NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06646361
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: November 28, 2017
• Case Number: F-2017-00351
• Publication Date: January 12, 1990

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Near East and
South Asia Review
12 January 1990
Special Issue: A Retrospective
of the 1980s, A Projection of the 1990s
Page
Articles The Middle East and South Asia: Staggering Into the 1990s
Conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia� between Israel
and the Palestinians, Iran and Iraq, India and Pakistan, and
within Lebanon and Afghanistan � are certain to demand
the attention of US policymakers as the century enters its
last decade.
1
Middle East-South Asia: Infusion of Advanced Weapons
Accelerates Region's Arms Race
Military forces in the Middle East and South Asia experienced
major quantitative growth and qualitative improvements in
their capabilities during the 1980s. The 1990s may witness
slower expansion of military inventories, but there will be
continued advances in weapons capabilities and efforts toward
indigenous military production.
5 (b)(3)
Middle East-South Asia: The Changing Roster of Leaders �
Which Ones Have_Uft_Their Mark, Which Ones Are Likely To
Leave a Mark?
Barring sudden deaths or coups, many of the leaders who
dominated the Middle East and South Asia in the 1980s seem
certain to dominate regional affairs in the early 1990s. Their
successors will be challenged to adopt new leadership styles to
counter even more daunting problems later in the decade.
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--geteret
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The Oil Market in the 1990s: Persian Gulf Producers Poised 13
To Reassert Market Dominance
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Although market conditions will favor the Persian Gulf oil
producers in the 1990s, they will have to coordinate their policies
to avoid price instability. In the later 1990s, when there is even
greater demand for Gulf oil and fewer key producers, it will be
easier to accommodate the production policies of individual Gulf
states.
Middle Eastern Terrorism: Iran and Radical Palestinians Continue 19
To Pose Biggest Threat
Given developments in the last two years, the high rate of terrorist
incidents perpetrated by Middle Eastern groups will be sustained
at least into the early 1990s. Strong indications continue that the
risk to Western, Israeli, and moderate Arab interests is as high as
ever.
Political Islam: The Evolving Challenge
The Islamic fundamentalist movement is likely to be dominated in
the 1990s by more flexible leaders adept at employing varied
tactics. Their movements almost certainly will have a major
impact on the social character, politics, and foreign policies of
virtually all Middle Eastern states through the end of the
century.
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The Shifting Positions of the Superpowers in the Middle East 27
and South Asia: Entering a New Era?
The United States and Soviet Union are likely to share an interest
in preventing conflict in the Middle East and South Asia in the 1990s.
Regional states may be more willing to risk an escalation of tension
and the possibility of military conflict because they believe the
dangers of superpower involvement will be reduced.
M%-eceii
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The Shifting Positions of the
Superpowers in the Middle East
and South Asia: Entering a New
Era?
The primary significance of the changes in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe for the Middle East and
South Asia may be that the attention of each
superpower will be focused elsewhere� on economic
and domestic political priorities, on Europe, and on
the management of the superpower relationship itself.
The superpowers are likely to share an interest in
insuring that conflict in the region does not disrupt
their more important interests.
The complexities of regional relationships, the rise of
"new thinking" in the Soviet Union, and the effort by
both superpowers to find political solutions to
regional conflicts make a zero-sum analysis of
US-Soviet relations increasingly irrelevant. A US
gain in political and economic influence will not
necessarily be a Soviet loss and vice versa.
The implications of this situation are likely to be
mixed. On the one hand, the dangers of superpower
confrontation almost certainly will decline. On the
other, regional states may be more willing to risk an
escalation of tension and the possibility of military
conflict because they believe the dangers of
superpower involvement will be reduced.
