1. EVOLUTION OF THE MIKOYAN DESIGN BUREAU SINCE 1970'S 2. INTRODUCTION OF MIG-25

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
06694168
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RIPPUB
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U
Document Page Count: 
5
Document Creation Date: 
December 28, 2022
Document Release Date: 
September 29, 2017
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
F-2017-02001
Publication Date: 
January 24, 1990
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PDF icon 1. evolution of the miko[15303598].pdf140.69 KB
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Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C06694168 SET/NF ENVELOPE CDSN = LGX432 MCN = 90024/41843 TOR = 900242357 PTTSZYUW RUEKJCS2317 0242356-SSSS�RUEALGX. ZNY SSSSS HEADER 242356Z JAN 90 FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC RUEALGX/SAFE 242340Z JAN 90 FM CIA TO RUETIAA/DIRNSA RUEHC/DEPARTMENT OF STATE RUEKJCS/DIA RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM RUCIAEA/FTD WPAFB OH BT CONTROLS S E $/1rE T NOFORN WNINTEL SECTION 1 OF 2 CITE CIA 022948 /*****4,***** BODY SERIAL: THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE SyedET//1\IF (b)(3) 53 of 72 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C06694168 2/23/2017 8:18 AM Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C06694168 SECRET//NF PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK 00 DLS DE (FOR NSOC); STATE FOR INR. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE REPORT CLASSSECRET--WNINTEL--NOFORN- (b)(1) DIST: 24 JANUARY 1990 (b)(3) COUNTRY: USSR SUBJ: 1. EVOLUTION 2. INTRODUCTION OF THE MIKOYAN OF MIG-25 DESIGN BUREAU SINCE 1970'S DOI: (b)(1) (b)(3) SOURCE: (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) SUMMARY: FOLLOWING THE DEFECTION OF LT. VIKTOR BELENKO WITH HIS MIG-25 BASIC INTERCEPTOR, THE MIKOYAN DESIGN BUREAU DEBATED THE FEASIBILITY OF CANCELLING PRODUCTION ON THIS VERSATILE AIRCRAFT. THE PRIMARY REASONS FOR KEEPING THIS TWO TRACK PRODUCTION EFFORT-- DEVELOPMENT OF A HIGH PERFORMANCE HIGH-MACH INTERCEPTOR, AND DEVELOPMENT OF A TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT--OPERATING INCLUDED PERCEIVED THREATS ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM THE U.S. B-70 BOMBER, SR-71 HIGH ALTITUDE RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT, AND BECAUSE OF THE MIG-25'S PROVEN EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST ADVANCED STRATEGIC AIR LAUNCH MISSILES. MIG-25 PRODUCTION LINES WERE ALSO KEPT OPERATING TO ACQUIRE WELDING AND STEEL FABRICATION TECHNOLOGIES DERIVED FROM THIS BASIC RESEARCH EFFORT. U.S. (b)(1) INTENTIONS TO DEVELOP MACH FOUR AND ABOVE RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT (13)(3) WILL BE COUNTERED BY THE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT OF FOLLOW-ON AIRCRAFT TO THE MIG-31 OR SOME OTHER TYPE OF ADVANCED AIRCRAFT WITH MORE SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT. TEXT: THE MIG-25 WAS DEVELOPED PRIMARILY TO COUNTER THE PERCEIVED THREAT SECRET//NF (b)(1) (b)(3) 54 of 72 2/23/2017 8:18 AM Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C06694168 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C06694168 SECRET//NF FROM THE UNITED STATES' B-70 BOMBER. WHEN (W(1) THE B-70 PROGRAM WAS CANCELLED, THE MIG-25 PROGRAM WAS RETAINED (b)(3) BECAUSE OF ITS DEMONSTRATED EFFECTIVENESS AGAINST THE U.S. HIGH ALTITUDE SR-71 RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. SR-71 (b)(1) INCURSIONS INTO RESTRICTED AIRSPACE OVER THE SOVIET UNION WERE OFTE00) REBUFFED BY THE LAUNCH OF MIG-25'S WHICH FORCED SR-71'S TO RETREAT FROM THEIR SURVEILLANCE PATTERNS OVER SOVIET TERRITORY. MIG-25'S WERE DESIGNED TO SHOOT DOWN HOUND-DOG MISSILES THAT WERE BEING CARRIED BY B-52 LONG RANGE BOMBERS. (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) COMMENT: