GUATEMALA: PEACE ACCORDS OFFERS BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06702206
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-02207
• Publication Date: March 6, 2007

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
06 March 2007
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Guatemala: Peace Accords
Offers Blueprint for Reform
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Key Findings
Guatemala: Peace Accords Offers Blueprint
for Reform
Ten years after the signing of the peace accords, the Guatemalan
Government has successfully maintained a cease-fire and demobilized
combatants, but its failure to fully implement key aspects of the agreements
has impeded efforts to overcome high rates of poverty and strengthen
democratic institutions. The 1996 peace accords uniquely aimed to
address not only the immediate consequences of the violent struggle, but
also to overcome the root causes of the conflict:
� Successive peaceful transitions of power during the past decade
demonstrate significant progress toward political stability.
� The government's most visible achievements has been dramatically
reducing the military budget to 0.33 percent of GDP half of the peace
accords target drawing down the armed forces, and carrying out
intelligence reforms.
� The sustainability of President Oscar Berger's efforts to increase health
and education spending and finance other reforms will be determined
primarily by the government's ability to increase revenue through tax
collection, which is currently among the lowest in the Hemisphere.
� The government's insufficient capacity to provide public security and
reduce the alarming rates of violence could negatively impact the success
of implementation efforts.
While the general public does not closely follow peace accords
implementation, there is consensus that the key components of the accords
such as poverty reduction, protection of human rights, and racial equality
should be the focus of policy dialogue in Guatemala. Encouraging the
government to fulfill peace accords commitments will help to strengthen
democratic institutions, spur economic development, and support political
stability. Specific areas in which the international community could
provide assistance include strengthening the rule of law, carrying out land
reform, and furthering police reform efforts.
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Scope Note
This paper provides an assessment of the Guatemalan Government's
efforts during the past decade to implement the 1996 peace accords, which
were designed to remedy the root causes of nearly four decades of internal
conflict. The paper focuses on the implementation of accords agreements
in the following areas: human rights, demilitarization, and the
strengthening of civilian authority; socioeconomic development and
agrarian reform; identity and rights of indigenous peoples; and
administration of justice and the fight against impunity. The paper also
identifies opportunities to support implementation of the peace accords and
strengthen democratic governance in Guatemala.
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Guatemala: Peace Accords Offers
Blueprint for Reform
Twenty-nine December 2006 marked the 10-year
anniversary of the peace accords that ended 36 years
of internal conflict between the Guatemalan
Government and the Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity (URNG) guerrilla movement.
More than 100,000 Guatemalans were killed and
1 million refugees were created from the conflict
between leftist guerilla forces and a series of military-
dominated governments, according to estimates from
various NG0s.12 The 1996 accords aimed to address
not only the immediate consequences of the violent
struggle but also to overcome the root causes of the
conflict.'
The absence of armed hostilities 10 years after the
signing of the peace accords demonstrates a
significant achievement; however, the government's
implementation efforts have stalled due to the broad
scope and ambitious nature of the accords, a
deteriorating security situation that has consumed the
government's attention, and a lack of international
and public pressure to show progress on
implementation. While the public is frustrated with
the government's failure to adequately address
unemployment and rampant crime, most Guatemalans
are not focused on peace accords implementation as a
means to solving these problems. Local and
international observers agree, however, that the
reforms encompassed in the peace accords constitute
a fundamental blueprint to address the complex social
and economic development issues that plague
Guatemala:4
� Guatemala continues to face some of the greatest
poverty and inequality in Latin America-
56 percent of the population lives in poverty, one in
five in extreme poverty.'
� Guatemala's human development is ranked by the
UN as the second lowest in the Western
Hemisphere.7 The UN human development index is
a comparative measure of life expectancy, literacy,
education ap.cLstandar�of living for countries
worldwide.
Dissecting the Peace Accords
13 The Guatemalan peace accords consist
ent
s including more than 300of,
commitments ome narrow and
ecific
other
vcagueandaweeping that attempt Pto address
snceniplex and longstanding political economic and
four thematic genes: h
issueisa. aTaht: agreementsacnan idedividediuto
hrights, f
demilitarization, and the strengt ening o civilian
authority; socioeconomic development and agrarian
reform', identity and right of indigenous peoples; and
administration of justice and the fight against
impunity. The peace accords are unique in th h
compreherisively address both peace and
developmentat t ey
issues, The accords were si n d by
nearly 60 individuals, including representatives of the
government thet e URNG, all major political Parties
and UN officials but the national government
primarily re emation of the
e
agreements.
Fundamental Peace Efforts Successful
In less than a decade, successive administrations have
made dramatic progress in reducing human rights
violations and gradually reducing the role and
influence of the armed forces.
