LATIN AMERICA REVIEW 23 MAY 1983 - 1983/05/23

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628035
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: May 23, 1983

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L.1./.?17
Latin America
Review
23 May 1983
3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
Latin America
Review
23 May 1983
3.5(c)
-Surfer
Articles
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3.5(c)
Chile: The Issue of US Certification
Although US certification for a resumption of military sales and
assistance is important to Chile's national security interests. Presi-
dent Pinochet is unlikely to make major concessions to obtain a
lifting of the ban.
3.5(c)
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Secfg
.4L.4 LAR 83-010
23 May 1983
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3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
Articles have been coordinated as appropriate with other offices within CIA.
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Chief,
Production Staff. Office of African and Latin American Analysis, telephone
3.5(c)
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Chile: The Issue of US Certification
The possibility that the United States might certify
Argentina for a resumption of military sales and
assistance while continuing to withhold certification
for Chile initially prompted Chilean President Pino-
chet last fall to take steps to improve his regime's
image on human rights issues. Pinochet continued to
balk, however, at extraditing the persons indicted by a
US grand jury for the Letelier/Moffit murders in
1976, and this has impeded certification. Frustrated
by his overall lack of progress at obtaining US
certification, Pinochet in February fired Foreign Min-
ister Rojas�who had pushed for moderate reform�
and backpedaled on some other initiatives. Nonethe-
less, the certification question remains important for
Chile's national security interests, and thus keeps
alive the chance that Pinochet will consider some
adjustments on human rights and the pace of transi-
tion to civilian rule. However, in view of Pinochet's
clear determination to give priority to internal securi-
ty over international considerations, we do not expect
any major conc._;.;sion
3.5(c)
UM/karma i:k,,i4rizetoents and Beoefiis
To hit the t in on US aims saies and military
assistance to Chile, the Reagan administration must
certify to the US Congress that Chile:
� Has mule significant progress in complying with
internationally recognized pr;nciples of human
rights.
� Is not aiding and abetting international terrorism.
� Has fully cooperated in bringing to justice those
indicted by a US grand jury in connection with the
Letelier/Moffit murders in Washington.
In addition to the military benefits that would accrue
to Chile from certification, the regime's international
image�and perhaps creditworthiness�would im-
prove
3.5(c)
19
3.5(c)
To achieve these benefits, Pinochet undertook at least
three initiatives during last fall:
� He sought to improve Chile's human rights image
by stressing�in diplomatic contacts and the
media�that his government is adhering to its time-
table for returning the country to civilian rule in the
1990s. In line with this, he appointed a commission
to study constitutional laws and gave approval for a
private political institute to explore possible direct
election of municipal and regional councils that
would elect a national congress.
� Santiago publicized the work of a high-level govern-
ment commission that studied the problems of
Chile's exiles and took under advisement the com-
mission's recommendations for the return of some
400 exiles.
� Chile courted Washington by supporting many US
positions in the 1982 UN General Assembly and in
other international and regional organizations.
Moreover, as the only South American nation to
participate with the United States in the 1481
UNITAS naval exercises, Chile resisted a post-
Falklands regional trend. 3.5(c)
These efforts were followed by what Pinochet and his
ministers regarded as several signs of improving rela-
tions with the United States. Chilean Foreign Minis-
ter Schweitzer described his meetings in March with
Secretary of State Shultz as "very positive."'
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