THE MIG-25 PROGRAM WAS RETAINED (b)(3) BECAUSE IT PROVIDED EXCELLENT DEFENSE AGAINST ADVANCED STRATEGIC AIOXJ) LAUNCH MISSILES (ASALM), BUT THIS REFERENCE APPEARS TO BE SOMEWHAT IN ERROR SINCE THE TIME FRAME FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF THE ASALM PROGRAM DOES NOT APPEAR TO COINCIDE WITH THE EVOLUTION OF THE MIG-25.) THE MIG-25 PROGRAM WAS ALSO KEPT GOING FOR (W(1) TECHNOLOGY DERIVED FROM IT. PERFECTED WELDING TECHNIQUES AND STEEL (b)(3) FABRICATION PROCESSES UNDER THE PROGRAM ARE STILL BEING UTILIZED THROUGHOUT HEAVY INDUSTRY IN THE USSR. 2. THE MIG-25 PROGRAM, WAS A (b)(1) TWO-TRACK (b)(3) PRODUCTION EFFORT DESIGNED TO DEVELOP A HIGH PERFORMANCE HIGH-MACH INTERCEPTOR, AND A TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. (b)(1) THE SEPTEMBER 1976 DEFECTION OF LIEUTENANT VIKTOR ( (BELENKO)) IN A (b)(3) MIG-25 BASIC INTERCEPTOR, AFTER THE AIRCRAFT (b)(1) WAS TAKEN APART AND REASSEMBLED IN JAPAN BY THE U.S., IT WAS SHIPPEOP) BACK TO THE SOVIET UNION WHERE THE MIKOYAN DESIGN BUREAU PROMPTLY DISASSEMBLED IT TO DETERMINE THE TYPE OF INFORMATION THAT THE U.S. COULD HAVE OBTAINED FROM ITS INVESTIGATION. (b)(1) (b)(3) 3. THE CAPABILITY OF THE (b)(1) MIG-31, WHICH WAS BUILT ON THE BASIS OF TECHNOLOGY (b)(1) INHERENT IN THE MIG-25. THE MIG-31 WOULD (b)(1) PROBABLY BE FORMIDABLE AGAINST MOST SYSTEMS, ALTHOUGH UNMANNED (b)(3) SYSTEMS COULD POSE PROBLEMS FOR THE INTERCEPTOR. (b)(1) WHETHER OR NOT MIG-31'S OR FOLLOW-ONS WOULD BE (b)(3) NECESSARY IN THE FUTURE GIVEN THE RETIREMENT OF THE U.S. SR-71 PROGRAM, U.S. DEVELOPMENT 00)(1) MACH FOUR AND MACH FIVE MANNED AIRCRAFT FOR USE AS RECONNAISSANCE (b)(3) AIRCRAFT THAT TYPE OF PERCEIVED THREAT FROM THE (b)(1) U.S WOULD HAVE TO BE COUNTERED. SOVIET (b)(1) (b)(3) SECRET//NF 55 of 72 2/212017 8:18 AM Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C06694168 Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C06694168 SECRET//NF RESPONSE TO THIS NEW THREAT TO BE IN THE FORM OF FOLLOW-ON TO THE MIG-31 OR SOMETHING SIMILAR UTILIZING MORE ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY. MACH FOUR OR MACH FIVE IS ABOUT AS HIGH AS MAN CAN GO USING CARBON BASED FUELS SUCH AS NATURAL GAS, AND TO GO UP FASTER THAN MACH FIVE, ONE WOULD HAVE TO USE DIFFERENT FUELS SUCH AS HYDROGEN. 3TATUS OF THE USE HYDROGEN FUEL. D TO (b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(1) (b)(3) b)(1 THIS PROJECT IS STRICTLY A (b)(3) TUPOLEV DESIGN BUREAU UNDERTAKING AND TSAGI HAS NOTHING (b)(1) TO (b)(3) DO WITH IT. THOX1) FIRST PROTOTYPE VERSION OF THIS AIRCRAFT WAS SCHEDULED TO BE TEST (b)(3) FLOWN SOMETIME IN LATE 1989. COMMENT: (b)(1) IT Ic(b)(3) HISTORICALLY CUSTOMARY FOR TSAGI TO BE INTIMATELY INVOLVED IN THIS TYPE OF WORK.) 5. TSAGI IS THE LARGEST INSTITUTE OF (W(1) ITS KIND IN THE SOVIET UNION--PRESUMABLY THE LARGEST RESEARCH (b)(3) INSTITUTE. ON THE ISSUE OF TSAGI CONVERTING SOME OF ITS CAPABILITIES AND FACILITIES TO CIVILIAN ENDEAVORS, (b)(1) HAD CONVERTED TO CIVILIAN PROGRAMS IN A LIMITED FASHION. (b)(3) COMMENT: PRESUMABLY, TSAGI, SINCE IT IS A BASIC RESEARCH (W(1) INSTITUTE, HAS LESS TO DO WITH CONVERSION SINCE ITS TECHNOLOGY WOULA(3) BE EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO ALL AREAS. THERE MAY STILL BE PARTIAL CONVERSION, PERHAPS AWAY FROM MILITARY SYSTEMS OR HIGH GRAVITATIONAL SYSTEMS, TO CONSUMER OR CIVILIAN PRODUCTION.) ADMIN (b)(1) (b)(3) WARNING: REPORT CLASSSECRET--WARNING NOTICE- SECRETYNT 56 of 72 2/23/2017 8:18 AM INTELLIGENCE Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C06694168 #b � a Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C06694168 SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED-- SECRETHNW ALL PORTIONS CARRY CLASSIFICATION AND CONTROLS OF OVERALL DOCUMENTS. END OF MESSAGE SECRET. BT #2318 NNNN SECRETUNF 57 of 72 2/23/2017 8:18 AM Approved for Release: 2017/09/07 C06694168