[SANITIZED]NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY WEDNESDAY 11 JANUARY 1984 - 1984/01/11

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628017
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: January 11, 1984

C-1 fi
Director
Central
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National Intelligence Daily
Wednesday
11 January 1984
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Contents
Special Analysis
Argentina: Alfonsin Taking Charge
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Special Analysis
ARGENTINA: Alfonsin Taking Charge
President Alfonsin has taken full advantage of the postelection
euphoria during his first month in office to address important domestic
and foreign policy issues. The left-of-center leader's tough rhetoric
and swift action have been matched by deft political efforts to regulate
the pace and temper the impact of promised reforms. These moves
thus far have helped prevent a backlash from Argentina's usual power
brokers�the military, the Peronists, and the unions. Beyond midyear,
however, economic problems coupled with unmet expectations and
possibly a strengthened opposition could result in more serious
challenges to Alfonsin. 3.5(c)
Alfonsin's most visible initiatives�and the most popular ones
among Argentines�have been aimed at curbing the military and 3.3(b)(1)
redressing violations of human rights committed durina the
antiterrorist campaigns of the late 1970s.
the military high command anticipated that it would
be subordinated to civil authority. It also expected that cuts would be
made in defense spending.
3.5(c)
In addition, the military was aware that the new government
would repeal the preelection amnesty decree that had absolved
members of the security forces of human rights abuses. Many officers
are privately expressing disgruntlement, but they realize they can do
little to challenge Alfonsin 3.5(c)
Alfonsin's strategy on the human rights issue
is intended to limit investigations to command levels and to assuage
the fears of officers concerned about a general purge. The newly
formed citizens' commission to investigate abuses, for example, was
conceived with the aid of a senior Army official to control the
inquiries Alfonsin intends to ensure
that judges do not conduct .a witch hunt.
Labor and the Economy
Alfonsin also is moving quickly with plans to democratize labor
unions by holding new union elections. Several local labor bosses,
who have been courted by the new government, reportedly have
pledged to support Alfonsin's union program. Labor militants were
unable to get support for a strike last month
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continued
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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lop-Streig.
3.3(b)(1)
Peronist-dominated unions, will be
unable to challenge the President for at least the next six months.
Alfonsin is attempting to mollify the opposition parties further by
giving Peronists middle-level government posts and by making a key
party leader a presidential adviser on military matters.
The administration's political initiatives are receiving greater
media coverage, but it has been equally active on the economic front.
The government has imposed price controls, submitted a major tax
reform package, and begun a program of increased public spending
to spur a recovery. According to the US Embassy, Economy Minister
Grinspun has also begun talks with bankers in the US and has
reiterated his willingness to facilitate refinancing some $18 billion in
foreign debt in 1984 and to negotiate a new IMF agreement.
Foreign Policy
Alfonsin's fast pace extends to foreign policy. His government has
offered concessions to Chile, for example, that could soon lead to a
settlement of the Beagle Channel dispute.
On the Falklands, Alfonsin has tried to appear flexible, but he still
supports the military's basic position that normalization of relations
with the UK has to be linked with renewed negotiations on sovereignty
over the islands. These moves improve his standing, and they may be
used to help justify cuts in defense spending and a more limited role
for the military.
The announcement in November, before the President took
office, that Argentina had mastered uranium-enrichment technology
led Alfonsin immediately to reaffirm his intention to assure that the
nuclear program is to be for peaceful purposes only. He transferred
the program to civilian authority and created a commission to
evaluate it.
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Alfonsin has been cautious, however, in making any major
changes in the nuclear program. He recognizes that it is a source of
national pride and that the military has a strong interest in protecting
it. The President probably will wait for the commission's report before
blocking out the direction ot tuture policy.
Outlook
3.5(c)
Alfonsin's bold style, the conditions conducive to change in
Argentina, and the disarray among opponents suggest that the new
President probably will continue to have his way over the next six
months. The successful transition to democratic rule and Alfonsin's
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decisive actions thus far, however, have produced extremely high
popular expectations that will be difficult to satisfy even under ideal
conditions. They are even less likely to be met after midyear, when
revenue raising measures probably will be inadequate to finance
public spending, putting renewed pr *ces and making
accommodations with labor difficult.
Labor leaders will then be better able to rally the opposition to
challenge ertonomic and union reforms. Even members of Alfonsin's
own coalition, especially the human rights groups, may demand more
vigorous prosecution of security officials and embarrass the
government if their demands are unmet.
Anti-Alfonsin sentiments in the military are unlikely to coalesce in
the near future. Officers subject to human rights Investigations will be
preoccupied with their own difficulties and probably will avoid
conspiracies that could make them appear guilty. Unrest in the
military will be likely to grow, although slowly, if Alfonsin appears to
be losing control of the investigations. 3.5(c)
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Most officers will grudgingly accept a settlement of the Beagle
Channel dispute, even with major concessions. On the other hand,
similar compromises on the Falklands would not be tolerated and
would almost certainly become a rallying point for opponents in the
military. At this point, however, the services are deeply divided on
many issues and lack a commonly acceptable leader.
3.5(c)
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