President Alvaro Arzu s government
This assessment was prepared by the Office of Asian Pacific, Latin American, and African Analysis.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Latin America Issue Manager, APLAA,
on
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(1996-2000) demonstrated a firm commitment to the
peace accords process initially' and achieved essential
progress in maintaining the cease-fire, demobilizing
and disarming guerrilla forces, disbanding an
extensive structure of civil defense patrols, and
returning refugees to their homes.9 However, this
tangible progress was soon overshadowed by the need
to implement comprehensive institutional reforms in
a relatively short time frame. Most observers agree
that the initial four-year timeline for implementation
and the subsequent extension to 2004 were unrealistic
given the scope of the agreement and the institutional
weakness of a government emerging from nearly four
decades of conflict.
Respect for Human Rights
On the whole, respect for human rights, a major
component of the accords, has greatly improved since
the end of hostilities, and violating human rights is no
longer an institutional policy of the state:
� Despite various allegations that the government has
engaged in social cleansing of suspected criminals,
there is no indication of a
state policy to pursue extrajudicial executions of
delinquents.'
� As of August 2006, a UN Special Rapporteur was
unable to identify a serious problem of
extrajudicial, summary,or arbitrary executions by
the govemment.11
Military and Intelligence Reform
The past three administrations have made slow,
piecemeal progress toward reducing the influence of
military and intelligence agencies. President Alfonso
Portillo (2000-04) successfully dismantled the
Presidential Military Guard, which was responsible
for political assassinations during the civil wa
4
The administration of President Oscar Berger (elected
in 2004) made important strides in achieving military
reform by dramatically reducing the military budget
and the overall number of troops:
� In June 2004, the number of military personnel was
reduced from 27,214 to 15,500 and other
downsizing efforts included the closure of 13 bases
and the termination of seven counterinsurgency-era
military commands.""
� The military's budget comprised 0.99 percent of
GDP in 1995 and was reduced to 0.33 percent of
GDP in October 2004, which is half the ceilin
stipulated by the peace accords.'
These reductions were supposed to be part of a
broader modernization effort,
has not materialized, and
prevents the military from fulfilling its mission."
continued development of
Guatemala's National Security Strategy will further
the military reform envisioned in the peace accords,
as the plan prioritizes the military's mission of
combating threats from international drug traffickers
over assisting law enforcement through joint patrols
with civilian police.19
Socioeconomic Reforms Need Funding
Many of the social reforms are fundamentally tied to
the government's ability to generate tax revenue, but
successive administrations have shown scant desire to
increase taxes, rationalize its tax system, or advance
the economic reforms that would increase growth
prospects. Guatemala has consistently had one of the(b)(1)
lowest tax collection rates in Latin America, thus (b)(3)
hindering its ability to finance many peace accords
commitments:
� The accords set a tax collection target of 12 percent
of the GDP, which is a 50-percent increase over the
1995 rate, but some observers believe even this
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target is probably inadequate to fund necessary
programs?'
� In 2005, tax collections only amounted to
9.5 percent of the GDP, although a recent revision
in base-year data increases this figure to
11 percent.22
The government is working to increase tax revenues,
and in June 2006 the Congress approved a bill aimed
at preventing tax evasion by increasing penalties
qnprWirllv fnr lniiqnpqq nwner
Social and Economic Agreements
The government has only partially implemented
socioeconomic accords that deal with multifaceted
development issues. Government initiatives that have
helped reduce illiteracy rates to 30 percent reflect
incremental progress on imnrovina the aualitv and
accessibility of education,
However,
formidable challenges remain in expanding the
coverage of primary and bilingual education in rural
departments and lowering the infant mortality rates a
key indicator of public health services.
President Berger has shown
a strong commitment to improve social indicators by
increasing health and education spending for the past
three years:25
� Government expenditures on health rose to
1.71 percent of GDP in 2005, which is higher than
the 1.3 percent target mandated by the peace
accords.'
� In 2001, the government achieved the peace accords
goal of increasing education spending by
50 percent.2
Land Reform
Government efforts to improve access to land
ownership and resolve land conflicts have been
insufficient due in large part to budget shortfalls that
have prevented government agencies from providing
credit for land purchases and mediating land disputes.
The creation of a national land registry and other key
land-related legal reforms have not been enacted,
Other pending reforms
include creating an agrarian legal code, reviewing the
status of idle and illegally acquired lands, and
establishing legal security for communal property.29
Indigenous Rights
Legal and institutional reforms mandated by the
accords have failed to significantly remove formal (b)(1)
and informal barriers to advancement for indigenous (b)(3)
people and to generally improve their quality of life:
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ndigenous people are generally
underrepresented in politics and have high rates of
illiteracy.
