CENTRAL AMERICA: GANG VIOLENCE OVERWHELMING GOVERNMENTS

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06702205
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-02207
• Publication Date: August 13, 2007

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
13 August 2007
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Central America: Gang
Violence Overwhelming
Governments
APLAA IA 2007-40721
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Central America: Gang Viol
Overwhelming Governments
Key Finding
Increasing violent crime threatens the internal stability of several Central
American nations, debilitates national economies, and undermines public
confidence in democratic government's ability to provide public security.
The homicide rates in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala are some of
the highest in the Western Hemisphere. Factors such as the lack of
economic opportunity, disintegration of family, social, and community
structures, and a legacy of conflict and violence from civil conflicts in the
1980s contribute to the growth of violent youth gangs.
Central American leaders are looking for solutions. They are increasingly
turning to military forces to restore law and order because of the favorable
image of the military and their availability to reinforce outgunned police
forces. Leaders endorsed the transnational antigang initiative proposed by
the US Attorney General in February and agreed to enhance information
exchange during a regional antigang conference in May 2007
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Governments are also launching more comprehensive
anticrime policies that focus on prevention, law enforcement, and
rehabilitation.
The complex trend of violent crime in Central America is not likely to
subside anytime soon given that reduction efforts hinge on the success of
long-term reforms to improve government services and reduce poverty and
income inequality. Various prevention and law enforcement programs
offer promise, but are likely to be fragmented and episodic because of
funding constraints and until regional cooperation becomes more robust.
Central American leaders will
probably will be
willing to augment police forces, increase mtelli ence shanng, and assist in
strengthening their judicial systems.
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Scope Note
This Intelligence Assessment examines the threat posed to Central
American nations from increased violent crime, committed primarily by
youth gangs. It identifies key impediments to effective public security
policies and assesses prospects for prevention and law enforcement
measures.
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Central America: Gang Violence
Overwhelming Governments
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Violent crime committed primarily by youth gangs
has become the key threat to internal stability for
several Central American nations. The level of
violent crime in El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras is undermining public confidence in
democratic governments' ability to provide public
security and taking a toll on national economies:
� The homicide rate increased 82 percent in
El Salvador from 2003 to 2006 and 71 percent in
Guatemala during the same period
� In 2005, the estimated murder rate per 100,000
people was 56 in El Salvador, 41 in Honduras, and
38 in Guatemala
In the United States the
corresponding figure was five per 100,000.6
� While it is difficult to estimate the cost of violence
to a country, the UN assessed the direct and indirec
cost of violent crime in El Salvador at $1.6 billion,
or 11.5 percent of GDP,
MS-13 members were charged with the December
2004 massacre of 28 public bus passengers, which
included more than a dozen women and young
children."
� Guatemalan small-business owners typically must
pay extortion fees between $13 and $67 monthly
and bus drivers between $6 and $27 daily to gangs,
depending on the profitability of their businesses or
bus routes
Factors such as the lack of economic opportunity,
disintegration of family, social, and community
structures, and a legacy of conflict and violence from
civil conflicts in the 1980s contribute to the problem,
Youth are particularly susceptible
to joining violent gangs in hopes of obtaining
security, social identif. v self-empowerment and
financial opportunity
� The governments' inability to provide adequate
public security consistently ranks as the chief
concern in public opinion polls.
The brutal nature of many of the crimes instills
tremendous fear in the lives of ordinary citizens: 78910
� Gang-related crimes include extortion, robbery,
murder for hire, drug retail, and kidnappin
to pay extortion generally results in death.
� Honduran gang members frequently attach
threatening notes to their dismembered victims and
Failure
� The majority of gang members live in poverty, are
unemployed, have low levels of education, and
abuse drugs
� Children as young as nine years old are now joining
gangs
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The countries' inability to integrate deportees
exacerbates gang violence. Salvadoran officials have
claimed that deportations have increased the scope
and quantity of crimes committed in El Salvador.
El Salvador's Public Security Minister claimed 1,400 (b)(1)
This assessment was prepared by the Office of Asian Pacific, Latin American, and African Analysis with
contributions from the Office of Crime and Narcotics Center. Comments and Queries are welcome and
may be directed to the Latin America Issue Manager, APLAA, oni
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deportees with criminal records were deported to
El Salvador from the United States in the first four
months of this year and approximately 3 000
criminals were deported in 2006
entral American leaders have
asked for more information on the criminal records of
deportees and assistance in reintegrating deportees
into their home countries
Longstanding Impediments to Effective
Government Response
Entrenched corruption, minimal resources, and
inadequate judicial systems remain persistent
obstacles to reduce violent crime in Central America.
Resource Constraints. At a regional development
meeting in April, Central American presidents
emphasized to their Mexican counterpart that their
security infrastructures were overwhelmed by the
rising level of crime citing a lack of resources to
make improvements,
� Citizens in rural Guatemala have complained about
spreading gang activity and note that in some areas
there are only eight police agents to protect more
than 25,000 citizens,
Guatemala's Minister of Government declared the
National Police needed an additional 15,000
officers and President Oscar Berger asked for
increased defense fundin for the milita to
su. .lement solice satrols
� The police-to-civilian ratio in El Salvador was 1 to
435 in 2006, which is less than half that of major
US metropo itan c
populations,
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es
th comparable
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Entrenched Corruption. The ability of law
enforcement agencies to respond to violent crime is
limited by pervasive corruption:
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� The Honduran National Police is widely viewed as
corrupt and its operational effectiveness is hindered
by officers engaged in illicit activities
� Police in areas of northern El Salvador are accused
by military officials of complicity in illegal
trafficking of weapons, drugs and humans along the
Guatemalan border
� Guatemalan police were charged with killing three
Central American Parliament members in February,
and many Guatemalans believe senior security
officials were complicit.
