russian and Etiranean AnaWsis.
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A second border crossing would facilitatelurkish-
Iraqi trade by reducing heavy traffic flows through
Habur and, if maimed by Iraqi officials, cut the Kurds
out of the lucrative cornmerCial�trade.
� The average number of oil tankers and cargo trucks
last year at the HaburZakho border Crossing was
about 1,800 at any. given time.
This average increased.to about 2,200 as
of May 2001.
� The KDP earns an estimated $15 Million a month
from illicit oil trading and levies on trade-through
Habur Gate.
Iraq Looking'to Reisseit'ContrOl
The new. crossing woiild enable Saddam-to increase
his influence inthe northrby reducing Kp? financial
independence and its-ability to dominate the rival
PUK arid Iraqi Kurdish affairs in general. *In the past,
Iraq has temporarily out off the north frorntrade with
Baghdad to demonstrate that Eaddarri,-rather-than the
Kurdish leaders, coritro4 theKurds?.econoznic
lifeline.
� Baghdad already controlithe�amount ofdiesel fuel
exported to Turkeythrough K.DP ,territory,. and.in
recent years has reduced the flow offueldnring
periods of. tension with the United $tatei.
Access by non-governmental organizations-(NG0s)
to northerri.lraq couldbe closed off if Iraq-assumes
control of the area'contiguous�to.the Syrian border,
where all NGO workers enternorthem Iraq. Turkey
. . ,
Ti
for the last foicyear.s ha S cieriiedNGcs� access:via
Habur.
Opening a secondborder crossing-float tinonopolizes
petroetini wade would berthe'ronSt sighifiCant Iraqi
action against - the KnrcLs.since.1996, whenBagh.dad
assisted-the KbP in piistingthe�PUK from the -
Kurdish- capitatofArbil. The movemould aid �
Baghdad's lOnOerm efforts to retake the north. For
the-foresCeablefutute, hOwever, die lack of a Kurdish -
threattnthetegizne, the-prospect..of a costly
occupation and reintegration., the threat 01 U
retaliation; and pleocupatiOnl:vith sanctions relief
are likely.to deter.Saddanifrorri making a.nia. or move
to regain control -of Iraqi-KurdiStan.
A�lOgical first step'in iMpleineitting the new border
�agreernentwsiuld 'be�the relbcation ofIraqi '
rpeChanized forcesnorthof Mosul toward:the Iraq-
TIgkey-Syrialti-border. �Iraqi.forces;ciirrently
stationed north of Tall.k.qfan fanderinain� fed
infantry diVisiOn anda.lone-thechanizecl-battalion�
are insufficient to control the communication
betWeen MoSiil and the boyderwith.Turkey.
. .
� Saddain;s la0s. of C Onsultati on.With the KIR. on the
�border-cfoisiitig.agreenient stigge.sts that he plans to
coritrof.the-cros4ng-and its sontberlY:aPprOaches.
�
. .
� K.Dp control of border trade has given die group a � To control a-corridor tdfhe.horder, reinforce key
strong upper hand overthe'POK for Most of the last river crossings and inountairi paisesi'iestrain .
decade. Baghdad '.s control over trade through the scouggling,,and.deter:K.71DP interference Iraq would
region Would-increase Saddarifs-levera e in playing . .need to deploy a. mechanized division and an
one party againstthe other. infantry divisionbetween Aip-Zalah and the border.
. Such. an operation.probablY would require corps-
level combat support and river-cc�ossibg assets.
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� Realigning forces .ndrtliCvard probably would draw
rigOlai- army fOrees,frOm�the Arbil or Kirkuk .area
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while leaving:Republican.Guard forces currently
garrisoned near Mosul- and Kirkuk- available for
offensive operations.
