THE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE THREAT

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06698985
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: September 11, 2017
• Case Number: F-2015-00894
• Publication Date: January 2, 2001

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The Biological Warfare Threat
The biological warfare (BW) capabilities of state and nonstate actors are growing
worldwide. This trend leads us to believe that the risk of an attack against the
United States, its interests and allies will increase in the coming years. In addition,
the United States would be affected by the use of BW agents anyWhere in the
world�a strong possibility in the years ahead. Washington probably would be
called upon to help contain conflicts or deal with a terrorist attack in which
biological agents were used�either overtly or covertly�or to provide scientific
expertise and humanitarian assistance to deal with their effects.
Biological weapons lend themselves to covert development and use; a deliberately
initiated disease outbreak can be difficult to distinguish from an infectious disease
that occurs naturally. The intentional introduction of disease to a susceptible
population �human, animal, or plant�by state or nonstate actors could prove to
be very costly politically, economically, and in terms of human life. Although the
preparation and effective use of BW agents by both states and nonstate actors are
more difficult than some popular literature seems to suggest, the degree of
difficulty varies with the specific biological agent sought and the sophistication of
the dispersal mechanism.
� Mature BW programs may include extensive research and development efforts
on pathogens to improve their virulence, stability, and resistance to detection
and vaccines or treatments. Such BW programs also have the means to
produce large quantities of biological agents and the means to optimize their
delivery.
� The materials for a simple, unsophisticated biological agent delivery device are
widely available. A state or nonstate actor with the objective of causing some
limited casualties and creating panic probably could design and assemble the
components for a crude biological device and develop an unsophisticated
method of agent dispersal.
This memorandum was prepared under the auspice's of the National Intelligence
Officer for S&T. It responds to a request from the SSCI to produce an
unclassified report on the biological watfare threat. It was reviewed by the DCI's
Nonproliferation Center, CIA, DIA, NSA, INR, and NIMA.
UNCLASSIFIED
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Biological Warfare Agents
Biological agents�living microorganisms or their derivatives, including bacteria, viruses, fungi,
and toxins�could be used to target humans as well as crops and animals. Many biological
agents are found naturally in the environment but vary considerably in transmissibility,
infectivity, and virulence or toxicity. A biological attack could mimic a natural disease outbreak,
� making it extremely difficult to identify the incident as an attack. A nonState group or individual
pursuing a biological weapons capability is more likely to choose bacteria, fungi, or toxins; such
agents are generally easier to handle and produce and require less specialized production
equipment than viruses.
Bacteria are single-celled organisms that include the causative agents of anthrax, brucellosis,
tularemia, plague, and many other diseases. Rickettsiae are a genus of bacteria that cause
diseases such as typhus, Q fever, and Rocky Mountain spotted fever. Rickettsiae differ from
most other types of bacteria in that they require a host cell for replication.
� Viruses are organisms that contain DNA or RNA and require other living cells to replicate.
Examples of viruses that could be used for BW include smallpox, Ebola, Marburg, and
Venezuelan equine encephalitis.
� Fungi are "plant-like" multi-cellular organisms devoid of chlorophyll, varied in complexity,
� and adapted for absorptive nutrition. Examples of fungal BW agents include the plant
pathogens that cause wheat stem rust and potato blight.
� 'Toxins are noxious or poisonous substances produced by some living organisms as part of
their normal metabolism. Clostridium botulinum produces a toxin�botulinum toxin�that
�has been exploited for BW purposes.
What Distinguishes a Biological Attack from Other Unconventional Weapons
Attacks?
� Scale. If contagious biological agents are disseminated, use in one area could
� potentially affect other areas or nations as infected people move from one
place to another�from office to home, from one airport to another�
spreading the disease and causing additional casualties. Such biological
agents gradually could cause far more casualties than other weapons of mass
destruction.
� Delayed onset. Most biological agents cause symptoms that have a delayed
onset, ranging from a few hours to many days. Thus, the fact that an attack
has taken place can be masked, and identification of the perpetrators would be
extremely difficult.
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� First responders. If there were no prior warning, the first responders to a
covert civilian attack probably would be health care providers, local
agricultural services personnel, or veterinarians responding to a seemingly
natural disease outbreak. This contrasts with other attacks�such as
conventional or chemical attacks�which have an immediate explosive or
toxic effect and would initiate an immediate response from emergency
personnel, such as firefighters, paramedics, and police.
� Political response. Public health officials and local government authorities
would face the potential for large-scale panic: the use of BW agents, which
has been hyped in the press, books, and movies, could incite mass terror.
People lack knowledge of the effects of BW agents, such as whether an agent
is contagious or persistent and how it spreads, and would be susceptible to
inaccuracies in media reporting.
