[SANITIZED]LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS: STAFF NOTES NOVEMBER 17, 1976 - 1976/11/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628099
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: November 17, 1976

Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628099
Latin American Trends
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CI SNLA 76-064
No. 1005-76
November 17, 1976
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LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
Th:s publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
CONTENTS
November 17, 1976
Argentina: Terrorist Tactics
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Argentina: Terrorist Tactics
The terrorist Montoneros are trying to get
sympathetic ordinary citizens to participate in
sabotage operations against the military government.
According to a recently captured document, the
Montoneros call sabotage of business and industry
a central element of their latest campaign and point
out that disruptive acts can be carried out easily
by individuals within a given plant with minimal
risk. The document claims that sabotage will refute
the government claim that the terrorists are on the
run, and will do visible damage to the "enemy."
To gain worker sympathy, the Montoneros are
calling for stepped up action against large companies
that have been firing or laying off employees. The
terrorists urge destruction of stock on hand, but
avoidance of disrupting the early stages of produc-
tion which would jeopardize workers' jobs. They
also call for destruction of files and computers in
government offices, but no actions that would
directly harm workers.
To achieve wider participation of citizens, the
Montoneros reportedly have formed "neighborhood
resistance centers" which are to organize and co-
ordinate disparate elements opposed to the military
government. The Montoneros also have backed the
creation of a resistance labor organization to
mobilize workers.
This tactic is a substantial change from past
practices, in which the terrorists stressed highly
compartmented, sophisticated operations requiring
trained individuals. The Montoneros have not
abandoned all such operations, but may, on one hand,
now believe that time and circumstance call for
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different measures. Their emphasis on broadened
citizen participation, on the other hand, may re-
flect lessened terrorist capability after many
months of relentless counterinsurgency by the mili-
tary.
The success of the new tactic is difficult to
assess at this time. Nonetheless, the terrorists
appear to have made relatively little headway in
efforts to exploit a protracted strike by power
workers that now appears to be nearing solution.
3.5(c)
November 17, 1976
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Latin American Trends
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3.5(C) No. 0 7 1 4-7 6
July 2 6 , 1976
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Approved for Release: 2018/10/02 C06628099
LATIN AMERICAN TRENDS
This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington com-
munity by the Western Hemisphere Division, Office of Current Intelligence,
with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of
Intelligence. Comments and quries are welcome. They should be directed to
the authors of the individual articles.
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NR
Argentina:
CONTENTS
July 26, 1976
Taps For Terrorists? 1
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Argentina: Taps For Terrorists?
The losses suffered by Argentine guerrillas in
recent weeks greatly exceed the actual numbers of
those arrested and killed. Theyi4have lost hideouts,
weapons, ammunition, and documents containing valuable
operational information,
Urban guerrilla warfare hasl'relied heavily on
terrorist tactics. Terror--according to one scholar's
definition--consists of symbolic acts that are designed
to influence political behavior by extraordinary means,
entailing the use or threat of violence. In Argentina,
leftist guerrillas have placed a heavy emphasis on the
symbolic nature of their violent acts--kidnaping and
killing military officers and police chiefs, foreign
diplomats, and wealthy businessmen--both domestic
and foreign.
3.5(c)
By skillfully executing operations against these
political targets for several years, the Peoples
Revolutionary Army and the Montoneros cultivated an
image of invincibility. In recent months, however,
the Peoples Revolutionary Army has been unable to
sustain this image. It is no longer able to commit
acts of violence at will without incurring heavy
losses. Moreover, the terrorists, no longer seem to
retain the tacit support of the public that is crucial
for the survival of a guerrilla movement.
The assassination last month of the newly appointed
federal police chief Cardozo may have been a major
turning point in popular alienation from the guerrilla
cause. Cardozo,a virtual political unknown, died in
the explosion of a bomb placed under his bed by a
fourteen-year-old girl friend of his daughter. The
horrifying aspects of this act have been played up
in the Argentine press. The staid and respected
Review of the River Plate recently commented in a
SRtT
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lead editorial: "She had eaten a' their table and
slept under their roof. FatherlYflove had been ex-
ploited through this faked friendship with the daughter
of the victim. The murderess was very young. Her
alleged ideological inclinations had been respected,
which shows a considerable effort by her victim to
place human values above political differences. Each
and every one of these circumstances, by themselves,
are sufficient to classify this as an atrocity." It
is significant that neither the Montoneros nor the
Peoples Revolutionary Army took customary public
credit for the killing.
More significant than the fact that it happened
is the way in which it happened. Argentine guerrillas
have not been completely indiscriminate in their use
of terrorism, but have restricted their targets to
identified political enemies. Even then when excesses
occurred--as in the killing last year of a three-year-
old in an attack on her father, an army major--they
usually were the culmination of eparticular terrorist
campaign that then quickly stopped. The Cardozo
atrocity suggests that terrorism is out of control,
that the chain of command has broken down, or that the
guerrilla cadre, at least, has lost sight of its
original political objectives.
The Tupamaro experience in Uruguay may be a parallel.
Until the Tupamaros directed the full weight of their
firepower against the military, they were still a
viable movement. The turning point came on April 14,
1972, when they stung the government into declaring
a "state of Internal War" by gunning down two police-
men, a naval officer, and a former interior minister.
Thereafter the Tupamaro decline was swift and complete.
In recent months the Peoples Revolutionary Army
has been the central target of the Argentine anti-
subversive campaign, but the Montoneros have suffered
as well. More than seven months have elapsed since
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Montonero chieftain Roberto Quieto was captured by
security forces. During that period the guerrillas
have made no known attempt to free him or to secure
his release. This lack of response suggests that his
comrades now lack the ability or the confidence to
make the same kind of demands that they did when they
kidnaped US honorary consul John Egan two years ago.
The latter possibility seems more likely. As
long as political activity was legal in Argentina�
the Montoneros could operate as a guerrilla organiza-
tion and as the renegade faction of the Peronist
party--under the banner of the "Authentic Party."
With overt political activity banned and the guerrillas
on the run, the safest course is to go underground
and regroup.
Even the safe course, however, in guerrilla
activity spells defeat. Terrorism is aimed first at
the audience--the general public--and only incidentally
at its victims. When violence stops, the crucial
elements of fear and publicity disappear.
July 26, 1976
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