� An alternative scenario for extending Iraqi military
presence toward the border-----on the north side of
Saddam Lake, between ljahuic, and the border:�
would require:a much greater commitment because
Iraqi forces would need to secure KDI'Lcontrolled
urban area and ridgelines along.thiS route
Turkey Flexing"Its INJUSeles
The Turks have talked aboutopening a second border
crossing into northern Iraq for several years
Prime Minister ECev.rit and
Foreign' Minister Cem in earlyJurie were touting
plans to open a second border crossingWith Iraq,
outside ICDP control'. The TurkS have held-a-number
of meetings with the Iraqis-to tinalize-a.potential
location and to :discuss.who would run the berder
crossing,
� Border trade With Iraq�worth an estimated $600-
$800 million ayear for AnkaraiS a vital aC.0140111jC
safety valve for .Turkey's impoverished-Kurdish
southeast. A-subStantial portion ofthe ideal.
o uiation is engaged in supporting the trade.
The key goal for the Turksis to-rein in
the Iraqi Kurds, pritrianly e KDP, by
using a secon :crossing fOgainmore control over a
key source of Kurdish revenues
� In late May
reports; that Ankara had deveioped a policy to react
With tnilitatY, force if the Iraqi Ktirds declared
independence. ; �
the Turks are
prepared to take-strong steps .to niake sure the Iraqi
Kurd i cannot create an independent entity and Turkey
would retaliateif the KDP used force to block
progreSs on the new border crossing.
� The Turks have-triaproY:ed.tbier ties with the KIDP's
rival-PL/K and Could Use this growing relationship
to press the KDP--perliips�-gOin. So far as to.foSter
�clashest!etween the twO-grOup.s.
.}Curds. Unnerved by Talks
The:OP and PUK have alleged-thatplans fof a
second liatilTithkeybonder'gate staffed by Iraqi
officials will embolden Saddam to-rnove north Both
parties, have expressed concern that the Ttirk.S would
facilitate;access-for ii44i-officiaLs. tO set up border
oneratiOaS on the Kurds' 'western flank,:
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Impact on US Interests
The border initiative-portends a Kurdish-Iraqi conflict
with the potential for dragging Washington- into the
fray. Baghdad, eifibOldened by. its. improving regional
position, the erosion Of UN sanctions, And the success
of other bilateral and illicit trading relationships; is
determined to rein in the Kurds and wrest Turkish
border trade revenues;
� The Kurds appear equallydeterrnined not to lose a
vital revenue stiearn or to give Saddain's regime a
new foothold in-the area.
� Iraq illicitly expo'rts about .�5,600 barrels per day of
oil to Turkey-via tanker tr4clts,
riaking Ankara the third-highest
importer--behirid.Syria and 'Jordan respectively�
of Iraqi illicit Oil.
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� Until a-riew.crossing opens,
Turkey will use its-rail line through Syria�
which opened in May for the first time in more than
20 years-to tratispert cargo outside the oil-for.
food program to Baghdad:
Iraqi control of the approaches to anew border
crossing would create a longer line of contact with the
Kurds and Put a greater.numbet of potential Kurdish
objectives within easy reach of-Iraqi ground forces.
� Warning of-Iraqi offensive operations would be
complicated because it would be.harder to
determine-Baghdad's Militnyobjective if it -
mobilizes armored or Mechanized forces in-the area.
� The longer front would reqUire. Iraqi troops to patrol
more road S and man additional theekpoints! _
increasing. opportunities for-clashes . With the ICDP.
Iraq could use the :additional- territory to deploy
surface-to-air weapons targeted at Operation Northern
Watch(ONVI) aircraft, further restricting .ON W's
freedom of movement._
� The new swath �Of territory wouid play host to 3
large voNtne of truck traffic, increasing the
potential for collateral damagcH=arid Iraqi
propaganda�.--should ONW. strike'Iraqi Suiface-to-
air units nearby: '
. .
� Iraq could deploy surface-to-air units.within imles
of the-Turkish border,_ including the border Crossing
usedby Turkish forceS deployed to tiorthern,Iraq.
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