� Legally mandated court interpreters for criminal
proceedings are often not available, placin
indigenous people at a disadvantage.
Violence Threatens Progress
The prevalence of violent crime will continue to be
the primary concern for Guatemalan society during
the 2007 presidential campaign and poses the greatest
risk to advancing economic and social reforms
encompassed in the accords. Excessive crime rates
divert resources and political capital away from peace
accords implementation and overwhelm the weak
judicial system:
� The government's inability to provide public
security has led to incidents of vigilante justice in
rural areas, setting back efforts to boost protection
of human rights
� In 2005, there was a 2-percent conviction rate for
the 5,400 murders nationwide', the low conviction
rate has created a climate of de facto impunity, even
as human rights abuse by the state has dramatically
declined.
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� Local and US business leaders fear organized crime
and drug trafficking are hurting the investment
climate and could overshadow potential benefits
from the US�Central America Free Trade
Agreement,
Shortages of qualified police and entrenched
corruption in law enforcement and the judiciary have
exacerbated the soaring violence. Vice President
Stein publicly admits the police force of
approximately 22,000 is riddled with corruption':
� In February 2007, four Guatemalan police officials
including the head of the organized crime division,
were charged with the murder in Guatemala of three
Salvadoran deputies to the Central American
Parliament,' and the police officers were
subsequently killed in prison.37
� In June 2006, two government officials were
wounded and several taken hostage in an armed
attack by squatters in a remote national park,38
exemplifying the loss of government control in
some rural areas,
� A series of apparently politically motivated crimes
in 2006�assassinations of several political party
activists, a national legislator, and a provincial
governor, in which organized crime and
narcotraffickers are the primary suspects�
contribute to the climate of insecurity.404142
The government's stopgap response to crime�using
the military in police patrols�is fueling concern
among human rights groups:
� A local human rights group says that a policy of
joint military-police patrols will draw the military
into internal security matters and inevitably lead to
abuses.
�
oncem about reports
that military officers have conducted street patrols
without the presence of the National Police.'"
Opportunities To Support Peace Ac
Strengthen Democratic Governance
Key aspects of the peace accords�particularly social
reform, modernizing state institutions, and poverty
alleviation�will be fundamental to economic and
democratic development in Guatemala. Countries
that played an important role in the peace accords
negotiation process such as Mexico, Colombia, Spain,
and Norway, most likely would have a vested interest
in encouraging further implementation of the
accords.'
International Role in
Accord
UN Verification Mission in Guatemala
NINtJGUA)
The UN played a key role in mediating an end to the
Guatemalan conflict and has been the most important
)
third party in the monitoring and verification f the
2o peace accords The MINUGUA mission (199o4
contained four roles verification, good office
bs
etween the parties technical ta assis nee d , an u
information concerning the peace accords.
Consultative Group
A consultative group comprised of the World Bank,
Inter-American Development Bank, and various
donor countries was formed to coordinate donor
commtmity efforth. The donors formally stated the
$2,4 billion of initial reconstruction assistance would
be conditioned to government performance on
specific objectives such as increasing fiscal revenues
from 8 to 12 percent Of GTDP.45
Norway actively supported implementation of the
accords through support to NGOs and its Ministry of
Foreign Affairs published a comprehensive study
entitled "Guatemala: Five Years After the Peace
Accords," which was based on findings from an
international conference it sponsored on the topic. A
similar conference 10 years after the peace accords
would help to raise the profile of peace accords
implementation."
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Targeted international assistance in the following
areas will assist the Guatemalan Government to
continue implementation efforts:
� Programs that improve the rule of law in Guatemala
would help the government qualify for Millennium
Challenge assistance that focuses on overcoming
obstacles to economic growth. For example,
USAID-funded programs helped to dramatically
reduce trial delays by uniting police, prosecutors,
judges, public defenders, and translators in an effort
to streamline administration of justice.
� El Salvador and Colombia successfully
implemented targeted community policing
programs that increased public confidence in local
police and could serve as models for reform. The
Inter-American Development Bank has financed a
police reform program in Guyana and could
potentially be a source of revenue for Guatemala's
reform efforts.
� Support for a UN-led international commission
designed to strengthen the rule of law by
investigating organized crime groups�now
pending approval by Guatemala's legislature�
would help prosecute individuals that threaten
human rights in Guatemala.
� Development of a land registry would help
marginalized peasants from rural areas to secure
title to their land, thus allowing them greater access
to credit. Chile successfully developed a land
registry, and perhaps it would be willing to offer
technical assistance to Guatemala.
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