[SANITIZED]LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS: STAFF NOTES DECEMBER 20, 1976 - 1976/12/13

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628132
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: December 13, 1976

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628132
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Latin American Trends
AFF NOTES
3.5(c)
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CI SNLA 76-073
No. 1014-76
December 20, 1976
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3.5(c)
Argentina: Dissension in the Junta
The recent complaints emanating from the army
and air force members of the ruling military junta
pose no direct threat to the position of President
Rafael Videla, the army member of the junta. None-
theless, the tension that the two dissidents have
lenerated could have lasting effects and seems likely
to hinder the efficiency of the governing body at
a time when policy initiatives are needed and expect-
ed.
Navy chief Admiral Massera and his air force
counterpart, GeneraeAgosti, are upset over what
they see as the army's predominance in the junta and
throughout the government. They resent, as well,
the influence of officers who, like Videla, favor
early conciliatory gestures toward civilians and
minimization of repressive tactics in the struggle
to counter leftist terorism. Massera in particular
has stepped up his long-standing campaign to dis-
credit Videla, whom he views as indecisive, ineffec-
tive, and too willing to compromise.
It is not clear whether the opportunistic
Massera nourishes the hope of gaining the presidency
himself or merely enjoys the role of "spoiler." In
any event, he pulled out the stops in a recent well
publicized speech, attacking Videla and those who
share the President's views. Addressing the familiar
theme of subversion, the admiral stressed the need
to press the fight against the left. But he added
that there are others, "much harder to identify,"
who must be guarded against. ,He went on to describe
them as the ones who believe "dialogue is an end in
itself," who "confuse communication with promiscuity,
democracy with cringing populism, and national unity
with uniformity." There was little doubt he was re-
ferring to Videla and others, particularly army
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chief of staff General Viola, who are closely identi-
fied with the "moderate" current of military opinion.
Agosti has reportedly been spreading the word
that he is determined to prevent the army from as-
suming "virtually total executive power" when in
fact power is to be spread among the services. In
this effort, Agosti *said, teair force and navy
were united. Massera, in turn, reportedly even des-
cribed a plan whereby he and Agosti would resign
their junta positions in an effort to oblige Videla
to do the same. In such an unlikely event, an army
officer would take over, but the man next in line,
Planning Minister General Diaz Bessone, at least
reportedly shares the "hard-line" views of Massera
and Agosti.
Several considerations appear to have been in
the minds of Massera and Agosti when they undertook
to raise the level of discord within the junta.
They may have hoped, for example, to capitalize on
the tension and anxiety that accompanied the annual
end-of-year promotion and retirement cycle. Some
eight army generals were marked for retirement,
among them three prominent "hard-liners."
Massera and Agosti may 'also be under pressure
from their subordinates to "flex the muscles" of
their respective services, which have indeed clear-
ly followed the lead of the a�rmy in most major
policy areas. Massera, who has headed the navy for
three years, may also be under a different sort of
pressure--to give up command and make room for others
to move up. The admiral may indeed believe his time
as head of the army is running short and seeks to
maximize his impact, one way or another, while his
influence is at its greatest. It has been suggested
by some observers that Massera, envisioning an
eventual bid to run as a civilian presidential
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candidate, is already grooming himself as an
"opponent"--of sorts--of military rule.
The effort to sow discord in the junta is not
likely to alter the power relationship among the
services. Indeed, one army general has claimed
that his colleagues have united to resist any ef-
fort to diminish the army's predominam:e. Videla's
position as head of the army and as President, more-
over, appears not to have been affected one way or
the other by the moves of Massera and Agosti.
The actions of the recalcitrant junta members
seem almost certain, however, to make it consider-
ably harder for the junta to agree on and implement
national policy. Massera and Agosti have highlighted
and thus worsened differences among top officers and
among the services. It will be exceedingly diffi-
cult to paper over such divergences, no matter how
hard individual officers work 'tomake a show of
unity.
Even though President Videla is not directly
threatened by Massera and Agosti, he will need to
spend increased time and effort both to rein them
in and to reassure himself of widespread support.
As a consequence, Videla will have less time to de-
vote to policy making and administrative duties.
He can ill afford this because the regime's programs
already appear bogged down and because Videla knows
the aggressive Diaz Bessone stands ready to step
into any policy void that may develop.
The unsettling effects Agosti and Massera have
had on the junta could soon hamper the government's
handling of two key issues. One is the basic
question of what role to allow labor, the most in-
fluential civilian sector, which has been in a kind
of limbo since the March coup Legislation
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establishing the new bases for union activity has
been under consideration for some time, but has en-
countered delay due to serious differences among the
military regarding how much latitude to permit
workers. Some, likalMasserallappear to want to limit
labor's influence severely, as much to prevent it
from again gaining Inordinainfluence as to punish
it for being disruptive in the past.
Over the past several months workers have become
increasingly restive over the tight controls placed
on wages and union activity. Their restiveness has
undoubtedly added to President Videla's determination
to proceed with a new, relatively conciliatory law
as quickly as possible. Yet the recent activities
of Massera and Agosti can hardly help but complicate
that effort still more.
The attitude of the dissidents also seems like-
ly to complicate life for Economy Minister Martinez
de Hoz, who has indicated the government's intention
to raise wages early in the new year to offset some
of the rapid rise in the cost of living, and perhaps
to mollify workers. Here, too, there is the distinct
possibility that those who oppose making gestures
toward labor will lobby against such an increase,
taking encouragemenCfrom the defiant tone of Massera.
Such officers will argue, as they have on previous
occasions, that wage hikes at this time constitute
a concession to labor, whose hugh gains under the
Peronists, they argue, caused much of the economic
chaos the junta inherited.
Videla wants very much to breathe new life into
the junta, which in the view of many observers has
seemed to be "running out of steam." The behavior
of his fellow junta members is almost certain to
make that goal all the harder to achieve.
3.5(c)
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