ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL/MILITARY SITUATION OVER NEXT FEW MONTHS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
06629901
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
March 8, 2023
Document Release Date:
August 8, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
F-2017-01057
Publication Date:
September 27, 1982
File:
Attachment | Size |
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ASSESSMENT OF POLITICALMI[15702882].pdf | 153.36 KB |
Body:
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Document
NEXT FEW MONTHSC
D COMET 820927
04/26/ CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
: ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL/MILITARY SITUATION OVER
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WNINTEL INTELSUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL/MILITARY SITUATION OVER
NEXT FEW MONTHS
2. THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE SALVADORAN
POLITICAL SCENE CONTINUES TO BE THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.
MINISTER OF DEFENSE GENERAL JOSE GUILLERMO ((GARCIA))
IS CLEARLY THE MOST POWERFUL MEMBER OF THE MILITARY AND
HAS PUBLICLY LINKED HIMSELF WITH A CONTINUATION OF THE
REFORMS INITIATED BY THE JRG. GARCIA HAS ALSO CONSISTENTLY
BACKED PRESIDENT ALVARO ((MAGANA)), WHO IN TURN SUPPORTS
GARCIA'S POLICIES. CLOSELY ASSOCIATED WITH GARCIA IS
THE CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES GENERAL STAFF, COLONEL
RAFAEL ((FLORES)) LIMA. GARCIA AND FLORES LIMA ARE GENERALLY
REGARDED BY THE SALVADORAN OFFICER CORPS AS A TEAM, A
PERCEPTION WHICH WE BELIEVE IS CORRECT.
3. GENERAL GARCIA AND COLONEL FLORES LIMA
ARE IN NO IMMEDIATE DANGER OF LOSING THEIR. POSITIONS IN THE
HIGH COMMAND. NONETHELESS, THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT ELEMENTS
WITHIN THE ARMED FORCES WHICH WOULD LIKE TO SEE GARCIA
OUSTED, AND, IN THE CASE OF ONE OFFICER GROUP, FLORES LIMA AS WELL.
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THERE ARE THREE GROUPS IN THE ARMED FORCES, IMPELLED BY
SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT MOTIVES. THESE GROUPS ARE:
A. OFFICER CORPS SYMPATHIZERS OF THE NATIONALIST
REPUBLICAN ALLIANCE (ARENA), PARTY AND ITS LEADER, ROBERTO
((D'AUBUISSON)). THIS GROUP OF OFFICERS WHICH WE CONSIDER
POSES THE GREATEST LONG-TERM THREAT TO GARCIA AS WELL AS
FLORES LIMA, CONTAINS TWO OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL FIELD
COMMANDERS IN THE ARMED FORCES, LTC. SIGFRIEDO ((OCHOA)) PEREZ,
COMMANDER OF CABANAS DEPARTMENT, AND LTC. JOSE DOMINGO
((MONTERROSA)), COMMANDER OF THE ATLACATL BATTALION.
COL. NICOLAS .((CARRANZA)), DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (ANTEL), WHO IS CLOSELY ALLIED
WITH D'AUBUISSON AND ARENA, IS VIEWED BY GARCIA AND
FLORES LIMA AS THE KEY ELEMENT IN THIS GROUP. ALL ARE
PERSONALLY CLOSE TO D'AUBUISSON. THESE OFFICERS OBJECT
TO GARCIA'S AND FLORES LIMA'S PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF LAND
REFORM POLICIES, WHICH THEY FEEL IDENTIFIES THE ARMED FORCES
WITH SUCH POLICIES. ADDITIONALLY, THE RIGHTIST OFFICERS
ARE CRITICAL OF GARCIA'S HANDLING OF THE WAR AND ARE
CONVINCED THAT GARCIA DEVOTES TOO MUCH TIME TO POLITICS
AND NOT ENOUGH TO STRATEGY AND SUPPORT FOR FIELD UNITS.
ON THE LATTER POINT, THEIR CRITICISM IS MORE AGAINST GARCIA
THAN FLORES LIMA.
