LEADERSHIP IN VIETNAM - NGO DINH NHU

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06672771
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: October 29, 2024
• Document Release Date: August 21, 2024
• Case Number: F-2020-00663
• Publication Date: October 30, 1963

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. MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
� VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: Leadership in Vietnam Ngo Dinh Nhu
1. The associated questions have been posed whether we can
hope for eventual viatory over the Viet Cong with the Diem-Nhu
regime in Vietnam and whether alternate leadership is available in
the country. This memorandum will discuss Ngo-Dinh Nhu in this
connection, and will not cover the unrealistic assumption that Diem
and Nhu can be separated. As preliminary, I believe that Nhu would
not attempt to displace his brother but would remain in a subordinate
position during Diem's incumbency.. Even assuming no other critical
event, however, the likelihood of Diem retiring in April 1966 is
considerable and at that time if not before Nhu may take over the full
leadership of Vietnam.
2. Nhu is a highly complex individual who is very little known
or understood by the Vietnamese or foreigners. For many years he
'deliberately took a very withdrawn position as "political counsellor"
to his brother, in order to emphasize his brother's full authority as
President of Vietnam. During the past year Nhu has taken public
responsibility for the strategic hamlet program and there are clear
indications of a political build up of Nhu as a public figure in Vietnam.
During .the withdrawal period, however, he was the 'subject of a plethora
of rumors and allegations which established his public image in Vietnam
and abroad as that of an intriguing, sinister and ruthless individual,
supplemented by his wife's harsh and sometimes hysterical utterances.
On the basis of this image many have concluded that it is impossible to
win the war in South Vietnam as long as he is in a position of leadership.
I believe that an examination of the man and the facts behind the image
would indicate a contrary conclusion. A balance sheet of Ngo Dinh Nhu
might be drawn up as:
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� ASSETS
A. Highly intelligent, sophisticated and experienced in the
practical techniques of political power.
B. He has adopted and is translating into action the political
philosophy of personalism. Despite much cynicism from outsiders
about this philosophy, its key factors are certainly laudable and
compatible with U. S. interests, i.e. the dignity of the human person,
his full participation in a community and the need for collective effort
to progress.
C. Courage, dedication and toughness.
D. The author and executor of the strategic hamlet revolutions
designed to create a new poibtical and social infrastructure for
Vietnam, to include self reliance, community development, defense
against the Viet Cong, individual participation in community decisions,
etc. This included the establishment of an effective interministerial
coordinating committee to bring all Vietnamese agencies together on
this. It also included an intense effort of indoctrinating the entire
bureaucracy and military, who are weak at best, with the objectives
of the program.
E. Organizer of the Republican Youth Movement. While this
organization may have "fascist" overtones and more than a modicum
of the � "Potemkin Village?' which was the fatal weakness of other GVN
sponsored political movements, it has represented .a mechanism for
activating and integrating the youth of the country into its development
and defense. As usual in Vietnam, there is a difference between
objectives and realities, and therefore this 'organization can only be
evaluated as ambiguous at this time.
F. Fully anti-communist, stemming from the incompatibility
of the Communist doctrine with his own. The similarity of some of
Nhuis techniques of political action with those of the communists,
e.g. the C,anLao party, should not be understood as implying a collabora-
tion between Nhu and communism.
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G. Non-corrupt. Despite the Saigon rumor factory we have no
evidence of corruption by the Ngo family and the atmosphere of the
GVN in this respect has been noted by many as contrasting sharply
with the governments of Thailand, Cambodia and others. There is an
indication that shady techniques have been used, with Nhuts approval
to accumulate funds for use for political organizations, but not fOr
personal gain.
H. The grudging respect of and some contact with inteLLectual
and political circles outside the GVN, e.g. the labor movement,
certain intellectual fronts, etc.
I. An intense Vietnamese nationalism and anti-colonialism, with
insistence that the Vietnamese solve their problems and build their
country to the greatest extent possible through their own efforts rather
than relying on foreign assistance:
J. Supervision and molding of unconventional paramilitary and
political action in support of the war effort, including the efforts
among the Montagnards, in which he has demonstrated imagination,
flexibility and judgment.
. LIABILITIES
A. Vanity, a fascination with intrigue and an intellectual arrogance.
This has on occasion led him to statements which, if not false, can only
be tortuously rationalized and occasionally to an acceptance of patently
false but tempting stories (e.g. some "contacts" with the Viet Cong).
B. Highly unfavorable public image stemming in good part from
poor handling of the press. .
C. An intense nationalism, frequently resulting in an anti-foreign
attitude and a rejection of recommendations or assistance because of his
belief that these will encourage reliance upon foreign guidance or
assistance. It also appears in his rejection of the significance of foreign
and U. S. opinion on Vietnam, if he considers it mistaken.
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� D. Ruthless in achieving political goals and manipulating
people and organizations toward these ends. This ruthlessness
should, however, be properly evaluated in light of the fact that
even for acts of treason such as the 1960 revolt and the 1962
bombing of the palace no individual has been executed although this
may represent Diem: rather than Nhu. In general, however, Vietnam
under the GVN has seen little Asian brutality except in the Viet Cong
war.
E. Frequent confusion between the goals and the reality of a
program and in particular a failure to appreciate the ways in which
lower level officials may warp theoretically laudable programs. Nhu
frequently complains of the inadequacy of Vietnamese cadre and their
inability to carry out such programs but he is also inclined to press
forward with them despite these inadequacies.
F. A temptation to shenanjgans in international affairs in matters
in which his hand is not welcome, e.g. Cambodia.
3. Just as Mr. Nhu cannot be separated from Diem, so Mrs. Nhu
cannot be separated from Mr. Nhu with any degree of practicality. Her
liabilities are well known, and stem largely from her complete lack of
tact in all of her activities. It is essential, however, to say that some
of her activities have had a positive side. These would include many
of the provisions of the family law (end of polygamy, protection of
property rights of wives,, etc); and the organization of the Womenp
Solidarity Movement to bring the hereto withdrawn Vietnamese woman
to her full role in modern society and give her a sense of responsibility
and participation in the community outside her family. She also contributes
her full portion of .courage to the ample reservoir possessed by the Ngo
family.
4. Reviewing all of the above I believe that a case can be made that
Ngo Dinh Nhu represents a strong, reasonably well oriented and efficient
potential successor of Diem as a leader of a country fighting communist
subversion, establishing its national solidarity and building a modern
society. His major liability is the highly unfavorable public image
possessed by Nhu and his wife, but I suggest that efforts to improve this
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rather than to assume its continuation would be well directed. This
is not to say that there are no alternatives in Vietnam; ii is merely
to suggest that a careful review of the man and the facts rather than
the image suggests that Nhu is a desirable rather than a caPostrophic
candidate in the search for 'dynamic leadership for Vietnam. Few
others offer as favorable a list of some of the critical assets necessary
to Vietnamfs situation.
William . Colby
Chief, Far East Divi on
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