SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06629422
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-02334
• Publication Date: October 11, 2002

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NEAR EAST
Iraq: Humanitarian Concerns in a Conflict
Saddam's response to conflict with the US could turn the side effects of
war into a humanitarian disaster. The greatest concern is that Saddam
might use chemical and/or biological agents in a way that increased civilian
fatalities and population displacement far beyond what a conventional war
would cause.
� In case of widespread CBW use against civilian targets in Kurdish or
Shia areas, for instance, panic could force hundreds of thousands of
people from their homes. Saddam's use in 1988 of chemical weapons
against Kurds in Halabja�a town with 80,000 inhabitants�killed
5,000, injured 10,000, and caused 40,000 to flee.
� Just the perception of a CBW attack would have much the same
effect as an actual attack As word of chemical attacks spread after
the Halabja attack, Kurdish villagers elsewhere began to flee in
anticipation of CBW attacks on them
� Iraq's neighbors probably would seal their borders in the
aftermath of a CBW attack, fearing contamination carried by the
refugees. Those escaping to remote areas or crossing unmonitored
borders would be cut off from medical help, potable water,
sanitation services, food supplies, and shelter.
expects a Baghdad-
centered military operation would displace some 500,000 persons internally
and make 225,000 refugees, If Saddam withdrew
his forces into major cities in an attempt to use the populace as "human
shields," both civilian casualties and civilian flight could be much larger.
worst-case scenario�based on a protracted conventional
war fought in major cities�some 200,000 Iraqis might flee to Kuwait, 200,000
to Saudi Arabia, 20,000 to Syria, and as many as 1,000,000 to Iran.
� Iran, for example, would be even less willing to host Iraqi
refugees than it was in 1991, mainly because it has had to deal
with some 2-3 million Afghans in eastern 'Iran
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More than 50 percent of Iraqis now depend on the government-distributed
ration basket supplied by the UN oil-for-food (OFF) program as their main
source of food. The UN says OFF-related food shipments will be suspended
if hostilities occur, and the country then will have approximately six months'
worth of stored food based on the UN-verified food supply currently in Iraq.
� Saddam might redirect some of this food to his security forces,
military units and loyal tribes, or destroy it as part of a "scorched
earth" tactic.
Loss of electrical power in the course of the conflict would degrade the
availability of potable water and health services, worsening sanitation
and denying injured civilians medical care iccess
to water is now relatively good in urban areas, while less than 50 percent
of households in rural areas have direct access to clean water.
� None of the country's 13 sewage treatment plants functions
properly, and raw sewage often is dumped into rivers and other
bodies of water.
most of Iraq's medical
facilities are more than 20 years old, have been ne lected since the
Gulf war, and lack emergency backup generators.
The few humanitarian aid agencies likely to stay in Iraq after hostilities
begin would be unable to offer adequate assistance. US and coalition forces
would be expected to take the lead in dealing with the immediate humanitarian
crisis, including provision of food and medicine and rebuilding civilian
infrastructure.
� US forces are pre-positioning some 3 million humanitarian daily
rations in the region, roughly the same number that were dropped
in Afghanistan between October and December last year
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TOP-SEQUZ
Iraq: Lobbying for Political Support
Saddam is stepping up efforts to win international backing and to bolster
domestic support. Saddam in the past month dispatched senior officials to
more than a dozen regional states�including Iran, Turkey, Syria, the UAE,
Libya, and Egypt�to stress the negative effects of war on the region and to
attempt building a consensus against a US attack.
Saddam also is currying local support to enhance security. In a bid to
build loyalty in a troublesome sector of the population and present Iraq's
elections and political system as free and fair, the Iraqi Revolutionary
Command Council issued a decree this month allowing citizens of the
Kurdistan autonomous region to cast their votes for President of Iraq in
any governorate,
5 11 October 2002
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