B. A SECOND GROUP OF ARMY OFFICERS FOCUSES
CRITICISM ON GARCIA, RATHER THAN FLORES LIMA, PRIMARILY
ON PROFESSIONAL MILITARY GROUNDS, MOST OF THESE OFFICERS
SUPPORT THE ECONOMIC REFORMS AND ARE NOT IN ARENA'S ORBIT
OF INVLUENCE. IN FACT, MANY VIEW D'ABUISSON WITH DISDAIN.
HOWEVER, THEY ALSO ARE CONCERNED OVER GARCIA'S MANAGEMENT
OF THE WAR. THEY COMPLAIN OF GARCIA'S INFREQUENT
CONTACT AND EXCHANGES WITH FIELD COMMANDERS. THESE OFFICERS
WOULD PREFER A MINISTER OF DEFENSE WITH MORE FIELD
EXPERIENCE REGARDLESS OF POLITICAL LEANINGS. THEY ALSO
TEND TO SHARE A PERCEPTION THAT GARCIA IS NOT PROSECUTING
THE WAR VIGOROUSLY, THAT HE HAS NOT DEVISED A COHESIVE
NATIONAL STRATEGY, PRIMARILY BECAUSE HE IS DISTRACTED BY
HIS EFFORTS TO MONITOR AND INFLUENCE THE POLITICAL PROCESS.
C. A THIRD, BUT SMALLER AND LESS SIGNIFICANT
OPPOSITION GROUP IS COMPRISED OF JUNIOR OFFICERS WITH
LIBERAL SENTIMENTS WHO DO NOT BELIEVE THAT GARCIA IS
SUFFICIENTLY COMMITTED TO LAND REFORM AND TO CORRECTING
HIMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY THE ARMED FORCES. THESE JUNIOR
OFFICERS BELIEVE THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD BE A VANGUARD OF
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS, POSSIBLY TO INCLUDE USE OF THE
ARMED FORCES IN A CIVIC ACTION ROLE. THE EXTENT OF JUNIOR
OFFICER DISSATISFACTION WITH GARCIA IS UNCERTAIN. HOWEVER,
THE JUNIOR OFFICERS DO NOT APPEAR ORGANIZED AND THERE ARE
NO IDENTIFIABLE LEADERS.
4. THE MOST ORGANIZED OF THE ABOVE THREE GROUPS APPEARS
TO BE THE PRO-ARENA FORCE DIRECTED BY CARRANZA, OCHOA
AND MONTERROSA. ARENA REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING RETIRED
MILITARY OFFICERS, HAVE ACTIVELY CAMPAIGNED AMONG THE
OFFICER CORPS TO INCREASE ANTI-GARCIA SENTIMENT. NONETHELESS,
GARCIA IS STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY FLORES LIMA WHO ENJOYS
CONSIDERABLE PRESTIGE IN THE NON-ARENA OFFICER GROUPING.
GARCIA IS SHREWD AND WELL INFORMED AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO
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SUCCESSFULLY WEATHER THE CRITICISM. REGARDLESS, VIRTUALLY
ALL ELEMENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES SEEM TO REALIZE THAT AN
ACTUAL MILITARY COUP AGAINST THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE
WOULD BE DISASTROUS AND WOULD PROBABLY FORCE AN END TO
AMERICAN MILITARY AID. ADDITIONALLY, GARCIA
AND FLORES LIMA ARE INCREASINGLY MORE SENSITIVE TO THE
PROBLEM. THEY ARE MOVING DECISIVELY TO REINFORCE THEIR POSITION
IN THE ARMED FORCES THROUGH A SERIES OF PERSONAL VISITS
TO UNITS IN THE FIELD AND BY DIRECT CONFRONTATION OF
OPPOSITION OFFICERS, INCLUDING BOTH OCHOA AND MONTERROSA.
GARCIA IS ALSO WORKING BEHIND THE SCENES TO UNDERCUT ARENA.
