ARGENTINA: PROSPECTS FOR THE MONTONEROS - 1982/10/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628158
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: October 22, 1982

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RE('
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
22 October 1982
ARGENTINA: PROSPECTS FOR THE MONTONEROS
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Summary
The Montonero leftist guerrillas were decimated by the harsh
military campaign against them in the mid-1970s, reducing their
numbers from an estimated 2,500 to SOM2 current 60 activists in
country and 300 in exile. Presently, the Montoneros hope to
exploit political tensions and deteriorating economic conditions
that have accompanied the Falklands defeat and the decision to
hasten the return of the government to civilian rule. The
Montoneros appear to be divided, however, over whether to renew
the armed struggle or focus on political action. For now they
appear to be moving on both fronts. Although evidence is thin,
plans are apparently being made for a stepped up propaganda
campaign against the government at the same time that the
Montoneros appear to be making oreliminary preparations for
violent activity.
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This memorandum was requested by the A retary of State for
Inter-American Affairs. It was prepared by South America
Division, Office of African and Latin American na y s and coordinated with
the Directorate of Operations. It contains information as of 21 October
1982. CUestions and comments may be directed to the Chief, South America
Division, ALA,
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
OR METHODS INVOLVED
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The Montoneros have an expanded reservoir of experience to
call upon for violent activities. Following their defeat by the
armed forces, they trained in Cuba and Lebanon. A number of them
also gained combat experience in Central America. Moreover,
Montonero leaders developed contacts with leftist political
parties in Western Europe, which reportedly have provided funds
and other support. 3.5(c)
Despite this, the Montoneros face serious constraints that
impede a return to regime threatening terrorist activities,
including:
-- the lack of general public support;
-- rifts within the Montonero movement itself over strategy;
-- uncertain external backing for a major terrorist
campaign; and
-- the capabilities of Argentine security forces.
If economic chaos ensues in Argentina and the effectiveness of the
military is diminished, many of these constraints could be
weakened. Even then we would expect the Montoneros to renew the
armed struggle only with sporadic attacks to test the armed
forces.
TO
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Back around
The Montoneros emerged in 1970 as the militant left-wing arm
of the umbrella Peronist movement under the leadership of then
exiled dictator Juan Peron. At Peron's bidding, they sought to
undermine the incumbent military regime by raiding military
barracks, robbing banks, and kidnaping both wealthy Argentines
and foreigners in and around Buenos Aires. By 1973, however, the
Montoneros were growing increasingly radical, calling for a
"popular war" against the upper classes, and expanding operations
into rural areas.
they numbered some 2,50U combatants and 11,uuU sympathizers.
After Peron assumed the presidency in late 1973, he attempted to
negotiate a halt to the terrorism, but the Montoneros refused to
come to terms. By 1974 the split was complete, and the Peronist
regime became the guerilla's target. The Peronist government
outlawed the Montoneros in mid-1975, and security forces moved
against them.
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Under Military Rule
After ousting the Peronist regime in 1976, the armed forces
had free rein against the Montoneros. Within three years the
army and intelligence services--employing torture, illegal
detentions, and widespread dragnets--succeeded in forcing most of
its members into inactivity or exile.
by early 1977 combatants had already been reduced 3.3(b)(1)
to about 300, and most of the leaders were either captured,
killed or fled the country. Any serious threat to the regime was
eliminated, although sporadic attacks--including several
spectacular kidnapings and bombings--continued until 1979. By
the end of that year, Montonero activists in Argentina were
estimated at 200 Their activities
were confined to distributing leaflets, painting slogans on
buildings in downtown Buenos Aires, and interrupting normal radio
and television broadcasting with propaganda speeches.
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Argentina have maintained close contact
abroad estimated in 19791
to also number some 200. The exiles soughtrefuge in
Latin America and Western Europe.I
, the Mexican government and leftist parties in
Western Europe--primarily in Spain, France, and Italy--have
backed the Montonero propaganda campaigns, providing Firmenich
with forums for anti-regime speeches and funding for printing and
travel.
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Montoneros in
with their network
in the case of Mexico; for
example, it fits the pattern of support for leftist groups. The
favorable operational climate presumably accounts for the
decision- I I�to base the mnntoneros'
political arm in Mexico City. 3.5(c)
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By 1980, the Montoneros, under the overall leadership of
exile Mario Firmenich, divided into two groups--clandestine
internal operations in Argentina and the much more visible
rainment abroad. I 3.3(b)(1)
Firmenich's decision to separate militant from political
action reflected ideological rifts within the movement. Veterans
of the struggle, as well as Firmenich himself, were uncertain
over whether to continue armed confrontation, build a popular
base to support a potential political party, or move forward on
both fronts. In an effort to identify the organization with a
legitimate party, he renamed the Montoneros the Peronist
Montonero Movement.