Ineffective Judiciary. The volume of criminal cases,
antiquated criminal codes, and a lack of coordination
between the police, investigators, and prosecutors
prevent violent criminals from being brought to
justice:
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Broken Prison System. Overcrowded prisons awash
with weapons and illicit activity often serve to
reinforce criminal delinquency rather than rehabilitate
violent convicts:
overcrowding, poor security,
incompetence, official corruption and lack of
training in many prisons.33
Public Taking Matters Into Own Hands
With their lives and livelihood at stake, the public has
engaged in demonstrations and formed vigilante
groups to execute gang members:
� Salvadoran bus drivers last fall shut down public
transportation because of the killings of 80 workers
in first nine months of 2006
� In El Salvador, there are reports of vigilante groups
forming to execute gang members that extort small-
business owners,
� The lack of state security in parts of rural
Guatemala has led to the formation of armed civil
defense natrols to counter youth cram,
� One Salvadoran military officer estimates there are
24,000 private security guards in the country, a
figure that nearly equals the number of police and
military officers combined
� One private security association estimated more
than half of Guatemala's 88,000 private security
guards work in companies without any government
oversigh
Governments Looking for Solutions
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Government leaders in the region are increasingly (b)(3)
turning to military forces to restore law and order
because of the favorable image of the military and
their availability to reinforce outgunned police forces.
Public opinion in Guatemala and El Salvador
generally prefers using the military to confront gangs,
A surge violence in June 2UU / prompted
Honduran commentators and former president (1990-
94) Rafael Callejas to urge the government to deploy
the military on law enforcement missions:'
� Guatemalan residents reported that an illegal armed
group killed a 17-year-old gang member in July
following the distribution of pamphlets threatening
to murder gang members that extorted small
businesses
A robust private security industry, which is largely
unregulated, has flourished due to the governments'
failure to stem crime and violence. The Salvadoran
Chamber of Commerce estimated that private
companies spend $600 million a year on security
� In Guatemala approximately 4,000 military�nearly
one-third of the armed forces�are participating in
citizen security missions
Central American governments are collaborating to
combat the transnational nature of youth gangs and
organized crime. Leaders endorsed the transnational
antigang initiative proposed by the US Attorney
General in February and agreed to enhance
information exchange during a regional antigang
conference in May 2007
� El Salvador has taken the lead in drafting a regional
security strategy that envisions a witness protection
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convention, a regional arrest warrant, and a fugitive
alert system
� A national antigang center, staffed with local
officials and FBI agents, is scheduled to open in
El Salvador in August to collect intelligence,
analyze gang structures and coordinate actions
targeting gangsl
Information ANTI I be shared with Honduras and
Guatemala.
Governments are beginning to consider more
comprehensive anticrime policies that focus on
prevention, law enforcement, and rehabilitation. In
December 2006, Honduran police implemented a
month-long gang prevention course for school age
children,
Central American countries may benefit from the
violence prevention model that produced successful
results in Colombia and major US cities. The Pan
American Health Organization (PAHO) chairs the
Inter-American Coalition for the Prevention of
Violence and designed a program that enhances local
capacity to develop citizen security initiatives:
� Twelve Central American municipalities initiated
the pilot program that seeks policy change at the
municipal level by gathering and analyzing data on
violence.'
� Municipal officials are trained in data collection,
receive technical assistance from PAHO, and are
instructed on violence prevention planning and
policy design.
� The pilot program in Central America will conclude
next year with an international conference on best
practices in crime and violence prevention in Latin
America.
Outlook
The complex trend of violent crime In Central
America is not likely to subside anytime soon given
that reduction efforts hinge on the success of long-
term reforms to improve government services and
reduce poverty and income inequality. Various
prevention and law enforcement programs offer
promise but are likely to be fragmented and episodic
because of funding constraints and until regional
cooperation becomes more robust. Military
participation in law enforcement will help
governments overcome police deficiencies but leaves
the administrations and armed forces vulnerable to
allegations of human rights abuses.
Lacking resources and expertise, Central American
leaders will continue to be receptive to US training
and material assistance. They probably will be
willing to augment police forces, increase intelligence
sharing, and assist in strengthening their judicial
systems. Increased participation by other Latin
American countries that have experienced high levels
of violence, such as Mexico and Colombia, in a
regional security approach could help diminish any
sensitivity to heavy US involvement.
Public security will remain a high-profile political
issue and will undoubtedly be wielded by various
opposition parties to attack current governments. The
ability of candidates to portray themselves as
effective guarantors of security will be a key
determiner in elections in Guatemala later this year
and in El Salvador in 2009. An organized transition
period would assist new administrations in fulfilling
campaign pledges to improve security.
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