ACCORDINGLY, IF GARCIA MAINTAINS THE WILL (
TO REMAIN AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE, HIS POSITION WILL REMAIN
SECURE FOR THE NEAR TERM. IF, HOWEVER, GARCIA TIRES OF
THE INTRIGUES WITHIN THE OFFICER CORPS, HE MAY CHOOSE TO
ABDICATE HIS POSITION. IN THIS RESPECT, ON AT LEAST ONE
OCCASION IN THE PAST GARCIA HAS CONFIDED TO FLORES LIMA
THAT HE WAS DISPOSED TO RESIGN HIS POSITION IF DIRECTLY
CONFRONTED BY SIGNIFICANT OPPOSITION FORCES. GARCIA APPEARS
TO HAVE ADOPTED A MORE AGGRESSIVE STANCE LATELY BUT IT
IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT HE MAY AGAIN BECOME DISPIRITED AND
RETIRE. IT IS FAR
MORE LIKELY THAT GARCIA WILL CONTINUE IN HIS PRESENT POSITION
FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.
MS ONUE, HE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY ENTIRELY DIVORCE
HIMSELF FROM SALVADORAN POLITICS AND JOIN HIS FAMILY
PRESENTLY RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES. IF GARCIA RESIGNS,
IT IS LIKELY THAT FLORES LIMA WILL ALSO STEP
DOWN, MOST LIKELY TO PURSUE PRIVATE BUSINESS INTERESTS IN
EL SALVADOR.
6. A PROBABLE SUCCESSOR TO GARCIA FOR THE MINISTER OF
DEFENSE POST IS GENERAL ((VIDES)) CASANOVA, DIRECTOR OF
THE NATIONAL GUARD. VIDES IS WEDELY RESPECTED THROUGHOUT
THE ARMED FORCES. HOWEVER, THE MORE ORGANIZED AND FORCEFUL
ARENA-LINKED GROUP COULD BE EXPECTED TO PROMOTE COL. CARRANZA.
7. ON THE CIVILIAN SIDE OF THE SALVADORAN LEADERSHIP,
PRESIDENT DR. ALVARO ((MAGANA)) CAN BE EXPECTED TO REMAIN
IN HIS POSITION UNTIL THE NEXT ELECTIONS. TO DATE, MAGANA
HAS BEEN REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL IN KEEPING THE GOVERNMENT ON
A CENTRIST COURSE, DESPITE THE CONSIDERABLE MANEUVERINGS
OF D'AUBUISSON AND ARENA. EVEN SO, THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC
PARTY (PDC) IS DISAPPOINTED WITH MAGANA AND FEELS THAT
HE IS NOT PURSUING WITH SUFFICIENT VIGOR THE REFORMIST
POLICIES INSTITUTED BY THE JRG. ADDITIONALLY, THE PDC
FEELS THAT MAGANA HAS FAILED TO FORCEFULLY CONDEMN THE
CONTINUING ASSASSINATIONS OF PDC OFFICIALS AT THE HANDS OF
RIGHTWING TERRORISTS, MANY OF WHOM ARE MEMBERS OF THE
SECURITY FORCES. ACCORDINGLY, SOME ELEMENTS OF THE
PDC, INCLUDING FORMER PRESIDENT JOSE NAPOLEON ((DUARTE)),
ARE DISPOSED TO HAVE THE PDC LEAVE THE COALITION GOVERNMENT
AND GO INTO OPPOSITION. OTHER ELEMENTS IN THE PARTY,
HOWEVER, BELIEVE THE PDC MUST REMAIN IN THE GOVERNMENT TO
RETAIN ITS INVLUENCE. A PDC WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GOVERNMENT.
WOULD ALLOW ARENA TO INCREASE ITS INFLUENCE IN THE NATIONAL
CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.
8. ARENA MAY BE THE MOST COHESIVE
OF ALL THE SALVADORAN POLITICAL PARTIES AT THIS TIME AND
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IN OUR VIEW WILL CONTINUE TO BE AN ACTIVE AND EFFECTIVE FORCE
WORKING TO LIMIT REFORMIST POLICY. SIMILARLY, D'AUBUISSON
CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN BEHIND-THE-SCENES
MANEUVERS TO LURE ARMED FORCES COMMANDERS INTO THE ARENA
RANKS, BOTH TO UNDERCUT GARCIA AND TO INCREASE HIS OWN
POLITICAL POSITION.
9. NO FILE. DECL
ALL SECRET.
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