SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06629403
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-02334
• Publication Date: January 17, 2003

Approved for Release: 2017/11/28 C06629403
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SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
17 January 2003
PASS SEIB 03-014CHX
Iraq: Saddam Taking Coercive Action To Ensure Military Fights
Saddain began his Army Day speech last week by warning that soldiers who retreat would
draw the wrath of Allah, and his commanders are preparing to use draconian means to
prevent soldiers from fleeing or deserting.
execution squads charged with killing soldiers who try
to retreat or surrender are collocated with Republican Guard (RG) and Regular Army
(RA) units.
Some 300 Directorate of Military Intelligence officers last month were assigned to I Corps
in northern Iraq and ordered to use all force necessary to quell any talk of desertion,
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nuch of the RG is preparing for urban combat to try to
maximize coalition military casualties. The willingness of RG soldiers to fight probably is
much stronger than that of RA forces because of the RG's better training, pay, and leadership
and its closer ties to the regime.
-- During the 1991 Gulf war, RG morale held up despite consistent coalition air attacks.
Although outmatched by US weapon systems and ultimately defeated, Guard units--until
the end of the war--tried to execute their mission to meet and stop the coalition advance
into southern Iraq.
-- The will to fight will vary by individual and unit throughout the Iraqi military and will
depend, in part, on combat conditions and regime control measures facing each unit.
Saddam in his speeches has stressed the military's ability to avoid defeat and rebuild, but low
morale apparently is widespread. Reporting on morale often relies on hearsay or reflects views
of a self-selected sample of Iraqis serving as intelligence sources, but a body of reporting since
the middle of last year points to morale problems similar to those experienced during the
Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars.
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the military expects Saddam to concede the south (b)(3)
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to the coalition in order to concentrate on defending Baghdad and that RA soldiers in the
south will desert if their commanders run.
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TOIEC.4,RETi
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