� Retribution. Policymakers and military decision-makers would face difficult
decisions in responding to an attack, even if the instigator were known.
Difficulties abound in planning for a proportional response to an attack, given
that the spectrum for biological attacks could range from simple food
poisonings to attacks against economic targets to large-scale biological attacks
designed to cause mass human casualties. A policymaker would have to
decide which weapon would be an effective and proportional response.
The Trend Lines
The growing threat of BW is generated by three disturbing trends:
� The number of players possessing biological weapons or seeking to acquire a biological
warfare capability is increasing.
� Biological agents with increasing lethality are being developed.
� Detection of BW programs and of the acquisition of BW-related capabilities is difficult.
First Trend: Expanding Number of Players
The United States and other concerned governments are working energetically to combat
proliferation. Nonetheless, the number of players, state and nonstate, possessing or seeking to
clandestinely acquire a BW capability is growing, despite the fact that the development,
possession, and use of biological weapons are banned by international treaty.
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States with Biological Warfare Programs
More than a dozen states, including Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria, either possess or
are actively pursuing offensive BW capabilities for use against their adversaries. Some may be
pursuing BW programs for use against internal enemies and opposition groups or for tactical use
in regional conflicts, making those potential conflicts all the more deadly and destabilizing if and
when they occur. Some states also are likely to be pursuing BW programs to maintain or acquire
an asymmetric warfare capability, with BW viewed as a means of countering overwhelming US
conventional military superiority. Some leaders probably view a BW capability as a means to
accomplish their goals of achieving regional power, reducing Western influence, and deterring
the United States from becoming engaged in a conflict in their region. Two states in particular�
Iraq and Iran� have extensive programs underway, although both are signatories to the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. We also have concerns about the status of Russia's
BW program.
Iraq
Iraq initiated a BW program in 1985. The program rapidly moved from BW agent research and
development to large-scale agent production and weaponization, providing Iraq an offensive BW
cnpahility by the time of the Gulf war.
� After fourLand-a-half years of claiming it had conducted only "defensive research" on
biological agents, Iraq finally declared in 1995 that it had produced some 30,000 liters of
concentrated BW agents including botulinum toxin, Bacillus anthracis, Clostridium
pelfringens, aflatoxin, and ricin. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
believed that Iraq produced substantially greater amounts�perhaps two to three times as
much as was declared.
� Iraq refuses to disclose fully the extent of its offensive BW program and has used
concealment and deception to deny access to the program. Baghdad still has not credibly
accounted for 25 BW agent-filled Al-Hussein missile warheads and nearly 200 BW bombs
officials claim to have unilaterally destroyed, as well as more than three metric tons of
imported growth media�directly related to past and future BW agent production capabilities.
� Iraq has demonstrated the capability to deliver BW agents from aircraft.
� Iraq retains an offensive BW capability of undetermined size and probably is exploiting
opportunities presented by the absence of UN inspectors and the increase in foreign contacts
to expand and improve its offensive BW capabilities.
Iran
Iran initiated a BW program in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq war. The program is now in the
late stages of research and development, and Tehran probably already holds some stocks of BW
agents and weapons. Iran probably has done research on both toxins and live organisms as BW
agents and could use many of the same delivery systems it would employ for CW delivery�
artillery shells and aerial bombs.
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� Iran has the technical infrastructure to support a significant BW program. It conducts high-
quality legitimate biomedical research at various institutes, which we suspect also support the
BW program.
� Tehran is expanding its efforts to acquire biotechnical materials, equipment, and expertise
from abroad�primarily from entities in Russia and the West. Because of the dual-use nature
of the equipment and technology, Iran could divert such equipment and technology to support
its BW effort and make more rapid advances in its BW program than would otherwise be
possible.
� 'We assess that no matter who is in power in Tehran, Iran will continue to develop and expand
its BW and other WMD programs as long as it perceives threats from US military forces in
the Gulf, and from Israel and Iraq.
Russia
The Soviet Union signed the Biological Weapons Convention on 10 April 1972, but then greatly
expanded its BW R&D and production to maintain the largest offensive BW program in history.
The Soviets also maintained millti-tnn 1:1W nript stockpiles of bacterial and viral agents until the
� late 1980s. With the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia inherited at least 31 known sites for BW
research, production, and weaponization.
After Yeltsin's April 1992 decree to end the program, some research and production facilities
were deactivated, and many took severe personnel and funding cuts. However, the Russians are
continuing to do research with the same organisms that the Soviets developed as BW agents, and
some facilities, in addition to being engaged in legitimate activity, may be maintaining the
capability to produce these agents. Increased transparency through US engagement programs has
reduced concern that facilities of the civilian cover organization BIOPREPARAT are currently
involved in BW work. However, Ministry of Defense facilities involved in the Soviet offensive
BW program have remained closed to Western visitors.
