SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06629392
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2022
• Document Release Date: December 11, 2017
• Case Number: F-2016-02334
• Publication Date: November 21, 2002

Approved for Release: 2017/11/28 C06629392
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SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
21 November 2002
PASS SEIB 02-271CHX
Iraq: Saddam Could Complicate Oil Restoration Efforts
indicates
Saddam has put explosives on oil wells and other facilities.
Iraq probably can wire about 200 of its nearly 1,500 wells with explosives placed 50 to 100 feet
below the surface, judging from the number of workover rigs it has and the amount of time
needed to plant the explosives; it could rig explosives on the surface assemblies of the remaining
1,300 wellheads, as was done in Kuwait. Wells detonated below the surface probably would not
bum, but each would discharge as much as thousands of barrels of oil per day.
-- Capping wells destroyed below the surface generally requires drilling a relief well to shut
off oil flow; to drill a relief well quickly requires knowledge about how the original well
was drilled and the exact location of the wellbore.
even Iraq might not
know where these records are kept.
-- Capping 1,300 Kuwaiti-style blowouts probably would take about a year
If Saddam used subsurface detonations in the northern region, where geologic conditions
mean oil wells have concentrations of deadly hydrogen sulfide gas, the release of the gas
along with the oil would create a dangerous environment for coalition forces and firefighters.
because the gas is heavier than air and hugs the ground, industry practice is to evacuate several
square miles around a spill.
-- To eliminate the danger of hydrogen sulfide, well-control teams probably would have to
try to set fire to the area; the fires then would need to be extinguished before stopping the
oil flow.
-- Even with preparations such as pre-positioning key equipment and personnel, the need
to burn off hydrogen sulfide gas, put out resulting fires, and dig relief wells means it
could take more than five years in a worst case scenario to cap 200 northern wells that
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suffered subsurface detonations.
Saddam could complicate firefighting efforts by destroying existing water distribution systems
in the oilfields. water is the single most important ingredient in
extinguishing well fires. Saddam did not destroy pipes leading to water sources in the Persian
Gulf war, probably because he anticipated his continued rule, but he could force firefighters to
construct new water systems in Iraq by doing so this time.
Saddam also could detonate production facilities and pumping stations to destroy customized
equipment, such as pumps and pump drivers, generators, and pressurized gas oil separation
vessels. The destruction of such equipment, which generally has manufacturing leadtimes in
excess of a year, would prevent any oil from being processed or moved to export facilities.
Crude oil production could be restored most rapidly by focusing immediate restoration efforts
solely in the southern producing system, which accounts for more than 2 million barrels per
day (b/d) of Iraq's more than 3 million b/d output capacity.
-- If mines and unexploded ordnance were cleared while water system reconstruction and
firefighting efforts were under way, and, if key parts and personnel were prepurchased
and pre-positioned, restoring partial output of about 1 million b/d would be possible in
about six to eight months; this period would roughly double if parts were not readily
available.
-- Even if all of Iraq's oil-producing infrastructure were destroyed, it is estimated as much as
2.5 million b/d of output, primarily in the south, could be restored in about two years.
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Approved for Release: 2017/11/28 C06629392