The End of the 1970s: Dramatic Events Challenge
Relative Superpower Strengths in the Region
The decade of the 1970s ended with a series of
dramatic events that raised serious questions about
the relative positions of the superpowers in the
Middle East and South Asia. Although progress in
US-backed negotiations on the Arab-Israeli conflict
suggested a strengthened US role, developments in
the Persian Gulf and South Asia pointed to an
enhanced position for the Soviet Union:
� The US-brokered Camp David accords of 1978
launched events that suggested the emergence of a
new and rational approach to resolving the
Arab-Israeli conflict. They were followed by the
signing of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Israel's
withdrawal from Sinai, and the establishment of
diplomatic relations between Cairo and Tel Aviv.
Moscow's exclusion from the talks seemed a fitting
epilogue to its declining relevance in the region.
� The Iranian revolution in 1979 was a significant
setback for the United States, which had
considered Iran under the Shah one of its most
important Third World allies. The prolonged
hostage crisis that ensued was a constant reminder
of the limitations of superpower capabilities.
� The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December
1979, when counterposed to the US expulsion from
Iran, appeared to mark the emergence of a more
aggressive Soviet Union, capable of expanding its
regional influence at US expense.
� Iraq's attack on Iran in late 1980 began the nearly
decadelong war that focused the attention of the
Arab world as well as much of the international
community on the Persian Gulf.
The Beginning of the 1980s: Neither Superpower
Capitalizes on New Developments
The ramifications of these events, played out during
the early 1980s, were less profound than might have
been expected, and neither superpower made
significant gains as a result of the setbacks of the
other:
� Instead of providing a model for negotiations with
other Arab states, the Egyptian-Israeli agreements
still stood alone at the end of the decade.
� Despite the US setback in Iran and the relative
strategic gain for the Soviet Union, Moscow could
not enhance its position in Iran.
� Rather than using their presence in Afghanistan to
prepare a bridgehead for further advances, the
Soviets struggled to keep their client regime in
power in Kabul and faced continuing international
censure for their occupation.
The Iran-Iraq war proved a bloody stalemate with
neither party able to register a decisive victory and
neither superpower gaining significant benefit or
suffering particular loss:
27
� Moscow's efforts to balance its relations between
Tehran and Baghdad angered both. But the Soviet
agreement to lease Kuwaiti oil tankers provided
Moscow with its first security role in the Persian
Gulf and improved its image with the Gulf states.
� The US commitment to protect Qulf shipping
from Iranian attack enhanced Washington's image
in the Arab Gulf states and increased their
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receptivity to supporting the US naval presence in
the region.
The End of the 1980s: A Growing US-Soviet
Commonality
The 1980s ended with another series of dramatic
events that laid the groundwork for the 1990s. In
contrast to the events of the late 1970s that
emphasized active superpower competition, recent
developments point to a growing commonality of US
and Soviet interests in the region, the difficulty of
each superpower in influencing its allies, and the
beginning of tentative efforts to cooperate to control
regional conflict:
� The outbreak of the Palestinian uprising in Israel's
occupied territories in December 1987 produced
modifications in the PLO's positions on
recognition of Israel, acceptance of a two-state
solution, and renunciation of terrorism. These
policy changes led to a US decision to begin a
formal dialogue with the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO).
� The development of "new thinking" in the Soviet
Union produced a more active and flexible Soviet
diplomatic effort in the Middle East. Moscow
upgraded its contacts with Israel and strengthened
its position in moderate Arab capitals.
� In early 1988, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev
announced Moscow's decision to withdraw its
military forces from Afghanistan, and in February
1989 the withdrawal was completed.
� Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini died in June
1989, and Iran stepped up its efforts to improve
economic and political relations with the Soviet
Union.
� The Iran-Iraq war ended in August 1988, following
(b)(3) unprecedented US and Soviet cooperation in the
United Nations to pass a resolution calling for a
cease-fire.
The 1990s: Entering an Era of Superpower Accord?
