UNACCREDITED DEGREE: SPECIAL SKILLS OFFICER

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628008
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 17, 2024
• Document Release Date: November 15, 2024
• Case Number: F-2013-02114
• Publication Date: May 3, 2011

Approved for Release: 2024/11/05 C06628008
3 May 2011
DISPOSITION MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: (U) Unaccredited Degree: Special Skills Officer
CASE: 2011-10164-IC
ISSUES UNDER INVESTIGATION:
1. ,(Q.) Based on a 2008 United States Secret Service investigation that
identified an Agency contractor as possessing a degree from a known
diploma mill, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated a proactive (b)(1)
investigation on 5 August 2008 into Agency Staff claiming degrees from (bbNj CNIalAAtSecct Act
non-accredited institutions. OIG matched a list of known, unaccredited (b)(6)
institutions against Agency BIO information to identify any individuals (b)(7)(c)
who had provided degree evidence to Human Resources (HR).1'2
a Special Skills Officer, holds a bachelor's degree from
and self-reported
having a fraudulent degree to OIG when he became aware of this
investigation, a known, unaccredited institution, is not affiliated with (b)(6)
the accredited (b)(7)(c)
(u/L.F.Quer) The term unaccredited refers to the recognition and acceptability of a degree for use in
federal employment as recognized by the Office of Personnel Management. Unaccredited degrees cannot
be used to meet the qualifications for federal positions that require a degree. The complete definitions of
accreditation are included in the Appendix.
2 (U/LF.01:413)' The Agency biographical profile (Agency BIO) is the mechanism for tracking information
on individuals who officially declare their education to the Agency by providing proof of attendance.
The Agency BIO is made available to hiring managers and used directly in staffing decisions. Only staff
employees and former employees were covered by this review because there is no central database on
contractor educational records.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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3. keY OIG reviewed
(b)(1) RESULTS:
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6) 7. f0
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(ib)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(3) CIAAct
CONFIDENTIAL (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
2. kef OIG reviewed the claims made by regarding his degree
and the associated education to determine if there were false statements or
improper use of an unaccredited degree, and if there was an improper
reimbursement for the degree by the Agency.
INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS:
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) 4. 1,)' OIG reviewed
Agency BIO.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct 5. freY OIG interviewed
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6) unaccredited degree.
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
security file for any degree daims(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Official Personnel Folder and 0nli(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
on 31 March 2009, regarding his
6. ke) OIG reviewed Agency regulations and relevant laws related to
the allegations. (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c) (b)(6)(b)(7)(c)
isaj currently serving as a Special Skills Officer
has been an Agency (b)(1)
employee since holds a bachelor's degree frc(b)(3) CIAAct
granted (b)(6) (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c) (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)-
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
2
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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10. (U) Former students identified by
that they had been defrauded and that their
The students were informed in a letter,
part:
were informed by DOJ
degrees were not valid.
that stated in
11. (U) advertised its degrees in mainstream publications.
Students would receive extensive credit for transferred courses as well as
extensive "life experience" credit. Students would register for a small
number of classes and were asked to purchase and read textbooks for the
classes. Students would then submit a paper based on the class topic for
grading. For classes taken at the university, students would pay an
enrollment fee for each class, and then a separate grading fee for each
paper submitted. Since there were no faculty behind the classes, student
submissions varied greatly in quality. There was no valid check of the
academic work performed.
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
13. JQ During a 31 March 2009 interview told OIG that he (b)(6)
received his degree prior to his entrance on du At the time he (b)(7)(c)
received his degree, he was an employee of
(b)(1)
did not pay or s egree ut provik,b�3, CIAAct
)
an annual stipend once he obtained the degree. explained duri(b)(3) NatSecAct
interview with OIG that, prior to his enrollment, he did not conduct (b)(6)
in-depth research into accreditation because it was advertised itl?)ta(c)
and endorsed by th (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6) (b)(6)
14. 4.C.-)- During his interview with OIG stated that he 0)(7)(c)o ,b,(7)(c)
recruiter, about lack of accreditation when
(b)(7)(c) he was initially recruited and prior to his formal employment application.
(b)(1) also stated that he informed an HR officer when contacted about his
(b)(3) CIAAct employment application. During his interview with OIG stated that
(b)(3) NatSecAct informed the HR recruiter that had been shut down so he was not
(b)(6)
able to provide official transcripts, was interviewed and related
(p)(7)(c)
(b)(1) that was "honest [and] upfront" about having a degree from and
(b)(3) CIAAct what work performed to obtain the degree during
(b)(3) NatSecAckruitment interview approximately one to one-and-a-half-years prio(b)(1)
(b)(6) entrance on duty. (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
CIAAct History Statement (SPHS)/Form 444 on He reported that he
(b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(c)p)(7)(c) (b)(6) (b)(3) NatSecAct
4-
15. ef
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
completed and signed an Supplemental Personal (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3)
(b)(3) NatSecActtended (b)(6)
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
and that he received his bachelor of science degree
\ In an updated SPHS form, dated
reported the same information, also
provided a copy of his transcript during his security processing
showing that he was granted 60 credits as transfer credits or by evaluation.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecA(
(b)(6) (b)(6)
(b)(7)(c) (b)(7)(c)
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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During an Office of Security background investigation interview on
(b)(1) advised the security investigator that he
(b)(3) CIAAct -
(b)(3) NatSecAc ssessed a degree from
t
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
that no longer exists
(b)(3) CIAAct . (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6) 17. ftQy A review of the position description for a specialized skills (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c) officer at a full performance level shows that the educational requiremen(b)(6)
for his position is a bachelor's degree or equivalent experience. (b)(7)(c)
recruiterj confirmed in an interview with OIG that et tf(b)(1)
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6)
(b)(6) (b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
18. (U) was widely recognized as a fraudulent institution.
Though it had "classes" and "coursework," the efforts of students were not
evaluated by actual faculty.
16. (21
stated that sometime in
letter stating that
he received a
was investigating
said that he completed paperwork
provided by the Depai Lii tent of Justice (DOD and eventually received a
check that reimbursed him for a percentage of the money he paid to
contended that he believed his degree is legitimate but from a school
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(o)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
requirements
(b)(6)
DISPOSITION:
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct 19. received his "degree" prior to his employment (b)(6)
(b)(6) with the Agency arid did not receive any US Government reimbursement. (b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
Agency recruiter was aware that 4egree was granted by an
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1) unaccredited institution when he entered on duty, and there is no evidence
(b)(3) CIAAct that profited from his degree. has not presented his "degre(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
.., the Agency as part of his Agency BIO nor presented it as part of any (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(6) (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c) application for internal positions.
(b)(1) (b)(1) (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(3) CIAAct (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) NatSecAc(b)(3) NatSecAct � /�
(
(b)(6) b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(c)
3 (U) The letters were generated by DOJ, and the funds were actually part of a civil forfeiture.
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(b)(3) CIAAct
CONFIDENTIAL (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
20. There is no evidence of criminal or regulatory violation on
the part of Based on the currently available information, no
disciplinary action or further investigation is recommended.
Special Agent
Supervisory Special Agent
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