Russia's remaining capability to produce and weaponize BW agents, together with the continued
involvement of officials associated with the former Soviet BW program, cause us to maintain
significant concern about the status of its offensive BW program.
The Proliferation of BW Expertise, Technologies, and Pathogens
By importing expertise and the required technologies and buying the necessary materials, state
and nonstate actors can make dramatic leaps forward in the development of biological agents and
delivery systems and achieve a self-sufficient BW capability much earlier than would otherwise
be possible.
� Russia's economic problems continue to make Russian scientists with BW-related expertise
vulnerable to recruitment by both countries and nonstate actors.
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� Collections of biological pathogens exist in many facilities worldwide, including universities,
vaccine and pharmaceutical plants, and various research institutions. These collections are
vulnerable to theft or even to the legitimate acquisition of pathogens that could be used for
BW purposes.
Nonstate Actors
In addition to the dozen or more states with BW programs, a small number of terrorist groups
have expressed an interest in biological materials or agents�although we judge terrorists will
continue to depend primarily on conventional weapons. Usama Bin Ladin has publicly called the
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction a "religious duty," and in 1999, a member of the
Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)�a group closely aligned with Bin Ladin�claimed in a press
interview to possess biological weapons.
� In addition, some members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult confessed to attempting to use
B. anthracis and botulinum toxin against targets in Japan in 1993 and 1995.
Nonstate actors with biological capabilities have fewer constraints on their activities than states
and may be more likely to use biological agents. The delayed effects of most biological agents
may make them attractive to use clandestinely, and potential attackers might not be deterred by
fear of retribution. A biological attack by a nonstate actor probably would cause fewer casualties
than an attack by a state, but the terror that such an attack would cause among the population
would still be substantial. Some of the terrorist groups�Bin Ladin's is the best example�have
an international network. Adding to the uncertainty and unpredictability of possible biological
attacks are the "lone militants" or ad hoc groups who may try to conduct a biological attack.
Second Trend: Increasing Lethality of Agents
The fact that the number of BW players is increasing does not tell the whole story about the
growing threat of BW, however. The second trend making the BW threat more dangerous is the
increasing sophistication and lethality of BW agents. Rapid advances in biotechnology,
� especially in genetic engineering technology, present the prospect of a whole new array of toxins
or live agents that will require new detection methods, preventive measures, and treatment,
including vaccines and therapies. In addition, researchers are exploring mixtures of slow- and
fast-acting agents and "cocktails" with chemical agents.
� In addition to making biological agents more difficult to detect, genetic engineering could be
used to make them resistant to antibiotics and vaccines and to increase their stability in
weapons and the environment.
� BW attacks need not be directed only at humans. Plant and animal pathogens could be used
against agricultural targets, creating potential economic devastation. Moreover, the economic,
political, and legal repercussions associated with mandatory seizure and destruction of property
(animals or crops) in response to such a disease outbreak would be large.
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�
At the same time, dissemination techniques, delivery options, and strategies for use of BW agents
are becoming more advanced. The possibility that several countries may be developing BW
warheads for ballistic missiles raises concerns. We believe, however, that biological weapons
are particularly well suited to covert delivery by a country's special operations forces or
intelligence services.
Third Trend: Difficulties in Detection
The third trend raising the level of the BW threat is that actors are engaging in more effective
denial and deception techniques�more aggressively concealing and protecting their BW
programs. Given the dual-use nature of the materials, technologies, and expertise associated with
biological weapons, activities related to BW program development are difficult to detect.
Concealment is relatively simple because a BW program includes many of the same activities as
legitimate research and commercial biotechnology; it is relatively easy to cloak offensive BW
work within ostensibly legitimate research, and very little distinguishes a vaccine plant from a
BW agent production facility; Supposedly legitimate facilities could be used to conduct
clandestine BW research or could be converted rapidly to biological agent production, providing
a mobilization or "breakout" capability. As a result, large stockpiles of biological agents simply
may not be required.
The public as well as some in the security community probably do not fully appreciate the wide
availability of BW-relevant technology and knowledge. In a technologically advanced society
that invests in healthcare, medical technology and treatment, safe food, and scientific research,
commercial biotechnology is imperative. Developing countries also need clean water, productive
agriculture, food processing technology; medical care, and good public health, and they too need
to be engaged in biotechnological research. Consequently, when materials, technologies, or
expertise that can be used for either offensive BW program development or commercial R&D
purposes are imported, it is difficult to know their destination and end-use without additional
information. To better understand the BW threat, we need to discern not only the BW
capabilities of states and nonstate actors, but also the intentions of potential actors. Determining
this intent is difficult, but it is essential if we are to better understand the.BW threat.
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