The new Soviet leadership, with its emphasis on
achieving international stability so that it can address
pressing domestic problems, may now consider
regional stability, no matter how attained, to be in its
best interests. Such a restructuring of the superpower
competition in the region will not ensure peace or
resolution of conflict. It could, however, reduce the
undermining of process and the exploitation of
tension that have marked Moscow's approach to the
region, and it almost certainly will reduce the
prospect of superpower confrontation.
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The Arab-Israeli Conflict. We expect the network of
alliances to become increasingly complex as both the
United States and the Soviet Union expand contacts
with key actors in the Arab-Israeli conflict:
� Moscow has a formal dialogue with Israel, and the
United States maintains a dialogue with the PLO.
� The Soviet position on both the modalities of an
Arab-Israeli peace process and the ingredients of
a settlement is virtually identical to those of Egypt
and Jordan. These states will continue to insist on
Moscow's participation in any negotiations.
We believe the zero-sum approach to US-Soviet
relations still has some utility with respect to the
Arab-Israeli conflict:
� If Israel maintains its refusal to negotiate with the
PLO and negotiations fail to move forward, the
United States is likely to experience an erosion of
its credibility and influence in the region.
Although the Soviet Union has gained credibility
as a constructive mediator because of its expanded
contacts with Israel and its more flexible approach
to a solution, the United States is perceived by the
Arab countries as Israel's patron and the only state
capable of pushing Israel to the negotiating table.
� If the peace process moves forward and Syria
becomes the obstacle to progress, the Soviets will
be under considerable pressure to deliver their
client.
� If the process produces a solution acceptable to
the moderate Arabs, both the United States and
the Soviet Union would receive credit.
The Persian Gulf. Soviet relations with Iran probably
will expand gradually. These ties will remain limited,
however, because of mutual suspicions, economic
incompatibilities, Moscow's desire not to undermine
its financially rewarding relationship with Iraq and its
improving relations with the Gulf states, and Iran's
reluctance to become closely identified with any
outside power:
� The Soviets and Iranians have agreed to resume
Iran's exports of natural gas to the USSR (at a
third of their prerevolution export levels) and to
expand trade relations (which are still at
prerevolution levels).
� Moscow has agreed in principle to sell arms to
Iran, but it has assured the Iraqis and the Gulf
states that the arms will not alter the military
balance in the region.
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Se et
The Soviet Union will probably continue its gradual
expansion of political and economic relations with the
Gulf states:
� The rhetoric of Soviet "new thinking," combined
with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and
Moscow's low-key approach to the Iran-Iraq war,
has mitigated Gulf state concerns about the threat
of an expansionist Soviet Union.
� Moscow has established diplomatic relations with
Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar in
the past several years. Only Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain have no formal relations with Moscow,
and we believe these will be established in the next
few years.
� Although the Soviet Union has little of economic
value to offer these states, it has had some success
marketing weapon systems to them. It almost
certainly will continue to try to capitalize on the
difficulty these states have in purchasing
sophisticated systems from the United States to
market its own weapons.
The United States benefited from its security
assistance to the Gulf states during the Iran-Iraq war,
and some of the smaller Gulf states still see it as the
ultimate security guarantor of the region. The overall
US presence and influence, however, may decline:
Reverse Blank
� It will not or cannot sell these states some of the
weapon systems they believe they need.
� It faces increasing economic competition in the
region from Western Europe and Japan.
South Asia. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
has weakened the USSR's military position in South
Asia but improved its political image. The
withdrawal has lessened the concerns of regional
states (particularlly Pakistan) about the military
threat posed by the USSR. But Soviet interests in
maintaining good relations with India limit the extent
to which Moscow can improve relations with
Islamabad.
The survival of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul has
enhanced the credibility of the Soviet search for a
political solution in Afghanistan based on
power-sharing. The fall of the Communist regime at
the hands of the Afghan insurgents would be a clear
setback and a long-term concern for the Soviet
Union, which has its own Islamic community to worry
about. The establishment of an Islamic regime in
Afghanistan, however, would not necessarily serve
Washington's best interests.
This article isfteleatial.
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