Cuban and Other External Support
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Cuba
has provided training facilities for recruits and a safehaven for
Firmenich. the
Castro regime also provided financial support, at least until
September 1982, and safeguarded funds acquired by the Montoneros
through their criminal activities.
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Moreover, Havana has also served as a staging area for .
Montoneros moving into Central America, where they gained combat
pxopripnrp
some Montoneros have worked with the Sandinistas
in various operations, including the training of Costa Rican
leftists and the assasination of former dictator Somoza, in
Paraguay. During the same period,
Montoneros helped to trAin AAiriation teams
for attacks on otticials in El Salvador
Montoneros were probably trairinn insurgents in Tegucigalpa.
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By mid-1979 Montoneros living in Africa had established
liaisons with various guerilla organizations, including the
Palestine Liberation Organization. The bonds with the PLO
developed in Africa probably strengthened the relationship which
had begun in 1978, when a group of Montoneros visited the PLO in
Beru it.
the Montoneros may have provided toe ralestinians witn a unique
nlactir exnlocivto and trainino in cemolition techniques.
the Montoneros--perhaps as
many as several dozen--received training from the PLO in
Lebanon. 3.5(c)
Montoneros and the Transition
The political and economic uncertainties following the
Falklands defeat have improved the potential operational climate
for the terrorists, and they retain the capability to carry out
attacks, should they decide to do so.
as of late 1981 about 60 members remained
inside Argentina and about 300 abroad, some of whom are gradually
returning home. Moreovr, indicate that
the organization has been further revamped to facilitate both
political and military action. Four separate components deal
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respectively with weapons and logistics; intelligence;
counterintelligence; and political action, which includes
propaganda activities and liaison with foreign terrorist and
leftist political movements. All components are based outside
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Argentina; exiles in Havana take the lead in weapons and
logistics, intelligence, and counterintelligence, while those in
Mexico focus on political action.
Inside Argentina, the Montoneros apparently are preparing to
resume operations, anticipating the return of some overseas
cadre. Caches of arms including automatic weapons, grenades, and
other explosives have been uncovered as recently as last January,
according to press and US Embassy reporting. In April,
Montoneros may have been involved in several bombings in downtown
Buenos Aires accordion to US officials there. The Montoneros,
also pressed
activities in
the Cubans
Argentina.
in
Se
tember for funds to bankroll
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Moreover, the Montoneros appear to be stepping up their
political activity. During the Falklands crisis, Firmenich
publicly appealed to regime leaders to allow him to return to
Argentina to join the struggle against the British and form a
leqtimate political party. The ruling junta refused.
Firmenich met with
a radical Peronist leader in Mexico City, where he offered the
Montoneros access to his newspaper for use as a propaganda
forum.
Prospects
The ability of the Montoneros over the next six to 18 months
to capitalize on current conditions in Argentina and their
enhanced military training and experience, however, will be
constrained by:
Lack of public support. We judge that labor and
political leaders presently believe their interests lay
in assisting the regime through the transition process
and not in backing or condoning violence that might
delay elections. Potential student support is also
uncertain.
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Ideological rifts within the Montonero movement. We
believe the lack of consensus on renewing violence could
force Firmenich to focus on political action, at least
until the effects of economic deterioration and the
struggle within the military become more apparent.
The willingness of outsiders to back a renewed
insurgency.
We judge that Cuba wishes to
withhold support to avoid alienating Buenos Aires at a
time when diplomatic relations are improving as a result
of Havana's aid during the Falklands. Moreover, we
believe the Cubans want the Montonros to continue to
concentrate on assisting insurgents in Central America
rather than in Argentina. We believe Castro is unlikely
to change his position any time soon.
The effectiveness of security forces. The Argentine
security services appear to have penetrated the
Montoneros and have confidence they can handle the
threat.
They continue, however,
o monitor Montonero movements,J
We believe that if the securi
significantly by continuing divisi
economic deterioration sparks seri
could be emboldened to renew terro
significant external support, howe
unlikely to mount more than sporad
government. Their recent experien
services should alsobeadeterren
terrorist tactics.
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ty forces are impaired
ons within the military, and if
ous social unrest, militants
rist activities. Without
ver, we judge they would be
ic attacks against the
ce at the hands of the security
t .to a hasty resumption of
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